# Narendra Kumar and others v. State of U.P. and others

- **Citation:** (2005) 2 ILRA 392
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2005-05-10
- **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 587 of 2005
- **Bench:** Ajoy Nath Ray, C.J. Ashok Bhushan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/narendra-kumar-and-others-v-state-of-u-p-and-others-40460
- **Pages:** 3

## Headnote

Constitution of India, Article 226-Service
Law-Ad-hoc
appointment-Appellants/
Petitioner ungone the regular selection
process-but the authority instead of
giving appointment on probation basis
for one year appointed adhoc basis-the
appellant, joined without any protestcan not have legitimate expiation, for
permanent job-held petitioner rightly
dismissed.

## Text

392 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2005
19. In view of what has been
discussed above the revisional court has
not committed any error much less error
of law so as to warrant interference by
this Court under its equitable and
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India.

20. Accordingly, both the writ
petitions fail and are dismissed. However,
there shall be no order as to costs.
Petition Dismissed.
---------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.5.2005

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE AJOY NATH RAY, C.J.
THE HON'BLE ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

Special Appeal No. 587 of 2005

Narendra Kumar and others ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri M.D. Singh Shekhar

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Kapil Rathore
S.C.

Constitution of India, Article 226-Service
Law-Ad-hoc
appointment-Appellants/
Petitioner ungone the regular selection
process-but the authority instead of
giving appointment on probation basis
for one year appointed adhoc basis-the
appellant, joined without any protestcan not have legitimate expiation, for
permanent job-held petitioner rightly
dismissed.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajoy Nath Ray, C.J.)

1. The appeal is taken up and
summarily disposed of. The appellant-
writ petitioners were issued letters of
adhoc appointment but they filed the writ
for the purpose of continuing to work.
The term of appointment on the adhoc
basis ran out on 17th February, 2004,
when they were stopped from discharging
their duty, they came to Court.

2. We are in respectful agreement
with the order passed by Hon'ble Mr.
Justice Tarun Agarwal dated `12th April,
2004 whereby his Lordship has held that
the writ petitioners were not entitled to
any relief and they had no right to hold
their respective posts.

3. We assume for the purposes of
this appeal, though the Hon'ble Judge has
held otherwise in the court below that the
posts were in the nature of substantive
permanent vacancies. However, it is the
admitted
position
that
though
the
selection committee after advertisement
had recommended appointments with a
probationary
period,
the
appointing
authority
chose
quite
a
different
procedure and issued adhoc letters of
appointments to all the writ petitioners.

4. On behalf of the appellants, it has
been contended that on the facts of this
case, the appointments granted must be
treated by the court as permanent
appointments to substantive posts, mere
running out of the period of ad hoc
appointment would not entitle the Court
to allow the writ petitioners ' services to
be terminated summarily.

5. On the part of the respondents, the
impugned judgment was supported on the
2 All] Narendra Kumar and others V. State of U.P. and others

 393
basis that, if an adhoc appointment comes
to an end with the running out of the
period of the granted tenure, the employee
would not necessarily have the right to
continue in the post.

6. In our opinion, in these service
matters, the facts and circumstances of
each case have to be looked at with regard
to the special attending details. On that
basis the Court has to come to a
conclusion whether the intention of the
appointing authority was a treat the
selection process as continuing regularly
as
a
regular
sequence
after
the
advertisement
and
the
selection
committee's report. The Court has to
consider, whether the appointing authority
did not choose to continue the process of
selection on a regular basis or on the basis
of the recommendations made by the
selection committee and chose instead, to
adopt a procedure which cannot be called
the culmination of the regular selection
process. Similarly, the point of view of
the employee has also got to be judged. If
the employee has undergone a fully
regular selection process and at the end
thereof has been issued a regular letter of
selection with the usual probationary
period, then and in that event the
employee
would
be
entitled
to
a
legitimate expectation of regularization
after the probationary period has been
properly served out.

7. In the instant case, as the Hon'ble
single Judge has also noted, the grant of
ad hoc appointment expressly described
as such made a world of difference. The
appointing authority was not minded to
grant probationary periods of service to
the Class IV employees the reason whey
it did not do so is its own business and the
writ court need not necessarily enquire
into that. The appellant on being issued
the ad hoc letters of appointment did not
there and then raise an objection that they
should have been issued probationary
periods and not mere ad hoc appointments
for one year. As such they were aware of
the tenuous nature of the appointment
which was being offered to them and they
accepted even such offer. It could not be
said that even on the ad hoc appointments
they had the same legitimate expectation
of getting permanent job just as if they
have been issued normal letters for
probationary service.

8. On this basis we respectfully
agree with his Lordship's reasoning that
the appointment of the writ petitioners
was purely temporary and was for a
limited period upto 17.2.2004. We also
agree with his Lordship's finding that it
was not a case of hire and fire as was
found in the case reported at 1986 (3)
SCC
156,
Central
Inland
Wat4er
Transport Corporation Ltd. and another
vs. Brojo Nath Ganguli and another.

9. The Division Bench judgment
referred to on behalf of the appellant
being the case of Dr. (Kumari) Ranjana
Saxena Vs. Vice Chancellor, Rohilkhand
University, Bareilly and others reported
at 1980 UPLBEC 225, is distinguishable
on this essential factual difference that in
that case the writ petitioner had objected
in the very beginning as to the offered
nature of temporary employment.

As such the appeal is dismissed
without any order as to costs.
---------
394 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2005
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 11.3.2005

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 16485 of 2001

Ravindra Raghav

...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Ashok Khare
Sri V.M. Zaidi
Sri V.D. Chauhan

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C.

U.P. Police Officers of subordinate ranks
(Punishment & Appeal) Rules 1991-Rule8 (2)-Dismissal Order-without holding
any
enquiry
or
without
any
order
dispensing holding inquiry-No reasons
recorded-statutory
requirement
of
recording the reasons about satisfaction
dispensing to hold enquiry also not
there-held-order
passed
by
S.P.
to
contrary to requirement of rule 8 (2)(b)
of act-can not sustained.

Held: Para 6 & 7

The Rules contemplate exercise of power
under Rule 8 (2)(b) for dispensing
holding of disciplinary enquiry when it is
not reasonably practicable to hold such
enquiry. The reasons thus which can
satisfy the requirement of Rule 8(2)(b)
has to be referable to not reasonably
practicable to hold an enquiry. No
reasons have been given in the order
which
can
be
said
to
fulfil
the
requirement
of
not
reasonably
practicable
to
hold
enquiry.
The
statutory requirement of exercising the
power is absent in the present case. As
observed above, no reasons have also
been given in the counter affidavit
bringing on the record the reasons on
the basis of which such satisfaction was
recorded by Superintendent of Police,
the court is at last to find out the basis
for invoking the power under Rule 8
(2)(b) of the Rules.

In above view of the facts, it is clear that
power
has
been
exercised
by
Superintendent of Police under Rule 8
(2)(b) contrary to the requirement as
laid down in Rule 8(2)(b). The order of
Superintendent of Police cannot be
sustained.
Case law discussed:
1991 SCC (1) 362
1996 (2) AWC-245
1994 (2) UPLBEC-1717
1998 (1) UPLBEC-638

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ashok Bhushan, J.)

1. Heard counsel for the petitioner
and learned standing counsel. Counter and
rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged
between the parties with the consent of
the parties the writ petition is being
finally disposed of.

2. By this writ petition, the
petitioner has prayed for quashing the
order dated 21st October, 2000 passed by
Superintendent of Police dismissing the
petitioner from service dispensing holding
of the enquiry under the provisions of
U.P. Police Officers of the subordinate
ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules,
1991 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules)
and the appellate order dated 15th
February, 2001 dismissing the appeal
filed by the petitioner.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner,
challenging the orders, contended that no
reasons have been given for dispensing
holding of the enquiry and dismissal of
the petitioner invoking the power under
Rule 8 (2) (b) of the Rules. The