# Navodaya Vidhyalaya Samiti & Ors v. Pundarikaksh Dev Pathak & Anr

- **Citation:** (2025) 10 ILRA 682
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-10-16
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 9462 of 2025
- **Bench:** Arun Bhansali, C J. Kshitij Shailendra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/navodaya-vidhyalaya-samiti-ors-v-pundarikaksh-dev-pathak-anr-52713
- **Pages:** 8

## Text

682 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

31. Even if the persons have been
appointed pursuant to an advertisement
which is illegal per se, they have no right to
be heard and cannot raise any objection
when they have been selected pursuant to
an advertisement which has been issued
illegally and is against the policy decision
taken in view of the directions as issued by
the Hon'ble Apex Court.

32. Accordingly, the present writ
petition is allowed.
----------
(2025) 10 ILRA 682
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.10.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ARUN BHANSALI,C J.
THE HON'BLE KSHITIJ SHAILENDRA, J.

Writ A No. 9462 of 2025
Connected With Writ A No. 6670 of 2025

Navodaya Vidhyalaya Samiti & Ors.
...Petitioners
Versus
Pundarikaksh Dev Pathak & Anr.
...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Rajesh Tripathi

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Devesh Kumar Sharma, Pankaj
Kumar Gupta

Issue for Consideration
1. Legality of termination order of cryptic in
nature, passed without considering the reply.
2. Effect of non-disclosure of pendency of
criminal case, took place while the applicant was
juvenile.

Headnotes
(A) Service law - Termination - Applicant
was selected and appointed on the post of
P.G.T.
(Mathematics)
in
Jawahar
Navodaaya Vidyalaya, and also paid two
months salary - Charge of concealment of
pendency of criminal case was leveled - At
the time of lodging F.I.R., the applicant
was
aged
about
17
years
-
Reply
submitted
by
applicant
was
not
considered - Effect - Cryptic nature of
termination
order
was
passed
-
Permissibility - Central Administrative
Tribunal set aside the termination order -
Validity challenged :

Held : Considering the cryptic nature of the
order of termination, we are of the opinion that
the authority was bound to examine each and
every aspect of the matter including the defence
put forth by the respondent as per the
guidelines issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of Avtar Singh, that was existent
since 2016 and was binding on the department
at the time when services of the respondent
were hurriedly terminated in the year 2021.
Having not done so, we find that the
department has failed to discharge lawful duty
cast on it and, therefore, we are not inclined to
interfere with the order of the Tribunal whereby
it has set aside the order of termination. [Para
11]

(B) Service law - Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 - S.
19 - Termination - At the time of lodging
F.I.R., the applicant was aged about 17
years - Non-disclosure of pendency of
criminal case, how far fatal - Central
Administrative
Tribunal,
while
setting
aside the termination order, remanded the
matter back for fresh consideration -
Validity challenged :

Held : A bare perusal of Section 19(1) of the
Act makes it clear that it starts with a 'nonobstante clause' excluding the applicability of
any other law in the matter of a juvenile and
clearly provides that a juvenile who has
committed an offence and has been dealt with
under the provisions of the Act, shall not suffer
disqualification attaching to a conviction of an
offence under such law. It means that even if a
juvenile is convicted for an offence committed
by him, his conviction would not be treated as a
disqualification - Even conviction of a juvenile
10 All. Navodaya Vidhyalaya Samiti & Ors. Vs. Pundarikaksh Dev Pathak & Anr.
683
has been found to be irrelevant qua his services
and the present case stands on much better
footings where trial against the petitioner is
pending - Once the Tribunal itself recorded a
finding regarding juvenility of the petitioner, it
rightly set aside the termination order but
remand made to the departmental authority was
an unwarranted exercise on its part. [Para 17,
22 and 24] (E-1)

Case Law Cited
1. Avtar Singh v. Union of India and others,
2016 (8) SCC 471; Shivam Maurya v. State of
U.P. and 5 others, 2020 (5) ADJ 5; Union of
India and others v. Ramesh Bishnoi, (2019) 19
SCC 710; Abhishek Kumar Yadav v. Union of
India and 3 others, 2022 (6) ADJ 564 -
referred to.

List of Acts
Juvenile
Justice
(Care
and
Protection
of
Children) Act, 2000 - Section 19; Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2015 - S. 111

List of Keywords
Appointment;
Concealment
of
criminal
proceeding;
Charge-sheet;
Civil
dispute;
Juvenile; Termination order; Cryptic nature;
Lawful
duty;
Non-obstacle
clause;
Disqualification;
Conviction;
Direct
reinstatement.

Case Arising From
Impugned Order dated 03.01.2025 of Central
Administrative
Tribunal
setting
aside
the
termination order passed by the authority and
remanding the matter back to department for
reconsideration.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner : Rajesh Tripathi
Advs. For the Respondent : Devesh Kumar
Sharma, Pankaj Kumar Gupta

(Delivered by Hon'ble Arun Bhansai, C J.
&
Hon'ble Kshitij Shailendra, J.)

1. These two writ petitions have been
filed challenging the same order dated
03.01.2025,
whereby
the
Central
Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench,
Allahabad ('the Tribunal') has disposed of
Original Application ('O.A.') No. 1015 of
2021 (Pundarikaksh vs. Union of India and
others),
set
aside
the
order
dated
02.11.2021 passed by the departmental
authority and issued a direction to the
competent authority to re-examine the case
of the applicant in the light of observations
made in the Tribunal's order and, after
taking into consideration the mandate of
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Avtar Singh vs.
Union of India and others : 2016 (8) SCC
471, pass a fresh reasoned order within a
period of three months.

2. Whereas the challenge laid by
Navodaya Vidhyalaya Samiti and others,
vide Writ-A No. 9462 of 2025, is only to
the order dated 03.01.2025, the petitioner
of Writ-A No. 6670 of 2025 (also referred
as 'the applicant' at some places in this
order), apart from challenging part of the
order dated 03.01.2025, has also challenged
a subsequent order dated 25.02.2025
whereby review application filed by him
has been rejected by the Tribunal.

3. Brief facts of the case are that in a
Recruitment Drive, 2019 initiated by the
department, the applicant applied for the
post of P.G.T. (Mathematics). Having
become successful in the process of
selection, letter of appointment was issued
to him on 22.07.2020, he joined the said
post on 07.08.2020 at Jawahar Navodaya
Vidyalaya,
Gauriganj,
Amethi
('the
institution') and was paid salary. After two
months, a letter dated 29.10.2020 was
issued by Navodaya Vidyalaya Sangathan,
Regional Office, Lucknow to the Principal
of the institution, which was accompanied
by a complaint against the applicant and he
was asked to submit a response. The
684 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
complaint was to the effect that the
applicant had, while applying for the post
in question, concealed pendency of a
criminal case against him.

4. The applicant responded to the
notice stating that the incident giving rise to
the said criminal case occurred on
18.04.2011
and
a
final
report
was
submitted by the Investigating Officer on
14.06.2011, however, after re-investigation,
a charge sheet was filed in Court, which
was not in the knowledge of the applicant.
The nature of allegations, false implication
of the applicant and all circumstances
relating to the case including the dispute
being trifling and of civil nature, were
elaborately
stated
in
the
response.
However, an order terminating services of
the applicant was passed by the authority
on 02.11.2021, which was served upon him
on 10.11.2021. It is against the said order,
the O.A. was filed by the applicant.

5. The Tribunal, after considering the
case of the parties, has found that qua
concealment
of
criminal
proceedings,
Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down
various parameters in the judgement of
Avtar Singh (supra) and, after reproducing
the ratio of the said judgment and by
observing that the applicant was aged about
17 years at the time of lodging of first
information report against him, subsequent
submission of final report and that the
allegations in the FIR raised a civil dispute
relating to which an O.S. No. 841 of 2009
was also filed, disposed of the O.A., set
aside the termination order and remitted the
matter to the department to pass a fresh
order, as noted above.

Writ A No. 9462 of 2025

6. Learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners- Navodaya Vidhyalaya Samiti
and others has made submissions that once
concealment of criminal proceedings on the
part of the applicant while entering into
services was apparent on the face of the
record, the Tribunal has grossly erred in
setting aside the termination order that was
passed for violation of conditions of
selection and appointment and it is settled
proposition of law that once an incumbent,
while entering into service, conceals
pendency of criminal case against him, the
same results in termination of his services.

7. Per contra, learned counsel for the
respondent
submits
that
once
the
respondent was admittedly a juvenile at the
time of alleged incident giving rise to
lodging of FIR in question, the Tribunal,
after setting aside order of termination,
should have directed his reinstatement in
service with all consequential benefits and
the order impugned, to the extent of
remand to the authority, is unsustainable
and, for this reason, the respondent also has
challenged part of the order to that extent
by filing connected Writ A No. 6670 of
2025.

8.
We
have
considered
the
submissions made by learned counsel for
the parties and have perused the material
available on record.

9. It is not in dispute that at the time of
alleged incident dated 18.04.2011 giving
rise
to
FIR
dated
08.06.2011,
the
respondent was aged about 17 years, hence,
a juvenile. The finding to that effect
recorded by the Tribunal has not been
shown to be perverse and, even otherwise,
an order dated 04.06.2024 passed by the
Juvenile Justice Board (JJ Board) declaring
the respondent as juvenile is also on record.
Said being the position, this Court has to
examine validity of the order passed by the
10 All. Navodaya Vidhyalaya Samiti & Ors. Vs. Pundarikaksh Dev Pathak & Anr.
685
Tribunal from both perspectives, i.e. as to
whether setting aside of termination order
was justified and as to whether remand was
necessary in the facts of the case.

10. It stands reflected from the
termination order dated 02.11.2021 that a
show cause notice was issued to the
respondent on 27.09.2021, which was
responded to by him by submitting a very
detailed reply dated 04.10.2021, however,
absolutely no consideration of the reply is
found in the order of termination and only
following is the so called consideration of
the response:-

"चूकक श्री पुंडर काक्ष िेि पाठक ने
प्राचाया जिाहर निोिय विद्यािय अमेठी के
माध्यम से प्रेवषत अपने स्पष्ट करण दिनांक:
04/10/2021 द्िारा कारण बताओ नोदटस पर
अपना स्पष्ट करण प्रेवषत ककया जो इस
कायाािय में दिनांकः 18/10/2021 को प्राप्त
हुआ ।

चूंकक श्री पुंडर काक्ष िेि पाठक ने
अपने स्पष्ट करण में ककसी नए तथ्य का
उल्िेख नह ं ककया इसलिए उनका स्पष्ट करण
स्िीकाया नह ं है।"

11. We have also gone through the
response given by the respondent to the
show cause notice, which contains a
detailed version regarding institution of
criminal case and aspects associated thereto
and considering the cryptic nature of the
order of termination, we are of the opinion
that the authority was bound to examine
each and every aspect of the matter
including the defence put forth by the
respondent as per the guidelines issued by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Avtar Singh (supra), that was existent
since 2016 and was binding on the
department at the time when services of the
respondent were hurriedly terminated in the
year 2021. Having not done so, we find that
the department has failed to discharge
lawful duty cast on it and, therefore, we are
not inclined to interfere with the order of
the Tribunal whereby it has set aside the
order of termination.

12. In view of above discussion, WritA No. 9462 of 2025 has no merit and the
same is, accordingly, dismissed.

Writ A No. 6670 of 2025

13. Learned counsel for the petitionerPundarikaksh
Dev
Pathak
has
made
vehement submissions that the JJ Board
had, by order dated 04.06.2024, declared
the petitioner as a juvenile, which order
remained unchallenged and, therefore, in
view of the provisions of Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000 (in short 'J.J. Act, 2000'), commission
of offence by a juvenile would not amount
to any disqualification qua his services and,
hence, even if the factum of pendency of
criminal case against the petitioner was not
disclosed by him during the course of
selection/appointment, the said fact being
immaterial, such non-disclosure would not
be fatal to his service and, therefore,
remand was unwarranted, particularly when
the Tribunal itself has recorded finding in
favour of the petitioner that he was a
juvenile aged 17 years at the time of
lodging of the FIR. To buttress his
submissions, learned counsel has referred
to Section 19 of J.J. Act, 2000 and also
placed reliance on a judgment of Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of
Shivam Maurya vs. State of U.P. and 5
others; 2020 (5) ADJ 5.
686 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

14. Per contra, learned counsel for the
respondents has made submission that since
the Tribunal has only remanded the matter
to the competent authority to pass a
speaking order in the light of directions
contained in the order itself as well as the
law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Avtar Singh (supra),
the arguments advanced on behalf of the
petitioner cannot be examined at this stage,
when a fresh order is yet to be passed by
the authority and, therefore, it would be
quite premature to examine the said
contention. It is further submitted that there
is no provision, either in the J.J. Act, 2000
or in any other law, whereunder an
incumbent to Government service has been
exempted from disclosing pendency of or
decision in a criminal case at the time when
he enters into process of selection or is
offered appointment and, therefore, the
contention advanced on behalf of the
petitioner is thoroughly misplaced.

15.
We
have
considered
the
submissions made by learned counsel for
the parties and have perused the material
available on record.

16. Once the status of the petitioner at
the
time
of
alleged
incident
dated
18.04.2011, as a juvenile is well established
on record, as noted above, the question to
be examined by this court is as to whether
non-disclosure of pendency of criminal
proceedings against him in the concerned
declaration forms etc., would be fatal to his
service. In this regard, first of all we deem
it appropriate to refer section 19 of the J.J.
Act, 2000 which reads as under:-

"19. Removal of disqualification
attaching
to
conviction:-
(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law, a juvenile who has committed an
offence and has been dealt with under the
provisions of this Act shall not suffer
disqualification, if any, attaching to a
conviction of an offence under such law.

(2) The Board shall make an
order directing that the relevant records of
such conviction shall be removed after the
expiry of the period of appeal or a
reasonable period prescribed under the
rules, as the case may be."

17. A bare perusal of Section 19(1) of
the Act makes it clear that it starts with a
'non-obstante
clause'
excluding
the
applicability of any other law in the matter
of a juvenile and clearly provides that a
juvenile who has committed an offence and
has been dealt with under the provisions of
the Act, shall not suffer disqualification
attaching to a conviction of an offence
under such law. It means that even if a
juvenile is convicted for an offence
committed by him, his conviction would
not be treated as a disqualification. On the
said proposition, we may refer to a
judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Union of India and others vs. Ramesh
Bishnoi (2019) 19 SCC 710, wherein it has
been laid down as under:-

"It is clear that at the time when
the charges were framed against the
respondent, on 30.06.2009, the respondent
was well under the age of 18 years as his
date of birth is 05.09.1991. Firstly, it was
not disputed that the charges were never
proved against the respondent as the girl
and her parents did not depose against the
respondent, resulting in his acquittal on
24.11.2011. Even if the allegations were
found to be true, then too the respondent
could not have been deprived of getting a
job on the basis of such charges as the
same had been committed while the
respondent was juvenile. The thrust of the
10 All. Navodaya Vidhyalaya Samiti & Ors. Vs. Pundarikaksh Dev Pathak & Anr.
687
legislation, i.e. The Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 as
well as The Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is that
even if a juvenile is convicted, the same
should be obliterated, so that there is no
stigma
with
regard
to
any
crime
committed by such person as a juvenile.
This is with the clear object to reintegrate
such juvenile back in the society as a
normal person, without any stigma.
Section 3 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2015 lays
down
guidelines
for
the
Central
Government, State Governments, the Board
and other agencies while implementing the
provisions of the said Act. In clause (xiv) of
Section 3, it is clearly provided as follows:-

"3. (xiv) Principle of fresh start:
All past records of any child under the
Juvenile Justice system should be erased
except in special circumstances."

In the present case, it is an
admitted fact that the respondent was a
minor when the charges had been framed
against him of offences under Sections 354,
447 and 509 of IPC. It is also not disputed
that he was acquitted of the charges.
However, even if he had been convicted,
the same could not have been held against
him for getting a job, as admittedly he was
a minor when the alleged offences were
committed and the charges had been
framed against him."

(emphasis by Court)

18. In the matter before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, the concerned incumbent
had been acquitted from the charges in
2011 and the Hon'ble Supreme Court also
examined even the situation where the
allegations levelled against a juvenile
would have been found to be true and he
was convicted, the same would stand
obliterated and no stigma would remain
existent in his getting job. When a plea was
raised before the Hon'ble Supreme Court
that though the concerned juvenile was
acquitted but no disclosure was made by
him as regards the criminal case pending
against him which would be fatal to his
service, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as
under:-

"28. In the facts of the present
case, it is admitted position that the
petitioner was juvenile as declared by the
Board at the time when the F.I.R. was
lodged against him, therefore, his case was
to be dealt, taking into consideration the
provisions of Juvenile Justice (Care &
Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Even if
it is presume that the petitioner had not
disclosed about the pendency of the
criminal
case,
the
requirement
of
disclosed details of criminal prosecution
faced as a juvenile is violative of right to
privacy and right to reputation of child,
guaranteed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. It also denudes the
child of protection sought by the Juvenile
Justice Act, 2000, hence, it was not
expected from the petitioner to disclose
details of criminal prosecution faced as a
juvenile.

29. Admittedly, the petitioner has
been acquitted in the present case and the
case so lodged against him was trivial in
nature and should not be viewed as
disqualification for entry in Government
service."

(emphasis by Court)

19. We are conscious of the fact that
J.J. Act, 2000 has since been replaced by
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015 (in short 'J.J. Act,
2015') and by virtue of sub-section (1) of
688 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Section 111 of the J.J. Act, 2015, the Act of
2000 has been repealed, however, as per
sub-section (2) of Section 111, anything
done or any action taken under the Act of
2000 shall be deemed to have been done or
taken under the corresponding provisions
of Act of 2015.

20. Therefore, while examining the
effect of juvenility of the present petitioner
on his services, we find that since the FIR
in question was lodged against him in the
year 2011 and the relevant date of the
alleged commission of offence by him, i.e.
18.04.2011, is prior to coming into force of
Act of 2015, no provision of the new Act
would come in his way. We are making
these observations in the light of Section 24
of the Act of 2015, which is identical to
Section 19 of the Act of 2000 providing
that even conviction of a juvenile shall not
suffer disqualification qua his services,
however, there is an addition in the new
Act in terms of proviso to sub-section (1)
of Section 24 wherein a child who has
completed or is above the age of 16 years
and is found to be 'in conflict with law' by
the Children's Court under Section 19(1)(i)
of the new Act, the protection granted
under sub-section (1) of Section 24 would
not be available to him.

21. Above aspect has been noticed for
the reason that since the petitioner has been
declared juvenile in the year 2024 and has
been found to be 'child in conflict with law'
by the J.J. Board vide its order dated
04.06.2024 and the Act of 2000 is not in
force, proviso attached to sub-section (1) of
Section 24 of J.J. Act, 2015 may be read
against him, but the proviso would not be
applicable in the present case, inasmuch as,
relevant date for consideration of the
criminal case lodged against the petitioner
would be the date when the said offence
was alleged to have been committed by
him,
i.e.
18.04.2011
and
not
any
subsequent date. At that time, the old Act
of 2000 was in force wherein no such
proviso was there as it finds place in the
Act of 2015.

22. From the above discussion, it is
crystal clear that even conviction of a
juvenile has been found to be irrelevant qua
his services and the present case stands on
much better footings where trial against the
petitioner is pending. Further, as per
judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Ramesh Bishnoi (supra), even
requirement of disclosing the details of
criminal prosecution faced by a juvenile is
violative of right to privacy and right to
reputation of child, guaranteed under the
Constitution of India, and therefore, it is
not expected of a juvenile to disclose such
details. Same proposition has been laid
down by this Court in the case of Shivam
Maurya (supra) and the judgment of
Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of
Ramesh Bishnoi (supra) as well as in the
case of Shivam Maurya (supra) are being
consistently
followed
by
this
Court.
Reference to the judgement of a learned
Single Judge of this Court in Abhishek
Kumar Yadav vs. Union of India and 3
others, 2022 (6) ADJ 564, can also be
made in this regard.

23. We may mention here that in the
review application filed by the petitioner
before the Tribunal, specific reference was
made to the order passed by the J.J. Board
as regards his status as juvenile and review
was sought taking aid of various provisions
of J.J. Act, 2000 as well as Division Bench
judgment in the case of Shivam Maurya
(supra). Further, prayers were made in the
review application to maintain that part of
the order dated 03.01.2025 whereby
10 All. Ravendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
689
termination order was set aside and to
direct respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to reinstate
the petitioner as P.G. Teacher in the
institution
in
question
with
all
consequential
benefits.
However,
the
Tribunal, without taking into consideration
the legal pleas raised, rejected the review
application by order dated 25.02.2025 (also
impugned before us) by observing that
review was not rehearing of the original
matter and that the review application was
misconceived.

24. In view of above discussion, we
are of the considered opinion that once the
Tribunal itself recorded a finding regarding
juvenility of the petitioner, it rightly set
aside the termination order but remand
made to the departmental authority was an
unwarranted exercise on its part. We are,
therefore, inclined to set aside the part of
order of Tribunal whereby matter has been
remanded to the authorities for fresh
consideration. Further, considering the
grounds raised and prayers made in the
review application, we also deem it
appropriate to direct reinstatement of the
petitioner in service with all consequential
benefits.

25. Accordingly, Writ-A No. 6670 of
2025 is allowed.

26. The order dated 03.01.2025 passed
by the Tribunal is set aside to the extent the
Tribunal has remanded the matter to the
authorities for fresh consideration and both
the orders impugned in this petition are
modified
with
a
direction
to
the
respondents to reinstate the petitioner in
service and grant him all consequential
financial and service benefits within a
period of one month from the date an
authentic copy of this order is produced
before them.
----------
(2025) 10 ILRA 689
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.10.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SIDDHARTH NANDAN, J.

Writ B No. 2774 of 2025

Ravendra Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Pushpendra Kumar, Ramdhan

Counsel for the Respondent:
C.S.C., Krishna Kant Singh

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation
could recall or review a final order which had
attained finality up to the High Court, in the
absence of statutory power of review under the
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, and
whether the State Government is a necessary
party in consolidation proceedings concerning
Gaon Sabha lands, particularly public utility land
recorded under Section 77(1)(H) of the U.P.
Revenue Code, 2006?

HEADNOTE
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 -
Sections 4, 11(c), 48 - Review/recall of final
orders - Consolidation authorities have got no
jurisdiction to review its order - Order dated
30.03.2010 attained finality up to the stage of
the High Court by judgment - In spite of that
the Deputy Director of Consolidation, set aside
the said order by the impugned order dated
09.05.2025 - Gram Sabha is only the custodian
of the land and not the owner - It is the
property of the State, which is vested in the
Gaon Sabha for the purposes of management -
Once the area is notified under Section 4 of the
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, then by
virtue of Section 11(c), the consolidation
authorities acquire the right to direct that any