# Naresh Kumar Valmiki v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2022) 10 ILRA 525
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-10-17
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 No. 14443 of 2022
- **Bench:** Rajesh Bindal, C. J. Samit Gopal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/naresh-kumar-valmiki-v-state-of-u-p-anr-47748
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

(A) Criminal Law - Reference made - The
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 -
Section 482 - Inherent power - Indian
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 21 - "Public
servant" - Section 21(3) - Judge is also a
"public servant" , The Scheduled Castes
and
Scheduled
Tribes
(Prevention
of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 - Section 2 (bg) -
"Public servant" , Section 4(2)(b) - duties
of "public servant" - registration of a
complaint or a First Information Report,
Section 14 - Special Court and Exclusive
Special Court , second proviso to Section
14 - Special Court so established or
specified shall have powers to directly
take cognizance of offence under this Act -
The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules,
1995 - Rule 7, 8 (via) and (vii),12. (Para -
12,13,14,20,21,)

Applications filed under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C.
- treated as a complaint - summoned -
challenging validity and legality of orders - Act
(The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 ) is a Special
Act - overrides any other - Special Court
designated under the Act - cannot take
cognizance of an offence on itself - by treating
an application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. as
a complaint - question referred - Whether
Special Judge can treat the application under
526 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint case or
not. (Para -2,5,6 )

HELD:-Special Judge or court so established
can treat an application under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C. as a complaint and proceed further in
accordance with law. Petitions and appeals be
placed before appropriate Bench. (Para - 23)

Reference answered. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-

## Text

10 All. Naresh Kumar Valmiki Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
525
person is bound to be brought home against
him. At the stage of framing charge, the
Court has to see if there is sufficient ground
for presuming that the accused has
committed an offence. If the answer is in
affirmative, the order of discharge cannot
be passed and the accused has to face trial.

10.

To
substantiate
aforesaid
proposition, the judgment rendered by
Hon'ble the Apex Court in State of
Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, AIR
1996 SC 1744 and Rajbir Singh vs. State
of U.P., AIR 2006 SC 1963 may be
usefully referred to.

11. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid
settled legal position, at this stage, only
prima
facie
availability
of
material
warranting framing of charge against the
applicant is enough and no roving enquiry
is
required
to
ascertain
veracity
or
otherwise of the prosecution's case.

12. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid
discussion, this Court does not find
illegality or infirmity in the impugned order
under challenge. There is no abuse of
court's process either.

13. In view of the aforesaid, the
instant application under Section 482
Cr.P.C. lacks merit and deserves to be
dismissed.

14.

Accordingly,
the
instant
application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.is
dismissed.
----------
(2022) 10 ILRA 525
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.10.2022

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RAJESH BINDAL, C. J.
THE HON'BLE SAMIT GOPAL, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 14443 of 2022
With other Connected Cases

Naresh Kumar Valmiki ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sri Arvind Kumar Singh

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
Sri Syed Ali Murtaza, A.G.A. For State, Sri
Neeraj Kumar Srivastava, Sri Shobhit
Yadav, Sri Ankit Srivastava, Sri Kartikey
Pandey

(A) Criminal Law - Reference made - The
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 -
Section 482 - Inherent power - Indian
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 21 - "Public
servant" - Section 21(3) - Judge is also a
"public servant" , The Scheduled Castes
and
Scheduled
Tribes
(Prevention
of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 - Section 2 (bg) -
"Public servant" , Section 4(2)(b) - duties
of "public servant" - registration of a
complaint or a First Information Report,
Section 14 - Special Court and Exclusive
Special Court , second proviso to Section
14 - Special Court so established or
specified shall have powers to directly
take cognizance of offence under this Act -
The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules,
1995 - Rule 7, 8 (via) and (vii),12. (Para -
12,13,14,20,21,)

Applications filed under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C.
- treated as a complaint - summoned -
challenging validity and legality of orders - Act
(The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 ) is a Special
Act - overrides any other - Special Court
designated under the Act - cannot take
cognizance of an offence on itself - by treating
an application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. as
a complaint - question referred - Whether
Special Judge can treat the application under
526 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint case or
not. (Para -2,5,6 )

HELD:-Special Judge or court so established
can treat an application under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C. as a complaint and proceed further in
accordance with law. Petitions and appeals be
placed before appropriate Bench. (Para - 23)

Reference answered. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-
1. Soni Devi Vs St. of U.P., 2022 (5) ADJ 64

2. Shantaben Bhurabhai Bhuriya Vs Anand
Athabhai Chaudhari & ors., AIR 2021 SC 5368

3. Ramveer Upadhyay & anr. Vs St. of U.P. &
anr. , 2022 SCC Online SC 484

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajesh Bindal,C. J.
&
Hon'ble Samit Gopal, J.)

1. This is bunch of 83 cases with different
reliefs. The matter has been placed before this
Court on the reference made by the learned Single
Judge disagreeing with the view taken by another
learned Single Judge in the case of Soni Devi vs.
State of U.P.1 Alongwith the main petition, other
petitions and appeals have been tagged with
similar issues involved.

2. The question of difference between the
two learned Judges is on the second question as
framed in the case of Soni Devi's case (supra)
which is in para-15 of the said judgment. It reads
as under:

"15.
The
second
question
for
consideration before this Court is as to whether
Special Judge can treat the application under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint case or not."

3. The answer given to the second
question is in para-18 of the said judgement
which is as follows:

"18. .... Therefore answer to the
second question that Special Judge can
treat the application under Section 156
(3)Cr.P.C. as a complaint case or not ?
Answer is "No" in view of Rule 5(1) of the
Amended Act."

4. While giving reasons for differing
with the said answer and making a
reference, learned Single Judge has referred
the question as follows:

"18. Thus, this Court differs with
the view taken in the case of Soni Devi
(Supra) in its second question as decided as
to whether it is correct ?"

5. The petitions are in which
applications filed under Section 156 (3)
Cr.P.C. have been treated as a complaint
and the accused persons therein have been
summoned to face trial. The accused
persons
thus
are
before
this
Court
challenging the validity and legality of the
orders passed against them.

6. Sri Arvind Kumar Singh, learned
counsel appearing in the main petition has
argued that as per the scheme of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention
of Atrocities) Act,
1989
(hereinafter referred to as "the Act")
lodging of a first information report is
mandatory if an act has been complained
of, which is an offence. He argued that
since the Act is a Special Act, the same
overrides any other Act. The Special Court
designated under the Act cannot take
cognizance of an offence on itself by
treating an application under Section 156
(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint. Even Rule 12 of
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995
(hereinafter referred to as "the Rules") and
Schedule (1) of the Rules provide for
10 All. Naresh Kumar Valmiki Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
527
payment of compensation to the victim at
different stages, starting from lodging of
the first information report. It does not
makes any provision for payment of
compensation in the event the offence as
complained of is treated as a complaint
case.

7. Sri Geetam Singh, learned counsel
appearing in Criminal Appeal No. 4141 of
2022 while referring to Rule 7 of the Rules
argued that the same only provides for
investigation without any option of enquiry.
He further places Rule 8 (via) and (vii) of
the Rules and argues that the same also
refers to the proceedings of investigation
only. He also argued that if the court takes
cognizance directly on an application
moved under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C., the
benefit of Rule 12 and Schedule (1) of the
Rules will not be extended to the victim
unless appropriate compensation is directed
to be given. It is argued that as such the
scheme and the intention of the legislation
is only for lodging of a first information
report for offences under the Act and not
any other remedy.

8. Sri Prateek J. Nagar, learned
counsel appearing in Criminal Appeal No.
5974 of 2021 argued that the Act is silent
with regards to process, procedure and
filing of a complaint and refers to first
information report only at every place. He
states that as such lodging of the first
information report is mandatory and
complaint is not maintainable.

9. Per contra, Sri Syed Ali Murtaza
and Sri Ankit Srivastava, learned counsels
for the State appearing in all the matters
argued that the inception of a criminal case
is on the basis of a first information report
or a complaint. It is argued that Section
4(2)(b) of the Act provides for duties of a
public servant, which shall include to
register a complaint or a first information
report under this Act and other relevant
provisions
and
to
register
it
under
appropriate Sections of this Act. It is argued
that a public servant is defined under
Section 2 (bg) of the Act, which includes
persons as defined under Section 21 of the
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and thus as
per third clause of Section 21 I.P.C. a Judge
is a public servant. Thus looking at the
provision of Section 4(2)(b) of the Act it is
argued that a public servant is under a duty
to take cognizance on a complaint or
register a first information report under this
Act and other relevant provisions as the
case may be, thus filing of a complaint
and/or treating an application under Section
156 (3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint is not barred.
It is further argued that even the second
proviso of Section 14 of the Act gives
power to the Special Court or Exclusive
Special Court so established or specified to
directly take cognizance of offences under
this Act and as such even taking cognizance
under the Act is not prohibited but is
expressly provided.

10. Heard Mr. Arvind Kumar Singh,
Mohd Zaid, Mr. Prateek J. Nagar, Mr.
Geetam Singh, Mr. Shree Prakash Giri, Mr.
Anil Kumar, Advocates in their respective
matters and Mr. Syed Ali Murtaza, Mr.
Neeraj Kumar Srivastava, Mr. Shobhit
Yadav, Mr. Ankit Srivastava, Mr. Kartikey
Pandey, learned counsels for the State of
U.P. and perused the records.

11. Section 14 of the Act reads as
follows:-

"14.
Special
Court
and
Exclusive Special Court.--(1) For the
purpose of providing for speedy trial, the
State
Government
shall,
with
the
528 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
concurrence of the Chief Justice of the
High Court, by notification in the Official
Gazette, establish an Exclusive Special
Court for one or more Districts:

Provided that in Districts where
less number of cases under this Act is
recorded, the State Government shall, with
the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the
High Court, by notification in the Official
Gazette, specify for such Districts, the
Court of Session to be a Special Court to
try the offences under this Act:

Provided further that the Courts
so established or specified shall have power
to directly take cognizance of offences
under this Act.

(2) It shall be the duty of the State
Government to establish adequate number
of Courts to ensure that cases under this
Act are disposed of within a period of two
months, as far as possible.

(3) In every trial in the Special
Court or the Exclusive Special Court, the
proceedings shall be continued from dayto-day until all the witnesses in attendance
have been examined, unless the Special
Court or the Exclusive Special Court finds
the adjournment of the same beyond the
following day to be necessary for reasons
to be recorded in writing:

Provided that when the trial
relates to an offence under this Act, the trial
shall, as far as possible, be completed
within a period of two months from the
date of filing of the charge sheet."

12. The second proviso to Section 14
of the Act makes it clear that the Special
Court so established or specified shall have
powers to directly take cognizance of
offence under this Act.

13. The Apex Court in the case of
Shantaben
Bhurabhai
Bhuriya
vs.
Anand Athabhai Chaudhari and others2,
in para- 9.1 ruled that in view of insertion
of proviso to Section 14 of the Act and
considering the object and purpose for
which the same has been inserted, it is
advisable that the court so established or
specified in exercise of powers under
Section 14 of the Act for the purpose of
providing
speedy
trial,
directly
take
cognizance of offences under the Atrocities
Act. The para 9.1 is quoted herein-below:-

"9.1. On fair reading of Sections
207, 209 and 193 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure and insertion of proviso to
Section 14 of the Atrocities Act by Act
No.1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016, we are of
the opinion that on the aforesaid ground the
entire criminal proceedings cannot be said
to have been vitiated. Second proviso to
Section 14 of the Atrocities Act which has
been inserted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f.
26.1.2016 confers power upon the Special
Court so established or specified for the
purpose of providing for speedy trial also
shall have the power to directly take
cognizance of the offences under the
Atrocities Act. Considering the object and
purpose of insertion of proviso to Section
14, it cannot be said that it is not in conflict
with the Sections 193, 207 and 209 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It
cannot be said that it takes away
jurisdiction of the Magistrate to take
cognizance and thereafter to commit the
case to the Special Court for trial for the
offences under the Atrocities Act. Merely
because, learned Magistrate has taken
cognizance of the offences and thereafter
the trial / case has been committed to
Special Court established for the purpose of
providing for speedy trial, it cannot be said
that entire criminal proceedings including
10 All. Naresh Kumar Valmiki Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
529
FIR and charge-sheet etc. are vitiated and
on the aforesaid ground entire criminal
proceedings for the offences under Sections
452, 323, 325, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the
Indian Penal Code and under Section
3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act are to be
quashed and set aside. It may be noted that
in view of insertion of proviso to Section
14 of the Atrocities Act and considering the
object and purpose, for which, the proviso
to Section 14 of the Atrocities Act has been
inserted i.e. for the purpose of providing for
speedy trial and the object and purpose
stated herein above, it is advisable that the
Court so established or specified in
exercise of powers under Section14, for the
purpose of providing for speedy trial
directly take cognizance of the offences
under the Atrocities Act. But at the same
time, as observed herein above, merely on
the ground that cognizance of the offences
under the Atrocities Act is not taken
directly by the Special Court constituted
under Section 14 of the Atrocities Act, the
entire criminal proceedings cannot be said
to have been vitiated and cannot be
quashed and set aside solely on the ground
that cognizance has been taken by the
learned Magistrate after insertion of second
proviso to Section 14 which confers powers
upon the Special Court also to directly take
cognizance of the offences under the
Atrocities Act and thereafter case is
committed to the Special Court/Court of
Session." (emphasis supplied)

14. The same thus makes it clear that
a special court or courts specified can take
cognizance directly.

15. The said judgement has been
relied
upon
by
the
Apex
Court
subsequently in the case of Ramveer
Upadhyay and another vs. State of U.P.
and another 3 and the argument of learned
counsel in the said case was that the
Additional District and Sessions Judge had
no jurisdiction to take cognizance or issue
summons or orders, has been held that it
cannot be sustained. Paras- 21, 22 and 23
of the said judgement are quoted hereinbelow:-

"21. Emphasizing Section 14 of
the Atrocities Act, Mr. Ranjit Kumar argued
that only the Special Judge under the
Atrocities Act was competent to pass an
order for issuance of summons. He argued
that the order of the Additional District and
Sessions Judge, Court No.2, Hathras being
without jurisdiction the High Court should
have quashed the same in exercise of its
power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Mr.
Ranjt Kumar also argued that Complaint
Case No.19/2018 patently a case of
malicious prosecution which stemmed from
political rivalry and was in gross abuse of
the process of Court.

22.
In
Shantaben
Bhurabhai
Bhuriya v. Anand Athabhai Chaudhari and
others: 2021 SCC Online SC 974, cited by
Mr.
Siddharth
Dave,
learned
senior
counsel, appearing on behalf of the
Respondent No.2, this Court rejected the
contention that only Special Court could
take cognizance of offences under the
Atrocities Act and held:

23. Therefore, the issue/question
posed for the consideration of this Court is,
whether in a case where cognizance is
taken by the learned Magistrate and
thereafter the case is committed to the
learned Special Court, whether entire
criminal proceedings can be said to have
been vitiated considering the second
proviso to Section 14 of the Atrocities Act
which was inserted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f.
26.1.2016?
530 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

24.
While
considering
the
aforesaid issue/question, legislative history
of the relevant provisions of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989, more particularly,
Section
14 pre-amendment
and
post
amendment is required to be considered.
Section 14 as stood pre-amendment and
post amendment reads as under:

.......

Provided that in Districts where
less number of cases under this Act is
recorded, the State Government shall, with
the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the
High Court, by notification in the Official
Gazette, specify for such Districts, the
Court of Session to be a Special Court to
try the offences under this Act;

Provided further that the Courts
so established or specified shall have power
to directly take cognizance of offences
under this Act."

X X X X

28. Considering the aforesaid
legislative
history
which
brought
to
insertion of proviso to Section 14 of the
Atrocities Act, by which, even the Special
Court so established or specified for the
purpose of providing for speedy trial the
power to directly to take cognizance of
offences under the Atrocities Act, 1989, the
issue/question posed whether in a case
where for the offences under Atrocities Act,
the cognizance is taken by the learned
Magistrate and thereafter the case is
committed to the Court of Sessions/Special
Court and cognizance is not straightway
taken
up
by
the
learned
Special
Court/Court of Session, whether entire
criminal proceedings for the offences under
the Atrocities Act, 1989 can be said to have
been vitiated, as so observed by the High
Court in the impugned judgment and order
?

29. On fair reading of Sections
207, 209, and 193 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure and insertion of proviso to
Section 14 of the Atrocities Act by Act No.
1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016, we are of the
opinion that on the aforesaid ground the
entire criminal proceedings cannot be said
to have been vitiated. Second proviso to
Section 14 of the Atrocities Act which has
been inserted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f.
26.1.2016 confers power upon the Special
Court so established or specified for the
purpose of providing for speedy trial also
shall have the power to directly take
cognizance of the offences under the
Atrocities Act. Considering the object and
purpose of insertion of proviso to Section
14, it cannot be said that it is not in conflict
with the Sections 193, 207 and 209 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. It cannot
be said that it takes away jurisdiction of the
Magistrate
to
take
cognizance
and
thereafter to commit the case to the Special
Court for trial for the offences under the
Atrocities Act. Merely because, learned
Magistrate has taken cognizance of the
offences and thereafter the trial/case has
been
committed
to
Special
Court
established for the purpose of providing for
speedy trial, it cannot be said that entire
criminal proceedings including FIR and
charge-sheet etc. are vitiated and on the
aforesaid
ground
entire
criminal
proceedings for the offences under Sections
452, 323, 325, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the
Penal Code, 1860 and under Section
3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act are to be
quashed and set aside. It may be noted that
in view of insertion of proviso to Section
14 of the Atrocities Act and considering the
10 All. Naresh Kumar Valmiki Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
531
object and purpose, for which, the proviso
to Section 14 of the Atrocities Act has been
inserted i.e. for the purpose of providing for
speedy trial and the object and purpose
stated herein above, it is advisable that the
Court so established or specified in
exercise of powers under Section14, for the
purpose of providing for speedy trial
directly take cognizance of the offences
under the Atrocities Act. But at the same
time, as observed herein above, merely on
the ground that cognizance of the offences
under the Atrocities Act is not taken
directly by the Special Court constituted
under Section 14 of the Atrocities Act, the
entire criminal proceedings cannot be said
to have been vitiated and cannot be
quashed and set aside solely on the ground
that cognizance has been taken by the
learned Magistrate after insertion of second
proviso to Section 14 which confers powers
upon the Special Court also to directly take
cognizance of the offences under the
Atrocities Act and thereafter case is
committed to the Special Court/Court of
Session.

30. In support of the above
conclusion, the words used in second
proviso to Section 14 are required to be
considered minutely. The words used are
"Court so established or specified shall
have power to directly take cognizance of
the offences under this Court". The word
"only" is conspicuously missing. If the
intention of the legislature would have to
confer the jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the offences under the Atrocities Act
exclusively with the Special Court, in that
case, the wording should have been "that
the Court so established or specified only
shall
have
power
to
directly
take
cognizance of offences under this Act".
Therefore, merely because now further and
additional powers have been given to the
Special Court also to take cognizance of the
offences under the Atrocities Act and in the
present case merely because the cognizance
is taken by the learned Magistrate for the
offences under the Atrocities Act and
thereafter the case has been committed to
the learned Special Court, it cannot be said
that entire criminal proceedings have been
vitiated and same are required to be
quashed and set aside."

23. In view of the judgment of
this Court in Shantaben Bhurabhai Bhuriya
(supra), the Argument of Mr. Ranjit Kumar
that the Additional District Judge and
Sessions Judge, Court No.4 Hathras had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance or issue
summons/orders cannot be sustained."

16. As far as other argument of
learned counsels with regard to Rule 12 and
Schedule Annexure-I is concerned, merely
non mentioning of stage for award of
compensation
in
cases
where
the
applications under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
are treated as a complaint case and also in
complaint cases, would not oust the
jurisdiction of the courts concerned to
award compensation to the victims at the
appropriate stage as the case may be.

17. While further dilating the issue it
is relevant to look into section 4 of the Act.
The same reads as follows:-

"4. Punishment for neglect of
duties. -

(1) Whoever, being a public
servant but not being a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,
wilfully neglects his duties required to be
performed by him under this Act and the
rules made thereunder, shall be punishable
with imprisonment for a term which shall
532 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
not be less than six months but which may
extend to one year.

(2) The duties of public servant
referred to in sub-section (1) shall include-

(a) to read out to an informant the
information given orally, and reduced to
writing by the officer in-charge of the
police station, before taking the signature
of the informant;

(b) to register a complaint or a
First Information Report under this Act and
other relevant provisions and to register it
under appropriate sections of this Act;

(c) to furnish a copy of the
information so recorded forthwith to the
informant;

(d) to record the statement of the
victims or witnesses;

(e) to conduct the investigation
and file charge sheet in the Special Court or
the Exclusive Special Court within a period
of sixty days, and to explain the delay, if
any, in writing;

(f) to correctly prepare, frame and
translate any document or electronic
records;

(g) to perform any other duty
specified in this Act or the rules made
thereunder:

Provided that the charges in this
regard against the public servant shall be
booked on the recommendation of an
administrative enquiry.

(3) The cognizance in respect of
any dereliction of duty referred to in subsection (2) by a public servant shall be
taken by the Special Court or the Exclusive
Special Court and shall give direction for
penal proceedings against such public
servant.

18. Public servant is defined in
Section 2(bg) of the Act which reads as
under:-

"2(bg) "public servant" means a
public servant as defined under Section 21
of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), as
well as any other person deemed to be a
public servant under any other law for the
time being in force and includes any person
acting in his official capacity under the
Central
Government
or
the
State
Government, as the case may be;"

19. At this juncture it is relevant to
refer to the definition of the word "public
servant" as per Section 21 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860, which reads as under:-

"21. "Public servant".- The words
"public servant" denote a person falling
under any of the descriptions hereinafter
following; namely:-

First.- Omitted

Second.- Every Commissioned
Officer in the Military, Naval or Air Forces
of India;

Third.- Every Judge including any
person empowered by law to discharge,
whether by himself or as a member of any body
of persons, any adjudicatory functions;
10 All. Naresh Kumar Valmiki Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
533

Fourth.- Every officer of a Court of
Justice (including a liquidator, receiver or
commissioner) whose duty it is, as such officer,
to investigate or report on any matter of law or
fact, or to make, authenticate, or keep any
document, or to take charge or dispose of any
property, or to execute any judicial process, or
to administer any oath, or to interpret, or to
preserve order in the Court, and every person
specially authorized by a Court of Justice to
perform any of such duties;

Fifth.- Every juryman, assessor, or
member of a panchayat assisting a Court of
Justice or public servant;

Sixth.- Every arbitrator or other person
to whom any cause or matter has been referred for
decision or report by any Court of Justice, or by
any other competent public authority;

Seventh.- Every person who holds
any office by virtue of which he is empowered
to place or keep any person in confinement;

Eighth.-
Every
officer
of
the
Government whose duty it is, as such officer, to
prevent offences, to give information of
offences, to bring offenders to justice, or to
protect the public health, safety or convenience;

Ninth.- Every officer whose duty it
is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or
expend any property on behalf of the
Government,
or
to
make
any
survey,
assessment or contract on behalf of the
Government, or to execute any revenue process,
or to investigate, or to report, on any matter
affecting the pecuniary interests of the
Government, or to make, authenticate or keep
any document relating to the pecuniary interests
of the Government, or to prevent the infraction
of any law for the protection of the pecuniary
interests of the Government;

Tenth.- Every officer whose duty it
is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or
expend any property, to make any survey or
assessment or to levy any rate or tax for any
secular common purpose of any village, town
or district, or to make, authenticate or keep any
document for the ascertaining of the rights of
the people of any village, town or district;

Eleventh.- Every person who holds
any office in virtue of which he is empowered
to prepare, publish, maintain or revise an
electoral roll or to conduct an election or part of
an election;

Twelfth.- Every person -

(a) in the service or pay of the
Government or remunerated by fees or
commission for the performance of any public
duty by the Government;

(b) in the service or pay of a local
authority, a corporation established by or under
a Central, Provincial or State Act or a
Government company as defined in section 617
of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956).

20. Section 4(2)(b) of the Act referred to
the duty of a "public servant" referred to in subsection (1) which provides for registration of a
complaint or a First Information Report under
this Act and other relevant provisions and to
register it under the appropriate sections of this
Act.

21. Third clause of Section 21 of IPC
makes it clear that a Judge is also a "public
servant".

22. A conjoint reading of Section 4 of
the Act, the definition of a ''public servant'
as per the Act and also the Indian Penal
Code, would leave no doubt that a
534 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
complaint or a First Information Report, as
given, has to be registered. The Act thus
draws a distinction in Section 4(2)(b) in the
nature of information given by the
concerned person, which can be through a
complaint or a First Information Report and
thus the court concerned has a discretion to
look into it and proceed as per its wisdom.

23. In view of our aforesaid
discussions, a Special Judge or court so
established can treat an application under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint and
proceed further in accordance with law.

24. This Court thus answers the
reference as referred by learned Single
Judge as follows:-

"The view taken in the case of
Soni Devi vs. State of U.P. and others:
2022(5)ADJ 64 that an application under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. cannot be treated as
a complaint case is incorrect. The court
concerned while exercising its judicial
discretion can treat the said application as a
complaint case also."

25. While answering the questions
referred to by the learned Single Judge, let
the present petitions and appeals be now
placed before the appropriate Bench on
October 20,2022.
----------
(2022) 10 ILRA 534
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.09.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAURABH SHYAM
SHAMSHERY, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 20095 of 2022

Akhilesh Kumar Gupta & Anr. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Sri Vishnu Prakash Srivastava

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
Govt. Advocate, Sri Vipul Pandey

(A) Criminal Law - The Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Inherent
power - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - 420,
467, 468, 471 and 120-B - "process of
law" - ''abused' - if the matter is
essentially of civil nature and has been
given
a
cloak
of
criminal
offence,
therefore, applying the principles, a High
Court can exercise its jurisdiction provided
under Section 482 Cr.P.C.- merely to take
advantage of a relatively quick relief
granted in a criminal case any contrast to
a civil dispute - such an exercise is
nothing but an abuse of process of law
which must be discouraged in its entirety.
(Para - 10)

Question of validity of agreement to sale of
property - subjudiced before Civil Court -
contrary stands taken by parties - Applicants
challenging F.I.R., charge sheet, summoning
order and entire proceedings - civil dispute
given a dark and bright colour of a criminal
offence - elements of conspiracy completely
absent - proceedings malacious - ingredients of
offence prima-facie not made out. (Para -
4,5,9)

HELD:-Criminal proceedings initiated against
the applicants are a glaring example of ''abuse
of process of law' where a dispute of civil nature
has been given colour of criminal offence. Prima
facie essential ingredients of alleged offence not
present. Criminal proceedings itself became
vexatious and oppressive. (Para -14 )

Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. allowed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-
1. St. of Haryana Vs Bhajan Lal , 1992 Supp (1)
SCC 335