# NHAI v. Ram Niranjan & Ors. Opp. Parties

- **Citation:** (2021) 4 ILRA 1
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-03-18
- **Bench:** Jaspreet Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/nhai-v-ram-niranjan-ors-opp-parties-47020
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

A. Civil Law - Arbitration and Conciliation
Act,1996
-
Sections
33,
34(3),
37acquisition of land-award-determination
of limitation-the award was passed on
03.03.2017 and the application filed u/s
34 of the Act on 02.12.2017 ie. beyond the
period of three months and 30 dayshence, court have no power to condone
the delay in view of the law of the Apex
Court
in
the
case
of
Popular
Constructions-limitation would commence
from the date of receipt of the signed copy
of the award, for three purposes-(a) the
period of 30 days' for filing an application
u/s 33 for correction and interpretation of
the award, or additional award may be
filed.,(b) the arbitral proceedings would
terminate as provided by section 32(1) of
the Act; (c) the period of limitation for
filing objections to the award u/s 34 of
the
Act
commences-issue
regarding
determination of limitation decided by the
District Judge may not be in consonance
with the settled provisions.(Para 1 to 39)

The appeal is dismissed.(E-5)

List of Cases cited:-

## Text

4 All. NHAI Vs. Ram Niranjan & Ors.
1
(2021)04ILR A1
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 18.03.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J.

Arbitration Appeal No. 6 OF 2019

NHAI ...Applicant
Versus
Ram Niranjan & Ors. ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Lavkush Pratap Singh, M.V. Kini, Ms.
Samidha, Stuti Mittal

Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
Mayank Sinha, Anita Tiwari, Girish Chandra
Sinha

A. Civil Law - Arbitration and Conciliation
Act,1996
-
Sections
33,
34(3),
37acquisition of land-award-determination
of limitation-the award was passed on
03.03.2017 and the application filed u/s
34 of the Act on 02.12.2017 ie. beyond the
period of three months and 30 dayshence, court have no power to condone
the delay in view of the law of the Apex
Court
in
the
case
of
Popular
Constructions-limitation would commence
from the date of receipt of the signed copy
of the award, for three purposes-(a) the
period of 30 days' for filing an application
u/s 33 for correction and interpretation of
the award, or additional award may be
filed.,(b) the arbitral proceedings would
terminate as provided by section 32(1) of
the Act; (c) the period of limitation for
filing objections to the award u/s 34 of
the
Act
commences-issue
regarding
determination of limitation decided by the
District Judge may not be in consonance
with the settled provisions.(Para 1 to 39)

The appeal is dismissed.(E-5)

List of Cases cited:-

1. St. of Mah. & ors. Vs Ark Builders Pvt. Ltd.,
(2011) 4 SCC Page 616

2. Dakshin Haryanan Bijli vitran Nigam Ltd., Vs
M/s. Navigant Technologies Pvt. Ltd., Civil
Appeal No.791 of 2021 d

3. U.O.I .Vs M/s. Popular Construction Comp.,
(2001) 8 SCC 470

4. P. Radha Bai & ors. P. Ashok Kumar & ors.,
(2019) 13 SCC 445

(Delivered by Hon'ble Jaspreet Singh, J.)

1. The appellant, National Highway
Authority of India has preferred the instant
appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter
referred to as "the Act of 1996") against the
judgment dated 14.05.2019 passed by the
District Judge, Pratapgarh in Case M.N.R.
No.127 of 2018, whereby the application of
the appellant purportedly under Section
34(3) of the Act of 1996 seeking
condonation of delay in filing the petition
under Section 34(1) of the Act of 1996 has
been rejected.

2 . Heard Shri Prashant Chandra,
learned Senior Advocate assisted by Ms.
Samidha, learned counsel for the appellant
and Shri G.C. Sinha, learned counsel for
the respondent No.1 as well as Ms. Anita
Tiwari, learned counsel for the respondents
No.2 to 9.

A. FACTUAL MATRIX

In
order
to
appreciate
the
controversy involved in this appeal, the
facts necessary for adjudication are being
noted hereinafter.
2 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

3. A notification was issued for
acquisition of land for the purposes of widening
of National Highway 55 on the stretch of land
134.700 km. to 263.000 km., Sultanpur-Varansi
Section. The land in question, under acquisition,
fell in Village Sonpuri, Paragna & Tehsil Patti,
District Pratapgarh. The said notification was
issued under the National Highways Act, 1956
(for short, "the Act of 1956").

4. A further notification under Section 3A(1) was issued on 07.09.2012, which was
followed by publication of notice in the daily
newspaper. The subsequent notification under
Section 3-D(1) was issued on 29.07.2013 and
thereafter considering the objections received
from the land-owners/persons interested, the
Competent Authority passed an award dated
18.09.2015 under Section 3(G) of the Act of
1956 by which compensation was determined
for the land acquired for widening of National
Highway 56 in Sultanpur-Varansi Section.

5 . The respondents herein, who were the
land-owners had filed their objections against
the award made by the Competent Authority,
the same was registered as Case No.1 (Ram
Niranjan and others vs. Union of India) and the
same was decided by the Arbitrator by means
of its award dated 03.03.2017.

6. The appellant, who was the respondent
before the Arbitrator on 28.04.2017 made an
application before the Arbitrator purportedly
under Section 33 of the Act of 1996 on the
premise that the award dated 03.03.2017 was
ex-parte, hence, requested a fresh award be
passed after considering the case as well as
submissions of the appellant herein.

7. On the aforesaid application moved
by the appellant, the Arbitrator issued
notices to the land-owners, who filed their
objections on 25.05.2017. The appellant
submitted its reply thereof on 09.06.2017
and after hearing the parties, the Arbitrator
by means of his order dated 28.07.2017
rejected the application filed by the
appellant and the award dated 03.03.2017
was maintained.

8. The appellant being aggrieved against
the award dated 03.03.2017 and the order dated
28.07.2017, sought permission from its
Department to assail the award and finding that
it did not have a signed copy of the order dated
28.07.2017, it made an application to the
Arbitrator, who provided a signed copy of the
order dated 28.07.2017 on 28.11.2017 and soon
thereafter on 02.12.2017, the petition under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 along with an
application under Section 34(3) of the Act of
1996 was preferred before the District Judge,
Pratapgarh which was registered as M.N.R.
No.127 of 2018.

9. The land-owners filed their objections
which was considered by the District Judge,
Pratapgarh and by means of the impugned
order dated 14.05.2019 the said application
under Section 34(3) of the Act of 1996 was
rejected. Consequently, the petition under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 also stood
dismissed.

10. The District Judge, Pratapgarh
considered the documents which were filed
by the parties and came to the conclusion that
since the appellant had acknowledged the
receipt of the award dated 03.03.2017 and
28.07.2017 in its letter dated 18.10.2017
marked as Paper No.11-C/3. Thus, it held that
in any case the award was available with the
appellant at any point prior to 18.10.2017 and
as Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not
applicable, consequently, it held the petition
to be time barred.

B.
Submissions
of
learned
counsel for the parties:-
4 All. NHAI Vs. Ram Niranjan & Ors.
3

11. Learned Senior counsel for the
appellant while attacking the order dated
14.05.2019 submits that the District Judge,
Pratapgarh has completely misdirected
itself on the issue of consideration of
condonation of delay. It is urged that from
the perusal of the impugned order, it would
indicate that the court below has been
influenced with the fact that the appellant
had implied knowledge of the impugned
award. However, it has failed to take note
of the fact that insofar as the limitation for
filing a petition under Section 34 of the Act
of 1996 is concerned, the same is to be
reckoned by referring to the provisions of
Section 31 read with Section 34(3) of the
Act of 1996 as that would determine the
date from which the period of limitation
commences.

11.1 It is further urged that
having knowledge of the award is wholly
immaterial rather it is the date on which a
signed copy of the award is received by a
party which is material and this aspect of
the matter has been completely ignored.

11.2 It is further urged that it was
specifically pleaded that the appellant had
not received the signed copy of the award
from the Arbitrator. It is only when the said
award was made available on 28.11.2017
that the appellant soon thereafter preferred
a petition on 02.12.2017 which as per the
law would be within limitation and this
aspect has not been considered by the
District Judge.

11.3 Even otherwise if at all there
was a delay, the same ought to have been
condoned whereas the learned District Judge,
Pratapgarh ignoring the aforesaid aspect of
the
matter
and
relying
upon
certain
documents which could only indicate that the
appellant had the knowledge of the award
has based its reasons on the said letter by
recording a finding that the appellant had
implied knowledge and had acknowledged
the receipt of the award dated 03.03.2017 and
28.07.2017 in its letter dated 18.10.2017.

11.4 Elaborating his submission,
learned Senior Counsel further submitted that
until and unless a signed copy of the award is
not received by a party, the limitation to
assail the award cannot commence. It then
urged that the legal requirement of signing
the arbitral award and delivering a copy to the
parties is not an empty formality. Section
31(5) of the Act of 1996 enjoins upon the
arbitrator to provide a signed copy of the
arbitral award to the parties and this is of
prime importance since from the date of
receipt of the signed copy of the award the
period
of
limitation
for
filing
objections/petition under Section 34 of the
Act of 1996 would commence.

11.5 It is further urged that in the
instant case since the signed copy of the
award dated 28.07.2017 was not provided to
the appellant nor a signed copy of the award
dated 03.03.2017 was provided hence it is
when the appellant made an application to the
arbitrator for providing a signed copy which
was made available only on 28.11.2017, did
the appellant prefer the petition under Section
34(1) of the Act of 1996 which otherwise was
within time but in order to avoid any
controversy as a matter of caution an
application under Section 34(3) of the Act of
1996 was moved and in the circumstances as
pleaded in the said application the delay
ought to have been condoned.

11.6 Learned Senior Counsel has
relied upon the decisions of the Apex Court
in the case of (i) State of Maharashtra and
4 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Ors. vs. Ark Builders Pvt. Ltd., (2011) 4
SCC Page 616, and

(ii)
Dakshin
Haryana
Bijli
Vitran Nigam Ltd., vs. M/s. Navigant
Technologies Pvt. Ltd., passed in Civil
Appeal No.791 of 2021 decided on
02.03.2021.

12. Per contra, Shri G.C. Sinha, learned
counsel for the respondent No.1 has
submitted that the facts as pleaded would
indicate that the arbitrator had passed an
award
on
03.03.2017.
Thereafter,
the
appellant had moved an application under
Section 33 of the Act of 1996 which came to
be decided on 28.07.2017 as a consequence
the award dated 03.03.2017 was affirmed.

12.1 It is further urged by Shri
Sinha that for the purpose of reckoning the
period of limitation and the date of its
commencement there is a difference, where
an award is assailed straightaway under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 and in a case
where an award is subjected to the provisions
under Section 33 of the Act of 1996.

12.2 Insofar as an award which is
subjected an application under Section 33 of
the Act of 1996 is concerned, a different
limitation is provided and in view thereof the
petition filed by the appellant was apparently
time barred as the provisions of Section 5 of
the Limitation Act is not applicable. In view
of Section 34(3) of the Act of 1996 once the
time prescribed therein stood elapsed, the
Court did not have powers to condone the
delay and rightly the District Judge,
Pratapgarh rejected the application.

12.3 It has also been submitted
by Shri Sinha that in the pleadings
delivered before this Court it has nowhere
been pleaded that the appellant did not
receive a signed copy of the award dated
03.03.2017. The entire emphasis in this
appeal is that the appellant did not receive
the signed copy of the award dated
28.07.2017.

12.4 It has also been urged that
in the given fact situation of the present
case, it would indicate that there is no
award dated 28.07.2017 rather the award is
dated 03.03.2017 and it is the order of the
rejection of the application under Section
33 of the Act of 1996 which is dated
28.07.2017.

12.5 It is also urged by Shri
Sinha that what the learned Senior Counsel
has urged that the limitation commences
from the date a signed copy of the award is
delivered to a party is in respect of those
matters where an award is straightaway
assailed under Section 34 of the Act of
1996 without preferring an application
under Section 33 of the Act of 1996.

12.6 However, in the present
case, since, the appellant moved an
application under Section 33 of the Act of
1996 then the limitation would commence
from the date of disposal of the application
under Section 33 by the Tribunal and not
from the date a signed copy of the award is
received by the appellant as would be
evident from Section 34(3) of the Act of
1996.

12.7

In
the
present
case
admittedly the said request was disposed of
on 28.07.2017, thus, that would be the
point of time which will be taken to be the
point of commencement of limitation and
admittedly three months and 30 days
expired in the month of November, 2017
and the petition was filed on 02.12.2017,
which apparently was time barred.
4 All. NHAI Vs. Ram Niranjan & Ors.
5

12.8 Once the Legislature has
intentionally not conferred upon the Court,
the power to condone the delay beyond a
particular period and Section 5 of the
Limitation Act not being applicable in such
circumstances
the
dismissal
of
the
application seeking condonation of delay
and consequent rejection of the petition
under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is
absolutely appropriate and proper which
requires no interference from this Court.

13. Ms. Anita Tiwari learned counsel
for the respondents No.2 to 9 has also
adopted the submissions of Shri G.C.
Shina.

C.
DISCUSSION
&
ANALAYSIS

14. The Court has considered the rival
submissions and also perused the record.
However, in order to appreciate the
submission of the learned counsel for the
respective parties, the provisions of the Act
of 1996 as applicable to the present
controversy needs to be noticed.

"31. Form and contents of
arbitral award.--(1) An arbitral award
shall be made in writing and shall be
signed by the members of the arbitral
tribunal.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), in arbitral proceedings with
more than one arbitrator, the signatures of
the majority of all the members of the
arbitral tribunal shall be sufficient so long
as the reason for any omitted signature is
stated.

(3) The arbitral award shall state
the reasons upon which it is based,
unless-

(a) the parties have agreed that
no reasons are to be given; or

(b) the award is an arbitral
award on agreed terms under Section 30.

(4) The arbitral award shall state
its date and the place of arbitration as
determined in accordance with Section 20
and the award shall be deemed to have
been made at that place.

(5) After the arbitral award is
made, a signed copy shall be delivered to
each party.

(6) The arbitral tribunal may, at
any time during the arbitral proceedings,
make an interim arbitral award on any
matter with respect to which it may make a
final arbitral award.

(7)(a) Unless otherwise agreed by
the parties, where and in so far as an
arbitral award is for the payment of money,
the arbitral tribunal may include in the sum
for which the award is made interest, at
such rate as it deems reasonable, on the
whole or any part of the money, for the
whole or any part of the period between the
date on which the cause of action arose
and the date on which the award is made.

[(b) A sum directed to be paid by
an arbitral award shall, unless the award
otherwise directs, carry interest at the rate
of two per cent higher than the current rate
of interest prevalent on the date of award,
from the date of award to the date of
payment.

Explanation.--The
expression
"current rate of interest" shall have the
same meaning as assigned to it under
6 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
clause (b) of Section 2 of the Interest Act,
1978 (14 of 1978).]

[(8) The costs of an arbitration
shall be fixed by the arbitral tribunal in
accordance with Section 31-A.]"

***** ***** *****

"33.
Correction
and
interpretation
of
award;
additional
award.--(1) Within thirty days from the
receipt of the arbitral award, unless
another period of time has been agreed
upon by the parties-

(a) a party, with notice to the other party,
may request the arbitral tribunal to correct
any computation errors, any clerical or
typographical errors or any other errors of
a similar nature occurring in the award;

(b) if so agreed by the parties, a
party, with notice to the other party, may
request the arbitral tribunal to give an
interpretation of a specific point or part of
the award.

(2)
If
the
arbitral
tribunal
considers the request made under subsection (1) to be justified, it shall make the
correction or give the interpretation within
thirty days from the receipt of the request
and the interpretation shall form part of the
arbitral award.

(3) The arbitral tribunal may
correct any error of the type referred to in
clause (a) of sub-section (1), on its own
initiative, within thirty days from the date
of the arbitral award.

(4) Unless otherwise agreed by
the parties, a party with notice to the other
party, may request, within thirty days from
the receipt of the arbitral award, the
arbitral tribunal to make an additional
arbitral award as to claims presented in the
arbitral proceedings but omitted from the
arbitral award.

(5)
If
the
arbitral
tribunal
considers the request made under subsection (4) to be justified, it shall make the
additional arbitral award within sixty days
from the receipt of such request.

(6) The arbitral tribunal may
extend, if necessary, the period of time
within which it shall make a correction,
give
an
interpretation
or
make
an
additional arbitral award under subsection (2) or sub-section (5).

(7) Section 31 shall apply to a
correction or interpretation of the arbitral
award or to an additional arbitral award
made under this section."

***** ***** *****

"34. Application for setting aside
arbitral award.-(1) *****

(2) *****

(3) An application for setting
aside may not be made after three months
have elapsed from the date on which the
party making that application had received
the arbitral award or, if a request had been
made under Section 33, from the date on
which that request had been disposed of by
the arbitral tribunal:

Provided that if the Court is
satisfied that the applicant was prevented
by sufficient cause from making the
4 All. NHAI Vs. Ram Niranjan & Ors.
7
application within the said period of three
months it may entertain the application
within a further period of thirty days, but
not thereafter."

15. It will also be relevant to notice
the dictum of the Apex Court in the case of
Ark Builders Pvt. Ltd., (supra) and
Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd.
(supra) as cited by the learned Senior
Advocate for the appellant.

16. In the case of Ark Builders Pvt.
Ltd., (supra) the Apex Court noticing the
provisions of Section 34(3) as well as
Section 31(5) of the Act of 1996 held that
the limitation prescribed under Section
34(3) would commence only from the date
a signed copy of the award is delivered to
the party making the application for setting
aside the award.

17 . In the case of Dakshin Haryana
Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. (supra) the Apex
Court again had the opportunity to consider
the issue regarding limitation and noticing
the earlier decision including that of Ark
Builders Pvt. Ltd., (supra) it opined that
there is only one date recognized by the
law i.e. the date on which a signed copy of
the final award is received by the parties
from which the period of limitation for
filing petition would commence.

18. It further held that the date on
which the signed copy is provided to the
parties is the crucial date in arbitration
proceedings under the Act of 1996. It is
from this date that the period of 30 days
commences for filing an application under
Section 33 for correction and interpretation
of the award or additional award. From the
said date the arbitral proceedings would
stand terminated as provided under Section
32(1) of the Act of 1996. The said date
would also be the date of commencement
of the period of limitation for filing a
petition to set aside the award under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996.

19. Learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant
relying
upon
the
aforesaid
decisions has emphasized that since the
period of limitation commences only when
a signed copy of the award is made
available
which
as
pleaded
by
the
appellant, the signed copy of the award
dated 28.07.2017 was made available only
on 28.11.2017, hence, the petition filed by
the appellant on 02.12.2017 was within
time and in any case was within the period
as provided under Section 34(3) of the Act
of 1996. Thus, the impugned order is bad.

20. Apparently, the submission of the
learned
Senior
Counsel
may
sound
attractive on the first blush, however, upon
deeper
consideration,
the
same
is
fallacious.

21. In the instant case what this Court
finds is, that upon perusal of the material in
the entire pleadings, there is no statement
made by the appellant that it did not receive
a signed copy of the award dated
03.03.2017. The entire thrust of the
submission of the learned Senior Counsel
for the appellant is that it did not receive a
signed copy of the award dated 28.07.2017,
which although is an order by which the
application under Section 33 of the Act of
1996 filed by the appellant was rejected.

22. For the purposes of setting aside
an award, the law provides for the
limitation in Section 34(3) of the Act of
1996 which has been noted hereinabove
first. Even Section 33 of the Act of 1996
8 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
provides certain time lines as mentioned in
the Section itself which has also been noted
hereinabove first.

23. From the conjoint reading of the
aforesaid sections namely Sections 31, 33 and
34(3) of the Act of 1996, it would indicate
that the form and contents of an arbitral
award is provided under Section 31 of the
Act of 1996. Section 31(5) of the Act of 1996
enjoins the responsibility on the arbitrator to
deliver the signed copy of the award to each
of the parties.

24. Section 33 of the Act of 1996 which
relates to correction, interpretation or for
passing of an additional award provides for a
limitation of 30 days from the date of receipt
of arbitral award or making the said
application unless a contrary time period has
been agreed by the parties. The said section
also provides that the Arbitrator after hearing
the parties shall correct the clerical or
typographical error in the award within 30
days from the date of receipt of such request
as provided under Section 33(2) of the Act of
1996.

25. Where the arbitral tribunal corrects
an error which has been referred to in Clause
(9) of sub-section (1) of Section 33, it can do
so on its own initative within 30 days from
the date of arbitral award, however, where a
request has been made for an additional
award, in terms of sub-section (4) of Section
33, the same can be done within 60 days from
the date of receipt of such request as provided
in sub-section (5) of Section 33 of the Act of
1996.

26. The arbitral tribunal also has
powers to extend the said time lines as
provided under sub-section (2) and (5) of
Section 33 as shall be evident from subsection (6).

27. Section 34(3) specifically states
that an application for setting aside may not
be made after three months have lapsed
from the date of which the party making an
application had received the arbitral award
or, if a request has been made under
Section 33 of the Act of 1996, from the
date of which the request has been disposed
of by the arbitral tribunal.

28. It is relevant to notice the
language used by the Legislature while
engrafting sub-section (3) of Section 34 of
the Act of 1996. The aforesaid sub-section
provides for two sitautions; (i) where an
award has been passed and is challenged
straightaway in terms of Section 34(1) then
the same can be done within three months
from the date on which the party making an
application for setting aside the award has
received the arbitral award. (referred by
this Court as first situation)

29. The other situation relates to a
challenge under Section 34(1) of the Act of
1996 where a party first makes a request in
terms of Section 33 of the Act of 1996 and
thereafter challenges the award then in such
a case the limitation for assailing an award
commences from the date when such
request under Section 33 of the Act of 1996
has been disposed of by the arbitral
tribunal. (referred by this Court as second
situation)

30. Noticing this contrast in the
language
of
the
section
and
upon
meaningful reading of the decision of the
Apex Court in the case of Dakshin
Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. (supra)
as referred above, it would reveal that in
such cases covered by the first situation,
where the date on which the signed copy of
the award is received by a party assumes
significance. Since, no party can challenge
4 All. NHAI Vs. Ram Niranjan & Ors.
9
an award unless it receives a signed copy,
consequently, it becomes a crucial date.

31. It will also be relevant to notice
that a proviso has been appended to Section
34(3) of the Act of 1996 which confers the
Court with powers to condone the delay of
30 days beyond 3 months from the date of
receipt of the arbitral award and not
thereafter. Thus, it can be seen that in any
case the power to condone the delay as
conferred upon the Court in terms of
Section 34(3) of the Act of 1996 is limited
and provisions of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act does not apply. This has
also been settled by the Apex Court in the
case of Union of India vs. M/s. Popular
Construction Company, (2001) 8 SCC
470.

32. Thus, applying the aforesaid
provisions and the principles as extracted
above, it would indicate that in the present
case, the limitation would be governed by
(the second situation) of Section 34(3).
Admittedly,
after
the
award
dated
03.03.2017 was passed, the appellant had
moved an application under Section 33 of
the Act of 1996 before the Arbitrator.
Admittedly, the said application was duly
contested and after hearing the appellant it
came to be decided on 28.07.2017. Thus,
once the award sought to be challenged had
been put through the request under Section
33 of the Act of 1996 then the limitation as
provided in the (second situation) of
Section 34(3) will apply and the limitation
will commence from the date of disposal of
the application under Section 33 of the Act
of 1996.

33. Once the appellant had made a
request under Section 33 of the Act of 1996
for seeking correction / interpretation in the
award dated 03.03.2017 and the said
application
came
to
be decided
on
28.07.2017, thereafter the appellant cannot
revert back to seek the benefit of limitation
as prescribed in respect of such an award
which
is
sought
to
be
challenged
straightaway without making a request in
terms of Section 33 of the Act of 1996. The
appellant cannot be permitted to take a
vacillating stand in law.

34. This Court is fortified in its view
in light of the decision of the Apex Court in
the case of P. Radha Bai & Ors. vs. P.
Ashok Kumar & Ors., (2019) 13 SCC 445
and the relevant portion reads as under:-

"32.
Section
34(3)
deserves
careful scrutiny and its characteristics must
be highlighted:

32.1. Section 34 is the only
remedy for challenging an award passed
under Part I of the Arbitration Act. Section
34(3) is a limitation provision, which is
inbuilt into the remedy provision. One does
not have to look at the Limitation Act or
any other provision for identifying the
limitation period for challenging an award
passed under Part I of the Arbitration Act.

32.2.
The
time-limit
for
commencement of limitation period is also
provided in Section 34(3) i.e. the time from
which a party making an application "had
received the arbitral award" or disposal of
a request under Section 33 for corrections
and interpretation of the award.

32.3. Section 34(3) prohibits the
filing of an application for setting aside of
an award after three months have elapsed
from the date of receipt of award or
disposal of a request under Section 33.
10 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Section
34(3)
uses
the
phrase
"an
application for setting aside may not be
made after three months have elapsed".
The phrase "may not be made" is from the
UncitralModel Law ["An application for
setting aside may not be made after three
months have elapsed from the date on
which the party making that application
had received the award or, if a request had
been made under Article 33, from the date
on which that request had been disposed of
by the Arbitral Tribunal".] and has been
understood to mean "cannot be made". The
High Court of Singapore in ABC Co. Ltd. v.
XYZ Co. Ltd. [ABC Co. Ltd. v. XYZ Co.
Ltd., 2003 SGHC 107] held:

"The
starting
point
of
this
discussion must be the model law itself. On
the aspect of time, Article 34(3) is brief. All
it says is that the application may not be
made after the lapse of three months from a
specified date. Although the words used are
''may not', these must be interpreted as
''cannot' as it is clear that the intention is to
limit the time during which an award may
be challenged. This interpretation is
supported by material relating to the
discussions amongst the drafters of the
Model Law. It appears to me that the court
would not be able to entertain any
application lodged after the expiry of the
three months' period as Article 34 has been
drafted as the all-encompassing, and only,
basis for challenging an award in court. It
does not provide for any extension of the
time period and, as the court derives its
jurisdiction to hear the application from
the Article alone, the absence of such a
provision means the court has not been
conferred with the power to extend time."
 (emphasis supplied)

32.4. The limitation provision in
Section
34(3)
also
provides
for
condonation of delay. Unlike Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, the delay can only be
condoned for 30 days on showing sufficient
cause. The crucial phrase "but not
thereafter" reveals the legislative intent to
fix
an
outer
boundary
period
for
challenging an award.

32.5. Once the time-limit or
extended time-limit for challenging the
arbitral award expires, the period for
enforcing the award under Section 36 of
the Arbitration Act commences. This is
evident from the phrase "where the time for
making an application to set aside the
arbitral award under Section 34 has
expired".["36. Enforcement.--Where the
time for making an application to set aside
the arbitral award under Section 34 has
expired, or such application having been
made, it has been refused, the award shall
be enforced under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in the same
manner as if it were a decree of the
Court."(emphasis supplied)] There is an
integral
nexus
between
the
period
prescribed
under
Section
34(3)
to
challenge
the
award
and
the
commencement of the enforcement period
under Section 36 to execute the award."

35. The Apex Court in the case of
Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd.
(supra) has categorically held as under:-

"(xvi) There is only one date
recognised by law i.e. the date on which
a signed copy of the final award is
received by the parties, from which the
period of limitation for filing objections
would start ticking. There can be no
finality in the award, except after it is
signed, because signing of the award
gives legal effect and finality to the
award.
4 All. NHAI Vs. Ram Niranjan & Ors.
11

(xvii) The date on which the
signed award is provided to the parties is
a crucial date in arbitration proceedings
under
the
Indian
Arbitration
and
Conciliation Act, 1996. It is from this
date that : (a) the period of 30 days' for
filing an application under Section 33 for
correction and interpretation of the
award, or additional award may be filed;
(b)
the
arbitral
proceedings
would
terminate as provided by Section 32(1) of
the Act; (c) the period of limitation for
filing objections to the award under
Section 34 commences."

36. Thus, what can be discerned
from the decision of the Apex Court is
that the limitation would commence from
the date of receipt of the signed copy of
the
award,
for
three
purposes
as
mentioned in the paragraph extracted
above.

37. Admittedly, in the present case,
the award was passed on 03.03.2017 and
the application under Section 33 was
preferred
on
28.04.2017.
This
categorically changes the complexion of
the submissions of the learned Senior
Counsel for the appellant inasmuch as the
award is now governed by the part of
Section 34(3) providing commencement
of the limitation from the date of the
disposal of the request under Section 33
of the Act of 1996.

38. The application as noticed
above was decided on 28.07.2017,
hence, the limitation would commence
from the said date and the period of
three
months
would
expire
on
28.10.2017 and had the application
under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 been
filed beyond the aforesaid period but
within 30 days thereafter, the said
delay could be condoned by the Court
concerned. However, admittedly, the
application
came
to
be
filed
on
02.12.2017 i.e. beyond the period of
three months and 30 days as prescribed,
hence, the Court did not have the power
to condone the delay in view of the law
of the Apex Court in the case of Popular
Constructions (supra).

CONCLUSION

39. From the aforesaid discussions
as well as considering the relevant legal
provisions and the law laid down by the
Apex Court, if the impugned order
passed by the District Judge, Pratapgarh
is seen, it is true that the manner in
which the issue regarding determination
of limitation has been noticed and
decided
by
the
District
Judge,
Pratapgarh may not be in consonance
with the settled provisions. However,
this Court in exercise of appellate
powers after delving into the matter and
having taken a re-look on the issue of
limitation, in view of the discussion
aforesaid comes to the finding and
conclusion that the petition filed by the
appellant under Section 34 of the Act of
1996 is beyond three months and 30
days and consequently the delay could
not have been condoned and for the said
reason,
this
Court
refrains
from
interfering in the order dated 14.05.2019
passed by the District Judge, Pratapgarh
in M.N.R. No.127 of 2018.

40. For the reasons recorded, the
appeal
fails
and
is
accordingly
dismissed. However, in the facts and
circumstance, there shall be no order as
to costs.
12 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
----------
(2021)04ILR A12
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 19.03.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DINESH PATHAK, J.

Criminal Revision No. 744 of 2021

Smt. Aarti ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri A.K. Mishra, Sri Sati Shanker Tripathi

Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
A.G.A., Sri Sandeep Kumar

Criminal
Law
-
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure, 1973- Sections 204 & 319 -
Applicant is sister in law of the
deceased-was not arraigned in the
charge sheet-but was summoned u/s
319Standard of sufficiency of evidence
in summoning of an additional accused
u/s319 Cr.P.C.-on much higher footing
than summoning u/s 204 Cr.P.C.-but
not
of
the
same
level
of
final
adjudication -summoning order not
illegal.

Revision dismissed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-

1. Brijendra Singh & ors.Vs St. of Raj., reported
in 2017(7) SCC 706

2. Sartaj Singh Vs St .of Har. & Another etc.

3. Hardeep Singh Vs St. of Punj. & ors., 2014
(3) SCC 92

4.Hardeep Singh Vs St. of Punj. & ors., (2014) 3
SCC 92

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dinesh Pathak, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
revisionist, learned A.G.A. for the State
and Sri Sandeep Kumar, learned counsel
for the opposite party no. 2.

2. The instant revision has been
preferred to set-aside the impugned order
dated 18.02.2021 passed by the Addl.
Sessions Judge/FTC-1, Mathura in Sessions
Trial No. 127 of 2019 (State Versus
Sanjaydeep and Others) arising out of Case
Crime No. 1587 of 2018 under Section
498A,
304B
I.P.C.,
Police
Station
Highway, District - Mathura whereby the
application filed by the opposite party no. 2
under Section 319 Cr.P.C. has been
allowed.

3. Factual matrix of the case are that
with respect to dowry death of the daughter
of the first informant, first information
report has been lodged wherein husband,
father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-inlaw (Jeth) and sister-in-law (Jethani) were
roped in for committing crime of cruelty
and harassment with the victim for demand
of dowry. It is averred in the first
information report that marriage of the
daughter of the first informant was
solemnized with Sanjaydeep on 30.11.2016
in which about Rs.50 Lakhs were expended
but subsequently, the victim was harassed
for additional dowry amounting to Rs.20
Lakhs. It is further averred that although
with respect to harassment and cruelty for
demand of dowry earlier one incident took
place, the same was amicably settled after
intervention of the elders in the family.
Thereafter, the daughter of the first
informant went to her matrimonial home
along with her in-laws on 18.10.2018. He
got information that his daughter had been
admitted in Nayati Hospital, Mathura
where she, subsequently, succumbed to
injuries on 19.10.2018.