# Nanhu & Ors v. Raksha Ram & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 11 ILRA 945
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-11-12
- **Case number:** Writ - C No. 1002672 of 2001
- **Bench:** Jaspreet Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/nanhu-ors-v-raksha-ram-ors-54812
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

C.S.C., Alka Verma, Deepak Chandra Jain,
Q.M. Haque, Tanay Hazari, Vijai Bahadur
Verma

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to the scope and limits of the
jurisdiction of the Registrar under Ss. 73 and 75
of the Registration Act, 1908, particularly
"where the execution of a sale-deed is denied
by the executant", and whether the Registrar
can direct registration in a summary proceeding
when serious disputes regarding execution and
title subsist.

Headnotes
Registration Act, 1908 - Ss. 71, 73, 74 &
75 - Scope of Registrar's powers - Denial
of execution - Effect - Registrar cannot
direct registration when execution itself is
disputed - Quasi-judicial authority - Limits
- Execution distinguished from mere
signing - Admission of signature not
equivalent to execution
- Registrar's
enquiry under Section 74 - Quasi-judicial,
summary in nature - Not substitute for
civil trial - Civil remedies already invoked
and dismissed for want of prosecution -
Indirect relief impermissible - Effect on
summary registration proceedings - Writ
jurisdiction - Challenge to order directing
registration - Order directing registration
946 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
without
adequate
reasons
-
Unsustainable.
Held: where a person denies the execution and
the Sub-Registrar in such cases is bound to
refuse the registration" and the powers under
Ss. 73 and 74 "is not as the appellate powers"
and "in such cases where the execution itself is
disputed, there cannot be a direction for
registering the sale-deed - It was an undisputed
fact that the petitioners held a "registered saledeed dated 03.08.1996" for Plots Nos. 64 and
203 and a "registered Will" for Plots Nos. 157
and 163, whereas the private-respondents'
alleged sale-deed dated 01.08.1996 was "not
registered" and its execution was specifically
denied by Matai before the Sub-Registrar - The
private-respondents had already taken recourse
to
civil
proceedings
and
consolidation
proceedings, both of which were "dismissed for
want of prosecution", and they could not be
permitted "to achieve something indirectly
which they have failed to achieve directly"- In
light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court
in Veena Singh v. District Registrar, the
Registrar "had exceeded his jurisdiction" in
directing registration when execution itself was
disputed, and such an order was also "not
sufficiently supported by reasons and is bereft
of sound reasoning"- The impugned order dated
27.08.2001 passed by the Registrar, Gonda, was
liable to be quashed, and accordingly "a writ in
the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the
impugned order". (Paras 18-34) (E-7)

Case Law Cited
Veena Singh v. District Registrar/Additional
Collector FR and another, 2022 7 SCC 1; Suraj
Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana,
(2009) 7 SCC 363

List of Acts
Registration Act, 1908; Constitution of India;
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953; Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908.

List of Keywords
denial of execution; duly executed; summary
proceedings; quasi-judicial; registered saledeed; registered Will; dismissed for want of
prosecution; exceeded his jurisdiction; surmises
and conjectures.

Case Arising From
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition filed
against the order dated 27.08.2001 passed by
the
District
Registrar,
Gonda,
directing
registration of the sale-deed under S. 73 of the
Registration Act, 1908.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
S.K. Mehrotra, I.D. Shukla
Advs. for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Alka Verma, Deepak Chandra Jain,
Q.M. Haque, Tanay Hazari, Vijai Bahadur Verma

## Text

_Characters 0–39,994 of 43,778. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39994 for what follows._

11 All. Nanhu & Ors. Vs. Raksha Ram & Ors.
945
29. It also shows that in order to
bring an industry within any of the entries
in Schedule I it has to be seen what is the
end product produced by that Industry.

 In
the
case
in
hands,
the
petitioner's industry is engaged in the
manufacturing of decorative laminating
sheets ( SENMICA) which to some extent
is a chemical endeavour but not to the
extent that the industry as a whole be
regarded as a " Chemical Industry" for the
purpose of imposition of cess. Moreover
the end product of the petitioner industry
.i.e.,
SENMICA
is
not
a
chemical
substance but a finished,composite product.
The declaration of the petitioners industry
as 'not chemical industry' was made by a
Division Bench of this Court vide judgment
and order dated 30.11.2004.

30. Considering in totalities of facts
and circumstances of the present case, order
dated 22.4.2002 (contained in Annexure
No.1) along with assessment orders dated
17.8.2002, 127.8.2002, 25.7.2002, 29.8.2002,
17.11.2003,
9.3.20024
(contained
in
Annexure Nos.1 to 6, 17, 18) are hereby
quashed. A further direction is hereby issued
that the amount of cess deposited by the
petitioner shall be released and shall be
refunded to the petitioner within a maximum
period of two months from the date a
certified copy of this order is produced before
the authority concerned.

31. In result, the writ petition
succeeds and is allowed.

32. Needless to say that cess in
respect of water consumed by petitioner's
industry in 'Formaline Plant' on the basis of
returns shall be levied in accordance with
law, especially under Section 3(2A) and
3(2) of the Cess Act, 1977.
----------
(2025) 11 ILRA 945
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 12.11.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J.

Writ - C No. 1002672 of 2001

Nanhu & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Raksha Ram & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
S.K. Mehrotra, I.D. Shukla

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Alka Verma, Deepak Chandra Jain,
Q.M. Haque, Tanay Hazari, Vijai Bahadur
Verma

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to the scope and limits of the
jurisdiction of the Registrar under Ss. 73 and 75
of the Registration Act, 1908, particularly
"where the execution of a sale-deed is denied
by the executant", and whether the Registrar
can direct registration in a summary proceeding
when serious disputes regarding execution and
title subsist.

Headnotes
Registration Act, 1908 - Ss. 71, 73, 74 &
75 - Scope of Registrar's powers - Denial
of execution - Effect - Registrar cannot
direct registration when execution itself is
disputed - Quasi-judicial authority - Limits
- Execution distinguished from mere
signing - Admission of signature not
equivalent to execution
- Registrar's
enquiry under Section 74 - Quasi-judicial,
summary in nature - Not substitute for
civil trial - Civil remedies already invoked
and dismissed for want of prosecution -
Indirect relief impermissible - Effect on
summary registration proceedings - Writ
jurisdiction - Challenge to order directing
registration - Order directing registration
946 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
without
adequate
reasons
-
Unsustainable.
Held: where a person denies the execution and
the Sub-Registrar in such cases is bound to
refuse the registration" and the powers under
Ss. 73 and 74 "is not as the appellate powers"
and "in such cases where the execution itself is
disputed, there cannot be a direction for
registering the sale-deed - It was an undisputed
fact that the petitioners held a "registered saledeed dated 03.08.1996" for Plots Nos. 64 and
203 and a "registered Will" for Plots Nos. 157
and 163, whereas the private-respondents'
alleged sale-deed dated 01.08.1996 was "not
registered" and its execution was specifically
denied by Matai before the Sub-Registrar - The
private-respondents had already taken recourse
to
civil
proceedings
and
consolidation
proceedings, both of which were "dismissed for
want of prosecution", and they could not be
permitted "to achieve something indirectly
which they have failed to achieve directly"- In
light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court
in Veena Singh v. District Registrar, the
Registrar "had exceeded his jurisdiction" in
directing registration when execution itself was
disputed, and such an order was also "not
sufficiently supported by reasons and is bereft
of sound reasoning"- The impugned order dated
27.08.2001 passed by the Registrar, Gonda, was
liable to be quashed, and accordingly "a writ in
the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the
impugned order". (Paras 18-34) (E-7)

Case Law Cited
Veena Singh v. District Registrar/Additional
Collector FR and another, 2022 7 SCC 1; Suraj
Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana,
(2009) 7 SCC 363

List of Acts
Registration Act, 1908; Constitution of India;
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953; Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908.

List of Keywords
denial of execution; duly executed; summary
proceedings; quasi-judicial; registered saledeed; registered Will; dismissed for want of
prosecution; exceeded his jurisdiction; surmises
and conjectures.

Case Arising From
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition filed
against the order dated 27.08.2001 passed by
the
District
Registrar,
Gonda,
directing
registration of the sale-deed under S. 73 of the
Registration Act, 1908.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
S.K. Mehrotra, I.D. Shukla
Advs. for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Alka Verma, Deepak Chandra Jain,
Q.M. Haque, Tanay Hazari, Vijai Bahadur Verma

(Delivered by Hon'ble Jaspreet Singh, J.)

1. Under challenge is the order dated
27.08.2001,
passed
by
the
District
Registrar, Gonda in exercise of powers
under Section 73 of the Registration Act,
1908 (for short, 'the Act of 1908'), whereby
it has directed the registration of sale-deed
to be executed in favour of the privaterespondents.

2.
In
order
to
appreciate
the
controversy involved in the instant petition,
it will be relevant to notice certain facts
giving rise to the instant petition.

3. The original-petitioner No.4, namely,
Matai, was the recorded tenure-holder of
Bhumidhari Plots No.64, 203, 157 and 163,
situate in Village Pakri Kaishwar, Post
Bishnupur Bairiya, Pargana, Tehsil and
District Gonda. The case set up by the
petitioners No.1 to 3 was that Matai was
living with them as a family. However, Matai
was finding it difficult to manage his
property, hence, he executed a sale-deed
dated 03.08.1996, in favour of the petitioners
No.1 to 3, relating to Plots No.64 and 203.
On the very same date, Matai also executed a
registered Will in favour of the petitioners
No.1 to 3 in respect of Plots No.157 and 163.

4. On the other hand, the privaterespondents set up a case that Matai had
11 All. Nanhu & Ors. Vs. Raksha Ram & Ors.
947
executed a sale-deed in their favour in
respect of all the four plots i.e. Plots No.64,
203, 157 and 163 on 01.08.1996. The
private-respondents along with Matai had
reached the office of Sub-Registrar for
completing all the formalities regarding
execution and registration of the sale-deed,
but on some pretext, Matai made himself
scarce and he fled from the Sub-Registrar's
Office.

5. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that
the
private-respondents
made
an
application to the office of Sub-Registrar
bringing on record the aforesaid facts
including that the sale consideration has
been paid to Matai and though he came to
execute and register the sale-deed, but he
fled from the site, hence, though the saledeed was executed, but could not be
registered, hence, an order for registering
the sale-deed in terms of Section 73 of the
Act of 1908 may be passed.

6.
The
said
proceedings
were
registered by the Sub-Registrar and the
petitioners No.1 to 3 were also issued
notices including Matai, who came forward and
denied the execution of the sale-deed said to
have been executed in favour of the privaterespondents before the Sub-Registrar and it was
also informed that Matai had already informed
the police about the illegal attempt of the
private-respondents for getting the sale-deed
executed
forcibly
including
putting
the
signatures on blank stamp papers and he
informed the Sub-Registrar that he had not
executed any sale-deed in favour of the privaterespondents. The Sub-Registrar considering the
facts and circumstances including noticing the
statement of Matai given to him, refused to
register the said document.

7. The private-respondents, being
aggrieved, preferred an application before
the Registrar under Section 73 of the Act of
1908. The matter was heard by the
Registrar and by means of the order dated
27.08.2001, it allowed the application of
the private-respondents and directed the
registration of the sale-deed in favour of the
private-respondents.

8. Being aggrieved, the petitioners
approached this Court by means of the
instant petition and by means of interim
order dated 07.09.2001, the execution of
the sale-deed in favour of the privaterespondents was stayed.

9. Shri I.D. Shukla, learned counsel
for the petitioners has argued that the entire
sequence of events, which have unfolded
would indicate that the petitioner No.4
Matai, who was the recorded tenure-holder
did not intend to execute the sale-deed in
favour of the private-respondents and he
had already informed to the Sub-Registrar
of the same, rather the petitioner No.4
executed a registered sale-deed in favour of
the petitioners No.1 to 3 and in furtherance
thereof, the name of the petitioners No.1 to
3 was also duly mutated in the revenue
records and it continues to do so.
Moreover, a FIR/NCR report was also
furnished to the police and in the given
circumstances, it was clear that the alleged
sale-deed and the claim of the privaterespondents could not be treated to be duly
executed, hence, the order impugned
passed by the Registrar is patently
erroneous.

10. Shri Shukla has further urged that
the reasoning upon which the impugned
order has been passed is two fold. The
Registrar
found
that
there
were
discrepancies in the statement given by
Matai regarding the version and the
sequence of events which occurred, which
948 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
clearly indicated that there was discrepancy
and the statement of Matai could not be
accepted as it was full of contradiction. The
other ground which was taken by the
Registrar in the impugned order was the
fact that the statement of the witnesses of
the sale-deed executed in favour of the
private-respondents clearly indicated that
Matai had executed the sale-deed after
taking the full sale consideration and in the
aforesaid circumstances, if the facts and the
material placed on record are seen, it will
reveal that the impugned order suffers from
vice of being arbitrary inasmuch as the
reasons as recorded above are based on
surmises and conjectures and not on the
basis of the material available on record.

11. It is submitted that the order just
refers to the statement of the witnesses, as a
matter of fact, but it does not disclose that
what the said witnesses stated which was
instrumental for the Registrar to arrive at a
conclusion that the sale-deed was executed
by Matai. In the impugned order, merely
making a reference that the witnesses
examined clearly proved the execution of
the sale-deed is per se bad, apart from the
fact that the chronology of events have not
been appropriately noticed including the
fact that the private-respondents had
already
instituted
a
suit
seeking
cancellation of the sale-deed executed and
registered in favour of the petitioners No.1
to
3
and
the
said
suit
of
the
plaintiffs/respondents
had
also
been
dismissed.

12. It has further been urged that
despite knowing the fact that Matai had
executed a sale-deed in favour of the
petitioners No.1 to 3 relating to Plots No.64
and 203 and a registered Will executed in
favour of the petitioners No.1 and 2
relating to Plots No.157 and 163, but the
said Will was not challenged. Thus, the
conduct of the private-respondents is also
contrary to their alleged case which has not
been
appropriately
considered
while
passing
the
order
and
in
such
circumstances, the petitioners, who are in
possession of the property cannot be made
to suffer at the behest of the privaterespondents that too in a summary
proceedings
especially
when
they
attempted to assail the rights of the
petitioners by filing a civil suit, wherein
they failed as the suit was dismissed. Thus,
for the aforesaid reasons, it is urged that the
impugned order be set aside after allowing
the petition.

13. Mrs. Alka Verma along with Shri
Tanay Hazari and Shri Vijai Bahadur
Verma, learned counsel for the privaterespondents have opposed the aforesaid
submissions and have urged that the
Registrar while passing the impugned
order dated 27.08.2001 has categorically
stated that the sale-deed was executed in
favour of the private-respondents after
taking the sale consideration and since
there were clear discrepancies in the
version of Matai relating to execution of
the sale-deed in favour of the privaterespondents, which is an indicator, that at
different places, different versions have
been given to delay and to harass the
private-respondents and to avoid the
registration of the sale-deed.

14. It is further urged that where the
Registrar had satisfied himself that the saledeed was executed by Matai in favour of
the private-respondents, which was also
supported with evidence and considered,
hence, such findings of fact based on
material on record cannot be assailed in a
petition
under
Article
226
of
the
Constitution of India.
11 All. Nanhu & Ors. Vs. Raksha Ram & Ors.
949

15. It was further urged that the word
'duly execution' has been taken note of in
several decisions which clearly indicates
that once the sale-deed had been executed
which was not denied and it was not stated
that it was executed under suspicious
circumstances, hence, by taking a contrary
stand, at a subsequent point of time, the
same would not aid an unscrupulous
person.

16. Taking note of the aforesaid, the
Registrar has passed the order, which
cannot be said to be bad and the alleged
grounds or discrepancies sought to be
projected by the petitioners relating to the
stamp
papers
also
could
not
be
substantiated, hence, the findings of fact
cannot
be
interfered
with
in
writ
jurisdiction.
Accordingly,
the
petition
deserves to be dismissed and if there is any
grievance, the petitioners can seek their
remedy before the regular Courts. Thus, for
this reason also, the petition deserves to be
dismissed.

17. The Court has heard learned
counsel for the parties and also perused the
material on record.

18. It is undisputed that Matai was the
owner of four bhumidhari Plots No.64, 203,
157 and 163. It is also undisputed fact that
the petitioners No.1 to 3 have a registered
sale-deed dated 03.08.1996 in their favour
executed by Matai in respect of Plots No.64
and 203. It is also an undisputed fact that
the petitioners No.1 to 3 also have a
registered Will in their favour executed by
Matai relating to other two Plots No.157
and 163. It is also an undisputed fact that
Matai in his lifetime had informed the SubRegistrar after executing the sale-deed in
favour of the petitioners No.1 to 3
regarding the alleged claim of the privaterespondents, who stated that Matai had
executed a sale-deed in their favour in
respect of all the four plots. It is also not
disputed by the private-respondents that
they claimed their sale-deed to be executed
on 01.08.1996, but not registered.

19. Thus, the issue arises that in case if
the sale-deed of the private-respondents is
said to have been executed validly on
01.08.1996 and even if registered later then
it would relate back to the date of execution
i.e. 01.08.1996 and that would be prior in
point of time than the registered sale-deed
of the petitioners No.1 to 3 which is dated
03.08.1996.

20. In order to resolve the conflicting
claims, it will be appropriate to notice what
is the width of jurisdiction of the Registrar
under Sections 71 and 73 of the Act of
1908. The relevant provisions of Sections
71, 73 and 75 of the Act of 1908 are being
reproduced hereinafter for ready reference:-

"71. Reasons for refusal to
register to be recorded.-(l) Every SubRegistrar refusing to register a document,
except on the ground that the property to
which it relates is not situate within his
sub-district, shall make an order of refusal
and record his reasons for such order in his
Book No.2, and endorse the words
"registration refused" on the document;
and, on application made by any person
executing or claiming under the document,
shall, without payment and unnecessary
delay, give him a copy of the reasons so
recorded.

(2) No registering officer shall
accept for registration a document so
endorsed unless and until, under the
provisions
hereinafter
contained,
the
document is directed to be registered.
950 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
* * *

73. Application to Registrar
where Sub-Registrar refuses to register
on ground of denial of execution.-(l)
When a Sub-Registrar has refused to
register a document on the ground that any
person by whom it purports to be executed,
or his representative or assign, denies its
execution, any person claiming under such
document, or his representative, assign or
agent authorized as aforesaid, may, within
thirty days after the making of the order of
refusal, apply to the Registrar to whom
such Sub-Registrar is subordinate in order
to establish his right to have the document
registered.

(2) Such application shall be in
writing and shall be accompanied by a copy
of the reasons recorded under section 71,
and the statements in the application shall
be verified by the applicant in manner
required by law for the verification of
plaints.

* * *

75. Order by Registrar to
register and procedure thereon.-(l) If the
Registrar finds that the document has been
executed and that the said requirements
have been complied with, he shall order the
document to be registered.

(2) If the document is duly
presented for registration within thirty days
after the making of such order, the
registering officer shall obey the same and
thereupon shall, so far as may be
practicable,
follow
the
procedure
prescribed in sections 58, 59 and 60.

(3) Such registration shall take
effect as if the document had been
registered when it was first duly presented
for registration.

(4) The Registrar may, for the
purpose of any enquiry under section 74,
summon and enforce the attendance of
witnesses and compel them to give
evidence as if he were a civil Court, and he
may also direct by whom the whole or any
part of the costs of any such enquiry shall
be paid, and such costs shall be recoverable
as if they had been awarded in a suit under
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."

21. In order to invoke the jurisdiction
in terms of Section 73 of the Act of 1908,
the private-respondents had to establish that
the document had been validly executed
and the requirement of law have also been
complied with.

22. It is in this context that the learned
counsel for the private-respondents have
urged that once the sale-deed had been
presented indicating the signatures had
been appended by the petitioner No.4,
namely, Matai would indicate that the
document was validly executed and since
the request for getting the said document
registered was made within a period of four
months from the date of its execution with
proper stamp duty, the legal requirement
also stood complied with. Hence, the order
of registration could not be faulted.

23. If the aforesaid aspect of the
matter is examined, it would reveal that so
far as Matai was concerned, he did not
accept the execution of the sale-deed in
favour of the private-respondents. It was
specifically put to the learned counsel for
the private-respondents regarding the suit
for cancellation filed by the privaterespondents and in response, it was
admitted that though the suit had been filed
11 All. Nanhu & Ors. Vs. Raksha Ram & Ors.
951
by the private-respondents bearing No.981
of 1998, but it stood dismissed for want of
prosecution. It is stated that a restoration
application is still pending.

24. It has also been informed by the
leaned counsel for the petitioners that while
the aforesaid writ petition was pending
before this Court, consolidation operations
in the village intervened wherein the
private-respondents had raised objections
under
Section
9-A(2)
of
the
U.P.
Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 (for
short, 'the Act of 1953') which have also
been dismissed for want of prosecution and
an application for restoration is pending
there, too.

25. It was also put to the learned
counsel for the private-respondents that
admittedly they had filed a suit for
cancellation only in respect of two plots to
which it was stated that since Matai had
executed a sale-deed in their favour relating
to all the four plots and only two plots i.e.
Plots No.64 and 203 were the subject
matter of the sale-deed executed and
registered by Matai in favour of the
petitioners No.1 to 3. Hence, the plea was
confined to Plots No.64 and 203.

26. In the aforesaid backdrop, another
undisputed fact that emerges that till date
there is no suit assailing the cancellation of
the registered Will executed by Matai in
favour of the petitioners No.1 to 3 relating
to Plots No.157 and 163.

27. Before proceeding further, it will
be appropriate to notice the dictum of the
Apex Court in Veena Singh v. District
Registrar/Additional Collector (F/R) and
another, (2022) 7 SCC 1, where the Apex
Court has considered the scheme of Section
73 of the Act of 1908 including the
remedies available in cases where there is a
dispute and how Section 73 is different to
Section 74 of the Act of 1908. For ease of
reference, certain relevant paragraphs of
the said report are being reproduced
hereinafter:-

"31. Section 71 requires the SubRegistrar who refuses to register a
document, except on the ground that the
property to which it relates is not situated
within his sub-district, to make an order of
refusal and record his reasons, and endorse
the refusal of registration on the document.
Further, the Sub-Registrar is required to
furnish a copy of the reasons recorded, to
any person executing or claiming under the
document.

32. Section 72 provides for an
appeal to the Registrar from an order of the
Sub-Registrar refusing registration on a
ground other than the denial of execution.
Section 72 is in the following terms:

"72. Appeal to Registrar from
orders
of
Sub-Registrar
refusing
registration on ground other than denial of
execution.?(1) Except where the refusal is
made on the ground of denial of execution,
an appeal shall lie against an order of a
Sub-Registrar refusing to admit a document
to registration (whether the registration of
such document is compulsory or optional)
to the Registrar to whom such SubRegistrar is subordinate, if presented to
such Registrar within thirty days from the
date of the order; and the Registrar may
reverse or alter such order.

(2) If the order of the Registrar
directs the document to be registered and
the document is duly presented for
registration within thirty days after the
making of such order, the Sub-Registrar
952 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
shall obey the same, and thereupon shall, so
far as may be practicable, follow the
procedure prescribed in Sections 58, 59 and
60; and such registration shall take effect as
if the document had been registered when it
was first duly presented for registration."

In terms of sub-section (1) of
Section 72, an appeal lies to the Registrar
against an order of the Sub-Registrar
refusing
to
admit
a
document
to
registration, except where the refusal is
made on the ground of a denial of
execution.

33. Section 73 provides for an
application to the Registrar where the SubRegistrar
has
refused
to
register
a
document on the ground of a denial of
execution. Section 73 provides thus:

"73. Application to Registrar where
Sub-Registrar refuses to register on ground of
denial of execution.?(1) When a Sub-Registrar
has refused to register a document on the
ground that any person by whom it purports to
be executed, or his representative or assign,
denies its execution, any person claiming under
such document, or his representative, assign or
agent authorised as aforesaid, may, within thirty
days after the making of the order of refusal,
apply to the Registrar to whom such SubRegistrar is subordinate in order to establish his
right to have the document registered.

(2) Such application shall be in
writing and shall be accompanied by a copy
of the reasons recorded under Section 71,
and the statements in the application shall
be verified by the applicant in manner
required by law for the verification of
plaints."

34. In terms of Section 73, where
a Sub-Registrar refuses registration on the
ground that the person by whom it purports
to be executed (or their representative or
assign) denies execution, any person who
claims
under
the
document
(or
a
representative assign or authorised agent)
may apply to the Registrar within thirty
days ?in order to establish [their] rights to
have the document registered?. Such an
application
has
to
be
in
writing,
accompanied by the reasons recorded under
Section
71.
The
statements
in
the
application have to be verified in the
manner required by law for the verification
of plaints.

35. On such an application being
preferred, the Registrar has to follow the
procedure which is spelt out in Section 74.
Section 74 stipulates as follows:

"74. Procedure of Registrar on
such application.?In such case, and also
where such denial as aforesaid is made
before a Registrar in respect of a document
presented for registration to him, the
Registrar shall, as soon as conveniently
may be, enquire"

(a) whether the document has
been executed;

(b) whether the requirements of
the law for the time being in force have
been complied with on the part of the
applicant
or
person
presenting
the
document for registration, as the case may
be, so as to entitle the document to
registration."

* * *

38. Section 76 provides for that
the order of refusal by the Registrar under
Sections 72 or 75 has to be reasoned, and
the Registrar is required to furnish a copy
of the reasons recorded to any person
11 All. Nanhu & Ors. Vs. Raksha Ram & Ors.
953
executing or claiming under the document.
It further provides that no appeal shall lie
against such an order of refusal.

39. In the event of a refusal by
the Registrar, a suit can be filed by a party
in terms of the provisions of Section 77
before a civil court, praying for a decree
directing the document to be registered. On
the other hand, an order of the Registrar
directing the registration of a document is
amenable to a challenge under Article 226
of the Constitution. While seeking a writ of
certiorari, the person moving the petition
before the High Court would be entitled to
establish whether the registration has been
ordered in breach of the statutory provisions
and is contrary to law. The mere existence of
the remedy available before a civil court,
under Section 9CPC to avoid the document
or to seek a declaration in regard to its
invalidity, will not divest a person, who
complains that the order passed by Registrar
for the registration of the document was
contrary to statutory provisions, of the
remedy which is available in the exercise of a
Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution. Undoubtedly, whether a writ
should be entertained lies at the discretion of
the Court and in a given case, the High Court
may decline to do so on the ground that
disputed questions of fact arise. However, it
needs to be emphasised that in the exercise of
the writ jurisdiction, it would be open to the
High Court to determine as to whether the
statutory provisions which guide the power of
the Sub-Registrar or, as the case may be, the
Registrar to order the registration of the
document have been duly fulfilled.

* * *

73.
The
"execution"of
a
document does not stand admitted merely
because a person admits to having signed
the document. Such an interpretation
accounts for circumstances where an
individual signs a blank paper and it is later
converted into a different document, or
when an individual is made to sign a
document without fully understanding its
contents. Adopting a contrary interpretation
would unfairly put the burden upon the
person denying execution to challenge the
registration before a civil court or a writ
court, since registration will have to be
allowed once the signature has been
admitted.

74. In giving meaning to the
expression ?execute? in the provisions of
the Registration Act, it is necessary to
adopt a purposive construction to protect,
facilitate and achieve the object of
registration. In Suraj Lamp & Industries (P)
Ltd. v. State of Haryana [Suraj Lamp &
Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana,
(2009) 7 SCC 363 : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ)
126] , R.V. Raveendran, J., speaking for a
two-Judge Bench of this Court, highlighted
the purpose of registration : (SCC pp. 36768, para 18)

"18. Registration provides safety
and security to transactions relating to
immovable property, even if the document
is lost or destroyed. It gives publicity and
public exposure to documents thereby
preventing forgeries and frauds in regard to
transactions and execution of documents.
Registration provides information to people
who may deal with a property, as to the
nature and extent of the rights which
persons may have, affecting that property.
In other words, it enables people to find out
whether any particular property with which
they are concerned, has been subjected to
any legal obligation or liability and who is
or are the person(s) presently having right,
title, and interest in the property. It gives
954 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
solemnity
of
form
and
perpetuate
documents which are of legal importance
or relevance by recording them, where
people may see the record and enquire and
ascertain what the particulars are and as far
as land is concerned what obligations exist
with regard to them. It ensures that every
person dealing with immovable property
can
rely
with
confidence
upon
the
statements contained in the registers
(maintained under the said Act) as a full
and complete account of all transactions by
which the title to the property may be
affected and secure extracts/copies duly
certified.'

* * *

76. The Registration Act exists so
that information about documents can be
put into the public domain, where it can be
accessed by anyone in order to prevent
forgeries and fraud, and so that individuals
can be aware of the status of properties. If
the interpretation conflating signing with
execution is adopted, it would ensure that
the
Sub-Registrars/Registrars
will
continuously end up registering documents
whose validity will inevitably be then
disputed in a civil suit or a writ petition.
While the suit or writ proceedings continue,
the document would remain on the public
records as a registered instrument, which
has the potential to cause more disruption.
Hence, such an interpretation should not be
adopted by this Court.

77. However, while adopting
the current interpretation ? that the
admission of one's signature on a
document is not equivalent to admission
of its execution ? it is important to
consider
the
power
of
the
SubRegistrar/Registrar and their procedures
under the Registration Act.
* * *

81. Sub-section (4) of Section 75
stipulates that for the purpose of the
enquiry under Section 74, the Registrar
may summon and enforce the attendance of
witnesses and compel them to give
evidence as if he is a civil court. The
Registrar is also empowered to impose the
obligation of paying the costs of the
enquiry on a party, and such costs are to be
recovered as if they have been charged in a
suit under the CPC. Thus, sub-section (4)
of Section 75 incorporates a deeming
fiction from two perspectives ? first, in
empowering the Registrar to summon and
enforce the attendance of witnesses and for
compelling them to give evidence ?as if he
were a civil court?; and second, in
awarding costs which become recoverable
?as if they have been awarded in a suit?
under the CPC.

82.
The
process
which
is
conducted by the Registrar for the purpose
of an enquiry under Section 74 cannot be
equated to the powers of the civil court,
though certain powers which are entrusted
to a civil court are vested with the Registrar
by the provisions of Section 75(4). A quasijudicial function is entrusted to the
Registrar for the purpose of conducting an
enquiry under Section 74. Where the
Registrar refuses to register a document
under Sections 72 or 76, no appeal lies
against such an order. Section 77, however,
provides that when the Registrar refuses to
order the document to be registered, any
person claiming under such document or its
representative, assign or agents may
institute a suit before the civil court within
the stipulated time for a decree directing
that the document shall be registered. It is
thus clear that the Registrar, when he
conducts an enquiry under Section 74, does
11 All. Nanhu & Ors. Vs. Raksha Ram & Ors.
955
not stand constituted as a civil court. The
enquiry before the Registrar is summary in
nature. The decision of the Registrar in
ordering document to be registered, or for
that matter in refusing to register a
document, is not conclusive and is
amenable to judicial review.

83. Therefore, in a situation
where an individual admits their signature
on a document but denies its execution, the
Sub-Registrar
is
bound
to
refuse
registration in accordance with Sections
35(3)(a)
of
the
Registration
Act.
Subsequently, if an application if filed
under Section 73, the Registrar is entrusted
with the power of conducting an enquiry of
a quasi-judicial nature under Section 74. If
the Registrar passes an order refusing
registration under Section 76, the party
presenting the document for registration
has the remedy of filing a civil suit under
Section 77 of the Registration Act, where a
competent civil court will be able to
adjudicate upon the question of fact
conclusively.

* * *

93. The Registrar purported to
exercise the powers conferred under
Section 74 and arrived at a finding that the
sale deed had been duly signed by the
appellant and was therefore liable to be
registered. However, the objections of the
appellant raised serious issues of a triable
nature which could only have been
addressed before and adjudicated upon by a
court of competent civil jurisdiction. As a
matter of fact, during the course of the
hearing, this Court has been apprised of the
fact that in respect of the remaining area of
1000 sq m in the front portion of the land, a
suit for specific performance [ Original Suit
No. 568 of 2014.] has been instituted by the
second respondent, resulting in a decree for
specific performance dated 16-11-2018. As
regards the subject-matter of the sale deed,
the second respondent has instituted a suit
for possession before the Civil Judge,
Senior Division, Fast Track Court [ Suit
No. 264 of 2016.] , where certain
proceedings are pending. In this view of the
matter, we are clearly of the opinion that
the Registrar in the present case acted
contrary to law by directing the sale deed to
be registered.

94. In the impugned judgment
[Veena Singh v. Collector, 2018 SCC
OnLine All 6299] , the Single Judge of the
Allahabad High Court has observed that
registration does not depend upon the
consent of the executant but on the
Registrar's finding that the executant had
actually signed the document. The High
Court held that having found in the course
of the enquiry that the sale deed was duly
prepared by a scribe, that the attesting
witness had stated that the sale deed was
signed by the appellant and she also placed
her fingerprints in their presence, it was
open to the Registrar to direct registration
in spite of a denial of its execution by the
appellant. In doing so, the Single Judge of
the High Court has, with respect, conflated
the mere signing of the sale deed with its
execution. For the reasons mentioned
earlier in this judgment, such an approach
is completely erroneous and cannot be
upheld."

28. From a perusal of the aforesaid
paragraphs, it would be clear that where a
person denies the execution and the SubRegistrar in such cases is bound to refuse
the registration, however, the powers under
Sections 73 and 74 is not as the appellate
powers and in such cases where the
execution itself is disputed, there cannot be
956 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
a direction for registering the sale-deed.
Any person so aggrieved has right of
approaching the Civil Court for getting
their rights adjudicated.

29. In light of the law as laid down by
the Apex Court in Veena Singh (supra) and
applying the said dictum to the facts of the
instant case, it would reveal that the
private-respondents
had
already
taken
recourse to get the sale-deed executed in
favour of the petitioners No.1 to 3
cancelled, however, the said suit remains
dismissed for want of prosecution till date.
It is also not disputed that the privaterespondents did not assail the registered
Will despite knowing the fact that their
claim was of all the four plots but they only
challenged the sale-deed relating to two
plots and the registered Will which relates
to the other two plots has not been
challenged.

30. It is also relevant to notice that
upon
the
commencement
of
the
consolidation operations as informed by
learned counsel for both the parties, the
private-respondents though had initiated
their objections under Section 9-A(2) of the
Act of 1953, but even that could not be
decided on merit and was dismissed for
want of prosecution.

31. In the aforesaid backdrop where
the private-respondents having taken
recourse to regular proceedings for
getting their rights adjudicated and
having left them unattended, which
resulted in its dismissal for want of
prosecution and till date they have not
been restored (as per the statements of
learned counsel for the parties), this
Court
cannot
permit
the
privaterespondents
to
achieve
something
indirectly which they have failed to
achieve directly as they had already
instituted proceedings, before the Civil
Court as well as the Consolidation Court,
which are of substantive nature having
binding effect on the title of the parties.

32. This Court is satisfied that in the
given facts and circumstances which have
been noticed hereinabove including the
law laid down by the Apex Court in
Veena Singh (supra), the Registrar had
exceeded his jurisdiction in passing the
impugned order directing registration of
the
sale-deed
vide
order
dated
27.08.2001, apart from the fact that the
order is also not sufficiently supported by
reasons and is bereft of sound reasoning.
Accordingly, this Court has no hesitation
to quash and set aside the impugned order
dated 27.08.2001.

33. This Court further notices the
fact that since there are proceedings
pending before the District Court as well
as before the Consolidation authorities
are on the nature of [even though the
substantive
proceedings
have
been
dismissed
for
want of
prosecution]
miscellaneous
application
seeking
restoration, but the fact remains that if the
said proceedings are revived then any
observations made by this Court while
setting aside the order dated 27.08.2001
may not be treated as an expression of
opinion on merits of the matter which
needless to say would be decided as per
evidence led by the parties and as per the
governing law.

34.