# Nangu @ Rambabu v. State of U.P

- **Citation:** (2023) 8 ILRA 722
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-08-11
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 1164 of 2015
- **Bench:** Rajan Roy, Manish Kumar Nigam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/nangu-rambabu-v-state-of-u-p-50558
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 302, 377/511 & 201 - Appeal
against
conviction
-
Extra-judicial
confession - Reliability - Benefit of doubt -
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
-
Sections
173(2),
207,
313
-
Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 27 - PW-2
and PW-7 informed to PW-1 that appellant
told
them
that
he
committed
huge
mistake and under influence of liquor and
ganja, he had taken deceased in bushes
for
sodomizing
and
later
on
killed
deceased, disposed dead body in pond -
Further St.d appellant requested them to
get matter compromised with PW1 by
taking money - PW-2 and PW-7 turned
hostile - PW-1 and PW-2 were close
relatives and had inimical terms with
appellant - PW-1 admitted proceedings
u/s 107/16 Cr.P.C. drawn against PW-1
and appellant - PW-2 not admitted of
having any criminal case, but admitted
appellant abused PW-2 after drinking -
Except for extra-judicial confession made
by appellant before PW-2, no other
evidence proving involvement of appellant
in crime - No recovery on pointing out of
appellant and clothes recovered from
place of incident, never sent for forensic
examination, no evidence of last seen
against appellant. (Para 29 to 31, 33)

Jail Appeal allowed. (E-14)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,778 of 49,924. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39778 for what follows._

722 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

22. The judgment and sentence order
dated 24.04.2003 passed by the Additional
Sessions Judge/FTC III, Sultanpur in ST
No. 37 of 2021, is set aside and the accused
is acquitted.

23. Accordingly, this criminal appeal
is allowed.

24. Let copy of the judgment be
immediately sent to the court concerned for
necessary action.
----------
(2023) 8 ILRA 722
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 11.08.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJAN ROY, J.
THE HON'BLE MANISH KUMAR NIGAM, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 1164 of 2015

Nangu @ Rambabu ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellant:
In Person, Rajesh Kumar Dwivedi

Counsel for the Respondent:
G.A.

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 302, 377/511 & 201 - Appeal
against
conviction
-
Extra-judicial
confession - Reliability - Benefit of doubt -
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
-
Sections
173(2),
207,
313
-
Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 27 - PW-2
and PW-7 informed to PW-1 that appellant
told
them
that
he
committed
huge
mistake and under influence of liquor and
ganja, he had taken deceased in bushes
for
sodomizing
and
later
on
killed
deceased, disposed dead body in pond -
Further St.d appellant requested them to
get matter compromised with PW1 by
taking money - PW-2 and PW-7 turned
hostile - PW-1 and PW-2 were close
relatives and had inimical terms with
appellant - PW-1 admitted proceedings
u/s 107/16 Cr.P.C. drawn against PW-1
and appellant - PW-2 not admitted of
having any criminal case, but admitted
appellant abused PW-2 after drinking -
Except for extra-judicial confession made
by appellant before PW-2, no other
evidence proving involvement of appellant
in crime - No recovery on pointing out of
appellant and clothes recovered from
place of incident, never sent for forensic
examination, no evidence of last seen
against appellant. (Para 29 to 31, 33)

Jail Appeal allowed. (E-14)

List of Cases cited:

1. Ram Lal Vs St. of H.P. reported in (2019) 17
SCC 411, (p. 418, para 14)

2. R. Vs Warwickshall: (1783) 1 Lesch 263

3. St. of Raj. Vs Raja Ram reported in (2003) 8
SCC 180, (SCC p. 192, para 19 & 20)

4. Balwinder Singh Vs St. of Punj. reported in
1996 SCC (Cri) 59, (SCC p. 265, para 10)

5. Pakkirisamy Vs St. of T. N. reported in (1997)
8 SCC 158, (SCC p. 162, para 8)

6. Kavita Vs St. of T. N. reported in (1998) 6
SCC 108, (SCC p. 109, para 4)

7. Aloke Nath Dutta Vs St. of W.B. reported in
(2007) 12 SCC 230, (SCC pp. 265-66, paras 87
& 89)

8. Sansar Chand Vs St. of Raj. reported in
(2010) 10 SCC 604, (SCC p. 611, paras 29-
30)

9. Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod Vs St. of
Guj. reported in (2009) 5 SCC 740, (SCC pp.
772-73, para 53)

10. Sk. Yusuf Vs St. of W.B. (2011) 11 SCC 754

11. Pancho Vs St. of Har. (2011) 10 SCC 165
8 All. Nangu @ Rambabu Vs. State of U.P.
723
12. Sahadevan & anr. Vs St. of T.N.reported in
(2012) 6 SCC 403, (SCC p. 412, para 16)

13.
Chandrapal
(earlier
M.P.)
Vs
St.
of
Chhattisgarh reported in 2022 LiveLaw (SC)
529, (Para 11)

14. Subramanya Vs St. of Karn. reported in 2022
LiveLaw (SC) 887, (Para 54, 57, 58, 59)

15. Pawan Kumar Chourasia Vs St. of Bihar
reported in 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 197, (Para 5)

16. Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs St. of Mah.
reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116, (SCC p. 185, para
153)

17.
Nikhil
Chandra
Mondal
Vs
St.
of
W.B.reported in (2023) 6 SCC 605, (SCC p. 609,
para 11)
(Delivered by Hon'ble Manish Kumar
Nigam, J.)

1. This appeal has been filed against
the judgment and order of conviction dated
01.08.2015 passed by learned Additional
District and Sessions Judge, Court No. 5,
Lakhimpur Khiri in S. T. No. 761 of 2010,
whereby the learned Additional District &
Sessions Judge, Court No. 5, Lakhimpur
Khiri (hereinafter referred to as the 'trial
court') has convicted the appellant Nangu
@ Rambabu for the offence punishable
under Section 302, 377/511 and under
Section 201 I.P.C.

2. Factual matrix of the case is that
the informant Mahesh submitted a written
complaint dated 01.11.2009 to the inspector
In-charge of Police Station Gola, District
Lakhimpur Khiri (Ex. Ka-13) to the effect
that the son of the informant namely Ankur
aged about 10 years on 31.10.2009, at
about 7:00PM, had gone to the nearby shop
for purchasing toffee but did not return in
the night. The complainant along with his
family members searched for his son Ankur
and at about 09:00 AM, in the morning, the
clothes of his son Ankur (Pant, underwear
& vest) were found near the pond situated
towards north of the village and after
making search body of his son Ankur was
found in the pond. It was requested that
necessary action be taken.

3. After recovery of the body, post
mortem was conducted on 02.11.2009 (Ex.
Ka-3A), thereafter a G.D. entry (Ex. Ka12) was made with Case Crime No. 1341 of
2009 under Section 302 & 201 I.P.C.

4. Another written complaint (Ex. Ka1) was submitted by the informant Mahesh
on 18.11.2009 to the In-charge of Police
Station Gola, District Lakhimpur Khiri to
the effect that on 18.11.2009, accused
Nangu @ Ram Babu came to cousin
brother of the informant namely Rajesh
Kumar and said that he had committed a
huge mistake, under the influence of liquor
and ganja, he had taken Ankur in the
bushes for the purposes of sodomizing and
on hue and cry made by Ankur, he had
killed him and after taking off the clothes
from the body he had disposed of the dead
body of Ankur in the pond. It was further
stated that Nangu @ Ram Babu said to his
cousin brother that he may take money and
get the matter settled with Mahesh.
Therefore, the informant has stated that he
has full confidence that his son Ankur has
been murdered by Nangu @ Ram Babu and
he may be sent to jail.

5. After the First Information Report
was lodged, the Police investigated the
crime and after collecting the evidence, a
charge-sheet Ex. Ka-7 was submitted under
Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. against Nangu @
Ram Babu under Section 302, 201 & 377
read with Section 511 I.P.C. The learned
Magistrate after taking cognizance and
724 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
complying with the provisions of Section
207 Cr.P.C. committed the case for trial to
the court of Sessions. On 09.02.2011,
accused Nangu @ Rambabu was charged
under Section Section 302, 201 & 377 read
with Section 511 I.P.C. During the trial,
statement of seven persons were recorded
by the prosecution namely Mahesh (father
of the deceased Ankur) PW-1, Rajesh
Kumar PW-2, Dr. S. P. Singh (doctor who
had
conducted
post
mortem
of
the
deceased) PW-3, Dr. A. K. Sharma PW-4,
Ram Narayan Singh PW-5, S.I. Manoj
Kumar Yadav PW-6 and Shahabuddin PW7. Statement of accused namely Nangu @
Rambabu was recorded under Section 313
Cr.P.C.

6. The prosecution produced written
complaint Ex. Ka-1, Inquest report Ex. Ka2, Recovery Memo Ex. Ka-3, Post Mortem
Report Ex. Ka-3A, Pathology report Ex.
Ka-4, Site plan Ex. Ka-5, Charge Sheet Ex.
Ka-6, Photograph Deadbody Ex. Ka-7,
Memo of Deadbody Challan Ex. Ka-8,
Specimen Mohar Ex Ka-9, Letter to
C.M.O. Ex. Ka-10, Police Station Report
Ex. Ka-11, Copy of G.D. Report Ex. Ka-12
and
written
report
Ex.
Ka-13
as
documentary evidence.

7. After considering the entire
evidence, the learned Sessions Judge
convicted the accused Nangu @ Rambabu
under Section 302 I.P.C. and sentenced the
accused/appellant with life imprisonment
and fine of Rs. 20,000/- and in case of
default of payment of fine, one year simple
imprisonment, under Section 377/511 I.P.C.
sentenced the accused/appellant five years
imprisonment and fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in
case of default of payment of fine, six
months simple imprisonment and under
Section
201
I.P.C.,
sentenced
the
accused/appellant three years imprisonment
and fine of Rs. 2,000/- and in case of
default of payment of fine, one month
simple imprisonment. All the sentences are
directed to be run concurrently.

8. Heard learned counsel for the
accused/appellant, learned A.G.A. for the
State and perused the material on record.

9. Learned counsel for the accusedappellant assailed the order of conviction
and made following submissions:

I) The case of the prosecution is solely
based upon the extra judicial confession of
the accused which is not reliable. This extra
judicial confession cannot form the basis of
conviction of the appellant since it has no
corroboration and when examined in the
light of settled principles of law, it is
inconsequential, thus, the accused is
entitled to the benefit of doubt.

II) The extra judicial confession,
besides being inadmissible is also a very
weak piece of evidence and in a case of
circumstantial evidence like the present,
one cannot form a valid basis for returning
the finding of guilt against the accused.

III) There is no reason for accused
appellant to have made confession before
the PW-2 as admittedly PW-2 is not in
good terms with the accused and was also
related with the PW-1 (cousin brother) who
was admittedly having enmity with the
accused appellant.

IV) In the present case, there was
neither any eye witness nor had the
prosecution proved the complete of chain
circumstances, there was no direct evidence
of involvement of the appellant in the
commission of crime.

V) In any case, the objects recovered
by the police have no link with the
commission of the crime, as such, it would
be impermissible in law to use these
8 All. Nangu @ Rambabu Vs. State of U.P.
725
recoveries
against
the
accused
for
sustaining the conviction. No recovery has
been made in furtherance to confessional
statement of the accused.

VI) The recovered articles of the
deceased (pant, vest & underwear) were not
sent
for
chemical
analysis
by
the
investigating officer nor there is any
forensic report on record. In the pathology
report Ex. Ka-4, no sperms were found in
the slide.

VII)
The
alleged
extra
judicial
confession made before the PW-2 is not
reliable for the reasons that the PW-2 is
related and inimical witness and moreover
the alleged extra judicial confession of the
accused was made before PW-2 Rajesh
Kumar after 16-17 days of the occurrence.

VIII) No blood was found by the
investigating officer on the spot. There is
an inordinate delay in lodging the F.I.R.

IX)
The
Court
have
failed
to
appreciate the medical and other evidence
placed on record in its correct perspective.

X) No motive have been established
by the prosecution for commission of the
crime by the accused.

XI) The case of the prosecution is
based on circumstantial evidence and chain
of circumstances proved by the prosecution
is not complete and the prosecution has
miserably failed to establish the fact that
only the accused appellant and no one else
could have committed the offence.

XII) The prosecution has miserably
failed to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt. It is settled position of law that
suspicion howsoever grave cannot take
place of the proof.

XIII) The appellant is innocent and
has been falsely implicated in this case on
account of enmity.

XIV) No recovery under Section 27 of
the Indian Evidence Act was made by the
investigating agency.

10. Per contra, learned A.G.A. argued
that the extra judicial confession in the
present case is admissible as it is duly
corroborated
by
other
prosecution
witnesses, and thus, the trial court was fully
justified
in
convicting
the
accused
appellant. It was also contended by the
learned A.G.A. for the State that the present
case is of circumstantial evidence and the
prosecution has succeeded in establishing
every circumstance of chain of events that
would fully support the view that the
accused is guilty of the offence. The trial
court while dealing with the judgment
under appeal, upon proper appreciation of
evidence,
thus,
has
come
to
right
conclusion.

11. With the help of both the counsel,
learned counsel for the appellant and
learned A.G.A. for the State, we have
perused the record of the case from which
it is clear that PW-1 is not the eye-witness
of the incident. In his examination-in-chief,
PW1 has stated that his cousin brother
Rajesh Kumar PW-2 and one Sahabuddin
PW-7 told PW-1 that the accused came to
them and said that the accused has
committed a huge mistake under the
influence of liquor and ganja, in the
evening of Saturday, the accused has taken
Ankur son of PW-1 with a view to
sodomise him to the bushes and attempted
to sodomise Ankur on which Ankur raised
hue and cry and therefore, he killed Ankur
and disposed of the dead body in the pond.
It was further stated by the accused that as
the police came to know about these facts,
requested them to take money and get the
matter settled with Mahesh (PW-1). In his
cross-examination PW-1 deposed that he
has raised suspicion for murder of his son
Ankur against Nangu @ Rambabu. It has
been further stated by PW-1 that he had
enmity with the accused appellant Nangu
726 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
@ Rambabu with regard to agriculture and
police had drawn proceedings under
Section 107/16 Cr.P.C. against both the
parties. It had also been admitted by the
PW-1 in his cross-examination that he had
long standing family enmity with the
Nangu @ Rambabu and prior to the
incident Nangu @ Rambabu said to PW1
that he would murder one or two persons.
In his cross-examination, it had also been
stated by PW-1 that at about 19 days later,
the PW-1 came to know that Nangu @
Rambabu has murdered his son Ankur but
subsequently he said that this news came to
him 5-6 days after the incident and he got
the report lodged in this regard after 6 or 7
days. In his cross-examination, PW-1 had
also admitted that Rajesh Kumar PW-2 is
his real cousin brother (चचेरा भाई). In his
cross-examination, he had also stated that
Rajesh Kumar PW-2 had informed the PW1 that his son was murdered by Nangu @
Rambabu and prior to this information
given by Rajesh Kumar PW-2, he had no
information in this regard that Nangu @
Rambabu had murdered his son Ankur. It
has further stated that nobody else in the
village had informed the PW-1 that his son
was murdered by Nangu @ Rambabu.

12.

PW-2
Rajesh
Kumar
in
his
examination-in-chief had stated that after
16-17 days of the incident, accused Nangu
@ Rambabu came to him and told that the
accused has taken Ankur son of PW-1 with
a view to sodomise him to the bushes and
attempted to sodomise Ankur on which
Ankur raised hue and cry and therefore, he
killed Ankur and disposed of the dead body
in the pond. It was further stated by the
accused that as the police came to know
about these facts, requested them to take
money and get the matter settled with
Mahesh (PW-1). It was further stated by the
PW-2 that he informed Mahesh PW-1, then
PW-1 gave a written complaint to the
police. In his cross-examination by the
defence, PW-2 has admitted that Mahesh is
his cousin brother (चचेरा भाई). It has been
further stated by PW-2 that the PW-2 or his
family had no quarrel with Nangu @
Rambabu or his family. Other family
members had quarrel with Nangu @
Rambabu. It had been further stated by
PW-2 in his cross-examination that Nangu
@ Rambabu used to quarrel and abuse him
after drinking liquor and therefore, there
was enmity. It had been admitted by PW-2
in his cross-examination that Nangu @
Rambabu used to abuse under the influence
of liquor. It had been further stated by PW2 in his cross-examination that Nangu @
Rambabu told about the incident to PW-2
in his agricultural field and there was
nobody in the agricultural field except PW2. It had been further stated by PW-2 that
he could not recollect the time whether it
was morning or evening when the accused
told him about the incident.

13. PW-3 Dr. S. P. Singh is the doctor
who has proved the post mortem report of
the deceased Ankur.

14. PW-4 Dr. A. K. Sharma,
pathologist in his examination-in-chief has
stated that on examination of slide, no
sperms were found.

15. PW-5 Sri Ram Narayan Singh, C.
O. Laharpur, Sitapur has proved the
investigation.

16. PW-6 S. I. Manoj Kumar Yadav
has proved the inquest report and other
relevant documents.

17. PW-7 Sahabuddin son of Sher Ali
was declared hostile as he denied that
8 All. Nangu @ Rambabu Vs. State of U.P.
727
Nangu @ Rambabu ever confessed his guilt
before him.

18. The accused was examined under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. and denied the
allegation leveled against him. In reply to
question no. 8 that why case has been
lodged against him, the accused appellant
replied that because of old enmity. In his
additional statement under Section 313
Cr.P.C., the accused has denied of making
extra judicial confession before Rajesh
Kumar.

19. From the oral evidence as referred
above, we find that there is no direct
evidence against the accused appellant of
committing the crime.

20. The learned trial court relying
upon the extra judicial confession made by
the accused before PW-2 has convicted the
accused.

21. It has been submitted by the
learned counsel for the appellant that there
is no eye-witness account of the crime
being committed by the accused appellant
and the case is of circumstantial evidence.
It was also contended by the learned
counsel for the appellant that the trial court
committed grave error in relying upon the
uncorroborated extra judicial confession
alleged to have been made by the accused
before PW-2 Rajesh Kumar.

22. It has been further contended by
the learned counsel for the appellant that
the prosecution has miserably failed to
prove the complete chain of circumstances
to bring the guilt of the accused.

23. Per contra, learned A.G.A. has
submitted that extra judicial confession
could be relied upon by the Court even
without there being any corroboration of
the same. In this connection, learned
A.G.A. has placed reliance upon the
decision of the Apex Court in case of Ram
Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh
reported in (2019) 17 SCC 411. It has
been further contended by learned A.G.A.
that the prosecution has proved its case by
leading evidence that it was only the
accused who could have committed the
crime and except for the accused no one
else has committed the crime.

24. There is no doubt that in the
present case there is no eye-witness
account.
It
is
a
case
based
upon
circumstantial
evidence.
In
case
of
circumstantial evidence, the onus lies upon
the prosecution to prove the complete chain
of evidence, which shall undoubtedly point
towards
the
guilt
of
the
accused.
Furthermore, in case of circumstantial
evidence, where the prosecution relies upon
the extra judicial confession, the Court has
to examine the same with greater degree of
care and caution.

25. It is settled principles of criminal
jurisprudence that extra judicial confession
is a weak piece of evidence. Wherever, the
Court upon due appreciation of entire
prosecution evidence, intends to base a
conviction on an extra judicial confession,
court must ensure that the same inspires
confidence and is corroborated by other
prosecution evidence. If, however, extra
judicial
confession
suffers
from
the
material
discrepancies
or
inherent
improbabilities and does not appear to be
cogent as per the prosecution version, it
may be difficult for the Court to base
conviction on such a confession. In such
circumstance, the Court would be fully
728 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
justified in ruling such evidence out of
consideration.

26. Confessions may be divided into two
classes, i.e. judicial and extra-judicial.
Judicial confessions are those which are
made before Magistrate or Court in the
course of judicial proceedings. Extra-
judicial confessions are those which are
made by the party elsewhere than before a
Magistrate
or
Court.
Extra
judicial
confessions are generally those that are
made by a party to or before a private
individual which includes even a judicial
officer in his private capacity. It also
includes a Magistrate who is not especially
empowered to record confessions under
Section 164 of the Code or a Magistrate so
empowered but receiving the confession at
a stage when Section 164 does not apply.
As to extra-judicial confessions, two
questions arise: (i) were they made
voluntarily? and (ii) are they true? As the
section enacts, a confession made by an
accused person is irrelevant in a criminal
proceedings,
if
the
making
of
the
confession appears to the Court to have
been caused by any inducement, threat or
promise, (1) having reference to the charge
against the accused person, (2) proceeding
from a person in authority, and (3)
sufficient, in the opinion of the Court to
give the accused person grounds which
would appear to him reasonable for
supposing that by making it he would gain
any advantage or avoid any evil of a
temporal nature in reference to the
proceedings against him. It follows that a
confession would be voluntary if it is made
by the accused in a fit state of mind, and if
it is not caused by any inducement, threat
or promise which has reference to the
charge against him, proceeding from a
person in authority. It would not be
involuntary, if the inducement, (a) does not
have reference to the charge against the
accused person, or (b) it does not proceed
from a person in authority; or (c) it is not
sufficient, in the opinion of the Court to
give the accused person grounds which
would appear to him reasonable for
supposing that, by making it, he would gain
any advantage or avoid any evil of a
temporal nature in reference to the
proceedings against him. Whether or not
the confession was voluntary would depend
upon the facts and circumstances of each
case, judged in the light of Section 24. The
law is clear that a confession cannot be
used against an accused person unless the
Court is satisfied that it was voluntary and
at that stage the question whether it is true
or false does not arise. If the facts and
circumstances surrounding the making of a
confession appear to cast a doubt on the
veracity or voluntariness of the confession,
the Court may refuse to act upon the
confession, even if it is admissible in
evidence One important question, in regard
to which the Court has to be satisfied with
is, whether when the accused made
confession, he was a free man or his
movements were controlled by the police
either by themselves or through some other
agency employed by them for the purpose
of securing such a confession. The question
whether a confession is voluntary or not is
always a question of fact. All the factors
and all the circumstances of the case,
including the important factors of the time
given for reflection, scope of the accused
getting a feeling of threat, inducement or
promise,
must
be
considered
before
deciding whether the Court is satisfied that
its opinion the impression caused by the
inducement, threat or promise, if any, has
been fully removed. A free and voluntary
confession is deserving of highest credit,
because it is presumed to flow from the
highest
sense
of guilt.
(See
R.
v.
8 All. Nangu @ Rambabu Vs. State of U.P.
729
Warwickshall: (1783) 1 Lesch 263). It is
not to be conceived that a man would be
induced to make a free and voluntary
confession of guilt, so contrary to the
feelings and principles of human nature, if
the
facts
confessed
were
not
true.
Deliberate and voluntary confessions of
guilt, if clearly proved, are among the most
effectual proofs in law. An involuntary
confession is one which is not the result of
the free will of the maker of it. So where
the statement is made as a result of the
harassment and continuous interrogation
for several hours after the person is treated
as an offender and accused, such statement
must be regarded as involuntary. The
inducement may take the form of a promise
or of threat, and often the inducement
involves both promise and threat, a promise
of forgiveness if disclosure is made and
threat of prosecution if it is not. (See
Woodroffe Evidence, 9th Edn., Page 284).
A promise is always attached to the
confession, alternative while a threat is
always attached to the silence-alternative;
thus, in the one case the prisoner is
measuring the net advantage of the
promise, minus the general undesirability
of a false confession, as against the present
unsatisfactory situation; while in the other
case he is measuring the net advantages of
the present satisfactory situation, minus the
general undesirability of the confession
against the threatened harm. It must be
borne in mind that every inducement, threat
or promise does not vitiate a confession.
Since the object of the rule is to exclude
only
those
confessions
which
are
testimonially
untrustworthy,
the
inducement, threat or promise must be such
as is calculated to lead to an untrue
confession. On the aforesaid analysis the
Court is to determine the absence or
presence of inducement, promise etc. or its
sufficiency and how or in what measure it
worked on the mind of the accused. If the
inducement, promise or threat is sufficient
in the opinion of the Court, to give the
accused person grounds which would
appear to him reasonable for supposing that
by making it he would gain any advantage
or avoid any evil, it is enough to exclude
the confession. The words 'appear to him'
in the last part of the section refer to the
mentality of the accused.

27. Now we may examine some
judgments dealing with this aspect:

I) In State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram
reported in (2003) 8 SCC 180, the Apex
Court laid down the principles that (SCC p.
192, para 19 & 20):

"19. An extra-judicial confession, if
voluntary and true and made in a fit state of
mind, can be relied upon by the Court. The
confession will have to be proved like any
other fact. The value of the evidence as to
confession,
like
any
other
evidence,
depends upon the veracity of the witness to
whom it has been made. The value of the
evidence as to the confession depends on
the reliability of the witness who gives the
evidence. It is not open to any Court to start
with a presumption that extra-judicial
confession is a weak type of evidence. It
would depend on the nature of the
circumstances,
the
time
when
the
confession was made and the credibility of
the witnesses who speak to such a
confession. Such a confession can be relied
upon and conviction can be founded
thereon
if
the
evidence
about
the
confession comes from the mouth of
witnesses who appear to be unbiased, not
even remotely inimical to the accused, and
in respect of whom nothing is brought out
which may tend to indicate that he may
have a motive for attributing an untruthful
730 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
statement to the accused, the words spoken
to by the witness are clear, unambiguous
and unmistakably convey that the accused
is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing
is omitted by the witness which may
militate against it. After subjecting the
evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on
the touchstone of credibility, the extrajudicial confession can be accepted and can
be the basis of a conviction if it passes the
test of credibility.

20. If the evidence relating to extra
judicial confession is found credible after
being tested on the touchstone of credibility
and acceptability, it can solely form the
basis of conviction. The requirement of
corroboration as rightly submitted by
learned counsel for the respondent-accused,
is a matter of prudence and not a invariable
rule of law................"

II) In Balwinder Singh v. State of
Punjab, reported in 1996 SCC (Cri) 59,
the Apex Court stated the principle that:
(SSC p. 265, para 10)

"10. An extra-judicial confession by
its very nature is rather a weak type of
evidence and requires appreciation with a
great deal of care and caution. Where an
extra-judicial confession is surrounded by
suspicious circumstances, its credibility
becomes
doubtful
and
it
loses
its
importance."

III) In Pakkirisamy v. State of T. N.
reported in (1997) 8 SCC 158, the Apex
Court held that: (SCC p. 162, para 8)

"8. .... It is well settled that it is a
rule of caution where the court would
generally
look
for
an
independent
reliable corroboration before placing any
reliance
upon
such
extra-judicial
confession."

IV) Again in Kavita v. State of T. N.
reported in (1998) 6 SCC 108, the Apex
Court stated the dictum that: (SSC p. 109,
para 4)

"4. There is no doubt that convictions
can be based on extra-judicial confession
but it is well settled that in the very nature
of things, it is a weak piece of evidence. It
is to be proved just like any other fact and
the value thereof depends upon the veracity
of the [witnesses] to whom it is made."

V) In the case of Aloke Nath Dutta v.
State of W.B. reported in (2007) 12 SCC
230, the Court, while holding the placing of
reliance on extra-judicial confession by the
lower
courts
in
absence
of
other
corroborating
material,
as
unjustified,
observed: (SCC pp. 265-66, paras 87 & 89)

"87.
Confession
ordinarily
is
admissible in evidence. It is a relevant fact.
It can be acted upon. Confession may under
certain circumstances and subject to law
laid down by the superior judiciary from
time to time form the basis for conviction.
It is, however, trite that for the said purpose
the court has to satisfy itself in regard to: (i)
voluntariness
of
the
confession;
(ii)
truthfulness
of
the
confession;
(iii)
corroboration.

* * *

89. A detailed confession which would
otherwise be within the special knowledge
of the accused may itself be not sufficient
to raise a presumption that confession is a
truthful one. Main features of a confession
are required to be verified. If it is not done,
no conviction can be based only on the sole
basis thereof."

VI) Accepting the admissibility of the
extra-judicial confession, the Court in the
8 All. Nangu @ Rambabu Vs. State of U.P.
731
case of Sansar Chand v. State of
Rajasthan reported in (2010) 10 SCC 604
held that : (SCC p. 611, paras 29-30)

"29. There is no absolute rule that an
extra-judicial confession can never be the
basis of a conviction, although ordinarily
an extra-judicial confession should be
corroborated by some other material. [Vide
Thimma and Thimma Raju v. State of
Mysore (1970) 2 SCC 105, Mulk Raj v.
State of U.P. AIR 1959 SC 902, Sivakumar
v. State (2006) 1 SC 714 (SCC paras 40
and 41 : AIR paras 41 & 42), Shiva Karam
Payaswami Tewari v. State of Maharashtra
(2009) 11 SCC 262 and Mohd. Azad v.
State of W.B. (2008) 15 SCC 449"

VII) Dealing with the situation of
retraction
from
the
extra-judicial
confession made by an accused, the Court
in the case of Rameshbhai Chandubhai
Rathod v. State of Gujarat reported in
(2009) 5 SCC 740, held as under : (SCC
pp. 772-73, para 53)

"53. It appears therefore, that the
appellant has retracted his confession.
When an extra-judicial confession is
retracted by an accused, there is no
inflexible
rule
that
the
court
must
invariably accept the retraction. But at the
same time it is unsafe for the court to rely
on the retracted confession, unless, the
court on a consideration of the entire
evidence comes to a definite conclusion
that the retracted confession is true."

VIII) Extra-judicial confession must
be established to be true and made
voluntarily and in a fit state of mind. The
words of the witnesses must be clear,
unambiguous and should clearly convey
that the accused is the perpetrator of the
crime. The extra-judicial confession can be
accepted and can be the basis of conviction,
if it passes the test of credibility. The extrajudicial
confession
should
inspire
confidence and the court should find out
whether
there
are
other
cogent
circumstances on record to support it. [Ref.
Sk. Yusuf v. State of W.B. (2011) 11 SCC
754 and Pancho v. State of Haryana (2011)
10 SCC 165.

IX) In Sahadevan & Anr. v. State of
Tamil Nadu reported in (2012) 6 SCC 403,
the Apex Court laid down the principles
that: (SCC p. 412, para 16)

"16. Upon a proper analysis of the
above-referred judgments of this Court, it
will be appropriate to state the principles
which would make an extra- judicial
confession an admissible piece of evidence
capable of forming the basis of conviction
of an accused. These precepts would guide
the judicial mind while dealing with the
veracity of cases where the prosecution
heavily
relies
upon
an
extra-judicial
confession alleged to have been made by
the accused.

(i) The extra-judicial confession is a
weak evidence by itself. It has to be
examined by the court with greater care
and caution.

(ii) It should be made voluntarily and
should be truthful

(iii) It should inspire confidence.

(iv)
An
extra-judicial
confession
attains greater credibility and evidentiary
value, if it is supported by a chain of cogent
circumstances and is further corroborated
by other prosecution evidence.

(v) For an extra-judicial confession to
be the basis of conviction, it should not
suffer from any material discrepancies and
inherent improbabilities.
732 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(vi) Such statement essentially has to
be proved like any other fact and in
accordance with law.

X) In Chandrapal (earlier M.P.) v.
State of Chhattisgarh reported in 2022
LiveLaw (SC) 529, (Para 11) the Apex
Court laid down the principle that however,
the Apex Court has consistently held that
an extra-judicial confession is a weak kind
of evidence and unless it inspire confidence
or is fully corroborated by some other
evidence of clinching nature, ordinarily
conviction for the offence of murder should
not be made only on the evidence of extrajudicial confession.

XI) In Subramanya v. State of
Karnataka reported in 2022 LiveLaw
(SC) 887, the Apex Court held that: (paras
54, 57, 58 & 59)

"54. Extra judicial confession is a
weak piece of evidence and the court must
ensure that the same inspires confidence
and is corroborated by other prosecution
evidence. It is considered to be a weak
piece of evidence as it can be easily
procured whenever direct evidence is not
available. In order to accept extra judicial
confession, it must be voluntary and must
inspire confidence. If the court is satisfied
that the extra judicial confession is
voluntary, it can be acted upon to base the
conviction.

57. The sum and substance of the
aforesaid is that an extra judicial confession
by its very nature is rather a weak type of
evidence and requires appreciation with
great deal of care and caution. Where an
extra judicial confession is surrounded by
suspicious circumstances, its credibility
becomes
doubtful
and
it
loses
its
importance like the case in hand. The
courts generally look for an independent
reliable corroboration before placing any
reliance upon an extra judicial confession.

58. This Court in Kashmira Singh v.
The State of Madhya Pradesh reported in
AIR 1952 SC 159, had observed as under:

"The confession of an accused person
is not evidence in the ordinary sense of the
term as defined in Section 3. It cannot be
made the foundation of a conviction and
can only be used in support of other
evidence. The proper way is, first, to
marshal the evidence against the accused
excluding the confession altogether from
consideration and see whether, if it is
believed a conviction could safely be based
on it. If it is capable of belief independently
of the confession, then of course it is not
necessary to call the confession in aid. But
cases may arise where the Judge is not
prepared to act on the other evidence as it
stands even though, if believed, it would be
sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an
event the Judge may call in aid the
confession and use it to lend assurance to
the other evidence and thus fortify himself
in believing what without the aid of the
confession he would not be prepared to
accept. [para 8, 10]"

59. In the case on hand, the High
Court committed a serious error in making
the confessional statement as the basis and
thereafter going in search for corroboration.
The High Court concluded that the
confessional statement is corroborated in
material
particulars
without
first
considering and marshalling the evidence
against
the
appellant
convict
herein
excluding the conviction altogether from
consideration. As held in the decision, cited
above, only if on such consideration on the
evidence
available,
other
than
the
confession a conviction can safely be based
8 All. Nangu @ Rambabu Vs. State of U.P.
733
then only the confession could be used to
support that belief or conclusion.

XII) In Pawan Kumar Chourasia v
State of Bihar reported in 2023 LiveLaw
(SC) 197, the Apex Court held that: (para 5)

"5. As far as extra-judicial confession
is concerned, the law is well settled.
Generally, it is a weak piece of evidence.
However, a conviction can be sustained on
the basis of extra-judicial confession
provided that the confession is proved to be
voluntary and truthful. It should be free of
any inducement. The evidentiary value of
such confession also depends on the person
to whom it is made. Going by the natural
course of human conduct, normally, a person
would confide about a crime committed by
him only with such a person in whom he has
implicit faith. Normally, a person would not
make a confession to someone who is totally
a stranger to him. Moreover, the Court has to
be satisfied with the reliability of the
confession keeping in view the circumstances
in which it is made. As a matter of rule,
corroboration is not required. However, if an
extra-judicial confession is corroborated by
other evidence on record, it acquires more
credibility."

28. Having stated the principles which
may be kept in mind by the Court while
examining the acceptability and evidentiary
value of the extra judicial confession, we
may now refer the facts of the present case.

29. PW-1 in his statement has stated
that his cousin brother (चचेरा भाई) Rajesh
Kumar PW-2 and one Sahabuddin PW-7
has informed the PW-1 that Nangu @
Rambabu came to them and said that he
committed a huge mistake and further told
that in the evening of Saturday, he had
taken Ankur in the bushes for sodomizing
and when he attempted, Ankur raised hue
and cry, therefore, the accused killed Ankur
and disposed of the dead body in the pond.
It was further stated by the accused before
these witnesses as per the evidence of PW1 that as the police came to know about the
incident, requested them to get the matter
compromised with PW-1 by taking money.

30. Rajesh Kumar cousin brother of
PW-1 was examined as PW-2. Sahabuddin
PW-7, the other person before whom the
alleged extra judicial confession was made
by the accused was declared hostile as he
has deposed that the accused has never
confessed before him.

31. It has come in the evidence of
PW-1 Mahesh and PW-2 Rajesh Kumar
that both the witnesses were close relatives
i.e. cousin brothers and were on inimical
terms with the accused appellant. PW-1 had
even admitted that proceedings under
Section 107/16 Cr.P.C. were drawn against
PW-1 and accused appellant. Though PW-2
had not admitted of having any criminal
case but has admitted that accused used to
abuse PW-2 after drinking.

32. In our opinion, it is improbable
that the accused would repose confidence
in a person who is inimical towards him
and
confess
his
guilt.
The
other
independent witness as alleged by the
prosecution i.e. PW-7 has not supported the
prosecution story.

33. From the perusal of the evidence
on record, it is also clear that except for the
extra-judicial confession made by the
accused appellant before PW-2 Rajesh
Kumar, there is no other evidence worth
mentioning proving involvement of the
accused appellant in the crime.