# Nanhak @ Nanhkey & Ors v. D.D.C., Unnao & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 10 ILRA 414
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-10-15
- **Case number:** Writ B No. 971 of 2025
- **Bench:** Jaspreet Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/nanhak-nanhkey-ors-v-d-d-c-unnao-ors-52666
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

C.S.C., Dilip Kumar Pandey

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether
the
Consolidation
Authorities
committed any error in rejecting the application
under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act,
1963 seeking condonation of delay of eighteen
years in moving a recall application against the
order dated 07.01.2002, and whether sufficient
cause had been explained so as to warrant
condonation of delay?

HEADNOTE
Indian Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 -
Condonation of delay - Recall application -
Delay of eighteen years - Application for recall
of
order
dated
07.01.2002
moved
on
27.01.2020 - Orders passed by Consolidation
Authorities rejecting the application on the
ground of limitation - It is not the length of
delay which is material, but the sufficiency of
cause - Longer the delay, the heavier is the
onus to explain the sufficiency of cause -
Vague averments that petitioners came to know
of the order in January, 2020 - No real attempt
to explain delay of eighteen years - Delay not
to be condoned in a routine manner or as an act
of generosity - Explanation required from the
date limitation starts to run - Notification under
Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings
Act, 1953 published long ago - Consolidation
Authorities lose jurisdiction after publication of
Section 52 notification - Participation of
petitioner No.2 in proceedings earlier - No
explanation for stopping appearance - No
cogent explanation shown - No palpable error
found in orders passed by three Consolidation
Authorities - Writ petition devoid of merits.
(Paras 4-22)

HELD Application seeking condonation of delay
was moved on 27.01.2020 for recall of the order
dated 07.01.2002, after a delay of eighteen
years. There was hardly any cause explained
and only vague averments were made that the
petitioners became aware of the order in
January, 2020. The longer the delay, the heavier
is the onus to explain the sufficiency of cause,
and the delay is not to be condoned in a routine
manner or as an act of generosity. Notification
under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of
Holdings Act, 1953 was published long ago, and
the petitioner No.2 had participated in the
proceedings earlier but later stopped appearing
without any explanation. In absence of cogent
explanation, the cause could not be treated to
be sufficient. Court did not find any palpable
error committed by the three Consolidation
Authorities in rejecting the application under
Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963.
Writ petition was dismissed at the admission
stage itself. (Paras 16-22)
Petition dismissed at admission stage. (E5)

CASE LAW CITED
Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab, (1995) 6 SCC
614;
N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7
SCC 123;
Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board and
others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969;
H. Guruswamy & Ors. v. A. Krishnaiah, 2025
SCC OnLine SC 54

List of Acts
Indian
Limitation
Act,
1963;
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953.

## Text

414 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
----------
(2025) 10 ILRA 414
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 15.10.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J.

Writ B No. 971 of 2025

Nanhak @ Nanhkey & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
D.D.C., Unnao & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Santosh Kumar Srivastava, Manish Kumar
Shukla

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Dilip Kumar Pandey

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether
the
Consolidation
Authorities
committed any error in rejecting the application
under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act,
1963 seeking condonation of delay of eighteen
years in moving a recall application against the
order dated 07.01.2002, and whether sufficient
cause had been explained so as to warrant
condonation of delay?

HEADNOTE
Indian Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 -
Condonation of delay - Recall application -
Delay of eighteen years - Application for recall
of
order
dated
07.01.2002
moved
on
27.01.2020 - Orders passed by Consolidation
Authorities rejecting the application on the
ground of limitation - It is not the length of
delay which is material, but the sufficiency of
cause - Longer the delay, the heavier is the
onus to explain the sufficiency of cause -
Vague averments that petitioners came to know
of the order in January, 2020 - No real attempt
to explain delay of eighteen years - Delay not
to be condoned in a routine manner or as an act
of generosity - Explanation required from the
date limitation starts to run - Notification under
Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings
Act, 1953 published long ago - Consolidation
Authorities lose jurisdiction after publication of
Section 52 notification - Participation of
petitioner No.2 in proceedings earlier - No
explanation for stopping appearance - No
cogent explanation shown - No palpable error
found in orders passed by three Consolidation
Authorities - Writ petition devoid of merits.
(Paras 4-22)

HELD Application seeking condonation of delay
was moved on 27.01.2020 for recall of the order
dated 07.01.2002, after a delay of eighteen
years. There was hardly any cause explained
and only vague averments were made that the
petitioners became aware of the order in
January, 2020. The longer the delay, the heavier
is the onus to explain the sufficiency of cause,
and the delay is not to be condoned in a routine
manner or as an act of generosity. Notification
under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of
Holdings Act, 1953 was published long ago, and
the petitioner No.2 had participated in the
proceedings earlier but later stopped appearing
without any explanation. In absence of cogent
explanation, the cause could not be treated to
be sufficient. Court did not find any palpable
error committed by the three Consolidation
Authorities in rejecting the application under
Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963.
Writ petition was dismissed at the admission
stage itself. (Paras 16-22)
Petition dismissed at admission stage. (E5)

CASE LAW CITED
Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab, (1995) 6 SCC
614;
N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7
SCC 123;
Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board and
others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969;
H. Guruswamy & Ors. v. A. Krishnaiah, 2025
SCC OnLine SC 54

List of Acts
Indian
Limitation
Act,
1963;
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953.

15. List of Keywords
Condonation of delay - Section 5 - Recall
application - Sufficient cause - Length of
10 All. Nanhak @ Nanhkey & Ors. Vs. D.D.C., Unnao & Ors.
415
delay - Eighteen years delay - Vague
explanation - Admission stage dismissal.

16. CASE ARISING FROM
Order dated 29.04.2025 passed by the Deputy
Director of Consolidation, affirming the orders
dated 24.04.2023 and 04.04.2022 passed by the
Settlement Officer of Consolidation and the
Consolidation Officer.

17. Appearances for Parties
Advs For
Petitioner: Santosh
Kumar
Srivastava; Manish Kumar Shukla
Advs For Respondents: C.S.C.; Dilip Kumar
Pandey

(Delivered by Hon'ble Jaspreet Singh, J.)

1.
Heard
Shri
Santosh
Kumar
Srivastava,
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioners. Notice on behalf of the Staterespondents No.1 to 3 has been accepted by
the office of the Chief Standing Counsel,
Shri Dilip Kumar Pandey, leaned counsel
has accepted notice on behalf of the
respondent No.4, Shri Anil Kumar Akela,
learned counsel has put in appearance on
behalf of the private-respondents No.5 to
14.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioners
and the private-respondents, both have
exchanged their pleadings and the counter
affidavit and the rejoinder affidavit filed by
them is taken on record.

3. Since, the pleadings have been
exchanged, accordingly, this matter is
decided at the admission stage itself.

4. Under challenge is the order dated
29.04.2025 passed by the Deputy Director
of Consolidation, Unnao, whereby the
revision preferred by the petitioners has
been rejected, as a consequence, the order
passed by the Settlement Officer of
Consolidation dated 24.04.2023 has been
affirmed which in turn affirms the order
dated
04.04.2022
passed
by
the
Consolidation
Officer,
rejecting
the
application for recall on the grounds of
limitation.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioners
has vehemently urged that the three Courts
have committed a grave error in rejecting
the application under Section 5 of the
Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, 'the
Act of 1963') on technical grounds. It is
urged that the cause shown in the
application seeking condonation of delay
was substantially explained, however, a
pedantic view has been taken by the three
authorities,
which
has
resulted
in
miscarriage of justice.

7. It is further urged that it is now too
well settled that in case, if the substantial
justice is pitted against technicalities, it is
the cause of substantial justice which must
be espoused and forwarded and this
premise has been lost sight by the three
Consolidation
Authorities,
hence,
the
orders are patently erroneous and deserve
to be set aside.

8. In support of his submissions,
learned counsel for the petitioners has
relied upon two decisions of the Apex
Court in Nand Kishore v. State of
Punjab, (1995) 6 SCC 614 and N.
Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy,
(1998) 7 SCC 123.

9.
Responding
to
the
aforesaid
submissions, learned counsel for the
private-respondents No.5 to 14 has urged
that even though the course of substantial
justice must prevail over technicalities, but
at the same time, it is also to be noticed that
deliberate delay which gives rise certain
416 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
vested rights to a party cannot be unsettled
merely on the whim of a party.

It is also submitted that longer the
delay, the explanation for it is to be more
robust. In the instant case, reference has
been made to Annexure No.4, which is a
copy of the recall application seeking
condonation of delay of an order dated
07.01.2002,
which
was
moved
on
27.01.2020 that is to say after eighteen
years and in this context, if the explanation
as furnished in the said application is
perused, it would reveal that let alone a
sufficient cause, no cause at all has been
shown. It is, thus, urged that the three
Consolidation Authorities after considering
the matter at length have delivered their
orders which cannot be said to be either
arbitrary or without jurisdiction or patently
erroneous for this Court to exercise its
power under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India and for the aforesaid
reasons, the writ petition deserves to be
dismissed.

11. The Court has heard learned
counsel for the parties and also perused the
material available on record.

12. As far as the decisions cited by the
learned counsel for the petitioners are
concerned, suffice to state that in Nand
Kishore (supra) the issue was not in
respect of condonation of delay. Moreover,
the decision would indicate that the said
order was passed by the Apex Court
categorically noting in Para-13 of the said
report that the said order was passed in
exceptional circumstances and in view
thereof, the powers under Article 136 are
all pervading and an order passed under
exceptional circumstances would be in the
nature of an order under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India, which does not make
it as a binding precedent. Thus, for the
aforesaid reason, the said decision in Nand
Kishore (supra) does not come to the aid of
the petitioners.

13. As far as the other decision in N.
Balakrishnan (supra) is concerned, it is
not disputed that the proposition laid down
therein clearly indicates that it is not the
length of delay which is material, but it is
the sufficiency of cause. In the said
decision, it was also noticed by the Apex
Court that in case, even if there is huge
delay, but the cause has been appropriately
explained, such delay can be condoned, but
its converse is, even where there is a short
delay, but not adequately explained it may
be fatal.

14. It is this proposition which is to be
applied in the instant case and now in the
backdrop of the proposition noticed above,
it will be appropriate to take a look at the
application moved by the petitioners
seeking condonation of delay and recall of
the order dated 07.01.2002, which has been
brought on record, as Annexure No.4.

15.
The
said
application
dated
27.01.2020, in Para-5 mentions casually
that in January, 2020, the petitioners came
to know about the order and thereafter on
27.01.2020, the application for recall has
been moved. For the purposes of clarity, it
will be appropriate to reproduce Para-3 to 7
of the said application and the same reads
as under:-

"ि र -3 यह दक उपरोि व ि में हम प्र थीगणों को
व दवपक्षी संख्य -8, 9 व 10 को कोई वैि दनक सूचन नहीं िी
गयी और न प्र थी को आक र पत्र 23 बन गय व 45 भी बन गय
और कब्ज भी िे दिय गय और उसी प्रक र से क दबज व िखील
घले आ रहे है।

ि र -4 यह दक दवव दित भूदम क इन्द्र ज तब से
बर बर चल आ रह है तथ कब्ज भी चल आ रह है और चूंदक
10 All. Nanhak @ Nanhkey & Ors. Vs. D.D.C., Unnao & Ors.
417
प्र थीगण कब्ज म चल आ रह है इसदलए कोई इन्तख ब भी नहीं
ली।

ि र -5 यह दक बम ह जनवरी 2020 में दवपक्षी
संख्य 1 त 7 ने दवव दित ख ते की भूदम में जो हम प्र थीगणो के
न म अंदकत थी कब्ज करने के दलए प्रय स दकय और यह कह दक
हम र दहस्स क यम हो चुक है तथ हम र न म भी चढ़ चुक है।

ि र -6 यह दक दिन ंक 22.01.2020 को
लेखप ल से दमल तब इन्त ख प्र प्त की तो उनके न म अंदकत होने
क तथ्य प्रक श में आय ।

ि र -7 यह दक इन्तख ब लेने के उपर न्त प्र थीगणो
ने उन्न व आकर वकील से दमले और क गज त क मुआइन कर य
तब दिन ंक 25.01.2020 को इन सभी मुकिमो की ज नक री
हुयी।"

16. It is in this backdrop, from a
perusal of the material on record, it would
indicate that there has been no real attempt
on the part of the petitioners to explain a
delay of eighteen years. It is true that where
cause has been sufficiently explained, the
Court is vested with powers to condone the
delay, but it is equally true that the delay is
not to be condoned in a routine manner or
as an act of generosity. The longer the
delay, the heavier is the onus to explain the
sufficiency of cause and consequently it
was incumbent upon the petitioners to have
explained it cogently. From a perusal of the
aforesaid paragraphs, it would indicate that
there is hardly any cause explained rather
just a vague averment has been made that
in the month of January, 2020 the
petitioners became aware and thereafter the
application has been moved on 27.01.2020.

17. At this stage, it will also be
relevant to refer to a recent decision of the
Apex Court in the case of Shivamma v.
Karnataka Housing Board and others,
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, wherein the
entire law on the sufficient cause and
limitation has been reviewed by the Apex
Court and it has been held that it is not only
for the period after the limitation expires
that cause has to be shown and explained,
but it is also to be explained from the date
the limitation starts to run and the
bonafides of the applicant relating to what
steps were taken during the period of
limitation.

18. This Court is reminded of another
decision of the Apex Court in the case of
H. Guruswamy & Ors. v. A. Krishnaiah,
2025 SCC OnLine SC 54, wherein the
Apex Court has reiterated and re-visited the
principles upon which an application for
condonation of delay is to be tested in
Paras 13 to 17 reads as under:-

"13. We are at our wits end to
understand why the High Court overlooked
all the aforesaid aspects. What was the
good reason for the High Court to ignore
all this? Time and again, the Supreme
Court has reminded the District judiciary as
well the High courts that the concepts such
as "liberal approach", "Justice oriented
approach", "substantial justice" should not
be employed to frustrate or jettison the
substantial law of limitation.

14. We are constrained to observe
that the High Court has exhibited complete
absence
of
judicial
conscience
and
restraints, which a judge is expected to
maintain while adjudicating a lis between
the parties.

15. The rules of limitation are not
meant to destroy the rights of parties. They
are meant to see that the parties do not
resort to dilatory tactics but seek their
remedy promptly.

16. The length of the delay is
definitely a relevant matter which the court
418 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
must
take
into
consideration
while
considering whether the delay should be
condoned or not. From the tenor of the
approach of the respondents herein, it
appears that they want to fix their own
period of limitation for the purpose of
instituting the proceedings for which law
has prescribed a period of limitation. Once
it is held that a party has lost his right to
have the matter considered on merits
because of his own inaction for a long, it
cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate
delay and in such circumstances of the
case, he cannot be heard to plead that the
substantial justice deserves to be preferred
as against the technical considerations.
While considering the plea for condonation
of delay, the court must not start with the
merits of the main matter. The court owes a
duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the
explanation offered by the party seeking
condonation. It is only if the sufficient
cause assigned by the litigant and the
opposition of the other side is equally
balanced that the court may bring into aid
the merits of the matter for the purpose of
condoning the delay.

17. We are of the view that the
question of limitation is not merely a
technical consideration. The rules of
limitation are based on the principles of
sound public policy and principles of
equity. No court should keep the 'Sword of
Damocles' hanging over the head of a
litigant for an indefinite period of time."

19. In this background, it would reveal
that there is hardly any statement made in
the application seeking condonation of
delay. The issue relates to the proceedings
initiated under the U.P. Consolidation and
Holdings Act, 1953 (for short, 'the Act of
1953') and it is also not disputed that on the
date when the said application for recall
was moved i.e. on 27.01.2020, the
notification under Section 52 of the Act of
1953 had been published long ago and had
it not been for moving an application for
condonation of delay, the Consolidation
Authorities loose their jurisdiction after the
notification of Section 52 of the Act of
1953.

20. It is taking note of the aforesaid
circumstances
including
the
material
available on record which indicates that the
petitioner No.2 himself participated in the
proceedings, but at a later stage, stopped
appearing, as a consequence, the impugned
orders though ex parte dated 07.01.2002
was passed.

21. There is no explanation in this
regard rather it is not even indicated that
once
Ram
Khilawan
himself
had
participated in the proceedings then what
was the cause which prevented him from
appearing in the proceedings thereafter
coupled with the fact that once the order
impugned dated 07.01.2002 was passed and
subsequent thereto, the notification under
Section 52 of the Act of 1953 was
published
even
then
what
was
the
explanation,
which
prevented
the
petitioners
to
move
an
appropriate
application within time or the cause which
prevented the petitioners to move the
application after eighteen years.

22. In absence of cogent explanation,
the cause cannot be treated to be sufficient
and merely to cover up the period of
eighteen years of delay, a futile attempt has
been
made
in
a
cavalier
manner.
Accordingly, taking note of the aforesaid
propositions including the decision of the
Apex Court in Shivamma (supra) and H.
Guruswamy (supra) the reasoning given
by the three Consolidation Authorities, this
10 All. Ram Raj Vs. Board Of Revenue & Ors.
419
Court does not find that there is any
palpable error committed by the three
authorities in rejecting the application
under Section 5 of the Act of 1963. Hence,
for all the aforesaid reasons, the petition is
devoid of merits and it is dismissed at the
admission stage itself.
----------
(2025) 10 ILRA 419
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.10.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Writ B No. 5737 of 1978

Ram Raj ...Petitioner
Versus
Board Of Revenue & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Hari Manish Bahadur Sinha, Ratnakar
Chaudhary, T.B. Pandey

Counsel for the Respondents:
Akhilesh Kumar, M.C. Yadav, M.L. Yadav,
Narayan
Dutt
Shukla,
P.N.
Singh,
Rituvendra Singh Nagvanshi, S.C., Salil
Srivastava, T.P. Singh

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether, where the Courts below in exercise of
their power under Section 331-A of the U.P.
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950
have concurrently opined that the Revenue
Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit as the
suit property was not 'land' within the meaning
of Section 3(14) of the Act of 1950, they ought
to have dismissed the suit or directed return of
the plaint for presentation to the Court of
competent jurisdiction?

HEADNOTE
U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,
1950 - Sections 3(14), 229-B, 331-A - Suit for
declaration with alternate prayer for possession
- Suit dismissed as not maintainable by three
Courts below - Suit property held not to be
'land' within the meaning of Section 3(14) of the
Act of 1950 - Issue referred under Section 331A - Sub-Divisional Officer carried out spot
inspection on 07.01.1968 - Suit property found
to be parti surrounded by boundary wall - No
crop raised for 14-15 months - Land crop-less
for last 2-3 years - Recorded as abadi - Suit
property not being used for purposes of
agriculture or pisciculture etc. - Finding that
property is abadi affirmed by Assistant Collector,
Additional Commissioner and Board of Revenue
- Nothing perverse demonstrated - Courts
below concurrently opined that Revenue Court
had no jurisdiction to try the suit - Held that
they ought not to have dismissed the suit -
Instead, the plaint should have been returned
for presentation to the Court of competent
jurisdiction, which would be the Civil Court - A
Court which opines that it has no jurisdiction
over
the
subject-matter
does
not
have
jurisdiction to dismiss the suit - Impugned
judgments and decrees quashed - Direction
issued to return plaint in Suit No. 398 of 1967
for presentation to competent Court - Interim
protection
against
dispossession
granted.
(Paras 1, 9, 16-20)

HELD Writ petition arose out of a suit for
declaration under Section 229-B of the U.P.
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950
with an alternate prayer for possession. Suit was
dismissed by the three Courts below as not
maintainable, the suit property being held not to
be 'land' within the meaning of Section 3(14) of
the Act of 1950.Sub-Divisional Officer, after
personal inspection recorded finding that the
suit property was recorded as abadi, and not
being used for purposes of agriculture or
pisciculture etc. That finding was affirmed in
appeal and second appeal.Since the Courts
below, in exercise of their power under Section
331-A of the Act of 1950, had concurrently
opined that the Revenue Court had no
jurisdiction to try the suit, they ought not to
have dismissed it. Instead, the plaint should
have been returned for presentation to the
Court of competent jurisdiction. A Court that
opines not to have jurisdiction over the subjectmatter does not have jurisdiction to dismiss the
suit. Accordingly, the judgments and decrees
dated 22.04.1970, 22.07.1971 and 24.05.1978