# Munna Lal & Anr v. Union of India & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 4 ILRA 1002
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-04-20
- **Case number:** Matters Under Article 227 No. 660 of 2022
- **Bench:** Mrs. Sangeeta Chandra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/munna-lal-anr-v-union-of-india-ors-48354
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

A.S.G., Sanjeev Singh
Shop
lease
expired-Cant
Board
issued
willingness to renew the lease-Principal Director
rejected
the
proposal-no
renewal
instead
auction-Appeal-rejected-Lease expired after 30
years-only question to be considered was for
fresh
grant-Fresh
grant
alone
could
be
considered for a public premise-constructed by
cantonment board on cantonment land -through
public auction.

Petition dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

1002 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
to whether that material in sufficient for
making assessment or re-assessment under
section 21 of the Act would be gone into
after notice is issued to the dealer and he
has been heard in the matter or given an
opportunity for that purpose. The assessing
authority would then decide the matter in
the light of material already in its
possession as well as fresh material
procured as a result of the enquiry which
may be considered necessary.

18. Facts of the present cases as briefly
noted above leaves no manner of doubt that
the Assessing Authority was having relevant
material in his hands on the basis of which
he had reason to believe that for the
Assessment
Years
in
question,
the
petitioners have evaded tax on undisclosed
sales and made huge transactions of
purchases and sales out of the Books of
Account. Therefore, the permission under
the proviso to sub-Section (2) of Section 21
of the Act, 1948 for the Assessment Years in
question have been lawfully granted by the
concerned Additional Commissioner, Trade
Tax and the notices under Section 21(1) of
the Act, 1948 have been lawfully issued by
the concerned Assessing Authorities to the
petitioners for the Assessment Years in
question. Under the circumstances, we do
not find any merit in these writ petitions.

19. For all the reasons aforestated, all
the writ petitions are dismissed.
----------
(2022)04ILR A1002
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 20.04.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS. SANGEETA CHANDRA, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 660 of 2022
Munna Lal & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Prashant Agarwal

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G., Sanjeev Singh
Shop
lease
expired-Cant
Board
issued
willingness to renew the lease-Principal Director
rejected
the
proposal-no
renewal
instead
auction-Appeal-rejected-Lease expired after 30
years-only question to be considered was for
fresh
grant-Fresh
grant
alone
could
be
considered for a public premise-constructed by
cantonment board on cantonment land -through
public auction.

Petition dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. Accountant and Secretarial Services (P) Ltd.
Vs U.O.I., 1988 (4) SCC 324

2. Hari Singh Vs Military Estate Officer, 1972 (2)
SCC 239

3. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs Nusli Neville
Wadia & anr., 2008 (3) SCC 279
(Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs. Sangeeta
Chandra, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner, Sri Varun Pandey, learned
counsel appearing for respondent nos.1 to 4
and Sri Sanjeev Singh, learned counsel
appearing for respondent nos.6 and 7.

2. Since the respondent no.5 is the
Estate Officer i.e. Quasi-Judicial Authority,
whose order has been challenged in this
petition, there is no need to issue notice to
the respondent no.5.
3. This petition has been filed
challenging the judgement and order dated
4 All. Munna Lal & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors.
1003
05.01.2022
passed
by
the
Learned
Additional District and Sessions Judge,
Court No. 19 in Miscellaneous Civil
Appeal No.194 of 2019 arising out of order
passed by the Estate Officer c/o Chief
Executive Officer, Cantonment Board,
Lucknow, dated 30.07.2019.

4. It has been argued by the learned
counsel for the petitioners that Shop No.1,
Block A, Nehru Road Shopping Complex,
Sadar Bazar, Cantt Lucknow, was leased
out to one Shri Munna Lal petitioner no.1
in an public auction held on 22.07.1981, for
a monthly rent which was deposited by the
lessee on 31.12.1981, in pursuance of
sanction granted on 07.11.1981 by the
General
Officer
Commanding-in-Chief,
Central Command, Lucknow. The lease
deed was signed on 16.03.1983. The
original allottee Munna Lal continued to
pay the monthly rent of Rupees 236.70/-
and continued in occupation of the shop in
question till his death on 31.03.1999. It has
been argued that the petitioner no.2
Mohammad Saleem inherited the shop by
virtue of a registered will made out by the
original allottee Munna Lal in favour of
Mohammed
Saleem
on
05.10.1989.
Mohammed Saleem was in possession of
the shop in question when the Cantonment
Board through its Chief Executive Officer
issued a letter dated 29.06.2013, to the
Lessee Munna Lal (already dead) for
renewal of lease which had expired in
March, 2013. Mohammed Saleem who was
in occupation of the shop informed the
Cantonment Board on 05.07.2013 of the
death of Munna Lal the original allottee,
and of his having inherited the lease on
basis of a registered Will. The Respondents
also issued a letter on 31.1.2014 showing
their willingness for consideration of
renewal of lease but later on changed their
mind as the proposal of the Cantonment
Board was shot down by the Principal
Director Defence Estates on 24.10.2014.
Consequently, the Board also passed a
resolution on 01.11.2014 for auction of all
shops where the leases had expired.

5. The respondent nos.6 and 7 issued a
letter dated 29.06.2013 to the petitioner for
renewal of lease which had expired.
Thereafter several correspondence took place
between Mohd. Saleem and the Cantt Board
showing willingness for consideration of
lease renewal by the Cantt Board. However,
the Cantt Board Resolution was not accepted
by the Principal Director, Defence Estates,
Central Command. The matter of renewal of
lease remained pending. The respondent no.5
without declaring the petitioner no.2 as
unauthorized occupant of the shop from a
particular date, issued notice under subsection (1) and clause (b) of sub-section (2)
of Section 4 of Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorized
Occupants)
Act,
1971
(hereinafter referred to as "the P.P.E. Act").
The said notice was issued only on
13.02.2015 giving five days' time instead of
seven days' time to submit reply latest by
18.02.2015.

6. Mohammed Saleem submitted his
reply and his willingness to clear all dues
for consideration of renewal of lease in his
name. He even deposited rent during the
pendency
of
the
proceedings
under
Sections 4 and 7 of the Act of 1971. An
amount of Rs.17,386 was also demanded as
damages by the respondent through notice
dated 26.11.2018 which was deposited
through
cheque
which
was
returned
inexplicably by the respondent no.5 who
passed an order of eviction on 30.07.2019
and also for payment of damages.

7. Mohd. Saleem being aggrieved
filed an Appeal bearing Misc. Civil Appeal
1004 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
No.194 of 2019 before the District Judge,
Lucknow in the P.P.E. Act. Initially, an
order of maintenance of status quo was
passed while admitting the Appeal on
14.08.2019. Mohd. Saleem also filed an
application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the
C.P.C. on 15.10.2020 for taking additional
evidence on record in Appeal, which was
allowed. However, the additional evidence
that was submitted by the petitioner was
not taken into account and the Appeal was
dismissed on 05.01.2022.

8. It has been argued by learned
counsel
for
the
petitioners
that
the
respondent no.5 could not have adjudicated
the dispute under the P.P.E. Act as it would
amount to a person being judge in his own
cause and the rule of bias would apply. It
has also been argued that order passed by
the respondent no.5 ignored the fact that
the lease had been granted after sanction
from the GOC-in-C, Central Command and
a lower officer like the Estate Officer or
even the Chief Executive Officer of the
Cantt Board could not go against such
sanction for grant of lease. It has also been
argued that the replies of the petitioner no.2
were not considered and no reasonable
opportunity of hearing was given by the
respondent no.5. It has also been argued
that under the P.P.E. Act, the provision for
eviction is provided in Section 4 and 5,
whereas Section 7 provides for claim for
compensation. A joint order could have
been passed under the Act as has been one
by the respondent no.5 in his order dated
01.08.2019.

9. It has also been argued that during
the pendency of the Appeal, the petitioner
no.2 moved an application for transfer of
the case under Section 24 of the C.P.C. as
the Additional District and Sessions Judge/
Court No.19 did not have jurisdiction to
decide the matter. Once such an application
is moved and pending, it shall be deemed
that jurisdiction of the learned court of
Additional Sessions Judge stood transferred
to the superior court for adjudication hence
the order passed in Appeal was without
jurisdiction. To substantiate his argument,
learned counsel for the petitioners has
referred to Section 9 of the P.P.E. Act subSection (1), wherein it has been provided
that "an Appeal shall be entertainable by
an officer who shall be the District Judge
of the District in which the Public Premises
are situate or such other judicial officer in
that district of not less than ten years
standing as the District Judge may
designate in this behalf."

10. It has been submitted that learned
Additional District Judge Pawan Kumar
Rai did not possess ten years standing as
the District Judge and therefore he could
not have adjudicated the Appeal. The
petitioners also moved an application on
06.12.2021 for keeping the appeal in
abeyance till the transfer application is
decided as the Presiding Officer of Court
No.19 was lacking in jurisdiction in
deciding the Appeal. However, such
application was kept pending and the
Appeal was dismissed.

11. It has also been argued by learned
counsel for the petitioners that as per the
Notification No. S.R.O. 235 of the Ministry
of Defence dated 21.07.1978, no person
can be judge for his own case and the
Estate Officer was the complainant in this
case, but as the Estate Officer he again
decided the matter exercising jurisdiction
under the P.P.E. Act.

12. It has also been argued that the
Cantt Board had filed an order of rejection
dated 24.10.2014 along with the copy of
4 All. Munna Lal & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors.
1005
the Board's Resolution C.B.R. No.02 dated
01.11.2014 before the District Judge to
show that the proposal for renewal of lease
had been rejected by the Competent
Authority. However, such rejection order is
absolutely illegal. The Principal Director,
Defence
Estate,
Central
Command,
Lucknow was not empowered to allow or
reject the renewal of lease as sanction of
the original lease was granted by the GOCin-C, Central Command, respondent no.2.
Since the original sanction was given by
respondent no.2 for executing lease deed in
favour of the allottee, termination of such
lease deed or any decision with regard to
whether the allottee was entitled to renewal
could only be taken by the GOC-in-C and
not by the Principal Director, Defence
Estate. As such the Resolution of the Cantt
Board
i.e.
Resolution
No.02
dated
01.11.2014 and the Cantt Board Resolution
No.13 dated 24.05.2014 were both illegal.

13. The learned counsel for the
petitioners has argued that the respondent
no.5 had committed a manifest error of law
in issuing notice on 09.02.2015 in the name
of a dead person, namely, Munna Lal who
had died on 31.12.1999. Such notice was
void ab initio and the entire proceedings
subsequent to such notice was also null and
void in the eye of law. It has been argued
that before such notice was issued the
petitioner no.2 had informed through his
letter dated 5.07.2013, the respondent no. 5
of the death of the original allottee Munna
Lal, and of his inheriting the lease on the
basis of a Will made out in 1989 by the
original allottee. Such fact was also ignored
by the District Judge altogether while
rejecting the Appeal.

14. It was also argued before the
Appellate Court that it was nowhere
mentioned in the conditions of the lease
deed that after expiry of term of 30 years,
the said lease shall automatically stand
cancelled. No notice of termination of
tenancy was ever given.

15. In the response submitted by the
Respondents in the Appeal, it had been
stated that Shop No.1 with a total area of
140 ft.2 had been allotted on the basis of a
public auction held in 1981, in favour of
one Munna Lal son of Baijnath. The lease
deed was signed in January 1983 for an
initial period of 10 years i.e. up to 1993,
with a clause for renewal for a further
period of five years at a time at the revised
rates of rent for a total period of 30 years.
When the Cantonment Board proposed
renewal of lease with sitting allottees, a
letter was issued in this regard to Munna
Lal, son of Baijnath. However, reply was
submitted by one Mohd Saleem, son of
Abdul Majid on 05.02.2014 praying that
lease be renewed in his favour as he was
running the shop in the name of New
Shehzada Watch House on the basis of an
alleged Will made out in his favour by the
original allottee. As per Clause (4) of the
lease deed dated 16.01.1983 the lease had
to be renewed initially after 10 years, that is
in 1993, and thereafter every five years at
the revised rate of rent. Such renewal was
not done. After more than one year of
expiry of total period of 30 years of the
lease, a request was made for renewal of
lease in favour of Mohammed Saleem.
Mohammed Saleem was not the original
allottee. He was only occupier of the shop.
There was a condition in the original lease
which prohibited creation of any right, title
or interest by way of subletting, or in any
other manner, by the original allottee in
favour of a third person without prior
permission of the Cantonment Board. No
written permission was ever sought for, nor
granted in favour of Mohammed Saleem to
1006 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
continue to occupy the shop in question, in
place of the original allottee Munna Lal. As
there was a violation of the specific
condition in the lease, such occupier as
Mohammed
Saleem
became
an
Unauthorised Occupant in terms of section
2(g) of the Act of 1971.

16. It has been argued by Sri Sanjeev
Singh that the learned Appellate Court
while considering issue no.4 regarding
validity of notice sent by the respondent
no.5 to a dead person, namely, Munna Lal
son of Baijnath, has observed that as per
the original lease deed signed in 1983 only
Munna Lal could have been recognised as
an allottee. As per Condition No.4 of the
lease, the allottee had to seek prior
permission in writing from the Competent
Authority for creating any right in favour of
any third person. In spite of such a
condition the original allottee Munna Lal
did not seek prior permission to hand over
the shop in question to Md Saleem during
his lifetime. After his death in 1999, Mohd
Saleem claimed to have inherited the shop
on the basis of a Will allegedly made out
by Munna Lal in his favour. The
respondent no.5 could not have recognised
Mohammed
Saleem
as
a
legitimate
occuppant of the shop and therefore all
proceedings were undertaken only on the
basis of notice issued in the name of
Munna Lal. The show cause notice and the
eviction orders were legally issued under
the Act of 1971 as Mohammad Saleem was
an Un-authorised Occupant in terms of the
Act of 1971 which recognised only
Original allottee in accordance with the
terms of the lease.

17. Sri Sanjeev Singh, learned
counsel appearing for the respondent nos.6
and 7 has also pointed out Section 3 of the
P.P.E.
Act
by
which
the
Central
Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette appoint any person being
gazetted officer of Government, as it thinks
fit, to be Estate Officers for the purpose of
the Act provided that such an officer of a
statutory authority shall only be appointed
as an Estate officer in respect of the public
premises controlled by that Authority.

18. In this case, the statutory authority
in question is the Cantonment Board. The
Estate Officer is
a gazetted officer
appointed by the Government of India for
the purpose of P.P.E. Act. The validity of
Section 3 was challenged in Accountant
and Secretarial Services (P) Ltd. Vs. Union
of India, 1988 (4) SCC 324 and in Hari
Singh Vs. Military Estate Officer, 1972 (2)
SCC 239. The Supreme Court however
negated such challenge that one of the
officers of the statutory authority was
appointed as Estate Officer which was
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
by observing thus:-

"32. Dr. Chitale, while initially
formulating
his
arguments
that
the
provision in 1971 Act appointing one of the
officers of the respondent Bank as the
Estate Officer is violative of Article 14. We
do not see any substance in this contention.
In the very nature of things, only an officer
or appointee of the Government, statutory
authority or corporation can be thought of
for implementing the provisions of the Act.
That
apart,
personal
bias
cannot
necessarily be attributed to such officer
either in favour of the Bank or against any
occupant who is being proceeded against,
merely because he happens to be such
officer. Moreover, as pointed out earlier,
the Act provides for an Appeal to an
independent judicial officer against orders
passed by the Estate Officer. These
provisions do not, therefore, suffer from
4 All. Munna Lal & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors.
1007
any infirmity. In fact, Dr. Chitale did not
pursue this objection seriously."

19. Such observations made by the
Supreme Court in the case of Accountant
and Secretarial Services (P) Ltd. (supra)
were quoted with approval by the Supreme
Court in New India Assurance Company
Ltd. Vs. Nusli Neville Wadia and another,
2008 (3) SCC 279.

20. It has been argued by learned
counsel for the respondent nos.6 and 7 that
the learned counsel for the petitioners is
himself misinterpreting Section 9 of the
Act by which either the District Judge or
any other Judicial Officer of ten years
standing, appointed by the District Judge
can decide the Appeal. It is not as if the
Judicial Officer so nominated should be a
District Judge of ten years standing as has
been interpreted by the learned counsel for
the petitioner.

21. Sri Sanjeev Singh has also argued
that although initially there was a provision
for renewal of lease after ten years for four
subsequent periods of five years each on
revised rent rates as applicable in the
market area, such leases were never
renewed after initial period of ten years.
Further, the total of 30 years period came to
an end in March, 2013 for the petitioner
no.1. After such lease had expired in
March, 2013 for the petitioner no.1 and for
others on various other dates following
2013, the Cantt Board has initially resolved
to renew the lease of the sitting allottees.
When the Resolution was forwarded to the
Principal Director Defence Estates, Central
Command, it examined the issue and found
that the leases that had already expired way
back could not be renewed. Only fresh
leases could be granted by way of public
auction of the public property. The shops in
question were situated in the main market
of Sadar Bazar and therefore had to be
auctioned in a public auction.

22.

Learned
counsel
for
the
respondent nos.6 and 7 has pointed out
from the order of the Estate Officer dated
01.08.2019 that every objection made by
the petitioners was considered in detail by
the Estate Officer but on perusal of the
record, the Estate Officer was satisfied that
the lease had not been renewed after the
initial period of ten years which came to
end in 1993. The maximum period for
which the lease could have been treated as
subsisting was 30 years which also expired
in 2013. Therefore, in the order dated
30.07.2019, there was a mention of initial
issuance of a notice under Section 4 (1) on
13.02.2015 calling upon the allottee to
appear on 18.02.2015 and a combined
notice under Section 4 sub-section (2)
clause (b) (ii) of the Act was also issued
calling upon the allottee to visit his office
on 21.02.2015 to show cause with regard to
why the lease should not be treated as
terminated and opportunity was given to
answer all material questions connected
with the matter along with the opportunity
to produce evidence in support of erstwhile
allottees case. Such personal hearing was
granted on 21.02.2015 to Sri Prashant
Agarwal, Advocate, who appeared for
noticees and requested for time to file
written objections. Repeatedly, dates were
fixed. In fact, although notice was issued
on February, 2015, actual order deciding
the matter was passed by the Estate Officer
only on 30.07.2019 i.e. almost four and a
half years time was granted to the noticee
to make out his case and submit evidence
in his favour. It was evident on perusal of
records that the original allottee / lessee had
failed to get renewal of lease deed coming
at the end of each successive five years at
1008 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the revised rate to be determined on the
basis of a fair market rent applicable in the
area in question. The lease had expired
before the Cantonment Board Resolution
was passed initially proposing renewal of
such lease therefore on expiration of lease,
there was no question of renewal and such
proposal was rightly rejected by the
Principal Director, Defence Estates. After
March, 2013, the possession or occupation
of the shops in question by the allottees
became illegal and unauthorized. The
Petitioner no.2 did not submit any material
to explain the continued occupation of the
shop after the expiry of the total lease
period of 30 years in March, 2013. The
legal representative appearing on behalf of
the petitioner no.2 also failed to establish
right of renewal of lease deed. Hence
notice under Section 4(1) (2)(b) (ii) of the
P.P.E. Act was issued and thereafter by the
same order, eviction was directed under
sub-section (1) of Section 5. The petitioner
no.2 was required to vacate the shop in
question within 15 days from passing of the
order and also to pay damages for
unauthorized occupation @ Rs.236/- per
month with effect from March, 2014.

23. Having heard learned counsel
for the petitioners and the counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondents,
this Court has carefully perused the order
passed by the Additional District Judge in
Appeal no.194 of 2019. The Additional
District Judge had first recorded the
submissions made by the appellant which
are in fact the same submissions as has
been recorded by this Court in the
foregoing paragraph of this order. The
Additional District Judge recorded the
submissions
made
by
the
counsel
appearing for the Cantt Board and then
framed points for determination.

24. The first point for determination
was
whether
additional
evidence
as
submitted by the appellant was admissible
under Order 41 Rule 27 of the C.P.C. This
point was decided in favour of the appellant
on the ground that the document sought to
be brought on record have been obtained by
the appellant under Right to Information
Act only in 2019.

25.

The
second
point
for
determination was whether the notice
issued on 13.02.2015 by the respondent
no.5 was a valid notice under the P.P.E.
Act. The Additional District Judge found
on perusal of the provisions of Sections 4
and 5 of the P.P.E. Act that the time limit
granted in Section 4 for showing cause to
the noticee was seven days. Initially, notice
which was given on 13.02.2015 asking
noticee to appear on 18.02.2015. It then
informed by the same notice that the
noticee could appear on 21.02.2015 at
11:00 am in the office of the Estate Officer.
Thus eight days' time was granted with
effect from 13.02.2015 to 21.02.2015
which was more than the time required
under Section 4(2) (b)(i). It has been
observed by the Appellate Court that notice
was rightly issued in the name of the
Allottee Munna Lal and Mohd. Saleem
could not have been issued notice as he was
not the authorized occupant nor the allottee.

26. The third point was whether the
Estate Officer was competent to pass the
order impugned dated 01.08.2019 under the
P.P.E. Act. The Additional District Judge
considered the provisions of Section 3 of
the P.P.E. Act and the fact that the Estate
Officer being a Gazetted officer of the
Cantt Board which is a statutory authority
had been duly nominated to act as an
officer under the P.P.E. Act.
4 All. Munna Lal & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors.
1009
27. With regard to the point no.4 as to
whether the respondents had the right to
evict the appellants and claim damages, the
Additional District Judge has found that the
notice was issued in a legal manner by an
officer duly appointed under Section 3 of
the Act. Time of almost four and a half
years was granted to the appellant to
present his case and thereafter a reasoned
order was passed. The Additional District
Judge considered Section 5 of the Act
which requires only grant of opportunity.
Such opportunity had indeed been granted.
The Additional District Judge thereafter
referred to the facts of the case that the
appellant Mohd. Saleem was not the
original allottee of the lease deed which
had been executed in March, 1983 for ten
years for rent of Rs.236/- per month with
Munna Lal son of Baijnath, initially for a
period of ten years and renewal was
expected to be done every successive five
years on a revised rate of rent for a total
period of 30 years. The entire period of 30
years expired in March, 2013. It referred to
the Cantt Board Resolution and also the
order passed by the Principal Director,
Defence Estates on 24.10.2014 and the
Cantt Board's consequential Resolution
passed thereafter on 01.11.2014.

28. After determining the four points
in favour of the respondents, the fifth point
for determination as to whether the
appellant was entitled to any relief in the
Appeal was decided against the appellant
and the Appeal was dismissed by the
Additional District Judge by his order dated
05.01.2022.

29. This Court finds from a perusal
of the documents on record including from
a perusal of the lease deed signed between
Munna Lal s/o Baij Nath and the Cantt
Board on 16.03.1983 that shops were
constructed by the Cantt Board under a
self-financed scheme wherein advance of
Rs.14,200/- was deposited by Munna Lal
s/o Baijnath on his successful bid of
Rs.236.70/- per month. In consideration of
a sum of Rs.14,200/- which was paid as
advance towards rent, the rent of the shop
in question in main Sadar Bazar was kept
at a reasonable rate of Rs.236.70/- per
month and half of the monthly rent alone
was to be deposited and rest was to be
adjusted from the advanced rent of
Rs.14,200/-. The lessee was required to
pay all taxes and other charges and to keep
the premises in question in good and
substantial repairs and on expiration of the
lease or on termination of the said term of
lease earlier, the lessee was required to
peacefully yield up the same to the lessor.
The allottee was prohibited from subletting or mortgaging in any manner or
giving up any rights in the premises in
question without the consent in writing of
the
lessor
having
been
previously
obtained. Several such conditions such as
relating to how the sign board was to be
affixed and other mundane matters were
mentioned
in
the
lease
fixing
the
responsibility of the lessor for carrying out
major structural repairs when required.
Under condition (4) of the lease, it was
provided that the lessor will on the request
and at the cost of lessee at the end of the
lease, and from time to time thereafter at
the end of each successful five years
period, up to a total period of 30 years
shall renew the lease on rent as fixed for
every renewed term of five years by the
GOC-in-C, or his authorized officer,
having regard to the rate of rent in the
locality at that time. The lessee was
required to get executed the renewed lease
for each successive five years term, unless
of course the lessor for reasons to be given
in writing in notice, determined the lease.
1010 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
30. In the case of the petitioners, the
lease term ran out after 30 years in March,
2013. There could not have any question of
consideration
for
renewal.
The
only
question to be considered by the Cantt
Board was for fresh grant. Fresh grant
alone could be considered for a public
premises like the shop in question which
was constructed in the Cantonment land by
the Cantt Board through public auction.

31. This Court finds no good ground
to show interference in the order impugned.

32. The petition is dismissed.

33. One month's time from today is
granted to vacate the premises in question
and hand over the peaceful and vacant
possession to the respondent nos. 6 and 7.

34. The petitioners shall also be liable
to pay damages as determined in the order
dated 30.07.2019, as the said order has
been affirmed by the District Judge and
also by this Court.
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(2022)04ILR A1010
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 28.03.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ROHIT RANJAN AGARWAL, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 837 of 2022
(Civil)

Seth Daryablal Manik Lal Tadaiya & Anr.
 ...Petitioners
Versus
Siddh Gopal Kudariya & Anr.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Ms. Shreya Gupta, Sri Ravi Anand Agarwal
Counsel for the Respondents:
Ms. Rama Goel Bansal, Ms. Shalini Goel

Civil Law - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
- Order XXI, Rules 97-101 and Section
151--Suit--For arrears of rent and ejectment-
-Decree-holder claimed to be landlord of first
floor of the house No. 196 rented to
respondent No. 2 at monthly rent of ` 100
since 1986--Respondent No. 2 defaulted in
payment
of
rent
since
1.6.2005--Notice
terminating the tenancy and demanding
arrears of rent on 12.7.2013 served on
respondent No. 2 on 19.7.2013--Rent was not
tendered--Suit filed on 13.8.2013 decreed on
28.3.2017--Revision filed thereagainst came
to be dismissed--Tenant-respondent No. 2
challenged the same by filing petition under
Article 227 of the Constitution--Same stood
dismissed--Courts below dismissed application
under Order XXI, Rule 97 on ground that
present
set
of
proceedings
have
been
launched to linger on the case and to delay
the execution of the decree--Executing court
not obliged to determine a question merely
because the resister or objector has raised it--
Executing court obliged to determine question
which was legally arisen between the parties
and
secondly
it
must
be
relevant
for
consideration and determination between the
parties--Courts below rightly rejected the
application under Order XXI, Rule 97, C.P.C.
holding that it was a dilatory tactic by
petitioners to stall the execution proceedings
launched by the decree holder.

Writ petition dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. Shreenath & ors. Vs Rajesh & ors.
MANU/SC/0286/1998;

2. Brahmdeo Chaudhary Vs Rishikesh Prasad
Jaiswal & ors. MANU/SC/0191/1997;

3. Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. Vs Rajiv Trust & ors.
MANU/SC/0252/1998;

4. Bool Chand & ors. Vs Rabia & ors.
MANU/SC/0867/2016;