# National Highways Authority of India v. Om Prakash Singh & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 11 ILRA 1286
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-11-25
- **Case number:** Conciliation Act 1996 No. 42 of 2025
- **Bench:** Jaspreet Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/national-highways-authority-of-india-v-om-prakash-singh-ors-52743
- **Pages:** 6

## Text

1286 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Court, shall be set at liberty forthwith. She
is free to go wherever she likes and stay
with whomsoever she wants, including her
husband Abhishek Rajput. The police
personnel, who have brought her forth, are
discharged
of
their
assignment
immediately.

38. Let the original records, produced
by the Principal, Shaheed Bhagat Singh
Junior High School, Bithoor, Kanpur
Nagar, be returned to her.

39. Let this order be communicated to
the Commissioner of Police, Kanpur Nagar,
the Incharge/Superintendent, Government
Children Home (Girls), Unit-1, Swaroop
Nagar, Kanpur Nagar and the Station
House Officer, Police Station- Chaubepur,
District- Western Commissionerate Kanpur
Nagar through the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar by the Registrar
(Compliance).
---------
(2025) 11 ILRA 1286
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 25.11.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J.

Appeal Under Section 37 of Arbitration And
Conciliation Act 1996 No. 42 of 2025

National Highways Authority of India
 ...Appellant
Versus
Om Prakash Singh & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Abhishek Pathak

Counsel for the Respondents:
Prasiddha Narayan Singh

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
1. Whether the Court under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
exceeded
its
jurisdiction
by
re-appraising
evidence and interfering with the arbitral award.
2. Whether the Court erred in not invoking
Section 34(4) to remit the matter back to the
Arbitral Tribunal for curing defects.

HEADNOTES
Civil Law - Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 - Section - 34, 34(1), 34(4), -
National Highways Authority of India Act
(NHAI Act) - Section - 3-G - Appeal u/s
Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act
- assailing the Commercial Court, judgment -
whereby the petition preferred under section 34
of the Act filed by the respondent no. 1 has
been allowed and the matter has been remitted
for consideration afresh - Award under the
NHAI Act - Arbitration Case - Award was
set aside and remitted for reconsideration -
instant appeal - appellant pleaded that the
court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section
34 by re-appraising evidence and ignoring
Section 34(4) - while the respondents
opposed that the court merely addressed
disparity in compensation among contiguous
landholders without re-evaluating evidence -
Court, after considering precedents including
Kinnari Mullick v. Ghansyam Das Damani
(2018), Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft
Technologies Ltd. (2025), and UHL Power
Co. Ltd. v. State of H.P. (2022), held that no
jurisdictional overreach was made, Section 34(4)
was inapplicable absent an application, and
parity in compensation justified remand -
accordingly, appeal is dismissed - however,
leaving the appellant to pursue remedies in the
arbitral proceedings.(Para - 26, 27, 28, 29)

Appeal Allowed. (E-11)
CASE LAW CITED
1. Kinnari Mullick v. Ghansyam Das Damani
(2018) 11 SCC 328
2. Hema Agarwal v. NHAI (2025:AHC:148001)
3. Chandra Kishori v. Union of India (2023 SCC
Online All 3950)
4.
Nitin
Maheshwari
v.
Union
of
India
(MANU/UP/4080/2023)
5.
Harish
Tripathi
v.
NHAI
(MANU/UP/4213/2023)
6.
Gayatri
Balasamy
v.
ISG
Novasoft
Technologies Ltd. (2025) 7 SCC 1
11 All. National Highways Authority of India Vs. Om Prakash Singh & Ors.
1287
7. UHL Power Co. Ltd. v. State of H.P. (2022) 4
SCC 116
8. AC Chokshi Share Broker (P) Ltd. v. Jatin
Pratap Desai (2025) 5 SCC 321
9. UCM Coal Co. Ltd. v. Adani Enterprises Ltd.
(2025:AHC-LKO:58732-DB)

LIST OF ACTS
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, National
Highways Authority of India Act (NHAI Act)

LIST OF KEYWORDS
Arbitral award - Arbitration Case - Section 34 -
Patent illegality - Jurisdiction of court - Reappraisal
of
evidence
-
Compensation
determination - NHAI Act - Judgment in
personam - remand to arbitral tribunal -
determination of compensation.

CASE ARISING FROM
Arbitration Case No. 4 of 2022 before the
Additional District Judge-I, Ambedkar Nagar -
Appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 against order
dated 08.08.2025.

APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
Counsel for Appellant(s): Shri Abhishek Pathak,
Counsel for Respondent(s): Sri Prasidh Narayan
Singh, assisted by Sri J.N. Singh

(Delivered by Hon'ble Jaspreet Singh, J.)

1. Heard Sri Abhishek Pathak, learned
counsel for the appellant and Sri Prasidh
Narayan Singh, learned counsel along with
Sri J.N. Singh, learned counsel for the
respondent no. 1 on caveat.

2. The instant appeal has been
preferred
under
Section
37
of
the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(hereinafter referred to as "the Act of
1996") assailing the judgment and order
dated 08.08.2025 passed by the Additional
District Judge-I, Ambedkar Nagar in
Arbitration Case No. 4 of 2022 whereby
the petition preferred under Section 34 of
the Act of 1996 filed by the respondent no.
1 has been allowed and the matter has been
remitted for consideration afresh.

3. The submission of learned counsel
for the appellant is that the Court while
exercising powers under Section 34 of the
Act
of
1996
has
overstepped
its
jurisdiction, inasmuch as, it has entered
into the merits of the dispute and it has reappraised the evidence which is not within
the domain of the Court exercising powers
under Section 34 of the Act of 1996.

4. It is further urged that where a view
has been taken by an Arbitrator after
considering the material available on
record, unless it is shown to be perverse,
such view has to be accepted and the courts
under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 are not
empowered to take a different view, thus,
the Court while entering into the factual
aspect, has re-appraised the evidence which
is not permissible, accordingly, the order
impugned dated 08.08.2025 is bad in the
eyes of law.

5. It has further been submitted by the
learned counsel for the appellant that the
court further over-stepped its jurisdiction
by ignoring the principles enunciated in
Section 34 (4) of the Act of 1996.

6. In case if certain technical errors were
discovered by the court in exercise of powers
under Section 34 of the Act, it was always
open for the court to have taken recourse to
the provisions of Section 34(4) enabling the
Arbitral Tribunal to iron out the creases and
to eliminate the ground upon which the
petition under Section 34 of the Act was
preferred. Having ignored this aspect, the
order passed by the Court stands vitiated.

7. The learned counsel for the
appellant has relied upon a decision of the
1288 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Apex Court in the case of Kinnari Mullick
and
Another
v.
Ghansyam
Das
Damani:2018 (11) SCC 328 and another
decision of a coordinate Bench of this
Court in Hema Agarwal and 2 others v.
National Highway Authority of India
and another:2025:AHC:148001.

8. It is thus urged that for the aforesaid
reasons, the order impugned cannot be
sustained and as such deserves to be set
aside.

9. Sri Prasidh Narain Singh, learned
counsel
appearing
for
the
private
respondent has urged that the court while
considering the respective submissions has
merely considered the impact of certain
awards which were passed in respect of a
contiguous land-holder and thereafter it has
come to the conclusion that the award
cannot be sustained as two equal persons
cannot be treated differently.

10. The entire reasoning of the Court
is on the aforesaid premise and it is not a
case where the court has undertaken an
independent or re-appraisal of evidence,
hence, the submission made by learned
counsel for the appellant does not flow
from the record.

11. It has further been urged that the
reliance placed by the learned counsel for
the appellant in the case of Kinnari Mullick
(supra) will not have any impact for the
reasons, ingredients mentioned therein are
not met.

12. It is thus urged that once the award
passed by the Statutory Authority under the
National Highway Authority of India Act
has been set aside and the matter has been
remitted for decision, considering the
observations made, it cannot be said that
the court has overstepped its jurisdiction,
hence, the appeal deserves to fail.

13. The Court has heard the learned
counsel for the parties and also perused the
material on record.

14.
Apparently,
the
scope
of
proceedings under Section 34 of the Act of
1996 is limited, the award can only be set
aside on the ground mentioned in Section
34 or if it fails to pass the patent illegality
test
as
enunciated
by
the
judicial
pronouncements of the Apex Court as well
as various High Courts.

15. In the aforesaid backdrop, if the
controversy is seen in the present case, also
noticing the averments of the respective
parties which have been incorporated in the
judgment under challenge, it would reveal
that the contention relates to how the land
acquired under the NHAI Act is to be
valued for the purposes of determining the
compensation.

16. It is not disputed that on the date
of the notification made under Section 3-G,
the land in question was recorded in the
revenue records as agricultural.

17. It is also not disputed that arbitral
proceedings or an award is per se inter-se
the parties and it does not partake the
nature of a judgment in rem rather it is a
judgment
in
personam
between
the
contracting parties who had agreed to get
their disputes resolved through the forum
of Arbitration.

18. In the instant case, since the
proceedings emanate from the NHAI Act,
accordingly, there is a statutory scheme.
This Court in case of (i) Chandra Kishori
v. Union of India; 2023 SCC Online All
11 All. National Highways Authority of India Vs. Om Prakash Singh & Ors.
1289
3950; Nitin Maheshwari v. Union of
India: MANU/UP4080/2023 (iii) Harish
Tripathi v. National Highway Authority
of India; MANU/UP/4213/2023 had the
occasion to consider the scheme of the
NHAI Act and the proceedings before the
statutory Arbitrator.

19. The core question that is involved
in such proceedings is determination of the
compensation based on the market value.
As already noticed above in the Chandra
Kishori
(Supra),
Nitin
Maheshwari
(supra) and Harish Tripathi (supra), this
Court
had
noticed
that
how
the
valuation/market value is to be determined
and applying the aforesaid principles, it
would indicate that merely taking note of
awards which have been passed in case of
contiguous or near-by tenure-holders ipsofacto may not give rise to any inference
that the court has re-appraised or enter into
the arena reserved for the Arbitral Tribunal.

20. Even in the instant case, it
would indicate that the court on its own
and noticing the material placed before
it which was also part of the record
before the arbitral proceedings found
that there is some disparity regarding
the grant of compensation and for the
aforesaid purpose without making any
comment, it has set aside the order,
requiring the statutory Arbitrator to
take a re-look.

21. The aforesaid issue regarding
remand as well as the severance of the
award was the subject matter of profound
consideration by the Apex Court in the
constitution Bench decision of Gayatri
Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies
Ltd., (2025) 7 SCC 1, however, the
principles laid therein are not attracted in
the case at hand.

22. Taking note of the relevant
provisions of the Act of 1996 as well as the
judgments of the Apex Court in (i) UHL
Power Co. Ltd. v. State of H.P., (2022) 4
SCC 116 and (ii) AC Chokshi Share
Broker (P) Ltd. v. Jatin Pratap Desai,
(2025) 5 SCC 321 which has been
followed by a Division Bench of this Court
in UCM Coal Co. Ltd. v. Adani
Enterprises
Ltd:
2025:AHCLKO:58732-DB, it would reveal that in so
far as the first submission advanced by the
learned counsel for the appellant relating to
entering into the domain of the reappraising the evidence is concerned, is not
made out.

23. The judgement relied upon by the
learned counsel for the appellant in
Kinnari Mullick (Supra) if seen, would
indicate the scope of Section 34(4) of the
Act of 1996 and the relevant portion of the
said report reads as under:-

"12.
In
this
backdrop,
the
question which arises is: whether the
highlighted portion in the operative part of
the impugned judgment of the Division
Bench can be sustained in law? For that,
we may advert to Section 34(4) of the Act
which is the repository of power invested in
the Court. The same reads thus:

"Section 34(4). On receipt of an
application under sub-section (1), the court
may, where it is appropriate and it is so
requested
by
a
party,
adjourn
the
proceedings
for
a
period
of
time
determined by it in order to give the
arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume
the arbitral proceedings or to take such
other action as in the opinion of arbitral
tribunal will eliminate the grounds for
setting aside the arbitral award."

13. On a bare reading of this
provision, it is amply clear that the Court
1290 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
can defer the hearing of the application
filed under Section 34 for setting aside the
award on a written request made by a party
to the arbitration proceedings to facilitate
the Arbitral Tribunal by resuming the
arbitral proceedings or to take such other
action as in the opinion of Arbitral
Tribunal will eliminate the grounds for
setting aside the arbitral award. The power
under this provision is that the arbitral
award has not been quintessence for
exercising set aside. Further, the challenge
to the said award has been set up aside
Further, under Section 34 about the
deficiencies in the arbitral award which
may be curable by allowing the Arbitral
Tribunal to take such measures which can
eliminate the grounds for setting aside the
arbitral award. No power has been
invested by the Parliament in the Court to
remand the matter to the Arbitral Tribunal
except to adjourn the proceedings for the
limited purpose mentioned in sub-section 4
of Section 34. This legal position has been
expounded In the case of McDermott
International Inc. (supra). In paragraph 8
of the said decision, the Court observed
thus:

"8.....parliament
has
not
conferred any power of remand to the
Court to remit the matter to the arbitral
tribunal except to adjourn the proceedings
as provided under sub-section (4) of
Section 34 of the Act. The object of subsection (4) of Section 34 of the Act is to
give an opportunity to the arbitral tribunal
to resume the arbitral proceedings or to
enable it to take such other action which
will eliminate the grounds for setting aside
the arbitral award." (emphasis supplied)
14. In any case, the limited discretion
available to the Court under Section 34(4)
can be exercised only upon a written
application made in that behalf by a party
to the arbitration proceedings. It is crystal
clear that the Court cannot exercise this
limited power of deferring the proceedings
before it suo moto. Moreover, before
formally setting aside the award, if the
party to the arbitration proceedings fails to
request the. Court to defer the proceedings
pending before it, then it is not open to the
party to move an application under Section
34(4) of the Act. For, consequent to
disposal of the main proceedings under
Section 34. of the Act by the Court, it would
become functus officio. In other words, the
limited remedy available under Section
34(4) is required to be invoked by the party
to the arbitral proceedings before the
award is set aside by the Court."

24. Having taken note of the aforesaid,
it would reveal that the basic criteria or
ingredients for invoking Section 34 (4) of
the Act of 1996 is not applicable nor made
out.

25. The learned counsel for the
appellant could not dispute the fact that no
application was give to the court seized
with the matter under Section 34(4) to
exercise its power under Section 34(4) of
the Act of 1996.

26. It also could not be demonstrated
successfully as to the ground upon which
the initial petition under Section 34 (1) of
the Act of 1996 was filed, what was those
technicalities which could have been ironed
out while considering or invoking the
powers under Section 34 (4) of the Act of
1996.

27. In absence of such material which
has not been indicated nor it could be
canvassed that the same existed, the
reliance upon the provisions of Section
34(4) of the Act of 1996 and upon the
judgment of the Apex Court in Kinnari
11 All. The Government of U.P. Vs. M/s Krishna Mohan Goel, Contractor
1291
Mullick (supra) does not come to the aid
of the appellant.

28. In so far as the decision of the
coordinate Bench in Hema Agarwal (supra)
is concerned, the same also has no
applicability in the instant case rather it has
merely relied upon the decision of the Apex
Court in Kinnari Mullick (supra) and as
noticed above where it could not be shown
as to how the provisions of Section 34 (4)
would apply, hence, the judgment of this
Court in Hema Agarwal (supra) is not of
any help to the appellants.

29. In the aforesaid circumstances, this
Court finds that the submissions advanced
by the learned counsel for the appellant
have no merit and the appeal is accordingly
dismissed, leaving it open for the appellant
to take recourse as may be available in law
while
participating
in
the
arbitral
proceedings
which
is
the
necessary
corollary and outcome after passing of the
impugned order dated 08.08.2025. Costs
are made easy.
----------
(2025) 11 ILRA 1291
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.11.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ARUN BHANSALI, C.J.
THE HON'BLE KSHITIJ SHAILENDRA, J.

Appeal Under Section 37 of Arbitration And
Conciliation Act 1996 No. 255 of 2025
Connected with 253 of 2025 & 252 of 2025

The Government of U.P. ...Appellant
Versus
M/s Krishna Mohan Goel, Contractor
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Rajiv Singh
Counsel for the Respondents:
Dilip Kumar, Sanjai Kumar Singh, Ashish
Jaiswal

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether objections filed under Section 34 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
require
prior
sanction
from
the
Legal
Remembrancer (L.R.) under the L.R. Manual,
and if absence of such sanction renders them
non-maintainable.

HEADNOTES
Civil Law - Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 - Section - 34, - Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 - Order VI Rule 14, Order
XXIX Rule 1, Order XLI Rule 27, -
Constitution of India - Article - 13, 166 -
Three Appeals - challenging three identical
orders
-
whereby
the
Commercial
Court
dismissed the appellant's objections filed under
section 34 of the Act, 1996 - on the ground on
not maintainable, since before filing of those
respective objections, the appellants had not
obtained prior permission from the Legal
Remembrancer (LR) - the issue for consideration
was whether such objections are maintainable
without L.R. sanction, with appellants arguing
that
the
L.R.
Manual
is
only
executive
instructions
and
departmental
permission
existed, while respondents contended Clause
17.07 requires sanction or ex-post
facto
approval - Court held that, Clause 15.05 applies
only to suits, Clause 17.07 does not mandate
prior sanction, and the L.R. Manual is not "law"
under Articles 13 and 166 of the Constitution,
citing State of U.P. v. Johri Mal (2004) 4 SCC
714, Union of India v. Naveen Jindal (2004) 2
SCC 510, United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar
(1996) 6 SCC 660, and distinguishing M/s B.M.
Construction Company v. State of U.P. (2025) -
therefore, impugned dismissal was unjustified -
the appeals were allowed - directions issued,
for restoration of all arbitration cases, to their
original number and status and the same shall
be decided on its merits within a period of four
months, accordingly.(Para - 11, 12, 13, 22, 24,
25)

Appeal Allowed. (E-11)

CASE LAW CITED