# National Insurance Co. Ltd. Revisionist v. Ram Kumar & Ors

- **Citation:** (2014) 3 ILRA 1427
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2014-12-18
- **Case number:** Civil Revision No. 60 of 2010
- **Bench:** Anil Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/national-insurance-co-ltd-revisionist-v-ram-kumar-ors-43146
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Motor Vehicle Act, 1988-Section-173(2)-
Revision against award by Accident
Claim Tribunal-amount being less than
10,000/--revision
against
that-not
maintainable.
Held: Para-12
Accordingly, in view of the said facts
once the statute has provided an appeal
under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles
Act against an award passed by the Motor
Accidents Claims Tribunal and further in
sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Motor
Vehicles Act provides that no appeal shall
lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal,
if the amount is less than ten thousand
rupees, so the revision filed by the
revisionist thereby challenging the award
dated 5.2.2010 passed by Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal/ Additional Distrct Judge,
Balrampur is not maintainable ( see also
Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. v.
Machado Brothers and others AIR 2004 SC
2093)
Case Law discussed:
2004 (22) LCD 40; AIR SC 96; (1998) 3 SCC
237; (2004) 5 SCC 518; (2003) 5 SCC 590;
AIR 2003 SC 511; (2003) 5 SCC 134; (2003) 4
SCC 753; AIR 2004 SC 2093.

## Text

3 All].
National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Ram Kumar & Ors.
1427
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 18.12.2014
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ANIL KUMAR, J.
Civil Revision No. 60 of 2010
National Insurance Co. Ltd.
Revisionist
Versus
Ram Kumar & Ors.
...Opp. Parties
Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Deepak Kumar Agarwal
Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
---
Motor Vehicle Act, 1988-Section-173(2)-
Revision against award by Accident
Claim Tribunal-amount being less than
10,000/--revision
against
that-not
maintainable.
Held: Para-12
Accordingly, in view of the said facts
once the statute has provided an appeal
under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles
Act against an award passed by the Motor
Accidents Claims Tribunal and further in
sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Motor
Vehicles Act provides that no appeal shall
lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal,
if the amount is less than ten thousand
rupees, so the revision filed by the
revisionist thereby challenging the award
dated 5.2.2010 passed by Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal/ Additional Distrct Judge,
Balrampur is not maintainable ( see also
Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. v.
Machado Brothers and others AIR 2004 SC
2093)
Case Law discussed:
2004 (22) LCD 40; AIR SC 96; (1998) 3 SCC
237; (2004) 5 SCC 518; (2003) 5 SCC 590;
AIR 2003 SC 511; (2003) 5 SCC 134; (2003) 4
SCC 753; AIR 2004 SC 2093.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Anil Kumar, J.)
1. Heard Sri Deepak Kumar
Agarwal,
learned
counsel
for
the
revisionist and perused the record.
2. Undisputed facts of the present
case are that in an accident which took
place on 27.12.2007 one Sri Ram Kumar
sustained grievous injuries due to rash and
negligent driving by the driver of the Jeep
No. U.P.-32/ W-7509 insured with the
National Insurance Company Limited/
appellant.
3. In order to get compensation, he
filed a Motor Accidents Claim Petition
no. 16 of 2008 ( Ram Kumar Vs. Sri Ram
Gupta and others ), allowed by means of
judgment and award dated 5.2.2010
passed by the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal/ Additional District Judge Court
no.2, Balrampur thereby awarding a sum
of Rs. 3520/- with 6% interest per annum
from the date of filing of the claim
petition. Aggrieved by the same, present
revision has been filed by the National
Insurance
Company
Limited
under
Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure,
1908.
4. Sri Deepak Kumar Agarwal,
learned counsel for the revisionist while
challenging
the
impugned
judgment
submits that as the award given by Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal is less than
Rs.10,000/- so in view of the embargo as
given in sub-section (2) of Section 173 of
the Motor Vehicles Act , appeal is not
maintainable . In these circumstances the
only remedy which is left to open for the
revisionist / Insurance Company to
challenge the award by way of revision
under Section 115 of Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. In support of his
argument, he has placed reliance on the
decision given by full Bench of this Court
1428
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
in the case of Kamla Yadav Vs. Smt.
Shushma Devi and others, 2004 (22) LCD
40. the relevant paragraphs is quoted as
under:-
" The procedure and powers of the
Tribunal are to be found under Section
169 quoted earlier. Interest and costs
both can be awarded by the Tribunal.
Section 173 provides for an appeal
against the award of claims Tribunal to
the High Court. Section 174 provides for
issuance of Certificate by the Tribunal for
recovery of the amount of compensation
in the same manner as arrears of land
revenue. The jurisdiction of the Civil
Court is barred under Section 175
relating to any claim for Compensation
which may be adjudicated upon by the
Claims Tribunal.
From a perusal of the above
provisions, there is no room to doubt that
the Claims Tribunal is under obligation to
act judicially as on receipt of an
application, the Tribunal has to give
notice to the parties who have to be
afforded an opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal then has to hold an inquiry
into the claim before the Tribunal makes
an award determining the amount of
compensation. It is true that a Tribunal
may adopt summary procedure but the
provisions regarding notice to the parties
and hearing them before making the
award cannot be dispensed with. For
certain purposes, namely, for taking
evidence on oath and enforcing the
attendance
of
witnesses
and
for
compelling the discovery and production
of documents and material objects, the
Tribunal shall have the powers of the
Civil Court . That is to say, it can compel
attendance of witness as well as may
compel discovery and production of
documents and material objects. Sofar the
structure and composition of the Tribunal
is concerned, we find that one who is or
has been a Judge of a High Court or a
District
Judge
or
qualified
for
appointment as a Judge of High Court or
as a District Judge are eligible for
appointment under Section 165(3) of the
Motor Vehicles Act. The above provisions
obviously provides for appointment of a
person well-versed with the judicial
functioning
as
well
as
sufficient
experience of working in the courts of
law. The provisions of the Act do not
permit appointment of any other executive
authority as member of the Claims
Tribunal. The tribunal has to base its
determination or award on the evidence
adduced an arguments advanced by the
parties. It is not based on subjective
opinion but objectively based on material
brought before it during the course of the
proceedings
after
investigation
and
inquiry . The awards can also be tested on
the basis of the provisions made under the
law as under different provisions of the
Motor Vehicles Act . The amount of
compensation to be awarded has also
been indicated. In pursuance of the
provisions indicated above, Additional
District Judge have been appointed as
Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal in
different districts of the State. Not alone
that Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal
acts judicially but it is under obligation to
act as such as it has to go through the
procedure which is normally adopted in
the regular courts of law. A few
deviations
here
and
there
in
the
procedure will have no material bearing
on the question so long, in substance, it is
incumbent upon the Motor Accidents
Claims Tribunal to issue notice to the
parties, hold investigation into the claim
and provide opportunity of hearing to the
3 All].
National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Ram Kumar & Ors.
1429
parties . During this process, parties
adduce their evidence and it has been
empowered to exercise the powers of the
Civil Court in examining the witnesses on
oath and to compel their attendance as
well as production of material documents
or objects necessary for determination of
the claim. Thus an adjudicating body
which is composed of or consists of
experienced judicial functionaries and it
is under obligation to act judicially can
hardly be said to be a body which is not a
judicial adjudicating body. Appointment
of any member of executive or nonjudicial authority is not envisaged, rather
it stands excluded under the provisions of
the Act. It has rightly not been disputed
before us that the nature of dispute
arising in the claim petitions is a dispute
of civil nature. It has also not been
disputed that prior to constitution of
Motor Accident Claims Tribunals such
disputes of claims on account of Motor
Accidents were being tried by the Civil
Court. It is , thus, clear that it is trial of
dispute of civil nature by a Tribunal
having a judicial functionary as its
member. There is no escape from the
conclusion that the Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal has all the trappings of a
Civil Court. Additional District Judge is
also undoubtedly a Civil Court. The only
ingredient which has to be seen is that as
to whether it is the State's Judicial power
which is being exercised by the tribunal or
not. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal
has been constituted by the State. Its
members are appointed by State. It deals
with disputes of civil nature which were
being earlier dealt with by the regular civil
courts. There is no dispute that the civil
courts discharge the "States' Judicial
functions" part of jurisdiction of which
stands transferred to the Motor Accidents
Claims Tribunal,composition,character as
well as functioning of which , have
already been indicated above. There can
(not) also be any dispute that Motor
Accidents Claims Tribunal is a court
subordinate to the High Court in view of
the fact that appeal against an award lies
to the High Court which fact has been
held to be conclusive on the point.
In view of the discussions held
above, we are of the view that the orders
of the District Judge/ Additional District
Judge passed as Motor Accidents Claims
Tribunal will be amenable to revisional
jurisdiction of the High Court under
Section 115 CPC."
5. Accordingly, it is submitted by Sri
Deepak Kumar Agarwal, learned counsel
for the revisionist that revision may be
allowed and the judgment and award dated
5.2.2010 passed by the Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal / Additional District
Judge Balrampur may be set aside.
6. After hearing learned counsel for
the revisionist and going through the
record, the core question which arises for
consideration in the present case is whether
by way of revision under Section 115
C.P.C., the revisionist/ Insurance Company
can challenge the impugned judgment
dated 5.2.2010 passed by the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal/ Additional
District Judge Court no.2, Balrampur in
M.A.C.P. No.16 of 2008 or not?
7. In order to decide the said
controversy, it is appropriate to go
through Section 173 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988. The said section
reads as under:-
"173 Appeals- (1) Subject to the
provisions of sub-section(2), any person
1430
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
aggrieved by an award of a Claims
Tribunal, may , within ninety days from
the date of the award , prefer an appeal to
the High Court:
Provided that no appeal by the
person who is required to pay any amount
in terms of such award shall be
entertained by the High Court unless he
has deposited with it twenty-five thousand
rupees or fifty per cent of the amount so
awarded , whichever is less, in the
manner directed by the High Court.
Provided further that the High Court may
entertain the appeal after the expiry of the
said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied
that the appellant was prevented by
sufficient cause from preferring the
appeal in time.
(2) No appeal shall lie against any
award of a Claims Tribunal, if the amount
in dispute in the appeal is less than ten
thousand rupees."
8. From the perusal of the said
section , the postilion which emerge out
that the legislature while framing the
provisions of Motor Vehicles Act has
clearly provided that if the award is given
by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is
less than Rs. 10,000/- , no appeal shall lie
against the same .
9. Thus keeping in view the said fact
as well as the it is not the duty of the
Court either to enlarge the scope of the
legislation or the intention of the
legislature when the language of the
provisions is plain and unambiguous. The
Court cannot rewrite, recast or re-frame
the legislation for the very good reason
that it has no power to legislate. The
power to legislate has not been conferred
on the Courts. The Court cannot add
words to a statute or read words that are
not there. Assuming there is a defect or an
omission in the words used by the
legislature the Court could not got to its
aid to correct or make up the deficiency.
10. The Court decide what the law is
and not what it should be. The Courts of
course adopt a construction which will
carry out the obvious intention of the
legislature but cannot legislate . But to
invoke judicial activism to set at naught
legislative judgment is sub serve of the
constitutional harmony and comity of
instrumentalities. The above said view is
reiterated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the following cases:-
(i) Union of India and another V.
Deoki Nandan Agarwal , AIR SC 96
(ii) All India Radio V. Santosh
Kumar and another (1998) 3 SCC 237
(iii) Sakshi V. Union of India and
others,(2004) 5 SCC, 518
(iv) Pandian Chemicals Ltd. V. CIT
(2003) 5 SCC 590
(v) Bhavnagar University V. Palitana
Sugar Mills(P) and others, AIR 2003 SC
511.
(vi)
J.P.Bansal
Vs.
State
of
Rajasthan,(2003) 5 SCC ,134.
11. In Nasiruddin Vs. Sita Ram
Agarwal, (2003) 4 SCC 753, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has held that the Court
can iron cut of the creases but cannot
change the texture of the fabric. It cannot
enlarge the scope of legislation or
intention when the language of provisions
is plain, unambiguous. It cannot add or
subtract words to statue or read something
into in which is not there. It cannot
rewrite or recast the legislation.
12. Accordingly, in view of the said
facts once the statute has provided an
appeal under Section 173 of the Motor
3 All].
 Ram Naresh Singh Vs. Estate of Late Smt. Maiki & Ors.
1431
Vehicles Act against an award passed by
the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and
further in sub-section (2) of Section 173
of the Motor Vehicles Act provides that
no appeal shall lie against any award of a
Claims Tribunal, if the amount is less than
ten thousand rupees, so the revision filed
by the revisionist thereby challenging the
award dated 5.2.2010 passed by Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal/ Additional
Distrct
Judge,
Balrampur
is
not
maintainable
(
see
also
Shipping
Corporation of India Ltd. v. Machado
Brothers and others AIR 2004 SC 2093)
13. So far as the law cited by learned
counsel for the appellant in support of his
argument of a Full Bench of this Court in
the case of Kamla Yadav ( supra) is
concerned, the same is not applicable in
the facts and circumstances of the case as
in the said matter this Court has held that if
any order is passed by Motor Accidents
Claims Tribunal during adjudication of the
claim petition then the same is revisable
under Section 151 of Code of Civil
Procedure as the Tribunal falls within the
scope and definition of word" Court".
14. For the foregoing reasons, the
revision lacks merits and is dismissed .
15. No order as to cost.
--------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 03.12.2014
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE AMRESHWAR PRATAP SAHI, J.
THE HON'BLE ARVIND KUMAR TRIPATHI (II), J.
Special Appeal No. 716 of 2014
alongwith Special Appeal No. 717 of 2014
Ram Naresh Singh
 ...Appellant
Versus
Estate of Late Smt. Maiki & Ors.
...Respondents
Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri A.P. Singh
Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Prashant Singh Gaur
High Court Rules, chapter-VIII, Rules-5Special Appeal-against the judgment of
Single
Judge-exercising
Appellate
power-in testamentary case-in view of
Full Bench decision of Sheet Guptaspecial appeal -held-not maintainable.
Held: Para-15
We are, therefore, of the clear view that
the present Special Appeal is barred in
view of the Full Bench decision in the
case of Sheet Gupta (supra), and the
report of the Stamp Reporter has to be
upheld.
Case Law discussed:
AIR 1974 SC 2048; AIR 2008 SC 1012; 2010
(28) LCD 1045.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Amreshwar Pratap
Sahi, J.)
1. These two Appeals arise out of a
common judgment rendered by the learned
single Judge in First Appeal No.186 of 2013
and First Appeal No.187 of 2013 that arose
out of orders passed for grant of letters of
administration under the provisions of
Indian Succession Act, 1925.
2. The learned District Judge, Lucknow,
granted letters of administration in favour of
the appellant in relation to the estate of Late
Smt. Maiki and others. Two sets of persons
namely Chhote Lal on the one hand and
Master and Jangali on the other filed
applications for setting aside and revoking the
letters of administration dated 6.1.1997.