# Nanhey v. State

- **Citation:** (2022) 9 ILRA 1623
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-08-29
- **Case number:** Jail Appeal No. 3589 of 2005
- **Bench:** Ashwani Kumar Mishra, Shiv Shanker Prasad
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/nanhey-v-state-49057
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure
Code,1973-Section 374(2) - Indian Penal
Code,1860-Sections 302 r/w Section 34Culpable
homicide-life
imprisonmentSudden fight over dirty water flowing in
the
drain
between
neighbours-The
statement of PW-1 is specific that it was
the accused appellant who inflicted stab
wound on the abdomen of the deceased
and other injuries caused by Lathi and
Danda by two brothers of the appellantthere was no premediation on part of the
accused
party-The
case
falls
under
Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC- therefore,
the appellant could at best be punished
for culpable homicide not amounting to
murder, under Section 304 IPC, and not
under Section 302 IPC-Since he has
already undergone incarceration of nearly
16 years, even without remission-The
appellant is thus convicted under Section
304 IPC and is released on the period of
sentence already undergone by him. (Para
1 to 20)
The appeal is partly allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

9 All. Nanhey Vs. State
1623

20. Record and proceedings be sent
back to the Court below forthwith.

21. A copy of this order be sent to the
jail authorities for following this order and
doing the needful.

22. This Court is thankful to Sri
Abhishek Mayank, learned counsel for the
appellant who has ably assisted this Court
and even argued the main matter. We are
also thankful to Sri N.K. Srivastava and Sri
Mishra, learned A.G.As for ably assisting
us.
----------
(2022) 9 ILRA 1623
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 29.08.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ASHWANI KUMAR MISHRA , J.
THE HON'BLE SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, J.

Jail Appeal No. 3589 of 2005

Nanhey ...Appellant
Versus
State ...Opposite Party

Counsel for the Appellant:
From Jail, Sri Pramod Kumar Pandey (A/C)

Counsel for the Opposite Party:
A.G.A.

A. Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure
Code,1973-Section 374(2) - Indian Penal
Code,1860-Sections 302 r/w Section 34Culpable
homicide-life
imprisonmentSudden fight over dirty water flowing in
the
drain
between
neighbours-The
statement of PW-1 is specific that it was
the accused appellant who inflicted stab
wound on the abdomen of the deceased
and other injuries caused by Lathi and
Danda by two brothers of the appellantthere was no premediation on part of the
accused
party-The
case
falls
under
Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC- therefore,
the appellant could at best be punished
for culpable homicide not amounting to
murder, under Section 304 IPC, and not
under Section 302 IPC-Since he has
already undergone incarceration of nearly
16 years, even without remission-The
appellant is thus convicted under Section
304 IPC and is released on the period of
sentence already undergone by him. (Para
1 to 20)
The appeal is partly allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:
1. Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak Vs St. of Guj.
(2003) 9 SCC 322 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1809

2. Virsa Singh Vs St. of Punj. (1958) AIR SC 465
: 1958 Cri LJ 818

3. St. of U.K. Vs Sachendra Singh Rawat (2022)
4 SCC 227
(Delivered by Hon'ble Ashwani Kumar
Mishra, J.
&
Hon'ble Shiv Shanker Prasad, J.)

1. Heard Sri Pramod Kumar Pandey,
learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant
and Mrs. Archana Singh, learned AGA for
the State.

2. This jail appeal is directed against
judgment and order dated 22.07.2005,
passed by the Additional Sessions Judge/
Special Judge, Budaun in Sessions Trial
No. 29 of 2003, State vs. Nanhey whereby
the appellant has been convicted under
section 302 read with 34 IPC, in Crime
No.123/98, Police Station Islamnagar,
District
Budaun
and
consequently
sentenced to life imprisonment.

3. As per the prosecution version the
first informant (PW-1) was cleaning drain
1624 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
in front of his house during morning when
accused appellant Nanhey alongwith his
brothers Nanki and Kalicharan objected to
the waste water being discharged in their
drain. The father of first informant (the
deceased) is stated to have told the accused
party that dirty water was being discharged
in this fashion, from before, on which the
accused persons got enraged and started
abusing the informant's father. This was
objected whereafter the accused appellant
Nanhey stabbed the deceased in his
abdomen while Nanki and Kalicharan hit
him by Lathi and Danda (stick - a blunt
object). The incident is said to have
occurred at 6.00 am. On raising alarm by
the brother-in-law of the informant, who
was also present, Mahipal and certain other
persons saw the incident and the accused
persons fled. On the basis of such written
report given by PW-1, the first information
report
under
Section
307
IPC
was
registered at 7.40 am on 11.5.1998.

4. The injured was taken to the police
station whereafter he was referred to the
hospital for medical examination. Injury
report (Ext. Ka-14) of injured Ram
Swaroop has been placed on record. The
injured Ram Swaroop remain hospitalized
and
ultimately
died
on
15.5.1998.
Panchayatnama has also been prepared on
15.5.1998 at 2.10 pm, in which the inquest
witnesses opined that death of Ram
Swaroop was homicidal. Postmortem of the
body came to be conducted by Dr. R.K.
Agarwal (PW-5) on 16.5.1998, wherein
cause of death was held to be shock and
septicemia, as a result of ante-mortem
injuries. The investigation continued and
ultimately a chargesheet was submitted
against the accused appellant Nanhey and
co-accused Nanki. Nanki, however, has
absconded.
Name
of
other
accused
Kalicharan was not included as an accused
in the chargesheet.

5. Cognizance in the matter was
thereafter
taken
by
the
concerned
Magistrate, who committed the matter to
the court of Sessions, by which the offence
was triable. Sessions Trial No. 29 of 2003
came to be registered wherein the charges
were read out to the accused appellant who
denied them and the trial commenced.

6. In order to establish the charge
framed
against
the
appellant
the
prosecution adduced oral and documentary
evidence.
The
documentary
evidence
consisted of written report of the FIR (Ext.
Ka-1); Attachment memo (Ext. Ka-2); FIR
(Ext. Ka-4); Postmortem Report (Ext. Ka6); Injury report of Ram Swaroop (Ext. Ka14);
and
Charge-sheet
etc.
These
documents were also proved.

7. The prosecution adduced oral
testimony of first informant Krishna Pal
(PW-1), who is an eye-witness to the act of
crime. PW-2 Munna Lal who happened to
be son-in-law of the deceased was
examined but he turned hostile. Prosecution
has also examined Sushil Kumar (PW-3),
who later conducted investigation in the
matter. PW-4, Head Constable Raj Kumar
Singh has verified that written report (Ext.
Ka-1) was incorporated in the General
Diary of the Police Station and Check FIR
was consequently issued. Dr. R.K. Agarwal
(PW-5), who conducted the autopsy has
proved the postmortem report (Ext. Ka-6).
The doctor opined that cause of death of
deceased was septicemia due to antemortem injuries. Dr. M.K. Verma, who
examined the injured was also adduced as
PW-7, for verifying his injury report (Ext.
Ka-14). PW-6 K.C. Dixit and PW-8
Mahendra Singh were formal witnesses.
9 All. Nanhey Vs. State
1625

8. On the basis of above evidence
adduced by prosecution, during the course
of trial, the Court of Sessions held the
accused appellant guilty of commissioning
offence under Section 302 read with 34 IPC
and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
Thus aggrieved, the accused appellant
preferred the present Jail Appeal in 2005.

9. Sri Pramod Kumar Pandey, learned
amicus curiae submits that charge under
Section 302 read with 34 IPC is not made
out against the accused appellant, inasmuch
as, the cause of death has not been
established and the allegation that it was on
account of the stab wound caused by the
appellant that the deceased died is not
proved. He also urges that accused
appellant has denied the accusations under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. and in reply to
Question No. 13 explained that deceased
was hit by buffalo and he fell on the Plough
due to which abdominal injury was caused.
It is also argued that defence of the
appellant has not been considered in its
correct perspective.

10. Counsel for the appellant in the
alternative submits that even if the
allegations made against the accused
appellant are taken on its face value, yet he
cannot be convicted of an offence under
Section 302 IPC since by virtue of
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, the act not
being on a premeditation and having arisen
in a sudden fight in the heat of passion
upon a sudden quarrel and without the
offender having taken undue advantage or
acted in a cruel or unusual manner would
not
amount
to
culpable
homicide
amounting to murder and, therefore, the
appellant at best could be sentenced under
Section 304 IPC Part 2 or at best Part 1,
and that the life sentence awarded under
Section 302 IPC is wholly unwarranted in
the facts of the case and is unsustainable in
law.

11. Learned AGA, Mrs. Archana
Singh on the other hand submits that a
timely first information report was lodged
in the matter under Section 307 IPC and the
injured was taken to the hospital by the
police. She submits that the injury report is
categorical with regard to the abdominal
stab wound caused to the deceased on the
left side of the abdomen which is consistent
with the ocular testimony of eye-witness
PW-1 who has seen the accused appellant
inflicting stab wound on the abdomen of
deceased. It is further submitted that the
ocular testimony of PW-1 is reliable and
matches with the postmortem report and
also the injury report and there is absolutely
no reason for any false implication of the
accused appellant. In such circumstances,
learned counsel submits that the conviction
and sentence awarded to the accused
appellant is absolutely in accordance with
law and the appeal lacks merit.

12. We heard learned counsel for the
parties and perused the records of the
present appeal and have carefully gone
through the evidence brought on record.

13. Records clearly reveal that a
timely first information report has been
lodged in the matter at 7.40 am on the date
of incident i.e. 11.5.1998. The incident
itself has taken place at 6.00 in the
morning. The allegation in the FIR is that it
was a sudden fight which erupted between
the parties on account of flowing of dirty
water in the drain. The accused appellant
and the deceased are otherwise neighbours
and closely related to each other. As per
FIR allegation the deceased had objected to
the abuses, being hurled, when an objection
was raised by the accused party over
1626 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
flowing of dirty water in the drain. It is
alleged that the appellant Nanhey caused
the first stab injury by knife on the left side
abdomen of the deceased, whereafter
injuries were also caused by hard and blunt
object (Lathi and Danda) by the two
brothers of the accused appellant. It is not
in dispute that charge-sheet has been filed
only against two brother namely Nanhey
and Nanki and as Nanki has absconded and
the trial has proceeded only against the
accused appellant.

14. The statement of PW-1 has been
relied upon by the prosecution, who
happens to be the son of the deceased and
his presence on the spot is not doubted.
PW-1 was residing in the same house with
the deceased and has categorically stated
that the three accused in the matter are the
sons of his uncle who live in the
neighbourhood. The site plan is part of
record which shows that the accused party
and the deceased were neighbours. He has
clearly stated that a fight erupted at 6.00 in
the morning when he was cleaning the
drain in front of his house and his father
was also present at the spot. The accused
party are stated to have hurled abuses and
on the deceased objecting to it the accused
party caused injuries to the deceased. The
statement of PW-1 is specific that it was
the accused appellant who inflicted stab
wound on the abdomen of the deceased.
Although counsel for the appellant has tried
to show some minor discrepancy in the
statement of PW-1, but we find that on
material
particulars
and
aspects
his
statement is consistent with regard to
injuries being caused by knife to the
deceased by the accused appellant. We
further find that the ocular testimony of
PW-1, who happens to be the son of the
deceased is consistent with the injury report
and the postmortem report both of which
have been duly proved by producing the
doctor who examined the deceased and the
doctor who conducted the postmortem of
the deceased. Once the ocular testimony of
witnesses is found consistent with the
medical evidence available on record and
the defence has otherwise not been able to
show any inconsistency in the statement of
eye-witness PW-1 on material aspects, we
are of the view that the incident as has been
alleged to have occurred has been proved
by the prosecution.

15. So far as the statement of accused
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. about a different
reason (fall on the Plough) is concerned, the
same clearly supports the prosecution
statement that an injury was caused to the
deceased on the eventful day. No defence
witness has otherwise been produced on
behalf of the accused appellant to substantiate
his defence that the cause of injury was other
than what has been alleged and substantiated
by prosecution in the matter.

16. So far as the argument advanced by
counsel for the appellant with regard to the
matter being covered by Exception 4 to
Section 300 IPC is concerned, it would be
worth noticing the provision itself at the
outset. Section 300 IPC defines murder. It
also contains various exceptions where the
offending act would not amount to murder.
Exception 4, which is relied upon on behalf
of the appellant, reads as under:-

"Exception 4. --Culpable homicide
is not murder if it is committed without
premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of
passion upon a sudden quarrel and without
the offender having taken undue advantage or
acted in a cruel or unusual manner."

17. The fourth exception takes out the
specified act out of the purview of culpable
9 All. Nanhey Vs. State
1627
homicide amounting to murder. Necessary
ingredients of Exception 4 are that the
offending
act
is
committed
without
premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat
of passion, upon a sudden quarrel and
without the offender having taken undue
advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual
manner. Explanation to Exception 4 also
provides that it is immaterial in such cases
as to which party offers the provocation or
commits the first assault. When the facts of
the present case are viewed in the context
of above provision, we find that the
prosecution case is specific, inasmuch as,
the dispute between the parties erupted
suddenly at the time when the son of the
deceased was cleaning his drain in front of
his house. PW-1, who is the star witness of
the prosecution, has clearly admitted that it
was during cleaning of drain by him that
the accused persons objected to flowing of
dirty water in their drain which resulted in
sudden fight erupting on the spot. The
deceased objected to the protest by accused
party by saying that such water was
flowing from before on which he was
abused and stab injury was caused to him
by accused appellant. There is nothing on
record to show that there was any
premeditation on part of the accused party
in
inflicting
the
stab
injury
which
ultimately resulted in septicemia and
consequential death. The statement of PW1 as also the contents of FIR clearly go to
show that it was a case of sudden fight in
the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel.
It is otherwise on record that after the
injuries caused to the deceased he was
taken to the hospital where he remained
hospitalized and ultimately died after five
days due to septicemia and hemorrhage on
account of ante-mortem injuries.

18. We may at this stage refer to the
judgment of the Supreme Court in State of
Uttarakhand v. Sachendra Singh Rawat,
(2022) 4 SCC 227 wherein the Court
examined Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC
and observed as under:

"8. In Virsa Singh [Virsa Singh v.
State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 : 1958
Cri LJ 818] , in paras 16 and 17, it was
observed and held as under : (AIR p. 468)

"16. ... The question is not
whether the prisoner intended to inflict a
serious injury or a trivial one but whether
he intended to inflict the injury that is
proved to be present. If he can show that he
did not, or if the totality of the
circumstances justify such an inference,
then, of course, the intent that the section
requires is not proved. But if there is
nothing beyond the injury and the fact that
the appellant inflicted it, the only possible
inference is that he intended to inflict it.
Whether he knew of its seriousness, or
intended serious consequences, is neither
here nor there. The question, so far as the
intention is concerned, is not whether he
intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a
particular
degree
of
seriousness,
but
whether he intended to inflict the injury in
question; and once the existence of the
injury is proved the intention to cause it
will be presumed unless the evidence or the
circumstances
warrant
an
opposite
conclusion. But whether the intention is
there or not is one of fact and not one of
law. Whether the wound is serious or
otherwise, and if serious, how serious, is a
totally separate and distinct question and
has nothing to do with the question whether
the prisoner intended to inflict the injury in
question.

17. It is true that in a given case
the enquiry may be linked up with the
seriousness of the injury. For example, if it
1628 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
can be proved, or if the totality of the
circumstances justify an inference, that the
prisoner only intended a superficial scratch
and that by accident his victim stumbled
and fell on the sword or spear that was
used, then of course the offence is not
murder. But that is not because the prisoner
did not intend the injury that he intended to
inflict to be as serious as it turned out to be
but because he did not intend to inflict the
injury in question at all. His intention in
such a case would be to inflict a totally
different injury. The difference is not one
of law but one of fact;...."

(emphasis supplied)

9. In Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai
Nayak [Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak v.
State of Gujarat, (2003) 9 SCC 322 : 2003
SCC (Cri) 1809] , on applicability of
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, it was
observed and held in para 11 as under :
(SCC pp. 327-28)

"11. The Fourth Exception of
Section 300 IPC covers acts done in a
sudden fight. The said Exception deals with
a case of prosecution (sic provocation) not
covered by the first exception, after which
its
place
would
have
been
more
appropriate. The Exception is founded
upon the same principle, for in both there is
absence of premeditation. But, while in the
case of Exception 1 there is total
deprivation of self-control, in case of
Exception 4, there is only that heat of
passion which clouds men's sober reason
and urges them to deeds which they would
not otherwise do. There is provocation in
Exception 4 as in Exception 1, but the
injury done is not the direct consequence of
that provocation. In fact, Exception 4 deals
with cases in which notwithstanding that a
blow may have been struck, or some
provocation given in the origin of the
dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may
have originated, yet the subsequent conduct
of both parties puts them in respect of guilt
upon an equal footing. A "sudden fight"
implies mutual provocation and blows on
each side. The homicide committed is then
clearly
not
traceable
to
unilateral
provocation, nor could in such cases the
whole blame be placed on one side. For if it
were so, the Exception more appropriately
applicable would be Exception 1. There is
no previous deliberation or determination
to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for
which both parties are more or less to be
blamed. It may be that one of them starts it,
but if the other had not aggravated it by his
own conduct it would not have taken the
serious turn it did. There is then mutual
provocation and aggravation, and it is
difficult to apportion the share of blame
which attaches to each fighter. The help of
Exception 4 can be invoked if death is
caused : (a) without premeditation, (b) in a
sudden fight, (c) without the offenders
having taken undue advantage or acted in a
cruel or unusual manner, and (d) the fight
must have been with the person killed. To
bring a case within Exception 4 all the
ingredients mentioned in it must be found.
It is to be noted that the "fight" occurring in
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not
defined in IPC. It takes two to make a fight.
Heat of passion requires that there must be
no time for the passions to cool down and
in this case, the parties had worked
themselves into a fury on account of the
verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight
is a combat between two and more persons
whether with or without weapons. It is not
possible to enunciate any general rule as to
what shall be deemed to be a sudden
quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether
a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily
depend upon the proved facts of each case.
9 All. Nanhey Vs. State
1629
For the application of Exception 4, it is not
sufficient to show that there was a sudden
quarrel and there was no premeditation. It
must further be shown that the offender has
not taken undue advantage or acted in a
cruel or unusual manner. The expression
"undue advantage" as used in the provision
means "unfair advantage"."

10.
In
Pulicherla
Nagaraju
[Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of A.P.,
(2006) 11 SCC 444 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri)
500] , this Court had an occasion to
consider the case of culpable homicide not
amounting to murder and the intention to
cause death. It was observed and held by
this Court that the intention to cause death
can
be
gathered
generally
from
a
combination of a few or several of the
following, among other, circumstances:

(i) nature of the weapon used;

(ii) whether the weapon was
carried by the accused or was picked up
from the spot;

(iii) whether the blow is aimed at
a vital part of the body;

(iv)
the
amount
of
force
employed in causing injury;

(v) whether the act was in the
course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or
free-for-all fight;

(vi) whether the incident occurs
by chance or whether there was any
premeditation;

(vii) whether there was any prior
enmity or whether the deceased was a
stranger;

(viii) whether there was any grave
and sudden provocation, and if so, the
cause for such provocation;

(ix) whether it was in the heat of
passion;

(x) whether the person inflicting
the injury has taken undue advantage or has
acted in a cruel and unusual manner;

(xi) whether the accused dealt a
single blow or several blows."

19. In light of the deliberations held,
we find that the case at hand clearly falls
within Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC and,
therefore, the appellant could at best be
punished
for
culpable
homicide
not
amounting to murder, under Section 304
IPC, and not under Section 302 IPC. It is
on record that the appellant was in Jail at
the time when charges were framed against
him in the year 2003. He has been released
from Jail only on 26.1.2019 and, therefore,
he has already undergone incarceration of
nearly 16 years, even without remission.
The appellant is thus convicted under
Section 304 IPC and is released on the
period of sentence already undergone by
him. He shall be released from Jail,
forthwith, unless he is wanted in any other
cases subject to compliance of Section
437A Cr.P.C.

20. This Jail Appeal is thus partly
allowed on above terms.

21. Sri Pramod Kumar Pandey,
learned Amicus Curiae has assisted the
Court in disposal of the present jail appeal
and is entitled to his fee quantified at
Rs.15,000/- from the High Court Legal
Services Authority.
----------
1630 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2022) 9 ILRA 1630
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 22.08.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MAHESH CHANDRA
TRIPATHI, J.
THE HON'BLE CHANDRA KUMAR RAI, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 3774 of 2011
Connected With
Criminal Appeal No. 4433 of 2011

Amit @ Amit Yadav ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Opposite Party

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri
P.C.
Srivasatva,
Sri
Amit
Singh
Chauhan, Sri Anil Srivastava, Sri Manish
Tandon, Sri Noor Mohammad, Sri Rajesh
Yadav, Sri Rajiv Lochan Shukla, Sri V.K.
Upadhyay, Sri Thakur Prasad Dubey

Counsel for the Opposite Party:
Govt. Advocate, Sri Jai Shankar Malviya

A. Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure
Code,1860 - Sectionn 374(2) - Indian
Penal
Code,1860-Sections
302/34,
504,506 - Arms Act,1959 - Section 25 -
Challenge to-Conviction- In the present
case, total 11 prosecution witnesses were
examined but from the perusal of the
evidence, it is clear that there is no direct
evidence against the accused and he is
the nephew of the PW-1, who is the
informant of the case and he has been
falsely implicated in the present casethere was a dispute between PW-1 and
the deceased regarding a shop and the
alleged incident had taken place at the
house of the informant, which also
creates
doubt
about
the
place
of
occurrence one of the eye witnesses who
is the step mother of the deceased, has
not been produced before the trial court
and the witnesses of recovery (PW-5 and
PW-6) have turned hostile-Once the
testimony of the PW-1 was trustworthy
and even his testimony was intact in the
cross-examination then in such situation
we do not find any good ground to make
any
adverse
reference
against
the
prosecution to the effect that even
though other witness was available but
she was being withheld from the CourtThe recovery of the country made pistols
and live cartridges, which were testified
to be true and the said weapons utilised
by the appellants for commission of
offence, which was proved by Doctor
(PW-3)
and
Doctor
(PW-4),
clearly
corroborate the same and hence, the
argument of recovery is also not tenable,
rather
the
prosecution
version
is
established- The recovery of the weapons
on their pointing out, the utilization
thereof and the manner of assault by the
appellants all stood corroborated with
the medical evidence and further fortified
by the post-mortem report- The evidence
on record also indicates that all the
accused had joined together on spot with
the common intention of committing
murder of the deceased-Held, the trial
court
had
rightly
accepted
the
prosecution version and the same was
proved beyond reasonable doubt -The
trial court is also fully justified in coming
to the conclusion that there was meeting
of mind established from the evidence on
record-learned trial court committed no
error to arrive at the conclusion of
convicting the appellants.(Para 1 to 52)

B. It is a trite proposition of law that in
criminal trial, it is the quality of evidence
which matters and not the quantity. Thus,
no
malafide
could
be
attributed
to
prosecution case simply on that premise.
Section 134 of Evidence Act does not
require
any
particular
number
of
witnesses to prove any fact. Plurality of
witnesses in a criminal trial is not the
legislative
intent.
Therefore,
if
the
testimony of sole witness is found reliable
on the touchstone of credibility, accused
can be convicted on the basis of said sole
testimony.(Para 46)

The appeal is dismissed. (E-6)