# Naseem Ahmad v. State of U.P

- **Citation:** Crimianl Appeal No. 2546 of 2006
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-03-06
- **Case number:** Crimianl Appeal No. 2546 of 2006
- **Bench:** Pankaj Naqvi, Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/naseem-ahmad-v-state-of-u-p-46455
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961- Sections
498-A, 304-B I.P.C. - Section 4 - Appeal
against conviction.

Held :- Death of wife caused by setting her
ablaze by husband - 3rd degree burns -
640 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
deceased not even taken to the hospital.
(Para 39)

Lenient View: In the facts of case no
ground made out for taking a lenient view for
the
purpose
of
sentencing.
(Para
39)
Prosecution has proved charges against the
appellant under Sections 498-A, 304-B, I.P.C
and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act
beyond any reasonable doubt. (Para 40)

Appeal rejected. (E-2)

List of Cases Cited:-

## Text

3-5 All. Naseem Ahmad Vs. State of U.P.
639
present appellant. Therefore, the above
contention loses significance and is not
helpful to the appellant.

(41) We have also perused carefully
the afore-cited judgement placed by the
learned senior counsel for the appellant.

In all humbleness, we may submit
that the facts of this case in hand, after
evaluation of the entire testimony is found
to be highly distinguishable from the one
referred by the learned senior counsel.
Therefore, the same is not applicable to the
given facts and circumstances of the case in
hand.

(42) It is cardinal principle of criminal
jurisprudence that prosecution would have
to prove its case beyond all reasonable
doubt
by
producing
convincing
and
clinching testimony in order to prove guilt
of the accused. Here in this case testimony
of witnesses of fact is consistent, clinching
and creditworthiness of the witnesses of
fact is found to be intact and inspiring
confidence.

(43) The above critical scrutiny
regarding
the
evidence,
facts
and
circumstances of the case goes to unravel
the truth in favour of the prosecution that it
has successfully proved the incident to
have been caused by the appellant in the
night intervening 17/18.6.1988 at 1.30
A.M. at village- Patwai, district- Rampur,
whereby, appellant- Arvind murdered Nem
Chand
by
using
countrymade
gun;
consequently, the conviction recorded and
the sentence awarded by the learned trial
Judge in Sessions Trial No.9 of 1989,
(State Vs. Arvind and another), Case
Crime No.88 of 1988, police station-
Patwai, district- Rampur is wholly justified.

(44) Arguments advanced in support
of the appellant sans merit and in the final
outcome this appeal is dismissed.

(45) Appellant- Arvind is on bail. His
bail bonds and surety bonds are hereby
cancelled. He shall be taken into custody
forthwith for serving out the sentence.

(46)

Let
a
copy
of
this
order/judgement be certified to the court
below for necessary information an follow
up action.
----------
(2020)03-05ILR A639
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.03.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE PANKAJ NAQVI, J.
THE HON'BLE SAURABH SHYAM
SHAMSHERY, J.

Crimianl Appeal No. 2546 of 2006

Naseem Ahmad ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Opposite Party

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Vijay Gautam, Sri B.K. Tripathi, Sri
Mohammad Parvez, Sri Mohd. Ashraf, Sri
N.I. Jafri, Smt. Chandra Kala Chaturvedi,
Sri Manisha Chaturvedi.

Counsel for the Opposite Party:
A.G.A.

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961- Sections
498-A, 304-B I.P.C. - Section 4 - Appeal
against conviction.

Held :- Death of wife caused by setting her
ablaze by husband - 3rd degree burns -
640 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
deceased not even taken to the hospital.
(Para 39)

Lenient View: In the facts of case no
ground made out for taking a lenient view for
the
purpose
of
sentencing.
(Para
39)
Prosecution has proved charges against the
appellant under Sections 498-A, 304-B, I.P.C
and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act
beyond any reasonable doubt. (Para 40)

Appeal rejected. (E-2)

List of Cases Cited:-

1. Kashmira Devi Vs. St. of Uttarakhand. &
ors, 2020 SCC Online SC 87.

2. Rammi Vs. St. of M.P., 1999 (8) SCC 649.

3. St. of Raj. Vs. Thakur Singh (2014) 12 SCC
211.

4. Baijnath & ors. Vs. St. of M.P., 2017 (1)
SCC 101.

5. Hazara Singh Vs. Raj Kumar 2013 (9) SCC
516.

6. St. of M.P. Vs. Babulal & ors, 2013 (12)
SCC 308.

7. St. of M.P. Vs. Surendra Singh, 2015 (1)
SCC 222.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saurabh Shyam
Shamshery, J)

1. Heard Ms. Chandra Kala Chaturvedi

learned counsel for the appellant and Shri.
A.N. Mulla, learned A.G.A., for the State.

2. This criminal appeal has been filed
under Section 374 (2) Cr.P.C, against the
judgment and order dated 24.3.2006 passed by
Additional District and Sessions Judge/Fast
Track Court No.1, District-Siddharth Nagar, in
Sessions Trial No.144/1999, whereby appellant
was convicted under Sections 498-A, 304-B
Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 4 of
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and sentenced for
one year rigorous imprisonment and fine of
Rs.1000/- under Section 498-A I.P.C., one year
rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.2500/-
under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and
Life Imprisonment under Section 304-B I.P.C.
In case of non-payment of fine to undergo
further sentence of 5 months. Other two
accused were acquitted.

3. Prosecution case in brief was that on
22.3.1995, first informant Haji Hafizullah
lodged a written report (Ex. Ka.1) alleging that
his daughter Raina Parveen @ Munni was
married to Mohd. Naseem r/o District-Bahraich
(accused/appellant herein) in the year 1989.
Soon after her marriage, accused repeatedly
demanded dowry of Rs.10,000/-, which was
ultimately given him. It was further alleged that
his daughter was murdered for dowry by the
appellant and his younger brother-in-law Mohd.
Ashfaq. Even after some days of marriage his
daughter told that she was subjected to cruelty
and also beaten for dowry demand. As the
daughter was subjected to cruelty, he brought
her to parental house. However, after some days
on intervention of elders, she was returned to
her matrimonial house. It was further alleged
that earlier also an attempt of murder was
committed upon her daughter by pouring
kerosene oil over her body. However, she was
saved and he took her back to parental house
and she remained there for two and a half years.
Subsequently, after settlement at Panchayat,
deceased was taken to her matrimonial house
by her husband and in laws.

4. In written report it was further
mentioned that on 21.3.1995, neighbour of
the first informant, Abdul Amin received a
phone call at about 1.30 in night that Raina
Parveen was seriously injured, after half an
hour, it was telephonically informed that
she was no more. Incident of burning was
3-5 All. Naseem Ahmad Vs. State of U.P.
641
committed at about 8 A.M. on 21.3.1995.
However, no medical aid was provided to
his daughter and she succumbed to burn
injuries.

5. On the basis of written report, an
F.I.R. (Ex.Ka.6) was lodged on 22.3.1995
at 8.30 A.M. at Police Station-Tehri Bazar,
District-Siddharth Nagar. Distance between
place of occurrence and police station was
reported to be 2 Km.

6. The Investigating Officer visited
the place of occurrence, prepared site plan
and recovery memo (Ex.Ka.5) of a Tincontainer, having capacity of 5 litres, in
which two litres of kerosene oil was found.
Inquest report was prepared and dead body
was sent for post mortem.

7. Autopsy of dead body of Raina
Parveen @ Munni was conducted on
23.3.1995 by Dr. S.S. Srivastava, who
found following antemortem injuries:-

(1) Burn 1st to 3rd degree involve
whole body except both foot and interior
part of left leg before knee joint. Line of
redness present.

(2) Abrasion (two) in area of 2
cm x 1 cm of forehead in middle point 4
cm above the arch of nose.

On internal examination, brain
and brain membrane were found congested.
Pleura, both lungs and larynx trachea were
found congested. Inside trachea, small
particles of carbon were found. In stomach,
liquid and gas were present. Cause of death
was shock as a result of antemortem burn
injury.

8. Trial was committed to the Court of
Sessions and charges under Sections 498-A
and 304-B I.P.C. and Section 4 of Dowry
Prohibition Act were framed against the
appellant and two others namely Imran @
Ganesh and Ashfaq Ahmad.

9. The prosecution in order to prove
their case examined P.W.1-Fariddduddin,
P.W.2-Sawara
Begum,
PW.3-Dr.S.S.
Srivastava, P.W.4-Ashiq Ali, P.W.5-Bansh
Lochan Pandey and P.W.6- Jag Prasad
Pandey.

10. P.W.1-Faridduddin (brother of
deceased)
in
his
chief
examination
supported the prosecution version on the
issue that death was caused within 7 years
of marriage, deceased was subjected to
cruelty for demand of dowry by her
husband soon before her death and death
was caused by burns. In cross-examination
this witness remained consistent, however
mentioned about cordial relations between
his sister and husband.

11. P.W.2-Sawara Begum, mother of
the deceased also supported the prosecution
version in her chief examination on the
issue of demand of dowry and that
deceased
was
subjected
to
cruelty.
Deceased had written a letter to her that she
was subjected to cruelty due to dowry
demand. She also told P.W.-2 that her
husband used to beat her. This witness also
remained unshaken in cross-examination.
However, she also mentioned about cordial
relations between her daughter and husband
(appellant).

12.
 P.W.-3,
Dr.
S.S.Srivastava
conducted post mortem of dead body of
deceased, proved injuries mentioned in the
post
mortem
report.
In
his
crossexamination, the Doctor stated that the
injuries could be an outcome of an
accident.
642 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

13. P.W.-4, Ashik Ali, neighbour of
appellant, Panch to the Inquest report of
dead body as well as to recovery of
container with two litres of kerosene oil
from the place of occurrence, supported the
recovery memo. In cross-examination,
P.W.-4 stated that there were cordial
relations between the deceased and her
husband. No incident of brawl between
them
was
reported.
P.W.-4
further
mentioned that at the time of incident,
appellant Naseem Ahmad was not present
at his house.

14. P.W.-5, Bansh Lochan Pandey,
proved written report and F.I.R. He
mentioned about recordings of statements
of the witnesses and recovery of a container
containing two litres of kerosene oil from
the place of occurrence.

15. P.W.-6, Jag Prasad Pandey was
the Tehsildar at the relevant time, who
prepared the inquest report of the dead
body of deceased.

16. Statements of the appellant as
well as other co-accused were recorded
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein they
denied prosecution case and submitted that
deceased died due to accident, while
preparing
food.
Mohd.
Harun
was
examined as defence witness (DW-1), who
stated about cordial relations between the
couple and that at the time of occurrence,
appellant was present at his shop. Marriage
was solemnised in 1987 or 1988. Deceased
died due to accident while preparing food
on stove.

17. Learned Trial Court after
considering statement of the witnesses and
other materials came to the conclusion that
marriage of the deceased was solemnised
within a period of 7 years from her death
and she was subjected to cruelty soon
before her death in regard to demand of
dowry. Accused/appellant poured kerosene
oil on the deceased and set her ablaze.
Learned Trial Court rejected the defence
story that deceased died due to accident
while preparing food on the stove.

18. The learned trial court acquitted
co-accused Imran and Ashfaq from all the
charges in absence of sufficient evidence
against them, however convicted the
appellant for all the charges.

19. Ms. Chandrakala Chaturvedi,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant submitted that:

(i). The impugned judgment and
order dated 24.3.2006 was passed only on
the basis of sole testimony of PW-2
(mother
of
the
deceased)
whereas
testimony
of
PW-1
(brother of
the
deceased) was found to be unreliable.

(ii). Demand of Dowry was not
proved.

(iii) Year of marriage remained
uncertain as there was different version of
P.W.-1, P.W.-2 and D.W.-1 on the issue,
therefore, it was not conclusively proved
that death was caused within 7 years of
marriage.

(iv). PW-1 (brother of deceased),
P.W.-4 (neighbour of appellant) and D.W.-
1 have stated about cordial relations
between deceased and appellant, therefore
allegations of cruelty for demand of dowry
are without any basis.

(v). PW-4 and DW-1 stated that
appellant-Naseem was not present at his
home at the time of occurrence and reached
3-5 All. Naseem Ahmad Vs. State of U.P.
643
house after the occurrence. Therefore,
prosecution failed to prove presence of the
appellant at his house at the time of
occurrence.

(vi). Presence of 2 litres kerosene
in container, half cooked rice on stove, of
which some part had spilled over, at the
place of occurrence indicates that deceased
was burnt while cooking and her death was
accidental.

(vii).
Doctor
(PW-3)
has
opined that death could be caused due
to accident, which corroborates from
the scene of occurrence and also
supports the explanation given by
appellant in the statement recorded
under Section 313 Cr.P.C.

(viii).
The
appellant
is
suffering
from
small
lymphocytic
Lymphoma (blood
cancer)
and
is
undergoing
treatment
at
BHU,
Varanasi. The appellant had already
served
more
than
13
years
of
imprisonment and is suffering from
major
health
issue
therefore
on
humanitarian
ground
the
appellant
deserves acquittal.

20. Per contra, Shri. A.N. Mulla,
learned
A.G.A.
opposed
the
submissions
of
the
appellant
and
submitted that testimony of P.W.1 and
P.W.2
was
consistent
and
they
completely supported the prosecution
version. He further submitted that
P.W.1, brother of deceased specifically
stated that the marriage of his sister
and appellant was solemnised in the
year 1989, occurrence took place on
21.3.1995 i.e. within seven years of
marriage.
P.W.1
supported
the
prosecution version regarding demand
of dowry as he specifically stated that
appellant demanded Rs.10,000/- for
opening a shop. Due to harassment and
cruelty, deceased remained at her
matrimonial house for about 3 years.
She was taken back on request of
family of appellant; but still subjected
to cruelty. He further submitted that
contradictions are trivial and are not
affecting the basic prosecution case.
He finally submitted that postmortem
report
completely
supported
the
prosecution version that the deceased
was not accidently burnt, but was set
ablaze after pouring kerosene oil,
which is evident from the nature of
injury No.1 which indicates that she
was burnt 1st to 3rd degrees, whole
body except both foot and interior part
of left leg before knee joint.

21.

In
the
present
appeal,
conviction of the appellant is under
Sections 498-A, 304-B, I.P.C. and
Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.

22. In Kashmira Devi Vs. State of
Uttarakhand & Ors, 2020 SCC Online
SC 87, the Court held in paragraph 18
that "for sustaining the conviction
under
section
304-B
I.P.C.
the
following essentials must be satisfied:-

(i) the death of a woman must
have caused by burns or bodily injury or
otherwise than normal circumstances;

(ii)
such
death
must
have
occurred within seven years of her
marriage;

(iii) soon before her death, the
woman must have been subjected to cruelty
or harassment by her husband or by
relatives of her husband;
644 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(iv) such cruelty or harassment
must be for or in connection with demand
for dowry;

(v) such cruelty or harassment is
shown to have been meted out to the
woman soon before her death.

(Vide Kans Raj Vs. State of
Punjab & Ors (2000) 5 SCC 207 and Smt.
Shanti & Anr. Vs. State of Haryana (1991)
1 SCC 371."

23. In the light of above legal
positions, we have to ascertain as to
whether in the facts and circumstances of
present case, the prosecution is able to
establish the ingredients of Section 304-B
I.P.C.

24. The first issue is as to whether
death of the deceased occurred within
seven years of her marriage.

25. Accurate date of marriage was
neither mentioned in FIR nor in testimony
of any of the witnesses. Only year of
marriage i.e. 1989 was mentioned, in the
written report lodged by P.W.1. P.W.1
(brother of the victim) alleged that he was 2
years elder to the victim, while another
sister Sikandar Jahan was 2 years elder to
him. P.W.1 was 37 years as on 10.4.2002
when he was examined. Thus, the year of
birth of P.W.1 would be 1965, that of
victim as 1967 and that of elder sister
Sikandar Jahan as 1963. The defence
alleged that the victim was married in the
year 1983-84. P.W.1 stated that the victim
was around 25-26 years old at the time of
her marriage. If that was so, then, year of
birth of the victim would be 1957-58 which
would surpass far beyond the year of birth
of elder sister of the victim (1963). The
trial court on cumulative assessment of the
evidence of P.W.'s 1 & 2, was of the view
that the period of marriage of the victim
would fall between 11.4.1988 to 11.4.1989.
P.W.2, mother of the deceased in her
testimony recorded on 11.6.2002 stated that
marriage of her daughter took place around
13-14 years ago. On the basis of testimony
of P.W.1 and P.W.2, it can be safely
presumed that marriage took place either in
1988 or 1989, thus the death on 21.3.1995
was within 7 years of marriage.

26. We are in complete agreement
with the reasoning of the trial court as
regards the year of marriage of the victim
to
which
no
perversity
could
be
demonstrated.

27. The next issue which requires
consideration of the Court is about cruelty
and harassment subjected to deceased in
connection with demand of dowry by her
husband soon before her death. On this
issue, written report as well as occular
evidence
of
P.W.1
and
P.W.2
has
supported prosecution version that there
was dowry demand of Rs.10,000/- after the
marrriage which was fulfilled by the father
of the deceased. Both the witnesses also
stated that due to cruelty, deceased was
forced to live at her parental house for
about 3 years. It has also come in the
evidence that she was subjected to cruelty
soon after she returned to her matrimonial
house. Thus, she was subjected to cruelty
over demand of dowry soon before her
death. Merely because P.W.1 and 2 stated
in cross-examination that there were cordial
relations between the deceased and her
husband, the entire evidence on cruelty and
demand of dowry cannot be rejected. The
Court has to see whether the testimony of
P.W.1 and 2 inspires confidence and we are
of the definite view that nothing has come
in evidence, except minor inconsistency or
3-5 All. Naseem Ahmad Vs. State of U.P.
645
contradictions or exaggerations which
could shake confidence in accepting
testimony of P.W.-1 and 2 to be reliable.

28. In Rammi Vs. State of M.P., 1999
(8) SCC 649, the Court in paragraphs 25
and 26 held that:

"25. It is a common practice in
trial courts to make out contradictions from
the previous statement of a witness for
confronting him during cross-examination.
Merely because there is inconsistency in
evidence it is not sufficient to impair the
credit of the witness. No doubt Section 155
of the Evidence Act provides scope for
impeaching the credit of a witness by proof
of an inconsistent former statement. But a
reading of the section would indicate that
all inconsistent statements are not sufficient
to impeach the credit of the witness. The
material portion of the Section is extracted
below:

155.
Impeaching
credit
of
witness.- The credit of a witness may be
impeached in the following ways by the
adverse party, or, with the consent of the
court, by the party who calls him-

(1)-(2) * * *

(3) by proof of former statements
inconsistent with any part of his evidence
which is liable to be contradicted;"

26. A former statement though
seemingly inconsistent with the evidence
need not necessarily be sufficient to amount
to
contradiction.
Only
such
of
the
inconsistent statement which is liable to be
"contradicted" would affect the credit of
the witness. Section 145 of the Evidence
Act also enables the cross-examiner to use
any former statement of the witness, but it
cautions
that
if
it
is
intended
to
"contradict" the witness the cross-examiner
is enjoined to comply with the formality
prescribed therein. Section 162 of Code
also permits the cross-examiner to use the
previous statement of the witness (recorded
under Section 161 of the Code) for the only
limited purpose, i.e. to contradict the
witness."

29. Submission of counsel for the
appellant that testimony of P.W.1 was
completely rejected by learned trial court is
liable to be rejected, as we have perused the
impugned judgment and find that the
learned trial court relied upon testimony of
P.W.1 however, noted contradictions in his
testimony, which were trivial.

30. P.W.1 and 2 remained consistent
in respect of issues such as deceased was
subjected to cruelty soon before her death
over demand of dowry, death took place
within seven years of marriage. Medical
examination,
nature
of
injuries
and
testimony of Doctor S.S.Srivastava (P.W.-
3), are clinching and sufficient to prove
beyond doubt that death of victim was
caused otherwise than under normal
circumstances, on account of burn injuries,
attributable to the appellant. Therefore,
prosecution was able to prove all the
necessary ingredients of Sections 498-A,
304-B I.P.C. and Section 4 of Dowry
Prohibition Act.

31. We have also considered the
provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence
Act 1872 and its applicability in the facts
and circumstances of present case. Section
106 provides inter-alia that when any fact is
exclusively within the knowledge of any
person, the burden of proving that fact is
upon him. In the present case, wife of the
accused died in the house, where they
646 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
ordinarily reside. The accused offers an
explanation that death of his wife was
caused by accident while cooking. We are
of the view that explanation given by the
accused is false which is a strong
circumstance that accused is responsible for
commission of the crime.

32. It is important to refer to
paragraph 22 of State of Rajasthan Vs.
Thakur Singh (2014) 12 SCC 211, on
applicability
of
Section 106 of
the
Evidence Act.

"22. The law, therefore, is quite
well settled that the burden of proving the
guilt of an accused is on the prosecution,
but there may be certain facts pertaining to
a crime that can be known only to the
accused, or are virtually impossible for the
prosecution to prove. These facts need to
be explained by the accused and if he does
not do so, then it is a strong circumstance
pointing to his guilt based on those facts."

33. Further presumption as to dowry
death under Section 113-B Indian Evidence
Act is also against the accused as
prosecution has successfully substantiated
the ingredients of "dowry death" that soon
before her death, deceased was subjected to
cruelty for demand of dowry by accusedappellant.
Accused/appellant
has
completely failed to rebut the presumption.

34. In Baijnath and Others Vs. State
of Madhya Pradesh, 2017 (1) SCC 101,
the Court in paragraph 30 held that:

"30. A conjoint reading of these
three provisions, thus predicate the burden
of
the
prosecution
to
unassailably
substantiate the ingredients of the two
offences by direct and convincing evidence
so as to avail the presumption engrafted in
Section 113B of the Act against the
accused. Proof of cruelty or harassment by
the husband or her relative or the person
charged is thus the sine qua non to inspirit
the statutory presumption, to draw the
person charged within the coils thereof. If
the prosecution fails to demonstrate by
cogent coherent and persuasive evidence to
prove such fact, the person accused of
either of the above referred offences cannot
be held guilty by taking refuge only of the
presumption to cover up the shortfall in
proof."

35. Lastly, we have to deal with the
submission of appellant on lenient view on
quantum of punishment.

36. In Hazara Singh Vs. Raj Kumar
2013 (9) SCC 516, the Court in paragraph
10 held that:

"10..........The
legislature
has
bestowed upon the judiciary this enormous
discretion in the sentencing policy, which
must be exercised with utmost care and
caution. The punishment awarded should
be directly proportionate to the nature and
the
magnitude
of
the
offence.
The
benchmark of proportionate sentencing can
assist the judges in arriving at a fair and
impartial verdict."

37. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs.
Babulal & Ors, 2013 (12) SCC 308 , the
Court in para 19 held that:

"19. In view of the above, the law
on the issue can be summarised to the
effect that one of the prime objectives of
criminal law is the imposition of adequate,
just, proportionate punishment which is
commensurate with the gravity and nature
of the crime and manner in which the
offence is committed. The most relevant
3-5 All. Naseem Ahmad Vs. State of U.P.
647
determinative factor of sentencing is
proportionality
between
crime
and
punishment keeping in mind the social
interest and consciousness of the society. It
is a mockery of the criminal justice system
to take a lenient view showing misplaced
sympathy
to
the
accused
on
any
consideration whatsoever including the
delay
in
conclusion
of
criminal
proceedings. The Punishment should not be
so lenient that it shocks the conscious of the
society being abhorrent to the basic
principles of sentencing. Thus, it is the
solemn duty of the court to strike a proper
balance while awarding sentence as
awarding a lesser sentence encourages a
criminal and as a result of the same society
suffers."

38. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs.
Surendra Singh, 2015 (1) SCC 222, the
Court in paras 13 and 14 held that:

"13. We again reiterate in this
case that undue sympathy to impose
inadequate sentence would do more harm
to the justice system to undermine the
public confidence in the efficacy of law. It
is the duty of every court to award proper
sentence having regard to the nature of the
offence and the manner in which it was
executed or committed. The sentencing
courts are expected to consider all relevant
facts and circumstances bearing on the
question of sentence and proceed to impose
a sentence commensurate with the gravity
of the offence. The court must not only keep
in view the rights of the victim of the crime
but also the society at large while
considering the imposition of appropriate
punishment. Meagre sentence imposed
solely on account of lapse of time without
considering the degree of the offence will
be counter-productive in the long run and
against the interest of the society.

14. In a recent decision in the
case of State of M.P. Vs. Bablu, (2014) 9
SCC 281, after considering and following
the earlier decisions, this Court reiterated
the settled proposition of law that one of
the prime objectives of criminal law is the
imposition of adequate, just, proportionate
punishment which commensurate with
gravity, nature of crime and the manner in
which the offence is committed. One should
keep in mind the social interest and
conscience of the society while considering
the determinative factor of sentence with
gravity of crime. The punishment should
not be so lenient that it shocks the
conscience of the society. It is, therefore,
solemn duty of the court to strike a proper
balance while awarding the sentence as
awarding lesser sentence encourages any
criminal and, as a result of the same, the
society suffers."

39. The case in hand is required to be
decided on the issue of granting lesser
punishment on the basis of aforesaid settled
legal proposition regarding principle of
sentencing. In the present case, accused
husband has caused death of his wife by
pouring kerosene and set her ablaze, which
caused 3rd degree burns, over her whole
body, except both foot and interior part of
left leg before knee joint. Deceased was
even not taken to the hospital. All essential
ingredients of offences under section 304-B
I.P.C. are proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Sentence awarded is just and appropriate.
In these circumstances, taking any lenient
view
will
be
against
the
aforesaid
principles of sentencing.

40. We, in view of above, do not find
any error in the impugned judgment and are
thus of the considered opinion that
prosecution has proved charges against the
appellant under Sections 498-A, 304-B,
648 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
I.P.C and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition
Act beyond any reasonable doubt.

41. The appeal is dismissed.
----------
(2020)03-05ILR A648
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.02.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ARVIND KUMAR MISRA-I, J.
THE HON'BLE GAUTAM CHOWDHARY, J.

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 3042 of 1987

Faiyaz & Ors. ...Appellants (In Jail)
Versus
State of U.P. ...Opposite Party

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Keshav Sahai, Sri Ajay Kumar Pandey

Counsel for the Opposite Party:
A.G.A.

Criminal law- Indian Penal Code - Section
302, - Section 302/34 - Appeal against
conviction.

Criminal law- Indian Penal Code -
Section 34 IPC - Common Intention

Held :- All appellants appeared on spot from
sugarcane field possessing country made pistols
and only one shot fired. Pre-concert amongst
appellants
established
by
description
and
manner of incident from the testimony of
witness. All the assailants shared the common
intention to kill the victim. Appellant's claim of
remaining silent on spot- irrelevant.

Appeal rejected. (E-2)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Arvind Kumar Mishra-I, J.
&
Hon'ble Gautam Chowdhary, J.)

1. By way of the instant criminal
appeal, challenge has been made to the
validity and sustainability of the judgment
and order of conviction dated 21.12.1987
passed by the VII-Additional Sessions
Judge, Meerut, in Sessions Trial No.8 of
1986 (State of U.P. Vs. Faiyaz and others),
under Section 302, 302/34 I.P.C., Police
Station- Kithore, District- Meerut, whereby
all the appellants have been sentenced to
life imprisonment.

2. Heard Sri Ajay Kumar Pandey,
learned counsel for the appellants, Shri
Krishna
Pahal,
learned
Additional
Advocate General assisted by Sri Bhanu
Prakash Singh, learned A.G.A. for the State
and perused the record.

3. Prosecution case is that one
Shaharyab s/o Afsar of village- Jadauda,
P.S.- Kithore, District- Meerut lodged an
F.I.R. at Police Station- Kithore, District-
Meerut on 13.10.1985 at 3:15 p.m. against
accused Faiyaz, Mahfooz, Hasnain and
Tariqat alleging that the informant and his
father Afsar were going to collect fodder
from jungle on 13.10.1985 around 12:00
noon, while they were so proceeding and
reached near the sugarcane filed of Faiyaz.
Suddenly Faiyaz, Mahfooz, Hasnain and
Tariqat, the co-villagers appeared on the
scene from the sugarcane field possessing
country
made
gun
in
their
hands
challenging that they will not spare the
informant side whereupon the informant
and his father got frightened and they tried
to flee away from the scene when Faiyaz
fired with his gun on informant's father due
to which he fell down and the informant
saved himself by fleeing away from the
scene. On hearing the sound of the fire
villagers
Yusuf,
Mahmood,
Muzaffar,
Hisamuddin, Nazar Hussain and Akhtar
arrived on the spot and on seeing these
persons the assailants also secured their
escape and disappeared in the sugarcane