# Niraj Kumar Singh v. Anand Kumar Mishra & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 3 ILRA 247
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-03-19
- **Case number:** Special Appeal Defective No. 554 of 2024
- **Bench:** Arun Bhansali, C.J. Jaspreet Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/niraj-kumar-singh-v-anand-kumar-mishra-ors-54328
- **Pages:** 15

## Text

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3 All. Niraj Kumar Singh Vs. Anand Kumar Mishra & Ors.
247

(i) It is first declared that the original petitioners/appellants shall be entitled to continue as
Officiating Principal of their respective Intermediate Colleges, till any regularly appointed
candidate is made available, to such institutions.

(ii) For the duration of their continuance as Officiating Principal, the original
petitioners/appellants shall be entitled to payment of higher salary of Principal, without any other or
further relief.

(iii) For the purpose of computation of period for which the higher payment of salary has
to be made, the original petitioners/appellants would be entitled to receive such higher salary from
the expiry of three months from the date of their signature being attested, as ad-hoc Principal. That
amount may be computed and paid out to the original petitioners/appellants, within a period of
three months from today.

49. The Special Appeals are allowed. No order as to cost.
----------
(2026) 3 ILRA 247
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 19.03.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ARUN BHANSALI, C.J.
THE HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J.

Special Appeal Defective No. 554 of 2024

Niraj Kumar Singh ...Appellant
Versus
Anand Kumar Mishra & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue(s) for consideration
Whether an order, which is passed between two contesting parties relating to an appointment in service,
between employer and its employee, can it be challenged by a third party in appeal.

Headnotes
A. Service/Procedural Law - The writ issued by the High Courts are purely discretionary and are
issued in favour of such a person whose fundamental or legal rights are violated at the behest of
the State. In this background, it cannot be disputed that KGMU falls within the meaning of the
word 'State' as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution of India. (Para 32)

B. A dispute between the employer and the employee is per-se a private dispute between the
two. The word 'private' has been used here in context with 'personam' and in contradistinction
to a litigation which may affect the rights of several persons or class of persons and in such cases
any such person or from such class of person, can come forward to contest as a litigation. (Para 33)

Any decision of an employer which violates the right of any particular employee or employees can be assailed
by such aggrieved employee or employees and not by any other employee or a third party altogether, who is
not affected by such a decision. (Para 34, 36)
248 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
In absence of any real injury, the appellant cannot be treated to be an aggrieved person. The
appellant was also not a party in the writ petition from which the impugned order arises. He may have been a
complainant upon whose complaint, the proceedings may have been triggered, however, such a complainant
can only be treated as an informant. Once the authorities have taken cognizance thereon and proceeded, his
right to participate in proceedings between the employer and the employee cannot be stretched to an extent
as to confer right on such a complainant to file an appeal which is confined only to a person aggrieved. (Para
53)

C. The concept of 'locus standi' in writ petitions is construed strictly so that the high prerogative
writs are not misused at the behest of intermeddlers. However, it is equally true that the concept of
'locus standi' is diluted where it come to a public interest litigation and that too for a laudable cause and
purpose relating to such sections of the society or underprivileged class who may not be denied or be
deprived of access to justice. Such cause can be brought to the notice of the Court by a public spirited person,
who himself may not be affected per-se with the cause he seeks to espouse. (Para 35)

D. It is not any mere order which by some chance has the potential to affect some right of a
person in future, which will get him a right to inter-meddle. The legal injury complained of must
be real and it must have some nexus and proximity in time with the issue at hand. It is no doubt
true that in service jurisprudence, certain orders passed, may be capable of impacting the seniority or
promotion of an entire cadre and such orders may confer rights on the affected employees to assail it.
However, the said concept cannot be stretched to such an extent that it may permit any or all employees to
challenge any order even though it may have been passed against any one or more specific employees, who
alone are directly impacted by such an order. It is for this very reason that the proximity of injury or
impact of the order is to be seen while considering the issue of 'locus standi' and to adjudge who
can be an 'aggrieved person'. (Para 49)

As per Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, the word 'locus standi' and 'aggrieved person' have been defined
as under:-
'Locus standi' :- "The right to bring an action or to be heard in a given forum", and
'aggrieved person':- "Having legal rights that are adversely affected; having been harmed by an
infringement of legal rights. " (Para 31)

In the instant case, even though the appellant and the writ petitioner/respondent are in service of the same
employer and primarily on the same post, but neither there is an issue between the two which may impact
the seniority or the chances of promotion of each other on account of dismissal order passed against the writ
petitioner which has been set aside by the learned Single Judge. (Para 50)

The difference in the seniority between the appellant and the writ petitioner/respondent is vast... so even if
the employment of the writ-petitioner/respondent is held to be bad, yet it may not impact the seniority or any
chance of promotion of the appellant due to the aforesaid vast difference. (Para 51)

Thus, the appellant could not successfully demonstrate any real injury or adverse impact, directly or indirectly
both in terms of proximity in time and the injury, which may have been caused to the appellant from the
order passed by the learned Single Judge. (Para 52)

Unless a person is impacted by direct adverse consequences which may either arise out of
promotion or seniority or matters of like nature which may impact an employee or class of
employees, till then, it may not allow any leverage to a particular employee or third party to
assail an order passed affecting the another employee relating to his appointment and dismissal,
which is per-se a matter purely between the employee and his employer. (Para 54)

The present appellant cannot be treated as an aggrieved person to assail the order passed by the learned
Single Judge, whereby the dismissal order passed against the writ-petitioner/respondent has been set aside.
3 All. Niraj Kumar Singh Vs. Anand Kumar Mishra & Ors.
249
However, it is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion regarding the validity of the
appointment of the writ-petitioner/respondent. This Court has confined its discussions only to ascertain the
locus of the appellant seeking leave to appeal. (Para 55)

Special appeal dismissed. (E-4)

Case Law Cited
1. Chandra Gupta Vs. Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forest and others, (1995)
1 SCC 23 (Para 15)
2. H. Anjanappa and others Vs. A. Prabhakar and others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 183 (Para 15)
3. Kesari Devi Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2005 SCC OnLine All 2371 (Para 15)
4. Vijay Prakash Dixit Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2022 SCC OnLine All 1169 (Para 15)
5. Prem Singh and Others Vs. Haryana State Electricity Board and others, (1996) 4 SCC 319 (Para 25)
6. Hav Rohmingliana and others Vs. State of Mizoram and others, 2005 SCC OnLine Gau 194 (Para 25)
7. Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar, (1976) 1 SCC 671 (Para 38)
8. Hari Bansh Lal Vs. Sahodar Prasad Mahto and others, (2010) 9 SCC 655 (Para 39)
9. Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, (2013) 4 SCC 465 (Para 40)
10. Kamli Ram Meena Vs. Ajmer Vidhut Vitaran Nigam Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine Raj 2322 (Para 45)
11. Rajasthan Public Service Commission Vs. Yati Jain, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 80 (Para 46)

List of Keywords
 appointment, locus standi, aggrieved person, seniority, injury, personal, proximity, employer, employee.

Appearances for Parties
For Appellant(s): Hari Prasad Gupta, Bhanu Pratap Singh, Durgesh Kumar Verma, Sandeep Kumar Ojha
For Respondent(s): Srideep Chatterjee, Amarjeet Singh Rakhra, C.S.C., Shubham Tripathi

(Delivered by Hon'ble Jaspreet Singh, J.)

I.A. No.1 of 2024

1. The instant special appeal has been filed by Niraj Kumar Singh alongwith an application
seeking leave of the Court to appeal and it is also accompanied by another application bearing I.A.
No.1 of 2024 seeking condonation of delay as the office has reported the appeal to be barred by
limitation by 63 days.

2. Shri Jaideep Narain Mathur, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Srideep Chatterjee,
learned counsel for the writ petitioner/respondent has raised a preliminary objection regarding
maintainability of the instant appeal at the behest of the appellant Niraj Kumar Singh. This
objection shall be considered a little later.

3. However, first it will be appropriate to consider the application seeking condonation of
delay. The said application is accompanied by an affidavit, where in Paragraphs 11 to 18, the
explanation for seeking condonation of delay has been furnished.

4. Explaining the delay, it was urged that once the order was passed by the learned Single
Judge allowing the writ petition then it should have been the employer Institution i.e. King
George's Medical University, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to 'KGMU', for short), who should
have assailed the said order by filing an appeal. However, once the KGMU did not take any
250 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
proactive step for filing the special appeal during the prescribed period of limitation, it is thereafter
the appellant Niraj Kumar Singh prepared and got the instant appeal filed. In the aforesaid
circumstances, the delay, as reported, was unintentional and bonafide. Hence, the delay in filing the
appeal deserves to be condoned.

5. The aforesaid submissions have been controverted by the learned Senior Counsel for the
writ petitioner/respondent and also the learned counsel for the KGMU stating that no proper
explanation has been given to seek the condonation of delay especially when the appellant Niraj
Kumar Singh does not have the locus standi to file the special appeal.

6. This Court has considered the submissions of the respective parties and finds that the crux
of the submission of Shri Mathur, learned Senior Counsel for the writ-petitioner/respondent was
primarily focused on the issue of locus standi of the appellant and the issue of delay is intricately
connected and made dependent on the issue of locus standi.

7. This Court finds that the two issues are separate, hence, the issue of locus standi will be
considered separately while dealing with the application seeking leave to appeal.

8. Insofar as the application for condonation of delay is concerned and looking into the
explanation furnished for the delay, this Court is of the view that the delay has been sufficiently
explained. Hence, the application seeking condonation of delay is allowed and the delay in filing
the appeal shall stand condoned. Office shall allot a regular number to the special appeal.

Order on Application seeking leave to appeal by the third party/appellant dated
15.10.2024.

9. Shri Mathur, learned Senior Counsel for the writ petitioner/respondent has raised an
objection regarding maintainability and locus standi of the appellant/third party, namely, Niraj
Kumar Singh to maintain this special appeal.

10. It was urged that the appellant is a complete stranger to the proceedings and he has no
right to assail the judgment passed in favour of the writ-petitioner/respondent as he does not fall
within the category of an 'aggrieved person'.

11. Learned Senior Counsel further urged that unless there is any legal injury, the appellant
cannot be permitted to assail an order, which is per-se between the writ petitioner and his employer
i.e. KGMU. It was also submitted that the nature of dispute is such, which is primarily between the
employer and the employee and in this context, the appellant, who is also an employee cannot
allege any grievance from the order entitling him to assail the impugned order. If at all, any
challenge to the order had to be raised, it could have been made by an aggrieved person, who
would be the employer, at best.

12. Learned Senior Counsel has further urged that the issue of locus standi is to be examined
strictly in a writ petition where a writ in the nature of certiorari is sought. The prerogative writs are
issued by the High Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction conferred in terms of Article 226 of the
3 All. Niraj Kumar Singh Vs. Anand Kumar Mishra & Ors.
251
Constitution of India which is a purely discretionary jurisdiction. It can be invoked by the writpetitioner, who establishes the violation of his fundamental or any other legal right at the behest of
the State, as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Any dispute inter-se between two
private individuals cannot be ventilated through a writ petition.

13. It was urged that in the instant case, the writ petitioner had challenged the order of
dismissal of his service. The writ petition was allowed and dismissal order was set aside. Such an
order restoring the services of the writ-petitioner, at best could be challenged by the employer, who
could be an aggrieved person, but not the appellant, who himself is an employee of KGMU and
none of his rights were affected by the order passed in favour of the writ petitioner.

14. Learned Senior Counsel for the writ-petitioner/respondent further submitted that if the
issue of locus standi is diluted at the behest of a stranger, who, if permitted to assail the order then
it would amount to opening up speculative front for inter-meddlers, who though not directly
affected, but may misuse the process of law and it would give rise to a chaotic situation not only for
the Courts of law, but also for the employer. It was thus urged that the application for leave to
appeal should be rejected and consequently the appeal too must meet the same fate.

15. In support of his submissions, Shri Mathur, learned Senior Counsel relied upon the
decisions of the Apex Court in Chandra Gupta v. Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of
Environment and Forest and others, (1995) 1 SCC 23 and H. Anjanappa and others v. A.
Prabhakar and others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 183. He further relied upon a Division Bench
decisions of this Court in Kesari Devi v. State of U.P. and others, 2005 SCC OnLine All 2371
and Vijay Prakash Dixit v. State of U.P. and others, 2022 SCC OnLine All 1169.

16. Shri Sanjay Bhasin, learned Senior Counsel duly assisted by Shri H.P. Gupta, learned
counsel for the appellant Niraj Kumar Singh has refuted the submissions on behalf of the writpetitioner/respondent and urged that the issue of locus standi and the concept of aggrieved party is
to be seen in context with the facts of the case. These are not absolute propositions rather has to be
seen on case to case basis. An order passed by a Court, if it impacts a person adversely, then such a
party can invoke the remedy of appeal even though he may not have been a party to the original
writ proceedings. It was urged that in the instant case, the facts are such which clearly establish that
the appellant Niraj Kumar Singh does have a firm locus standi as he is an aggrieved person which
entitles him to file the instant appeal.

17. Shri Bhasin urged that the appointment of the writ petitioner/respondent itself was against
the statutory Rules. The appellant had made a complaint and in furtherance thereof, the proceedings
were initiated by the KGMU. Certain orders were passed, by which, the writ-petitioner/respondent
was dismissed from service and it came to be challenged by the writ-petitioner/respondent, in the
first round, by means of Writ-A No.9049 of 2020. The said writ petition was disposed of with
certain directions and at that stage the appellant had been heard by the writ Court.

18. In furtherance of the orders passed by the writ Court dated 10.05.2022, the employer
issued a fresh show cause notice to the writ petitioner/respondent and later by an order dated
06.06.2022, the services of the writ-petitioner/respondent was terminated.
252 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

19. This order dated 06.06.2022 was again challenged in Writ-A No.4805 of 2022, wherein
the writ Court, by means of the order dated 04.08.2022 directed the employer KGMU to pass fresh
orders. Once again, the termination order was passed by the employer on 02.12.2022 which again
came to be challenged by the writ petition by means of Writ-A No.1414 of 2023. The writ Court
once again taking note of the submissions of the parties concerned, allowed the writ petition by
setting aside the termination order dated 02.12.2022 with a further direction to reinstate the writpetitioner/respondent with all consequential benefits.

20. Shri Bhasin further urged that the core issue involved is regarding the validity of the
appointment of the writ-petitioner/respondent in KGMU. The writ-petitioner/respondent and the
appellant both are employees within the same cadre, except the appellant was a regular appointee
while the writ-petitioner/respondent was granted appointment on compassionate grounds.

21. It was urged that where the writ-petitioner/respondent's appointment itself was against the
statutory Rules, the appointment being void, hence, the writ petitioner could not be permitted to
continue. Insofar as the facts of the matter between the parties are concerned, the same are not
disputed. It is a clear case where the authorities had noted that the appointment of the writpetitioner/respondent was against the statutory provisions, but the learned Single Judge while
allowing the writ petition noticed that the initial defect in the appointment did not render the
employment void rather it was merely an irregular appointment.

22. Shri Bhasin further urged that in this backdrop where the appointment of the writpetitioner/respondent itself was bad and the seniority and the chances of promotion of the appellant
is affected. This will naturally bring the appellant within the definition of the word 'aggrieved party'
and clothe him with the locus standi to assail the judgment, which ideally should have been done
by the employer, but for the reasons best known not done, hence, the appellant had to take the step
forward.

23. Shri Bhasin further urged that as far as the reliance placed by the learned Senior Counsel
for the writ-petitioner/respondent on the decision of the Apex Court in Chandra Gupta (supra) is
concerned, the same would not come to the aid of the writ-petitioner/respondent, as the Apex Court
has clearly held that it had not decided the issue of locus standi. Once the issue itself was not
decided by the Apex Court, then the same cannot be treated as a binding precedent. Moreover for
the same reason, the reliance placed on the two Division Benches of this Court in Kesari Devi
(supra) and Vijay Prakash Dixit (supra) who merely follow the decision of Chandra Gupta
(supra) would also not help the writ-petitioner/respondent.

24. Shri Bhasin further submitted that the Apex Court decision of H. Anjanappa (supra) deals
with the concept of proper and necessary parties, which is primarily in context of a civil litigation
governed by the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure, hence, the same does not come to the
aid of the writ-petitioner/respondent. Thus, neither in the facts nor on law, the writpetitioner/respondent can oppose the right of the appellant to seek leave to appeal.

25. Shri Bhasin in support of his submissions has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court
in Prem Singh and Others v. Haryana State Electricity Board and others, (1996) 4 SCC 319
3 All. Niraj Kumar Singh Vs. Anand Kumar Mishra & Ors.
253
and on a decision of the Gauhati High Court in Hav Rohmingliana and others v. State of
Mizoram and others, 2005 SCC OnLine Gau 194.

26. The Court has heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and also perused the
record for the purposes of considering the application seeking leave to appeal moved by the
appellant.

27. At the outset, certain undisputed facts that are relevant for considering the said application
are being noticed as under:-

(a) Both the writ-petitioner/respondent and the present appellant Niraj Kumar Singh are
employees of KGMU. It is also not disputed that the appellant was appointed on 07.11.2005 and his
services were confirmed on 22.11.2008 whereas the writ-petitioner/respondent was initially
appointed on 21.04.2004 and his service was confirmed on 27.07.2005 as Junior Clerks and later
after the cadre re-structuring, were appointed as Head Assistant.

(b) A complaint was made regarding the validity of the appointment given to the writpetitioner/respondent in the month of July, 2018 by an Advocate. The Departmental Authorities did
not find favour with the said complaint.

(c) In April, 2020, another complaint was made to the State Government, in pursuance thereof,
the State Government directed the Disciplinary Authority of KGMU to consider the issue of
appointment of the writ-petitioner/respondent. This order of the State Government dated
02.06.2020 was made the subject matter of challenge in Writ-A No.9049 of 2020, which came to
be disposed of by means of the judgment dated 10.05.2022. Though this order was challenged in
Special Appeal No.239 of 2022, yet for want of actual follow up, the said special appeal remained
pending without any effective orders.

(d) In the interregnum, in furtherance of the order passed by the writ Court dated 10.05.2022, a
fresh show cause notice was issued to the writ-petitioner/respondent dated 13.05.2022 which led to
passing of an order of dismissal of the writ-petitioner/respondent from service on 06.06.2022. This
was challenged in Writ-A No.4805 of 2022 and the writ petition was allowed by the learned Single
Judge vide its judgment dated 04.08.2022 with specific directions to pass fresh orders. (e) Once
again, in furtherance of the directions as per order dated 04.08.2022 passed in Writ-A No.4805 of
2022, the order of dismissal was passed by means of the order dated 02.12.2022 which was made
the subject matter of challenge raised by the writ-petitioner/respondent in Writ-A No.1414 of 2023.
It is this writ petition which was allowed by means of the judgment and order dated 15.07.2024
which is now sought to be challenged by the appellant Niraj Kumar Singh, who seeks leave to
appeal.

28. In light of the above-mentioned factual background, the question that arises is whether an
order, which is passed between two contesting parties relating to an appointment in service,
between employer and its employee, can it be challenged by a third party in appeal.
254 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

29. In order to answer the aforesaid question, in context with the facts as noticed hereinabove,
it would reveal that permitting a challenge at the behest of the third party, necessarily would require
this Court to examine whether the appellant as a third party has any locus to assail the order. It will
also be required to be seen whether the appellant can be treated to be an aggrieved person
especially noticing the nature of dispute between the parties.

30. The Court proposes to examine the question involved by considering as to how the locus
standi of a person is adjudged in a litigation and who can be an aggrieved person.

31. As per Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, the word 'locus standi' and 'aggrieved
person' have been defined as under:-

'Locus standi' :- "The right to bring an action or to be heard in a given forum", and

'aggrieved person':- "Having legal rights that are adversely affected; having been
harmed by an infringement of legal rights. "

32. It is well settled to be disputed that the writ issued by the High Courts are purely
discretionary and are issued in favour of such a person whose fundamental or legal rights are
violated at the behest of the State. In this background, it cannot be disputed that KGMU falls within
the meaning of the word 'State' as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution of India.

33. A dispute between the employer and the employee is per-se a private dispute between the
two. The word 'private' has been used here in context with 'personam' and in contradistinction to a
litigation which may affect the rights of several persons or class of persons and in such cases any
such person or from such class of person, can come forward to contest as a litigation.

34. Any decision of an employer which violates the right of any particular employee or
employees can be assailed by such aggrieved employee or employees and not by any other
employee or a third party altogether, who is not affected by such a decision.

35. The concept of 'locus standi' in writ petitions is construed strictly so that the high
perogrative writs are not misused at the behest of inter-meddlers. However, it is equally true that
the concept of 'locus standi' is diluted where it come to a public interest litigation and that too for a
laudable cause and purpose relating to such sections of the society or underprivileged class who
may not be denied or be deprived of access to justice. Such cause can be brought to the notice of
the Court by a public spirited person, who himself may not be affected per-se with the cause he
seeks to espouse.

36. It is to be noticed that a dispute between an employer and an employee, is primarily a
private dispute between them and it has been kept out of the ambit of a public interest litigation.

37. It will be apposite to note certain decisions of the Apex Court to understand the concept of
'locus standi' and 'aggrieved person'.
3 All. Niraj Kumar Singh Vs. Anand Kumar Mishra & Ors.
255

38. In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, (1976) 1 SCC 671 are quite apt and are
being reproduced hereinafter:-

"13. This takes us to the further question: Who is an "aggrieved person" and what are the
qualifications requisite for such a status? The expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic, and
to an extent, an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and
comprehensive definition. At best, its features can be described in a broad tentative manner. Its
scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute
of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of
the petitioner's interest, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him.
English courts have sometimes put a restricted and sometimes a wide construction on the
expression "aggrieved person". However, some general tests have been devised to ascertain
whether an applicant is eligible for this category so as to have the necessary locus standi or
"standing" to invoke certiorari jurisdiction.

* * *

37. It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an
applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) "person aggrieved"; (ii) "stranger"; (iii)
busybody or meddlesome interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from
those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern
them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of pro bono
publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in
the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives.
Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of
some applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking the wheels of administration. The
High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the threshold.

38. The distinction between the first and second categories of applicants, though real, is
not always well-demarcated. The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones; a solid central
zone of certainty, and a grey outer circle of lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an
outermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central zone are those
whose legal rights have been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of
"persons aggrieved". In the grey outer circle the bounds which separate the first category from the
second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this
outer zone may not be "persons aggrieved".

39. To distinguish such applicants from "strangers", among them, some broad tests may
be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their
efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which
the matter falls to be considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has
been infringed? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense, that his interest, recognised
by law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority,
complained of? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person

against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of
something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something?
256 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or
inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to object and
be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in
the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority? Is the
statute, in the context of which the scope of the words "person aggrieved" is being considered, a
social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the
community? Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals?"

39. In Hari Bansh Lal v. Sahodar Prasad Mahto and others, (2010) 9 SCC 655, the Apex
Court clearly held that PILs are not maintainable in service matters except by way of writ of quowarranto. The relevant observations made by the Apex Court in Para-34 is being noticed
hereinafter:-

"34. From the discussion and analysis, the following principles emerge:

(a) Except for a writ of quo warranto, PIL is not maintainable in service matters.

(b) For issuance of a writ of quo warranto, the High Court has to satisfy that the
appointment is contrary to the statutory rules.

(c) Suitability or otherwise of a candidate for appointment to a post in government
service is the function of the appointing authority and not of the court unless the appointment is
contrary to statutory provisions/rules."

40. The Apex Court in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra and
others, (2013) 4 SCC 465 while considering the issue of locus standi, aggrieved person and the
issue of legal injury held as under:-

"Person aggrieved

9. It is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to meddle in any
proceeding, unless he satisfies the authority/court, that he falls within the category of aggrieved
persons. Only a person who has suffered, or suffers from legal injury can challenge the
act/action/order, etc. in a court of law. A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is
maintainable either for the purpose of enforcing a statutory or legal right, or when there is a
complaint by the appellant that there has been a breach of statutory duty on the part of the
authorities. Therefore, there must be a judicially enforceable right available for enforcement, on the
basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. The Court can, of course, enforce the performance of
a statutory duty by a public body, using its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided that
such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence
of such right is a condition precedent for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is implicit in
the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief prayed for must be one to enforce a
legal right. In fact, the existence of such right, is the foundation of the exercise of the said
jurisdiction by the Court. The legal right that can be enforced must ordinarily be the right of the
appellant himself, who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief as
regards the same. [Vide State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta [1951 SCC 1024 : AIR 1952 SC
12] , Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P. [AIR 1954 SC 728] , Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. v.
State of W.B. [AIR 1962 SC 1044] , Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. [(1996) 5 SCC 460 : AIR
3 All. Niraj Kumar Singh Vs. Anand Kumar Mishra & Ors.
257
1996 SC 2736] and Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Assn. (2) v. S.C. Sekar
[(2009) 2 SCC 784] .]

10. A "legal right", means an entitlement arising out of legal rules. Thus, it may be
defined as an advantage, or a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. The expression,
"person aggrieved" does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary
injury; a person aggrieved must, therefore, necessarily be one whose right or interest has been
adversely affected or jeopardised. (Vide Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. Home Insurance Co. of New
York [(1974) 2 SCC 387 : AIR 1974 SC 1719] and State of Rajasthan v. Union of India [(1977) 3
SCC 592 : AIR 1977 SC 1361] .)

* * *

14. This Court has consistently cautioned the courts against entertaining public interest
litigation filed by unscrupulous persons, as such meddlers do not hesitate to abuse the process of
court. The right of effective access to justice, which has emerged with the new social rights regime,
must be used to serve basic human rights, which purport to guarantee legal rights and, therefore, a
workable remedy within the framework of the judicial system must be provided. Whenever any
public interest is invoked, the court must examine the case to ensure that there is in fact, genuine
public interest involved. The court must maintain strict vigilance to ensure that there is no abuse of
the process of court and that, ?ordinarily meddlesome bystanders are not granted a visa?. Many
societal pollutants create new problems of non-redressed grievances, and the court should make an
earnest endeavour to take up those cases, where the subjective purpose of the lis justifies the need
for it. (Vide P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam [(1980) 3 SCC 141 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 649 : AIR
1980 SC 856] , Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. [(2010) 2 SCC 114 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 324] , State
of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal [(2010) 3 SCC 402 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 81 : (2010) 1
SCC (L&S) 807] and Amar Singh v. Union of India [(2011) 7 SCC 69 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 560] .)
15. Even as regards the filing of a public interest litigation, this Court has consistently held that
such a course of action is not permissible so far as service matters are concerned. (Vide Duryodhan
Sahu v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra [(1998) 7 SCC 273 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1802 : AIR 1999 SC 114] ,
Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra [(2005) 1 SCC 590 : AIR 2005 SC 540] and
Neetu v. State of Punjab [(2007) 10 SCC 614 : AIR 2007 SC 758] .)"

41. Now in this background, it will be apposite to notice the Apex Court decision in Chandra
Gupta (supra), wherein the issue involved was relating to expunction of adverse remarks and the
consequent promotion, whether such promotion would date back to when it was due and how the
seniority of the officer is to be reckoned. In this background, the Apex Court observed as under:-

"23. The said Rules do not provide for any opportunity of objection being given to any
other officer against the Government decision for entering the remarks or expunging those remarks.
Therefore, it should follow that no legal right or locus standi can be given to any person to
challenge the expunction of an adverse entry.

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258 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

25. What is required to be carefully noted is the Court was considering the effect of
expungement of adverse remarks which was likely to prejudice the chances of promotion. It is
well-settled in law that no employee has a right or vested right to chances of promotion as held by
this Court in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra [(1974) 1 SCC 317 : 1974 SCC
(L&S) 137 : (1974) 2 SCR 216] : (SCC p. 329, para 15)

"It is now well settled by the decision of this Court in State of Mysore v. G.N. Purohit
[1967 SLR 753 (SC)] that though a right to be considered for promotion is a condition of service,
mere chances of promotion are not. A rule which merely affects chances of promotion cannot be
regarded as varying a condition of service. In Purohit case [1967 SLR 753 (SC)] the districtwise
seniority of sanitary inspectors was changed to Statewise seniority, and as a result of this change
the respondents went down in seniority and became very junior. This, it was urged, affected their
chances of promotion which were protected under the proviso to Section 115, sub-section (7). This
contention was negatived and Wanchoo, J., (as he then was), speaking on behalf of this Court
observed:

'It is said on behalf of the respondents that as their chances of promotion have been
affected their conditions of service have been changed to their disadvantage. We see no force in
this argument because chances of promotion are not conditions of service.'"

42. Then, the Apex Court went on to consider other cases relating to the adverse entries and
promotion and then in Para-36, it noticed as under:-

"36. What requires to be carefully noted is eligibility for promotion is one thing while
actual promotion is a different thing. Even in this ruling promotion in accordance with the rules
alone was what was directed. Even assuming on the strength of this ruling the appellant is entitled
to promotion on the date when he became eligible for promotion but for these adverse entries, a
factual finding requires to be rendered on the following aspects:

1. Whether the adverse entries for 1980-81 and 1981-82 were actually communicated?

2. After expunction of adverse remarks whether there was a comparative estimate of the
merits by the Departmental Promotion Committee?

These are matters pending adjudication in OA No. 617 of 1992. Therefore, we restrain
from saying anything more as to the entitlement of seniority of the appellant over Respondents 3 to
5. That will depend upon the decision in OA No. 617 of 1992."

43. It would thus be seen that in this context where the issue was pending before the CAT in
O.A. No.617 of 1992 and to protect the rights of contesting parties, the Apex Court in Para-39
observed as under:-

"39. We do not think we should entertain the civil appeal at this stage against
interlocutory orders.