# New India Assurance Co. and another v. Lekhraj Singh Verma

- **Citation:** (2001) 2 ILRA 134
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2001
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/new-india-assurance-co-and-another-v-lekhraj-singh-verma-39811
- **Pages:** 3

## Text

2All] New India Assurance Co. and another V. Lekhraj Singh Verma

134
them so long as it is not cancelled by a
court having the power to cancel it."

6. In this way, the Consolidation
Authorities are competent to decide right,
title and interest of the land in suit
ignoring
the
sale
deed,
which
is
admittedly void and therefore the suit
stands abated under Section 5(2) of the
Act. The application is, accordingly,
allowed and the appeal as well as suit
stands abated under Section 5 (2) of U.P.
Consolidation of Holdings Act.

25,*,1$/ -85,6',&7,21
25,*,1$/ -85,6',&7,21
&,9,/ 6,'(
&,9,/ 6,'(
'$7(' $//$+$%$'
$7(' $//$+$%$'
%()25(
%()25(
7+( +21·%/( 86 75,3$7+, -
7+( +21·%/( 86 75,3$7+, -

)LUVW $SSHDO )RUP 2UGHU 1R RI

1HZ ,QGLD $VVXUDQFH &R DQG DQRWKHU
«'HIHQGDQW $SSHOODQWV
9HUVXV
/HNKUDM 6LQJK 9HUPD
«&ODLPDQW 5HVSRQGHQW

&RXQVHO IRU WKH 3HWLWLRQHU
6KUL $. %DQHUML
&RXQVHO IRU WKH 5HVSRQGHQWV

0RWRU 9HKLFOHV $FW 6HFWLRQ
1R IDXOW OLDELOLW\ YLV D YLV 5XOH RI VWULFW
OLDELOLW\ $ZDUG RI &RPSHQVDWLRQ HYHQ LQ
WKH DEVHQFH RI QHJOLJHQFH RQ SDUW RI
RZQHUH RU GULYHU RI WKH 9HKLFOH
+HOG 3DUD DQG

1R )DXOW /LDELOLW\
 HQYLVDJHG LQ 6HFWLRQ
 RI WKH 09 $FW LV GLVWLQJXLVKDEOH IURP
WKH 5XOH RI VWULFW OLDELOLW\ ,Q WKH IRUPHU
WKH FRPSHQVDWLRQ DPRXQW LV IL[HG DQG LV
SD\DEOH
HYHQ
LI
DQ\
RQH
RI
WKH
H[FHSWLRQV WR WKH 5XOH FDQ EH DSSOLHG ,W
LV
VWDWXWRU\
OLDELOLW\
FUHDWHG
ZLWKRXW
ZKLFK WKH FODLPDQW VKRXOG QRW JHW DQ\
DPRXQW XQGHU WKDW FRXQW
&DVH /DZ
-7 6&
 $OO (5

By the Court

1. This appeal has been directed
against the judgement and award dated
21.2.1990 passed by Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal/IInd A.D.J. Meerut in
motor accident claim case no. 27 of 1988
awarding a sum of Rs. 80,000/- alongwith
interest at the rate of Rs. 12% per annum
on account of injury sustained by claimant
in motor accident.

2. On 18.10.1985 claimant, Ex.
Captain of military Service was coming
from Begum Bridge side on a cycle and
going towards Shastri Nagar in Merrut
City. At about 12 noon near Prayag
Nurshing Home Car No. UHO 131 owned
by appellant no. 2 and insured with
appellant no. 1 due to rash and negligent
driving of the driver dashed against the
claimant due to which he fell down on the
road and sustained injuries. He was
treated in the hospital till 14.12.1985, but
still could not be cured. His hip bone was
fractured and one of leg has shortened by
2 1/2 inches. He also took prolonged
treatment in B.H.U. and another hospital.

The claimant filed claim petition for
Rs. 3,05,000/-.

3. The Tribunal on considering the
evidence of the parties held that accident
took place due to rash and negligent
driving of the car in question and there
was no negligence on the part of the
claimant.
On
the
quantum
of
compensation the Tribunal awarded a sum
of Rs. 5,000/- for medicines purchased by
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2001

135
the claimant, Rs. 5,000/- for medicines to
be taken in future, Rs. 5,000/- for mental
shock, Rs. 10,000/- for pain and mental
pain, Rs. 50,000/- for pains and suffering
and Rs. 5,000/- incurred in special diet,
total Rs. 80,000/-.

The
above
finding
has
been
challenged in this F.A.F.O.

4. Heard the learned counsel for the
appellants and perused the judgement.

5. The learned counsel for the
appellants contended that there was no
negligence on the part of the driver of the
car and therefore, claimant was not
entitled
to
any
compensation.
The
Tribunal on considering the evidence of
the parties has recorded a finding of fact
that accident took place due to rash and
negligent driving of the driver of the car.
Assuming that there was no negligence,
according to recent judgement of the
Apex Court in Smt. Kaushnuma Begum
and others Vs. The New India Assurance
Co. Ltd. and others J.T. 2001 (1) SC 375,
it must be noted that the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal is not restricted to decide claims
arising out of negligence in the use of
motor vehicles. Negligence is only one of
the species of the causes of action for
making a claim for compensation in
respect of accidents arising out of the
motor vehicles. There are other premises
for such cause of action. A question was
posed in the said case even if there is no
negligence on the part of the driver or
owner of the motor vehicle, but accident
happens while the vehicle was in use,
should not the owner be made liable for
damages to the person who suffered on
account of such accident ? Held that this
question depends upon how far the Rule
in Rylands V. Fletcher (1861-1873 All
England Reports 1) can apply in motor
accident
cases.
The
said
Rule
is
summarised as below :-

"The true rule of law is that the
person who for his own purposes, brings
on his land and collects and keeps there
anything likely to do mischief if it
escapes, must keep it at his peril and if he
does not do so, he is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is
the natural consequence of its escape. He
can excuse himself by showing that the
escape was owing to the plaintiff's
default, or perhaps that the escape was the
consequence of vis major, or the act of
God, but as nothing of this sort exists
here, it is unnecessary to inquire what
excuse would be sufficient".

6. It was further held that 'No Fault
Liability' envisaged in Section 140 of the
MV Act is distinguishable from the Rule
of strict liability. In the former the
compensation amount is fixed and is
payable even if any one of the exceptions
to the Rule can be applied. It is statutory
liability
created
without
which
the
claimant should not get any amount under
that count. Compensation on account of
accident arising from the use of motor
vehicles can be claimed under the
common law even without the aid of a
statute. The provisions of the MV Act
permits that compensation paid under 'No
Fault Liability' can be deducted from the
final amount awarded by the Tribunal.
Therefore, these two are resting on two
different premises. We are, therefore, of
the opinion that even apart from Section
140 of the MV Act, a victim in an
accident which occurred while using a
motor
vehicle
is
entitled
to
get
compensation from a Tribunal unless any
one of the exceptions would apply. The
2All] Ram Paita Kanaujia V. State of U.P. through S.S.P., Varanasi and others

136
Tribunal and the High Court have,
therefore gone into error in divesting the
claimants of the compensation payable to
them.

7. In this way, the claimant was
entitled to claim compensation even in the
absence of negligence on the part of
owner or driver of the vehicle.

8. Regarding compensation it was
contended that the Tribunal had doubly
allowed the compensation on same count.
I have gone through the judgement of the
Tribunal and found that compensation has
rightly been allowed on separate counts
which
are
permissible under Motor
Vehicles Act.

There is no force in the appeal and
the appeal in dismissed accordingly.

Stay order dated 27.8.1999 stands
vacated.

25,*,1$/ -85,6',&7,21
25,*,1$/ -85,6',&7,21
&5,0,1$/ 6,'(
&5,0,1$/ 6,'(
'$7(' $//$+$%$'
'$7(' $//$+$%$'
%()25(
%()25(
7+( +21·%/( 0 .$7-8 -
7+( +21·%/( 0 .$7-8 -
7+( +21·%/( 86 75,3$7+, -
7+( +21·%/( 86 75,3$7+, -

&ULPLQDO 0LVF :ULW 3HWLWLRQ 1R RI

5DP 3DLWD .DQDXMLD &RQVWDEOH 1R
«3HWLWLRQHU
9HUVXV
6WDWH
RI
83
WKURXJK
6HQLRU
6XSHULQWHQGHQW RI 3ROLFH 9DUDQDVL DQG
RWKHUV
«5HVSRQGHQWV

&RXQVHO IRU WKH 3HWLWLRQHU
6KUL 5& 8SDGK\D\
&RXQVHO IRU WKH 5HVSRQGHQWV
$*$
&RQVWLWXWLRQ RI ,QGLD $UWLFOH :ULW E\
3ROLFH
&RQVWDEOH
&KDOOHQJLQJ
WKH ),5
XQGHU VHFWLRQ ,3&),5
VKRZLQJ
SULPD
IDFLH
FDVH

3HWLWLRQ
GLVPLVVHG
+HOG 3DUD DQG
$ ODUJH QXPEHU RI SHWLWLRQV DUH FRPLQJ
XS EHIRUH WKLV &RXUW ZLWK DOOHJDWLRQV
DJDLQVW WKH 3ROLFH WKDW WKH\ DUH EHKDYLQJ
OLNH EDQGLWV WKLHYHV UDSLVW DQG SHWW\
FULPLQDOV
,Q
VLPLODU
&UO
0LVF
ZULW
3HWLWLRQ
1R

RI

0DKHVK
&KDQGUD +G &RQVWDEOH 9 6WDWH GHFLGHG
RQ

DQG
&UO
0LVF
:ULW
3HWLWLRQ 1R RI 5DPD .DQW
0LVUD 9 6WDWH GHFLGHG RQ
ZH FRQGHPQHG WKLV VDG VWDWH RI DIIDLUV
SUHYDLOLQJ LQ RXU FRXQWU\ 7KH ZD\ LQ
ZKLFK D ODUJH QXPEHU RI 3ROLFH SHUVRQQHO
DUH EHKDYLQJ UHPLQGV XV RI WKH GD\V RI
WKH
ODWHU
0XJKDOV
ZKHQ
7KXJV
DQG
3LQGDULV ZHUH ORRWLQJ WKH SXEOLF DQG
WHUURUL]LQJ
WKHP
LQ
PDQ\
ZD\V
7KH
3ROLFH
DUH
VXSSRVHG
WR
SURWHFW
WKH
SHRSOH DQG QRW WR UDSH EODFN PDLO RU ORRW
WKHP :H GR QRW PHDQ WR VD\ WKDW WKHUH
DUH QR JRRG SROLFHPDQ EXW LW VHHPV WKDW
WKH\ DUH LQ WKH PLQRULW\ 7KH PDMRULW\ RI
WKH SROLFHPHQ DUH QRW EHKDYLQJ SURSHUO\
DW DOO 7KH 'LUHFWRU *HQHUDO RI 3ROLFH
PXVW ORRN LQWR WKLV DQG SDVV DSSURSULDWH
RUGHUV WR FKHFN WKHVH NLQGV RI FULPLQDO
DFWLYLWLHV RI SROLFHPHQ :H DUH OLYLQJ LQ D
FLYLOLVHG VRFLHW\ ZKHUH WKH UXOH RI ODZ
SUHYDLOV DQG LW LV KLJK WLPH WKDW WKH
SROLFH DOVR VWDUW EHKDYLQJ LQ D FLYLOLVHG
PDQQHU
6LQFH WKH DOOHJDWLRQ LQ WKH ),5 PDNH RXW
D SULPD IDFLH FDVH ZH FDQQRW LQWHUIHUH
7KH SHWLWLRQ LV GLVPLVVHG +RZHYHU WKH
REVHUYDWLRQV LQ WKLV MXGJHPHQW ZLOO QRW
LQIOXHQFH
WKH
&RXUW
KHDULQJ
WKH
SHWLWLRQHU
V EDLO DSSOLFDWLRQ RU WUDLO

By the Court

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitione.