# National Insurance Company Ltd v. Smt. Seema Devi & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 1 ILRA 204
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-11-02
- **Bench:** Vivek Kumar Birla
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/national-insurance-company-ltd-v-smt-seema-devi-ors-45983
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Rule of Interpretation - Purposive
Interpretation - Plain words have to
be accepted as such but where the
intention of the legislature is not clear
- it is the Court's duty to discern the
intention
in
the
context
of
the
background in which a particular
Section is enacted - Courts have to
give the statute a purposeful or a
functional interpretation - provisions
of Act have to be read so as to achieve
and promote the aims and object of
the Act - construction which would
defeat the rights of the havenots and
the underdog and which would lead to
injustice should be avoided (Para 13)

B. Interpretation of Statute - when a
provision is directory - provision in a
statute which is procedural in nature
although employs the word "shall"
may not be held to be mandatory - if
the procedural violation does not
seriously
cause
prejudice
to
the
adversary party - courts must lean
towards
doing
substantial
justice
rather than relying upon procedural
and technical violation - litigation is a
journey towards truth & court is
required to thrash out the underlying
truth in every dispute (Para 18, 19)

C.
Civil
Law
-
Employee's
Compensation
Act,
1923
-
Interpretation - this Act is a piece of
social security and welfare legislation
- dominant purpose is to protect the
workman - Act has been enacted with
a object to provide payment by
certain classes of employers to their
employees of compensation for injury
by the accident - provisions of the Act
should
not
be
interpreted
too
narrowly so as to debar the workman
from compensation - In case of doubt
the interpretation in favour of the
worker should be preferred (Para 11,
12, 14)

D.
Civil
Law
-
Employees
Compensation
Act
(8
of
1923)-
Section
10
-
Claim
petition
-
Maintainability - Statutory notice of
the accident in writing without delay
to the employer - Directory - Held -
Act
being
a
beneficial
piece
of
legislation enacted for the benefit of
the
have-nots
and
Commissioner
having been given power to entertain
the claim petition & decide the same
even in absence of notice u/s 10 of
the Act - the statutory requirement of
giving notice of accident u/s 10 of the
Act is merely 'directory' and not
'mandatory' - claim petition would be
maintainable even if no notice of
accident is given to the Insurance
company u/s 10 & even without any
prayer for waiver of the statutory
notice (Para 21, 29)

E.
Civil
Law
-
Employees
Compensation
Act
(8
of
1923)-
1 All. National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Smt. Seema Devi & Ors.
205
Section 21(1)(b) - Claim petition -
Venue of proceeding - Territorial
jurisdiction - claim petition may be
filed by the claimant where the
claimant
ordinarily
resides
-
expression `ordinarly resides' - means
where
the
person
claiming
compensation normally resides at the
time of filing the claim petition - Not
necessary that it should be filed
where accident takes place - Claim
petition cannot be rejected on ground
of territorial jurisdiction alone, where
claims are preferred under beneficial
piece of legislation - as the Insurance
Company
has
branch
office
everywhere
and
therefore,
no
prejudice is caused to the company
(Para 26, 27)

Vehicle insured at district Siwan
-
accident took place in district Siwan
(Bihar) - claimants landless labourers
shifted to District Gorakhpur & residing
there - Insurance Company has its
regional office at Gorakhpur - Held -
once the insurance Company has branch
offices at different places, therefore, no
substantial injury or injustice would
cause to the insurance-Company (Para
28)

Dismissed. (E-4)

List of Cases cited :-

## Text

_Characters 0–39,679 of 43,080. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39679 for what follows._

204 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2021)01ILR A204
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.11.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR BIRLA, J.

FAFO Defective No.- 459 of 2020

National Insurance Company Ltd.
 ...Appellant
Versus
Smt. Seema Devi & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Komal Mehrotra

Counsel for the Respondents:
-------

A. Interpretation of Statute - Golden
Rule of Interpretation - Purposive
Interpretation - Plain words have to
be accepted as such but where the
intention of the legislature is not clear
- it is the Court's duty to discern the
intention
in
the
context
of
the
background in which a particular
Section is enacted - Courts have to
give the statute a purposeful or a
functional interpretation - provisions
of Act have to be read so as to achieve
and promote the aims and object of
the Act - construction which would
defeat the rights of the havenots and
the underdog and which would lead to
injustice should be avoided (Para 13)

B. Interpretation of Statute - when a
provision is directory - provision in a
statute which is procedural in nature
although employs the word "shall"
may not be held to be mandatory - if
the procedural violation does not
seriously
cause
prejudice
to
the
adversary party - courts must lean
towards
doing
substantial
justice
rather than relying upon procedural
and technical violation - litigation is a
journey towards truth & court is
required to thrash out the underlying
truth in every dispute (Para 18, 19)

C.
Civil
Law
-
Employee's
Compensation
Act,
1923
-
Interpretation - this Act is a piece of
social security and welfare legislation
- dominant purpose is to protect the
workman - Act has been enacted with
a object to provide payment by
certain classes of employers to their
employees of compensation for injury
by the accident - provisions of the Act
should
not
be
interpreted
too
narrowly so as to debar the workman
from compensation - In case of doubt
the interpretation in favour of the
worker should be preferred (Para 11,
12, 14)

D.
Civil
Law
-
Employees
Compensation
Act
(8
of
1923)-
Section
10
-
Claim
petition
-
Maintainability - Statutory notice of
the accident in writing without delay
to the employer - Directory - Held -
Act
being
a
beneficial
piece
of
legislation enacted for the benefit of
the
have-nots
and
Commissioner
having been given power to entertain
the claim petition & decide the same
even in absence of notice u/s 10 of
the Act - the statutory requirement of
giving notice of accident u/s 10 of the
Act is merely 'directory' and not
'mandatory' - claim petition would be
maintainable even if no notice of
accident is given to the Insurance
company u/s 10 & even without any
prayer for waiver of the statutory
notice (Para 21, 29)

E.
Civil
Law
-
Employees
Compensation
Act
(8
of
1923)-
1 All. National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Smt. Seema Devi & Ors.
205
Section 21(1)(b) - Claim petition -
Venue of proceeding - Territorial
jurisdiction - claim petition may be
filed by the claimant where the
claimant
ordinarily
resides
-
expression `ordinarly resides' - means
where
the
person
claiming
compensation normally resides at the
time of filing the claim petition - Not
necessary that it should be filed
where accident takes place - Claim
petition cannot be rejected on ground
of territorial jurisdiction alone, where
claims are preferred under beneficial
piece of legislation - as the Insurance
Company
has
branch
office
everywhere
and
therefore,
no
prejudice is caused to the company
(Para 26, 27)

Vehicle insured at district Siwan
-
accident took place in district Siwan
(Bihar) - claimants landless labourers
shifted to District Gorakhpur & residing
there - Insurance Company has its
regional office at Gorakhpur - Held -
once the insurance Company has branch
offices at different places, therefore, no
substantial injury or injustice would
cause to the insurance-Company (Para
28)

Dismissed. (E-4)

List of Cases cited :-

1. Sir Chunilal Mehta Sons Ltd. Vs
Century Spinning and Manufacturing
Company Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 1314

2. Bharat Singh Vs Management of New
Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New Delhi &
ors. 1986 (2) SCC 614

3. National Insurance Comp. Ltd. Vs Rais
& anr. 2016 (2) AICC 1502 (DB)

4. P. T. Rajan Vs T.P.M. Sahir (2003) 8 SCC
498

5. Sugandhi (dead) by Lrs. & anr. Vs P.
Rajkumar Rep. By his Power Agent Imam
Oli 2020 SCC Online SC 870

6. Mantoo Sarkar Vs Oriental Insurance Co.
Ltd. & ors. (2009) 2 SCC 244

7. Malati Sardar Vs National Insurance
Company Ltd. & ors. (2016) 3 SCC 43

8. Morgina Begum Vs Md. Hanuman
Plantation Ltd (2007) 11 SCC 616

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vivek Kumar Birla, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
appellant.

2. Present appeal has been filed
challenging the award dated 16.7.2020
passed by Commissioner / Deputy Labour
Commissioner, Gorakhpur in E.C. Case
No. 79 of 2015.

3. Challenging the impugned award
submission is that in view of the provision
of Section 21 (1) (b) of the Employee's
Compensation
Act,
1923
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
the
Act)
learned
Commissioner at Gorakhpur did not have
the jurisdiction to decide claim petition
inasmuch as the claimants are resident of
district Siwan and the accident had also
taken place in district Siwan. The vehicle
was also insured by the branch office of the
appellant-Company at district Siwan in the
State of Bihar. It was further submitted that
even in her statement the claimant no. 1
had stated that she has come from district
Siwan and therefore, the claimants are not
resident
of
Gorakhpur.
Submission,
206 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
therefore, is that the amendment is totally
without jurisdiction.

4. It was further submitted that no
notice under Section 10 of the Act was
given to the Insurance Company and as
such
the
claim
petition
was
not
maintainable. He has drawn attention to the
substantial questions of law framed in the
present appeal, which are quoted as under:-

"A. Whether the finding recorded
by
the
Commissioner
Employee
compensation while deciding preliminary
issue is illegal, erroneous and misappraisal of
the records?

B. Whether the present claim
petition was not maintainable as the learned
Commissioner lacked jurisdiction in view of
Section 21 of the Act?

C. Whether analogy derived by the
Commissioner Employees Compensation Act
while deciding preliminary issue is perverse
and based on no reasoning?

D. Whether in the absence of
notice under section 10 of the Employees
Compensation Act the claim petition is
maintainable without any prayer for waiver
of the statutory notice?"

5. Submission, therefore, is that the
claim petition itself was not maintainable in
absence of notice under Section 10 of the Act
without there being any prayer for waiver of
the same and that in any case in view of
Section 21 (1)(b) of the Act the Tribunal at
Gorakhpur
was
coram
non
judice.
Submission is that the impugned award is,
therefore, without jurisdiction.

6. I have considered the submissions
and have perused the record.

7. Before proceeding further it would
be relevant to note Section 10 and Section
21 (1) (b) of the Employee's Compensation
Act, 1923, which are quoted as under:-

"10. Notice and claim.- (1) No
claim for compensation shall be entertained
by a Commissioner unless notice of the
accident has been given in the manner
hereinafter provided as soon as practicable
after the happening thereof and unless the
claim is preferred before him within two
years] of the occurrence of the accident or, in
case of death, within two years] from the date
of death:]

Provided that, where the accident is
the contracting of a disease in respect of
which the provisions of sub- section (2) of
section 3 are applicable, the accident shall be
deemed to have occurred on the first of the
days during which the workman was
continuously
absent
from
work
in
consequence of the disablement caused by
the disease:

Provided further that in case of
partial disablement due to the contracting of
any such disease and which does not force
the workman to absent himself from work,
the period of two years shall be counted from
the day the workman gives notice of the
disablement to his employer:

Provided further that if a workman
who,
having
been
employed
in
an
employment
for
a
continuous
period,
specified under sub- section (2) of section 3
in respect of that employment, ceases to be so
employed and develops symptoms of an
occupational
disease
peculiar
to
that
employment within two years of the cessation
of employment, the accident shall be deemed
to have occurred on the day on which the
symptoms were first detected:]

Provided further that the want of or
any defect or irregularity in a notice shall not
be a bar to the entertainment of a claim]--

(a) if the claim is preferred] in
respect of the death of a workman resulting
1 All. National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Smt. Seema Devi & Ors.
207
from an accident which occurred on the
premises of the employer, or at any place
where the workman at the time of the
accident was working under the control of
the employer or of any person employed by
him, and the workman died on such
premises or at such place, or on any
premises belonging to the employer, or
died without having left the vicinity of the
premises or place where the accident
occurred, or

(b) if the employer or any one of
several
employers
or
any
person
responsible to the employer for the
management of any branch of the trade or
business in which the injured workman was
employed] had knowledge of the accident
from any other source at or about the time
when it occurred:

Provided
further,
that
the
Commissioner may entertain] and decide
any claim to compensation in any case
notwithstanding that the notice has not
been given, or the claim has not been
preferred], in due time as provided in this
sub- section, if he is satisfied that the
failure so to give the notice or prefer] the
claim, as the case may be, was due to
sufficient cause.

(2) Every such notice shall give
the name and address of the person injured
and shall state in ordinary language the
cause of the injury and the date on which
the accident happened, and shall be served
on the employer or upon any one of]
several employers, or upon any person
responsible to the employer for the
management of any branch of the trade or
business in which the injured workman was
employed.

(3) The State Government may
require that any prescribed class of
employers shall maintain at their premises
at which workmen are employed a notice-
book, in the prescribed form, which shall
be readily accessible at all reasonable times
to any injured workman employed on the
premises and to any person acting bona fide
on his behalf.

(4) A notice under this section
may be served by delivering it at, or
sending it by registered post addressed to,
the residence or any office or place of
business of the person on whom it is to be
served, or, where a notice- book is
maintained, by entry in the notice- book.]
(emphasis supplied)

21. Venue of proceedings and
transfer - (1) Where any matter under this
Act is to be done by or before a
Commissioner, the same shall, subject to
the provisions of this Act and to any rules
made hereunder, be done by or before the
Commissioner for the area in which-

(a) the accident took place which
resulted in the injury; or

(b) the [employee] or in case of
his death, the dependant claiming the
compensation ordinarily resides; or

(c) ..........

(1A) ........

(2) ..........

(3) .........

(4) .........

(5) ........."
(emphasis supplied)

8. Now insofar as the submission that
the claim petition was not maintainable in
absence of notice under Section 10 of the
Act, in Section 10(1)(b) a proviso has been
added, whereby the Commissioner is
empowered to entertain a claim petition
and decide any claim to compensation in
any case notwithstanding that the notice
has not been give, or the claim has not been
preferred, in due time as provided in this
sub-section, if he is satisfied that the failure
so to give the notice or prefer the claim, as
the case may be, was due to sufficient
208 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
cause. Therefore, in such view of the
matter, this Court is of the opinion that in a
case
of
beneficial
legislation
the
requirement of the notice cannot be
inferred in strict sense so as to hold a claim
not maintainable in absence of notice under
Section 10 of the Act. Clearly, the
Commissioner is empowered to entertain
and decide the claim to compensation.

9. Insofar as the applicability of
provision of Section 21 (1)(b) of the Act is
concerned, again the provision has to be
interpreted in the manner so as to serve the
purpose and object of this beneficial piece
of legislation.

10. Therefore, although, I am of the
opinion that the substantial questions of
law as framed in the present memo of
appeal do not arise for consideration,
however, in view of the arguments raised
by learned counsel for the appellant and in
view of the observations made and as held
by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Sir Chunilal vs. Mehta Sons Ltd. vs.
Century Spinning and Manufacturing
Company Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 1314, I
proceed to decide the question nos. B and
D as framed in the memo of appeal in view
of the fact that such questions are
repeatedly raised before this Court by the
Insurance Company in appeals filed before
this Court. Relevant paragraph 6 of Sir
Chunilal (supra) is quoted as under:-

"6. We are in general agreement
with the view taken by the Madras High
Court and we think that while the view
taken by. the Bombay High Court is rather
narrow the one taken by the former High
Court of Nagpur is too wide. The proper
test for determining whether a question of
law raised in the case is substantial would,
in our opinion, be whether it is of general
public importance or whether it directly
and substantially affects the rights of the
parties and if so whether it is either an open
question in the sense that it is not finally
settled by this Court or by the Privy
Council or by the Federal Court or is not
free from difficulty or calls for discussion
of alternative views. If the question is
settled by the highest Court or the general
principles to be applied in determining the
question are well settled and there is a mere
question of applying those principles or
that the plea raised is palpably absurd the
question would not be a substantial
question of law." (emphasis supplied)

11. It is the golden rule of
interpretation that the provisions of any Act
have to be read so as to achieve the aims
and object of the Act. The Employee's
Compensation Act, 1923 has been enacted
with a object that this is an Act to provide
that
payment
by
certain
classes
of
employers
to
their
employees
of
compensation for injury by the accident.

12. It is needless to point out that it is
too well settled that this Act is a piece of
social security and welfare legislation and
its dominant purpose is to protect the
workman and, therefore, the provisions of
the Act should not be interpreted too
narrowly so as to debar the workman from
compensation which the legislature thought
they ought to have.

13. A reference may be made to a
judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Bharat Singh vs. Management of
New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New
Delhi and others 1986 (2) SCC 614,
paragraph 11 whereof are quoted as under:-

"11. In interpretation of statutes,
Courts have steered clear of the rigid stand
1 All. National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Smt. Seema Devi & Ors.
209
of looking into the words of the Section
alone but have attempted to make the
object of the enactment effective and to
render its benefits unto the person in whose
favour it is made. The legislators are
entrusted with the task of only making
laws. Interpretation has to come from the
Courts. Section 17-B on its terms does not
say that it would bind awards passed before
the date when it came into force. The
respondents' contention is that a Section
which imposes an obligation for the first
time, cannot be made retrospective. Such
sections should always be considered
prospective. In our view, if this submission
is accepted, we will be defeating the very
purpose for which this Section has been
enacted. It is here that the Court has to
evolve
the
concept
of
purposive
interpretation which has found acceptance
whenever a progressive social beneficial
legislation is under review. We share the
view that where the words of a statute are
plain and unambiguous effect must be
given to them. Plain words have to be
accepted as such but where the intention of
the legislature is not clear from the words
or where two constructions are possible, it
is the Court's duty to discern the intention
in the context of the background in which a
particular Section is enacted. Once such an
intention is ascertained the Courts have
necessarily to give the statute a purposeful
or a functional interpretation. Now, it is
trite to say that acts aimed at social
amelioration
giving
benefits
for
the
havenots
should
receive
liberal
construction. It is always the duty of the
Court to give such a construction to a
statute as would promote the purpose or
object of the Act. A construction that
promotes the purpose of the legislation
should be preferred to a literal construction.
A construction which would defeat the
rights of the havenots and the underdog and
which would lead to injustice should
always be avoided. This Section was
intended to benefit the workmen in certain
cases. It would be doing injustice to the
Section if we were to say that it would not
apply to awards passed a day or two before
it came into force."
(emphasis supplied)

14. In Bharat Singh (supra) Hon'ble
Apex Court has taken the view that welfare
legislation should be given a purposive
interpretation safeguarding the rights of the
have-nots rather than giving a literal
construction.
In
case
of
doubt
the
interpretation in favour of the worker
should be preferred.

15. A reference may also be made to
judgment of Hon'ble Division Bench of this
Court in the case of National Insurance
Company Ltd. vs. Rais and another 2016
(2) AICC 1502 (DB). Paragraphs 19 and
20 whereof are quoted as under:-

"19. In the written statement on
behalf of the appellant a plea has been
raised that application of the respondent
no.1 is barred by Section 10 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 for
want of statutory notice. A Workman, who
is injured in accident, is duty bound to give
a notice of it informing in writing without
delay to the employer. The object of giving
such notice appears to enable the employer
to verify the accident and its nexus with the
course of his employment, however, no
claim for compensation will be rejected in
case of accident resulted in the death of the
workman in the premises of the employer
or within his control or the employer had
knowledge of the accident from any other
source. Thus, there is no hard and fast rule
about the compliance of Section 10 of the
Workmen's
Compensation
Act,
1923,
210 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
which
may
render
the
claim
not
maintainable.

20. In the present case, the
employer has not opposed the claim on the
basis of want of notice. The Insurance
Company has no locus to raise this plea.
Moreover,
in
the
application
for
compensation in para 11 specific plea has
been mentioned that respondent no.1 had the
knowledge of the accident, which resulted in
the death of the deceased Mohd. Asif. For
this reason there was no need to give notice
under
section
10
of
the
Workmen's
Compensation Act, 1923. This plea has not
been controverted by the respondent no.1,
who is the employer. In this background, we
are of the opinion that in the present case the
Commissioner
has
rightly
waived
the
condition of notice and on this account no
fault can be found in the impugned judgment
and order."
(emphasis supplied)

16. In the present case, in paragraph 16
of written statement the owner / employer /
insured has categorically stated that they have
informed the Insurance Company Branch
Officer Siwan in writing about the accident
and death of Driver Govind Kumar. Further,
they have not challenged the absence of
notice under Section 10 of the Act and
employer / insured has not opposed the claim
on the basis of want of notice under Section
10 of the Act, Thus, Insurance Company
cannot raise this plea.

17. In such view of the matter, facts
as well as law as involved, in present case,
insofar as notice under Section 10 of the
Act is concerned, are fully covered the
observation made by Hon'ble Division of
this Court in Rais (supra).

18. In what circumstances and context
a statute provision can be considered to be
mandatory or directory a reference may
also be made to a landmark judgment of
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P. T.
Rajan vs. T.P.M. Sahir 2003 (8) SCC
498. Paragraph 49 whereof is quoted as
under:-

"49. Furthermore, a provision in a
statute which is procedural in nature
although employs the word "shall" may not
be held to be mandatory if thereby no
prejudice is caused. (See Raza Buland
Sugar Co. Ltd v. Municipal Board, Rampur
AIR 1965 SC 895, State Bank of Patiala v.
S.K.
Sharma
1996
(3)
SCC
364,
Venkataswamappa v. Special Dy. Commr.
(Revenue) 1997 (9) SCC 128 and Rai
Vimal Krishna v. State of Bihar 2003 (6)
SCC 401)" (emphasis supplied)

19. It is the settled law that procedure
is the handmaid of justice. Suffice to refer
to a latest judgment of Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Sugandhi (dead) by Lrs. and
another vs. P. Rajkumar Rep. By his
Power Agent Imam Oli 2020 SCC Online
SC 870. Paragraph 10, whereof is quoted as
under:-

"10. It is often said that procedure
is the handmaid of justice. Procedural and
technical hurdles shall not be allowed to
come in the way the of the court while
doing substantial justice. If the procedural
violation does not seriously cause prejudice
to the adversary party, courts must lean
towards doing substantial justice rather
than relying upon procedural and technical
violation. We should not forget the fact that
litigation is nothing but a journey towards
truth which is the foundation of justice and
the court is required to take appropriate
steps to thrash out the underlying truth in
every dispute. Therefore, the court should
take a lenient view when an application is
1 All. National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Smt. Seema Devi & Ors.
211
made for production of the documents
under sub-rule (3)." (emphasis supplied)

20. No doubt, in the very first line of
Section 10 (1) of the Act the word used is
"shall" that "No claim for compensation
'shall' be entertained by a Commissioner
unless notice of accident ......", has been
used. It is also equally correct that in a
normal sense word "shall" is used in
mandatory sense. However, it is also
golden rule of interpretation that in the field
of law, to give the statute a purposeful or
functional interpretation and that it should
promote the purpose or the object of the
Act, as observed in Bharat Singh (supra),
a construction which would defeat the
rights of the have-nots and the underdog
and which would lead to injustice, should
always be avoided. Keeping this in mind,
coupled with the discretion given to the
Commissioner by proviso to 3rd proviso to
Section 10(1) of the Act by using word
"may" that "provided further, that the
Commissioner 'may' entertain and decide
any claim to compensation in any case
notwithstanding that the notice has not
been given, ........ was due to sufficient
reason," to my mind, this discretion left
with the Commissioner can be best
exercised if the word "shall" in first line of
Section 10(1) of the Act is taken or
interpreted as directory and not mandatory,
moreso, when this point is related to
procedural part of preferring a claim, and to
my mind, it is not referable to substantive
right of a claimant, which stood accrued the
moment untoward incident or accident has
taken place. Moreso, when the Act is a
beneficial piece of legislation.

21. Accordingly, it is held that in
view of the Act being a beneficial piece of
legislation enacted for the benefit of the
have-nots and the Commissioner having
been given power to entertain the claim
petition and decide the same even in
absence of notice under Section 10 of the
Act,
the
interpretation
of
statutory
requirement of giving notice under Section
10 of the Act is merely 'directory' and
cannot be held to be 'mandatory', which
may render the claim not maintainable.

22. Insofar as the applicability of
provision of Section 21 (1)(b) of the Act is
concerned, again the provision has to be
interpreted in the manner so as to serve the
purpose and object of this beneficial piece
of legislation as the manner in which
interpretation has to be given to this clause
also is already settled by the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bharat
Singh (supra) as noted above.

23. Insofar as territorial jurisdiction in
such cases of accident and death is
concerned, a reference may be made to
certain judgments of Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the cases of Mantoo Sarkar vs.
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and others
2009 (2) SCC 244, Malati Sardar vs.
National Insurance Company Limited
and others 2016 (3) SCC 43 and Morgina
Begum vs. Md. Hanuman Plantation
Limited 2007 (11) SCC 616.

24. Paragraphs 16, 18, 20, 21 and 23
of Mantoo Sarkar (supra) are quoted as
under:-

"16. We say so because ordinarily
an appellate court shall not, having regard
to the provisions contained in sub-section
(1) of Section 21 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, entertain an appeal on the
ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction on
the part of the court below unless he has
been prejudiced thereby. Other respondents
did not raise any question of jurisdiction.
212 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Although one witness each had been
examined on behalf of the truck owner and
owner of the bus, neither a question of lack
of territorial jurisdiction was raised nor the
question of any prejudice had been argued.
It is only the first respondent who raised
the question of territorial jurisdiction.
However, no prejudice was caused to the
appellant by the claim petition being tried
by the MACT at Nainital.

18. The Tribunal is a court
subordinate to the High Court. An appeal
against the Tribunal lies before the High
Court. The High Court, while exercising its
appellate
power,
would
follow
the
provisions contained in the Code of Civil
Procedure or akin thereto. In view of subsection (1) of Section 21 of the Code of
Civil
Procedure,
it
was,
therefore,
obligatory on the part of the appellate court
to pose unto itself the right question, viz.,
whether the first respondent has been able
to show sufferance of any prejudice. If it
has not suffered any prejudice or otherwise
no failure of justice had occurred, the High
Court should not have entertained the
appeal on that ground alone.

20. A distinction, however, must
be made between a jurisdiction with regard
to subject matter of the suit and that of
territorial
and
pecuniary
jurisdiction.
Whereas in the case falling within the
former category the judgment would be a
nullity, in the latter it would not be. It is not
a case where the Tribunal had no
jurisdiction in relation to the subject matter
of claim. As a matter of fact the civil court
had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. If
the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to
entertain a claim petition under the Motor
Vehicles Act, in our opinion, the Court
should not have, in absence of any finding
of sufferance of any prejudice on the part
of the first respondent, entertained the
appeal.

21. In Bikash Bhushan Ghosh v.
Novartis India Ltd., [ (2007) 5 SCC 591],
this Court has held :

"17. There is another aspect of
the matter which cannot be lost sight of. If
the provisions contained in the Code of
Civil Procedure are given effect to, even if
the Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal
had no jurisdiction, in view of the
provisions contained in Section 21 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, unless the
respondent suffered any prejudice, they
could not have questioned the jurisdiction
of the court. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman
Paswan this Court held: (AIR p. 342, paras
6-7)

`6. ... If the question now under
consideration fell to be determined only on
the
application
of
general
principles
governing the matter, there can be no doubt
that the District Court of Monghyr was
`coram non judice' and that its judgment
and decree would be nullities. The question
is what is the effect of Section 11 of the
Suits Valuation Act on this position.

7.
Section
11
enacts
that
notwithstanding anything in Section 578 of
the Code of Civil Procedure an objection
that a court which had no jurisdiction over
a suit or appeal had exercised it by reason
of overvaluation or undervaluation, should
not be entertained by an appellate court,
except as provided in the section. Then
follow provisions as to when the objections
could be entertained, and how they are to
be dealt with. The drafting of the section
has
come
in--and
deservedly--for
considerable criticism; but amidst much
that is obscure and confused, there is one
principle which stands out clear and
conspicuous. It is that a decree passed by a
court,
which
would
have
had
no
jurisdiction to hear a suit or appeal but for
overvaluation or undervaluation, is not to
be treated as, what it would be but for the
1 All. National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Smt. Seema Devi & Ors.
213
section, null and void, and that an objection
to jurisdiction based on overvaluation or
undervaluation, should be dealt with under
that section and not otherwise.

The reference to Section 578,
now Section 99 CPC, in the opening words
of the section is significant. That section,
while providing that no decree shall be
reversed or varied in appeal on account of
the defects mentioned therein when they do
not affect the merits of the case, excepts
from its operation defects of jurisdiction.
Section 99 therefore gives no protection to
decrees passed on merits, when the courts
which passed them lacked jurisdiction as a
result of overvaluation or undervaluation. It
is with a view to avoid this result that
Section 11 was enacted. It provides that
objections to the jurisdiction of a court
based on overvaluation or undervaluation
shall not be entertained by an appellate
court except in the manner and to the extent
mentioned in the section. It is a selfcontained provision complete in itself, and
no objection to jurisdiction based on
overvaluation or undervaluation can be
raised otherwise than in accordance with it.

With reference to objections
relating to territorial jurisdiction, Section
21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that
no objection to the place of suing should be
allowed by an appellate or revisional court,
unless there was a consequent failure of
justice. It is the same principle that has
been adopted in Section 11 of the Suits
Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary
jurisdiction. The policy underlying Sections
21 and 99 CPC and Section 11 of the Suits
Valuation Act is the same, namely, that
when a case had been tried by a court on
the merits and judgment rendered, it should
not be liable to be reversed purely on
technical grounds, unless it had resulted in
failure of justice, and the policy of the
legislature has been to treat objections to
jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as
technical and not open to consideration by
an appellate court, unless there has been a
prejudice on the merits. The contention of
the appellants, therefore, that the decree
and judgment of the District Court,
Monghyr, should be treated as a nullity
cannot be sustained under Section 11 of the
Suits Valuation Act.' "

23. We cannot also lose sight of
the fact that the appellant herein was a
labourer. The justness or otherwise of the
amount of compensation has not been
disputed before us. If the High Court
judgment is to be complied with, appellant
would again have to initiate another
proceeding either at Bareilly or Gurgaon or
at Delhi or at Jabalpur. The same evidence
would have to be rendered once again."
(emphasis supplied)

25. Paragraphs 14 and 16 of Malati
Sardar (supra) are quoted as under:-

"14. We are thus of the view that
in the face of judgment of this Court in
Mantoo Sarkar (supra), the High Court was
not justified in setting aside the award of
the Tribunal in absence of any failure of
justice even if there was merit in the plea of
lack of territorial jurisdiction. Moreover,
the fact remained that the insurance
company which was the main contesting
respondent had its business at Kolkata.

15. Reliance placed on decisions
of this Court in G.S. Grewal and Jagmittar
Sain Bhagat is misplaced. In G.S. Grewal,
the subject matter of dispute was not
covered by the definition of "service
matters" under Section 3(o) of the Armed
Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 and on that
ground, it was held that the Armed Forces
Tribunal had no jurisdiction in the matter.
Thus, it was a case of inherent lack of
jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter.
214 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Similarly in Jagmittar Sain Bhagat, the
claimant before the Consumer Protection
Forum was found not be a "consumer"
under Section 2(1) (d) of the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 and on that ground the
order of the consumer forum was held to be
without jurisdiction. The said cases did not
deal with the issue of territorial jurisdiction.

16. The provision in question, in
the present case, is a benevolent provision
for the victims of accidents of negligent
driving.
The
provision
for
territorial
jurisdiction has to be interpreted consistent
with the object of facilitating remedies for
the victims of accidents. Hyper technical
approach in such matters can hardly be
appreciated. There is no bar to a claim
petition being filed at a place where the
insurance company, which is the main
contesting parties in such cases, has its
business. In such cases, there is no
prejudice to any party. There is no failure
of justice. Moreover, in view of categorical
decision of this Court in Mantoo Sarkar
(supra), contrary view taken by the High
Court cannot be sustained. The High Court
failed to notice the provision of Section 21
CPC."(emphasis supplied)

26. In the case of Morgina Begum
(supra) even this controversy regarding
provision of interpretation of Section 21
(1)(b) of the Act has also given. Paragrpahs
6, 7, 8 and 9 whereof are also quoted as
under:-

"6. Section 21 (1)(b) of the Act
clearly provides that the claim petition may
be filed by the claimant where the claimant
ordinarily resides. In our opinion, the
expression `ordinarly resides' means where
the person claiming compensation normally
resides at the time of filing the claim
petition. The proviso to Section 21 which is
also relevant for the present controversy,
provides that in case the Commissioner,
other than the Commissioner having
jurisdiction over the area in which the
accident took place, entertains the claim
petition then he shall give a notice to the
Commissioner having jurisdiction over the
area and the state Government concerned.
The Amended Section 21 has been
specifically introduced in the Act by
Amending Act No. 30 of 1995 with effect
from 15th September, 1995 in order to
benefit and facilitate the claimants. The
Statement of Objects and Reasons for the
Amendment of the Act, a copy of which
has been produced before us, clearly
mentions that the amendment has been
brought about for benefits of the claimants
viz.
either
the
workmen
or
their
dependents. The relevant portion of the
Statement of Objects and Reasons, reads as
under:-

"It is also proposed to introduce
provision for facilitating migrant workmen
to file compensation claims before the
Commissioners having jurisdiction over the
area where they or their dependents
ordinarily reside. Provision for transfer of
compensation from one Commissioner to
another has also been made."

7. The idea behind introduction of
this amendment is that migrant labourers
all over the country often go elsewhere to
earn their livelihood. When an accident
takes place then in order to facilitate the
claimants they may make their claim not
necessarily at the place where the accident
took place but also at the place where they
ordinarily reside. This amendment was
introduced in the Act in 1995. This was
done with a very laudable object, otherwise
it could cause hardship to the claimant to
claim compensation under the Act. It is not
possible for poor workmen or their
dependents who reside in one part of the
country and shift from one place to another
1 All. National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Smt. Seema Devi & Ors.
215
for their livelihood to necessarily go to the
place of the accident for filing a claim
petition. It may be very expensive for the
claimants to pursue in such a claim petition
because of the financial and other hardship.
It would entail the poor claimant traveling
from one place to another for getting
compensation. Labour statutes are for the
welfare of the workmen.

8. This Court has in Bharat Singh
v. Management of New Tuberculosis
Centre, New Delhi and Ors., [1986] 2 SCC,
614 has taken the view that welfare
legislation should be given a purposive
interpretation safeguarding the rights of the
have-nots rather than giving a literal
construction.
In
case
of
doubt
the
interpretation in favour of the worker
should be preferred.

9. The view which we are taking
has been taken by a Division Bench of the
Orissa High Court in the case of S.K.
Saukat
Ali
Alias
Sekho
S.K.
v.
Commissioner
for
Workmen's
Compensation-cum-Deputy
Labour
Commissioner, Cuttack and Ors., (1999) 2
Transport and Accident Cases 638 (Ori)
and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the
case of Noorjahan v. National Insurance
Co. Ltd. Hyderabad and Anr. (1999) 3
T.A.C. 276 (AP). Hence, we are of the
opinion that the view taken by both these
High Courts is correct. A claimant can
apply before the Commissioner having
jurisdiction over the area where the
claimant resides, and it is not always
necessary to prefer a claim petition where
the accident has taken palce. This is for the
facility of the workmen and advances the
cause of welfare of the worken. Therefore,
the view taken by the Gauhati High Court
in the impugned order that the claim
petition could only be filed at the place
where the accident had taken place, cannot
be sustained. Section 21 (1)(b) read with its
proviso is a beneficial legislation for the
welfare of the workmen and by the above,
interpretation, it will advance the cause of
the workmen. Therefore, we are of the
opinion that the view taken by the Gauhati
High Court in the impugned order cannot
be sustained and accordingly we set aside
the impugned order."(emphasis supplied)

27. Clearly, as per the law laid down
the claim petition cannot be rejected on the
ground of territorial jurisdiction alone,
where the claims are preferred under such
beneficial piece of legislation.

28. On perusal of record, I find that
although the vehicle was insured in the
branch office of the appellant-Company at
district Siwan and the accident had also
taken place in district Siwan (Bihar),
however, in paragraphs 16 and 18 it has
been categorically stated that the claimants
are landless labourers and have shifted to
District Gorakhpur and are residing there. It
has futher been stated that the opposite
party no.