# Mukhtar Begum & Ors v. Addl. District Judge and AnrRespondents

- **Citation:** (2013) 2 ILRA 585
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2013-05-06
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mukhtar-begum-ors-v-addl-district-judge-and-anrrespondents-42590
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Manish Kumar

U.P.
Urban
Buildings
&
Regulation
(Letting and Rent Control) Act 1972Section-27(7)- Application to release
accommodation by Land Lord on ground
of bonafied need-allowed by Prescribed
authority-during
pendancy
of
rent
control appeal-land lord died-application
to substitute the heirs as well as
bonafide requirement of substituted land
lord-rejection on ground after death of
original
land
lord
bonafide
need
automatically comes to an end-held-such
approach unknown to judicial systemunreasonable-set-a-side-consequential
direction given.

Held: Para-12
By the impugned order the learned
Appellate Court has summarily thrown
out the landlord in a surreptitious
manner by applying its own whims. It is
well known that Judges must administer
law according to the provisions of law. It
is the bounden duty of Judges to discern
legislative intention in the process of
adjudication.
Justice
administered
according to individual's whim, desire,
inclination and notion of justice would
lead to confusion, disorder and chaos.
Since such tendency is in its primary
stage it is giving rise to indiscriminate
and frequent petitions before this Court
and is leading this Court to colossal
delay in administration of justice, in civil
cases, in out country. I am bound to
mention that the misinterpretation of
law by the learned Appellate Court is
gross of inexcusable error.

Case Law discussed:
AIR 2001 SC 803; 1997 AIR (SC) 2399;
2008(3) ARC 198; AIR 1999 Supreme Court
3029

## Text

2 All] Mukhtar Begum & Ors. Vs. Addl. District Judge and Anr.
585
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 06.05.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SAAEED-UZ-ZAMAN SIDDIQI
J.

Rent Control No.29 Of 2012

Mukhtar Begum & Ors ...Petitioner
Versus
Addl. District Judge and AnrRespondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Adnan Ahmad
Sri Manish Misra

Counsel for the Respondents:
Manish Kumar

U.P.
Urban
Buildings
&
Regulation
(Letting and Rent Control) Act 1972Section-27(7)- Application to release
accommodation by Land Lord on ground
of bonafied need-allowed by Prescribed
authority-during
pendancy
of
rent
control appeal-land lord died-application
to substitute the heirs as well as
bonafide requirement of substituted land
lord-rejection on ground after death of
original
land
lord
bonafide
need
automatically comes to an end-held-such
approach unknown to judicial systemunreasonable-set-a-side-consequential
direction given.

Held: Para-12
By the impugned order the learned
Appellate Court has summarily thrown
out the landlord in a surreptitious
manner by applying its own whims. It is
well known that Judges must administer
law according to the provisions of law. It
is the bounden duty of Judges to discern
legislative intention in the process of
adjudication.
Justice
administered
according to individual's whim, desire,
inclination and notion of justice would
lead to confusion, disorder and chaos.
Since such tendency is in its primary
stage it is giving rise to indiscriminate
and frequent petitions before this Court
and is leading this Court to colossal
delay in administration of justice, in civil
cases, in out country. I am bound to
mention that the misinterpretation of
law by the learned Appellate Court is
gross of inexcusable error.

Case Law discussed:
AIR 2001 SC 803; 1997 AIR (SC) 2399;
2008(3) ARC 198; AIR 1999 Supreme Court
3029

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saeed-Uz-Zaman
Siddiqi, J.)

1. By means of this petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
the petitioners have prayed for issue a
writ in the nature of certiorari quashing
the impugned order dated 08.02.2012
passed by Additional District Judge
(Court No.7), Unnao in Rent Appeal No.
1 of 2011.

2. Brief facts of the case are that the
petitioners filed P.A. Case No.14 of 2007
for release of accommodation under
Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Rent Act,
1972 which was allowed by the learned
prescribed authority vide judgment and
order dated 19.01.2011, against which the
tenants preferred the instant appeal in
which they moved an application No. 4C
to the effect that the landlord has died on
14.03.2011 (during pendency of appeal).
The case was instituted by him on the
ground of personal need and requirement
which has vanished due to death, and as
such, the cause of action has perished.
The petitioners filed objection 50C
against this application, in which the
application was opposed on the ground
that subsequent to the death of landlord,
his widow and two sons have become
employment-less and have no source of
586 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
income and, as such, cause of action has
not come to an end to which the tenant
filed rejoinder application alleging therein
that his three sons are unemployed. It has
further been alleged that since substitution
has rightly been carried out in the appeal
which shows that bonafide requirement of
the landlord has also died.

3. The learned appellate court
reached to the conclusion that prescribed
authority has allowed the application on
the basis of bonafide requirement of the
deceased landlord. The landlords who are
petitioners before the learned Appellate
Court have moved amendment application
paper No. 49A seeking addition of
bonafide requirement of the sons of the
deceased landlord, who are petitioners
before this Court. It was sought to be
amended that the two sons of the
deceased
landlord
have
learnt
photography and computer along with
their father and they have no other
engagement and after the death of the
father they have no source of income.
This amendment application has been
opposed by the tenant opposite party
through objection paper No. 57(a).
Aggrieved by rejection of application 49A and the release petition, the landlords
have preferred the instant petition.

4. I have heard both the parties and
perused the record.

5. The learned appellate court has
observed that under Section 21(7)13 of
U.P.
Rent
Act,
1972,
the
legal
representatives of landlord who died
during the pendency of the application
under clause 9(a) of Sub-section 1, such
legal representatives shall be entitled
prosecuted such application "further on
the basis of their own need in substitute of
the need of the deceased" But in spite of
this provision of law, the learned
appellate court has observed that need of
the landlord has come to an end. The
learned appellate court has rejected the
impugned application paper no. 49(a) and
set aside the judgment and order of
release dated 22.01.2011 and has given a
liberty to the landlord to move fresh
application for release under Section 21 of
U.P. Rent Act. The impugned order is,
itself, violative of the express provision
contained in sub-section 7 of Section 27
of U.P. Rent Act No.XIII of 1973 the
intention of the legislature is that, where,
during the pendency of application for
release, the landlord dies, his legal
representatives
shall
be
entitled
to
prosecute such application further on the
basis of their own need in substitute of the
need of the deceased. The point sought to
be urged is that, subsequent development
shall have to be taken into account in
eviction proceedings, particularly even
eviction is sought by a landlord on the
ground that the bonfide need the building
for his own use or for the use of any
member of family.

6. Hon'ble Apex Court has held in
Gaya Prasad Vs. Praddep Srivastava
(AIR 2001 SC 803) which is extracted
below:-

"We have no doubt that the crucial
date for deciding as to the bona fides of
the requirement of the landlord is the date
of his application for eviction. The
antecedent days may perhaps have utility
for him to reach the said crucial date of
consideration.
If
every
subsequent
development during the post petition
period is to be taken into account for
judging the bona fides of the requirement
pleaded by the landlord there would
2 All] Mukhtar Begum & Ors. Vs. Addl. District Judge and Anr.
587
perhaps be no end so long as the
unfortunate situation in our litigative slow
process system subsists. During 23 years
after the landlord moved for eviction on
the ground that his son needed the
building, neither the landlord nor his son
is expected to remain idle without doing
any
work,
lest,
joining
any
new
assignment or starting any new work
would be at the peril of forfeiting his
requirement to occupy the building. It is a
stark reality that the longer is the life of
the litigation the more would be the
number of developments sprouting up
during the long interregnum. If a young
entrepreneur decides to launch a new
enterprise and on that ground he or his
father seeks eviction of a tenant from the
building, the proposed enterprise would
not
get
faded
out
by
subsequent
developments
during
the
traditional
lengthy longevity of the litigation. His
need may get dusted, patina might stick
on its surface, nonetheless the need would
remain intact. All that is needed is to
erase the patina and see the gloss. It is
pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut
the door before an applicant just on the
eve of his reaching the finale, after
passing through all the previous levels of
the litigation, merely on the ground that
certain developments occurred pendente
lite, because the opposite party succeeded
in prolonging the matter for such unduly
long period.

We
cannot
forget
that
while
considering the bona fides of the need of
the landlord the crucial date is the date of
petition. In Remesh Kumar vs. Kesho Ram
[1992 Suppl. (2) SCC 623] a two-Judge
Bench of this Court (M.N. Venkatachalia,
J., as he then was, and N.M. Kasliwal, J.)
pointed out that the normal rule is that
rights and obligations of the parties are to
be determined as they were when the lis
commenced and the only exception is that
the court is not precluded from moulding
the reliefs appropriately in consideration
of subsequent events provided such events
had an impact on those rights and
obligations. What the learned Chief
Justice observed therein is this:

"The normal rule is that in any
litigation the rights and obligations of the
parties are adjudicated upon as they
obtain at the commencement of the lis.
But this is subject to an exception.
Wherever subsequent events of fact or law
which have a material bearing on the
entitlement of the parties to relief or on
aspects which bear on the moulding of the
relief occur, the court is not precluded
from taking a cautious cognizance of the
subsequent changes of fact and law to
mould the relief."

7. In the case of Kamleshwar
Prasad
Vs.
Pradumanju
Agarwal
reported in 1997 AIR (SC) 2399 the
Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-

"Mr. Manoj Swarup, learned counsel
appearing for the appellant in this Court
urged that the person for whose bona fide
requirement the order of eviction has
been passed by the appellate authority
having died during the pendency of the
writ
petition.
The
said
bonafide
requirement no longer subsists and
consequently the High Court should have
taken that fact into consideration and
should have interfered with the order
passed by the appellate authority for the
eviction of the tenant.

That apart, the fact that the landlord
needed the premises is question for
starting a bushiness which fact has been
588 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
found by the appellate authority. In eye of
law, it must be that on the day of
application for eviction which is the crucial
date, the tenant incurred the liability of
being evicted from the premises. Even if the
landlord died during the pendency of the
Writ petition in the High Court the bona
fide need cannot be said to have lapsed as
the business in question can be carried on
by his widow or any elder son. In this view
to the matter, we find no force in the
contention of Mr, Manoj Swarup, learned
counsel appearing for the appellant and we
do not find any error in the impugned
judgment of the High Court under Article
136 of the Constitution. The appeal,
accordingly, fails and is dismissed but in the
circumstances without any order as to
costs."

8. The learned counsel for the
opposite party relied upon the judgment
laid down in R.S.Gahlaut Vs. VIIth
Additional District Judge, Meerut and
another 2008 (3) ARC 198; but this is
not applicable to this case at all.

9. The impugned order passed by the
learned appellate court is in contravention
of violation of settled rules of justice and
contravene the basic principles of natural
justice and rules of procedure. It deserve
to be quashed.

10. A larger Bench of Hon'ble Apex
Court in Sayed Dastagir Vs. T.R.
Gopalakrishna Setty reported in AIR
1999 Supreme Court 3029 has held that:

"In construing a plea in any pleading,
Courts must keep in mind that a plea is
not an expression of art and science but an
expression through words to place fact
and law of ones case for a relief. Such an
expression may be pointed, precise, some
times vague but still could be gathered
what he wants to convey through only by
reading the whole pleading, depends on
the person drafting a plea. In India most
of the pleas are drafted by counsels hence
aforesaid difference of pleas which
inevitably differ from one to other. Thus,
to gather true spirit behind a plea it should
be read as a whole. This does not distract
one from performing his obligations as
required under a statute. But to test,
whether he has performed his obligations
one has to see the pith and substance of a
plea. Where a statute requires any fact to
be pleaded then that has to be pleaded
may be in any form. Same plea may be
stated by different persons through
different words then how could it be
constricted to be only in any particular
nomenclature or word. Unless statute
specifically require for a plea to be in any
particular form, it can be in any form."

11. It has been further been held in
the case is that:-

"Courts cannot draw any inference
in abstract or to give such hyper technical
interpretation to defeat a claim of specific
performance which defeats the very
objective for which the said Act was
enacted."

12. I am afraid the learned Appellate
Court
has
discussed
the
correct
perspective of law in para 10 of its
judgment but thereafter it has derailed its
finding and rejected the amendment
application and dismissed the case itself
in a hitlarian way unknown to the judicial
system of this country without assigning
any cogent reasons. The judgment of the
learned Appellate Court shows that it has
analyze the law in a perverse manner and
has in reaching to unjust conclusions. It
2 All] Smt. Vidyawati Vs.Smt. Raj Dei and Others
589
has misread the law and dismissed the
amendment as well as entire case on
conjectures
and
surmises.
By
the
impugned order the learned Appellate
Court has summarily thrown out the
landlord in a surreptitious manner by
applying its own whims. It is well known
that
Judges
must
administer
law
according to the provisions of law. It is
the bounden duty of Judges to discern
legislative intention in the process of
adjudication.
Justice
administered
according to individual's whim, desire,
inclination and notion of justice would
lead to confusion, disorder and chaos.
Since such tendency is in its primary
stage it is giving rise to indiscriminate and
frequent petitions before this Court and is
leading this Court to colossal delay in
administration of justice, in civil cases, in
out country. I am bound to mention that
the misinterpretation of law by the learned
Appellate Court is gross of inexcusable
error.

13. In either case the impugned
order passed by the learned appellate
court is capricious and unreasonable by
which he has turned hostile from law or
true law as laid down by the legislature
and incorporated by various court and the
Hon'ble Apex Court.

14. Original application for release
was filed in the year 2007 which deserves
to be decided within two months as
prescribed under rule 15(3) of the Rules
framed under U.P. Rent Act No. XIII of
1972 but for the last 6 years it could not
be decided and at this stage the delay has
been caused due to the miss-application of
law and wrong judgment by the learned
appellate court. The impugned application
of the petitioners should be allowed and is
accordingly
allowed.
The
learned
appellate court shall decide the appeal
within two months from the date of
production of certified copy of this order
on merits by applying its judicial mind.

15. In result, the writ petition
succeeds and the impugned order dated
08.02.2012, passed by opposite party no.1
is hereby quashed.

16. Let the copy of this order be sent
to the learned District Judge, Unnao who
may, in turn recall the appeal to its own
diary, if not possible then transfer it to
some other competent court, without
delay.
---------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 21.05.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SAEED-UZ-ZAMAN SIDDIQI,
J.

First Appeal No. 47 of 1978

Smt. Vidyawati ...Appellant
Versus
Smt. Raj Dei And Others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Harguru Charan, Sri A.K. Bajpai
Sri A.R. Khan, Sri Amar Nath Singh
Sri Apurva Kumar, Sri Ashok Bajpai
Sri G.P. Mishra, Sri H.G. Upadhyay
Sri Jai Shree Net, Sri R.B. Tiwari
Sri R.L. Ojha, Sri S.C. Tewari

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri S.C. Mishra, Sri Dev Kumar Tripathi
Sri R.B. Tewari

Specfic Relief Act 1963-Section 16(a)-
Suit
for
specific
performance-decreed
without framing issue regarding readiness
and
willingness-held-judgment
became
perverse in eye of law-matter remitted