# Munna Lal v. State Of U.P. & Ors - **Citation:** (2016) 4 ILRA 165 - **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad - **Decided:** 2016-04-26 - **Bench:** Rajan Roy - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/munna-lal-v-state-of-u-p-ors-43562 - **Pages:** 6 ## Text 4 All. Munna Lal Vs State Of U.P. & Ors. 165 Intermediate Education (2003) 8 SCC 311 and Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of T.N. (2004) 3 SCC 1)." 14. The Apex Court has reiterated the same view in Inderjit Singh Grewal Vs. State of Punjab and another 2011 (3) ACR 3544 (SC). 15. This Court has also taken the same view in Shiv Shankar Vs. Board of Revenue U.P. At Allahabad and 3 others, 2014 (10) ADJ 42. 16. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, the order dated 29.1.2016 passed by the Deputy Commissioner Food Varanasi Division Varanasi in Appeal No. 60 of 2012 (Om Prakash Vs. State of U.P.) cannot be sustained in the eye of law, it is hereby quashed. 17. So far as petitioner's right being subsequent allottee is concerned, this Court in number of cases has held that the subsequent allottee has no right to file writ petition. Reference may be had to the judgments of this Court in Nasarudin Vs. State of U.P. and Ors. 2015 (11) ADJ 557, Smt. Javitri Devi Vs.State of U.P. and others( (WRIT - C No. - 63117 of 2015, decided on 18.11.2015), Shyam Singh Vs. State Of U.P. And 4 Others (WRIT - C No. - 63882 of 2015, decided on 4.12.2015) and Roop Kishor Vs. State Of U.P. And 4 Others (Writ-C No.68087 of 2015, decided on 18.12.2015). 18. The view taken by this Court although in different case has been approved by the Apex Court in Poonam Vs. State of U.P. and Others (supra), in view of that, no relief can be granted to the petitioner. 19. The writ petition is allowed in part as indicated above. --------- ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATED: LUCKNOW 26.04.2016 BEFORE THE HON'BLE RAJAN ROY, J. Service Single No.- 7108 Of 2016 Munna Lal ...Petitioner Versus State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents Counsel for Petitioner Shrawan Kumar Verma Counsel for Respondents 166 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES C.S.C. The petitioner was engaged as daily wager in the year 1989 for performing the duties of Jeep-Driver under opposite parties 2 to 4. Earlier he had filed a writ petition bearing no. 8898 (SS) of 2011 seeking regularization of his services on Group-C post in terms of U.P. Regularization of Daily Wages Appointment on Group-'C' Posts which was disposed of vide order dated 14.12.2011 with a direction to opposite party no.2 to consider the grievance of the petitioner and decide his representation by a speaking and reasoned order. The concerned opposite party considered the case of petitioner for regularization but has declined the same on the ground that there were breaks in his service. Court held that order under challenge cannot be sustained as there is no requirement in the Rules that the candidate seeking regularization should be in continuous service from the date of his initial engagement till commencement of Rules or his consideration for regularization. The requirement is that he should be 'continuing as such' on the date of commencement of the Rules which the petitioner herein was. The writ petition stands allowed. (Delivered by Hon'ble Rajan Roy, J.) 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner was engaged as daily wager in the year 1989 for performing the duties of Jeep-Driver under opposite parties 2 to 4. Earlier he had filed a writ petition bearing no. 8898 (SS) of 2011 seeking regularization of his services on Group-C post in terms of U.P. Regularization of Daily Wages Appointment on Group-'C' Posts (Outside the Purview of U.P. Public service Commission) Rules, 1998 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules, 1998') which was disposed of vide order dated 14.12.2011 with a direction to opposite party no.2 to consider the grievance of the petitioner and decide his representation by a speaking and reasoned order. In compliance thereof the concerned opposite party considered the case of petitioner for regularization but has declined the same on the ground that there were breaks in his service from 01.02.1995 to 07.05.1995, 22.03.2008 to October, 2009 and October 2010 to 11.11.2010 thereby opining that the services were not continuous and secondly for the reason that there are already surplus Jeep-Drivers. 3. As far as the first reason is concerned it has not been disputed by opposite party no.2 that except for aforesaid breaks in service the petitioner has been working since 1989 on daily wages as Jeep-Driver. Rule 4 of the Rules, 1998 reads as under:- "4(1)(i) Any person who-was directly appointed on daily wage basis on Group 'C' posts in the Government service before June 29, 1991 and is continuing in service as such on the date of commencement of these rule,. "4(1)(ii) .... ..... .... .... .... ..... ...... .... ..... ....., shall be considered for regular appointment in permanent or temporary vacancy, as may be available in Group 'D' post, on the date of commencement of these rules on the 4 All. Munna Lal Vs State Of U.P. & Ors. 167 basis of his record and suitability before any regular appointment is made in such vacancy in accordance with the relevant service rules or orders. 4(2). .... ..... ..... .... .... ..... 4(3). .... .... .... .... .... ..... 4(4). ... .... .... .... .... ..... 4(5). ... ... ... .... .... ..... 4(6). .... .... .... ..... .... ....." 4. Rule 4(1)(i) of the Rules 1998, is paramateria to rule 4(1)(a) of U.P. Regularization of Daily Wages Appointments on Group 'D' Posts Rules, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules, 2001'). 5. The word 'continuing in service as such' on the date of commencement of these rules occurring in both the Rules i.e Rules of 1998 and 2001 do not imply continuous service from the date of initial appointment. They only mean that the person should be continuing in service as a daily wager on the commencement of these Rules. 6. This Court has already considered the purport of the said words as used in rule 4(1)(a) of Rules, 2001 pertaining to regularization of daily wagers of Group-'D' Posts in Writ Petition No. 1278(SS) of 2007 [Deshraj vs. State of U.P. & others] decided on 13.01.2011 and Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 38170 of 2005 (Janardan Yadav vs. State of U.P. and Others) decided on 14.12.2007. In the case of Deshraj (supra) this Court after considering the aforesaid provision of Rules, 2001 held as under:- "According to the State a strict interpretation has to be given to these rules according to which if the petitioner is not working exactly on December 21, 2001 then he will loose his right to consideration for regularization. After giving careful thought this proposition appears to be totally unrealistic. Take a situation where a person has worked since June 1988 till December 20, 2001 and has not worked on the date of December 21, 2001 but has been continued from the date of December 22, 2001 for further employment. Will this absence of one day be taken as a rigorous requirement and the case of the person be rejected on the ground that he was not present on the particular date of December 21, 2001. Where thousands of persons are working, any person can fall ill or fall prey to an accident. There can be numerous situations where he may be debarred to join duties on the particular date. A reasonable thing will be that the employee should be working in and around that date. Insistence of the opposite parties for a particular date and a particular hour can lead to absurdity. Such an interpretation can not be allowed because if such a narrow interpretation is given then a great injustice can be caused to the persons who have although worked for more period than is required for regularization but were absent on that fateful date which appears to be a magical date invented by the State. There, he will loose his right. I feel that a 168 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES person who has worked since 1988 to 2008 is, a more deserving candidate for regularization than a person who has strictly worked since June 29, 1988 to December 21, 2001 only. Moreover, it may also be clarified that the provision does not say that the service of the petitioner should be continuous. The word used in the rule is not "continuous in service'" on a particular date. There is a lot of difference between the continuous service on a particular date and continuing on a particular date. I may add here that the regularization rules are always different in connotation and purpose than recruitment rules. The very word 'regularization' in the rules denotes that there were some defects in the service of an employee which are sought to be corrected by the process of regularization. Had everything been right the appointment would have been permanent from the very beginning. The purpose of the regularization rules is that certain unavoidable anomaly which have crept in the service of the employees will have to be pardoned, condoned and overlooked by the authorities and the service may be streamlined. The regularization rules have to be interpreted with benevolence. It can not be given a narrow compass for interpretation and not such a strict interpretation which have been given in the case of the petitioner." 7. The judgment in the case of Deshraj has been upheld in Special Appeal. 8. In Janardan Yadav's case(supra) this Court after considering the same provision held as under:- "6.The only requirement under Rule 4(1)(a) are that the incumbent was directly appointed on daily wage basis on a Group 'D' post in a Government service before 29.06.1991 and is continuing in service as such on the date of commencement of the said Rules. The further requirement under clause (b) of Rule 4(1) is that he must have possessed requisite qualification required for regular appointment on that post at the time of such employment on daily wage basis. "7. Respondents have not disputed the existence of all the said three conditions but their further presumption is that the Rules also contemplate continuous service throughout from the date of initial engagement till the date of commencement of the Rules and only then a person appointed on daily wage basis would be entitled for regularization. It is also the stand of the respondents, which is evident from para-20 of the counter-affidavit which reads as under: "20. That the contents of para 23 of the writ petition is not correct and denied. As stated the petitioner is continuously working relates to the working of a daily wager without any break as there is no break mentioned in the regularization rules. The petitioner or a daily wager has to work throughout year except on the national holiday." "8. The said stand is contrary to the Rules and it amounts to reading certain words in Rule 4(1) which is not provided therein by the Rule framing authority. The Rule framing authority has not framed the aforesaid Rules in manner as are being read by the respondents. Since the Rules are applicable only to daily wage employees, the Rules framing authority was 4 All. Munna Lal Vs State Of U.P. & Ors. 169 aware that such employee could not have worked continuously throughout and, therefore, has clearly provided that the engagement must be before 29.06.1991 and he is continuing as such on the date of commencement of the rules. If a daily wage engagement has been made before 29.06.2001 and was continuing on 21.12.2001, meaning thereby the daily wage engagement remained necessity of the department or the requirement thereof for more than 10 years, for such a person only, the benefit of regularization under 2001 Rules has been provided, and it nowhere requires further that the incumbent must have worked continuously from the date of initial engagement till the commencement of these Rules and to read these words would amount to legislation, which is not permissible in law while interpreting the statute, it is well settled that neither any word shall be added nor be subtracted but if a plain reading of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the same has to be followed as such. This Court does not find any ambiguity in Rule 4(1) providing as to which kind of persons would be entitled for regularization and it nowhere requires that the incumbent must have worked throughout from the date of initial engagement till the date of commencement of the rules." 9. In view of the above discussion the first reasoning given in the impugned order cannot be sustained as there is no requirement in the Rules that the candidate seeking regularization should be in continuous service from the date of his initial engagement till commencement of Rules or his consideration for regularization. The requirement is that he should be 'continuing as such' on the date of commencement of the Rules which the petitioner herein was. 10. Cut off date mentioned in the Rules, 1998 is 29.06.1991. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was engaged prior to it to work on daily wages on the post of Jeep-Driver. By means of Government order dated 13.08.2015 the cut off date has been extended upto 31.03.1996 and policy decision has been taken to consider those covered by this cut off date for regularization as against supernumerary post, therefore, as far as second ground is concerned the same is also of no relevance in view of this Government order dated 13.08.2015 which provides for creation of supernumerary posts. The rejection order had been passed prior to issuance of Government order dated 13.08.2015, obviously for this reason it does not take the same into account. 11. Though, the rejection order was passed in the year 2012 but considering the factual and legal position discussed hereinabove the delay in approaching the Court is liable to be condoned especially as the basis of the writ petition is the Government order dated 13.08.2015 which has been issued recently. 12. In view the discussion made hereinabove the impugned order is 25.07.2012 passed by opposite party no.2 contained in Annexure no.1 is hereby quashed. The opposite party no.2 is directed to reconsider the case of the petitioner for regularization keeping in mind the observations made hereinabove, in the light of Government order dated 13.08.2015 and the Rules, 1998 and such other Government orders as may have been issued subsequently on the subject and take a decision regarding regularization of petitioner's service on a Group-'C' post within a period of next three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. 170 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES 13. As far as non-payment of wages from February, 2015 onwards is concerned, the competent authority shall look into the matter and take a decision in this regard expeditiously; say within a period of next two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. 14. The writ petition stands allowed in the aforesaid terms. --------- ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.03.2016 BEFORE THE HON'BLE RAN VIJAI SINGH, J. Writ C No.- 7244 Of 2016 M/s Eastern Export House & Anr. ...Petitioners Versus Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal & Ors. ...Respondents Counsel for Petitioners: Rajesh Kesharwani, Arun Kumar Gupta Counsel for Respondents: Ashish Agrawal, Sandeep Arora HELD: 1. Under Section 21 of the DRRBFI Act, 1993, the Appellate Tribunal has the power to waive or reduce the statutory pre-deposit of 75%, but while exercising such power it must consider BOTH financial hardship AND the prima facie merits of the case. 2. The Appellate Tribunal committed an error by only considering the financial hardship/closure of business and directing a deposit of 50%, without examining the prima facie merits raised by the petitioners. 3. Legal principles laid down in *ITC Limited* and *Pole-ADS Advertising (P) Ltd.* require the authority to apply its mind to the merits while deciding a waiver request-mere hardship is not sufficient. 4. The Tribunal is required to record reasons showing due application of mind while granting, reducing, or refusing waiver. 5. The Appellate Tribunal failed to evaluate important aspects, including settlement proposals, payments made, export insurance issues, and allegations of misconduct by the Bank. 6. Consequently, the impugned order dated 22.1.2016 was held unsustainable and was quashed. 7. The Tribunal must pass a fresh order after hearing both sides, without granting unnecessary adjournments. Any adjournment, if granted, must carry a cost of at least ₹2,000.