# No.871181334 Ex.Ct. S.G. Singh v. I.G. of Police C.S.,CRPF, Lucknow & another

- **Citation:** (2006) 2 ILRA 851
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2006
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No 30768 of 1999
- **Bench:** Dr. B.S.C Chauhan, Shishir Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/no-871181334-ex-ct-s-g-singh-v-i-g-of-police-c-s-crpf-lucknow-another-41002
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Constitution of India, Art. 226-Service
Law-Cancellation
of
appointmentPetitioner was appointed as constable in
C.R.P.F.-at the time of filling application
form-furnished
incorrect
particularsabout involvement any criminal casesappointing
authority
noticed
the
evolvement
in
criminal
case
under
Section
279,
337,506
I.P.C.-during
verification of character-challenged on
the ground the offence do not constitute
moral turpitude held-suppressing the
material
information
about
the
involvement in Criminal Case-itself moral
turpitude
consequence
of
criminal
proceeding about acquittal on technical
ground-not material.

Held: Para 27,30,31

Thus, in view of the above, the matter
requires to be examined in the facts and
circumstances of the case. In the instant
case,
as
suppressing
the
material
information by the petitioner of his
involvement in criminal case itself is a
moral turpitude, it is of no consequence
as to whether the offence, he was tried
involved moral turpitude or not.

Thus, it is the antecedent, conduct or
character
of
the
candidate
to
be
appointed to the services which is of
paramount consideration, not of the
result of the criminal case in which he
has been involved, as acquittal may be
on a technical ground or for want of
evidence etc.

In view of the above, the petitioner has
obtained
the
employment
by
misrepresentation, i.e., suppressing the
material
information
sought
by the
appointing authority. The information
was required to verify his character and
antecedents. Thus, neither the result of
the prosecution nor the nature of the
offence, in which he had been involved,
has any bearing on the case. Principles
of natural justice are not attracted in
such as fact situation.
Case law discussed:
AIR 1964 SC-853, AIR 1956 All. E.R.-349, AIR
1994 SC-853, 1956 AER-349, AIR 1994 SC2151, 1994 (2) SCC-481, 2000 (3) SCC-581,
1995 (4) Supp. SCC-100, 1990 (3) SCC-655,
AIR 1964 SC-72, 2003 (8) SCC-319, 2004 (6)
SCC-325, AIR 1966 SC-1340, AIR 2000 SC1650, AIR 1965 Alld-382, AIR 1963 Alld.-527,
AIR 1996 SC-3300, 1997 (4) SCC-1, AIR 1959
AU-71, 1966 (55) SCC-605, AIR 2003 SC-179

Constitution
of
India-Art.-226-Writ
Petition
maintainability-writ
petition
against
the
state
officer
without
impleading the state or union as
necessary
party-held-writ
not
maintainable.

Held: Para 13

Thus,
we
reach
the
inescapable
conclusion
that
the
writ
is
not
852 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2006
maintainable against the Government
officers or the employees of the State, it
lies only against the State/Union of India
and if State is not impleaded, the writ is
not maintainable.

AIR 1977 SC-1701, 2003 (2) SCC-472, AIR
1965 Ker.-277, AIR 1976 SC-2538, AIR 1964
SC-669, AIR 1987 SC-1970, AIR 1994 SC-853,
1956 AER-349, AIR 1994 SC-2151, 1994 (2)
SCC-481, AIR 1992 SC-1555, 2000 (3) SCC581

## Text

2 All] No.871181334 Ex.Ct. S.G. Singh V. I.G. of Police C.S.,CRPF, Lucknow & another
851
The case of Palak Dhari Yadav
(supra) has not been correctly decided.

19. Let our opinion be placed before
the learned Single Judge for deciding the
writ petition.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.09.2008

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. B.S.C CHAUHAN, J.
THE HON'BLE SHISHIR KUMAR, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No 30768 of 1999

No. 87181335 Ex Ct. Sheo Govind Singh

...Petitioner
Versus
Inspector General of Police CS, CRPF,
Lucknow and another ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri R.K. Pandey
Sri S.K. Shukla

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri N.K Chatterji

Constitution of India, Art. 226-Service
Law-Cancellation
of
appointmentPetitioner was appointed as constable in
C.R.P.F.-at the time of filling application
form-furnished
incorrect
particularsabout involvement any criminal casesappointing
authority
noticed
the
evolvement
in
criminal
case
under
Section
279,
337,506
I.P.C.-during
verification of character-challenged on
the ground the offence do not constitute
moral turpitude held-suppressing the
material
information
about
the
involvement in Criminal Case-itself moral
turpitude
consequence
of
criminal
proceeding about acquittal on technical
ground-not material.

Held: Para 27,30,31

Thus, in view of the above, the matter
requires to be examined in the facts and
circumstances of the case. In the instant
case,
as
suppressing
the
material
information by the petitioner of his
involvement in criminal case itself is a
moral turpitude, it is of no consequence
as to whether the offence, he was tried
involved moral turpitude or not.

Thus, it is the antecedent, conduct or
character
of
the
candidate
to
be
appointed to the services which is of
paramount consideration, not of the
result of the criminal case in which he
has been involved, as acquittal may be
on a technical ground or for want of
evidence etc.

In view of the above, the petitioner has
obtained
the
employment
by
misrepresentation, i.e., suppressing the
material
information
sought
by the
appointing authority. The information
was required to verify his character and
antecedents. Thus, neither the result of
the prosecution nor the nature of the
offence, in which he had been involved,
has any bearing on the case. Principles
of natural justice are not attracted in
such as fact situation.
Case law discussed:
AIR 1964 SC-853, AIR 1956 All. E.R.-349, AIR
1994 SC-853, 1956 AER-349, AIR 1994 SC2151, 1994 (2) SCC-481, 2000 (3) SCC-581,
1995 (4) Supp. SCC-100, 1990 (3) SCC-655,
AIR 1964 SC-72, 2003 (8) SCC-319, 2004 (6)
SCC-325, AIR 1966 SC-1340, AIR 2000 SC1650, AIR 1965 Alld-382, AIR 1963 Alld.-527,
AIR 1996 SC-3300, 1997 (4) SCC-1, AIR 1959
AU-71, 1966 (55) SCC-605, AIR 2003 SC-179

Constitution
of
India-Art.-226-Writ
Petition
maintainability-writ
petition
against
the
state
officer
without
impleading the state or union as
necessary
party-held-writ
not
maintainable.

Held: Para 13

Thus,
we
reach
the
inescapable
conclusion
that
the
writ
is
not
852 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2006
maintainable against the Government
officers or the employees of the State, it
lies only against the State/Union of India
and if State is not impleaded, the writ is
not maintainable.

AIR 1977 SC-1701, 2003 (2) SCC-472, AIR
1965 Ker.-277, AIR 1976 SC-2538, AIR 1964
SC-669, AIR 1987 SC-1970, AIR 1994 SC-853,
1956 AER-349, AIR 1994 SC-2151, 1994 (2)
SCC-481, AIR 1992 SC-1555, 2000 (3) SCC581

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.)

1. This writ petition has been filed
for quashing the order dated 20.1.1988
(Annex 1), by which the services of the
petitioner were terminated and order
dated 3.6.1999 (Annex. 5), by which his
appeal has been dismissed.

2. The facts and circumstances
giving rise to this case are that petitioner
was recruited on the post of Constable in
the Central Reserve Police Force (in
short, CRPF) in 1987. His services had
been terminated vide impugned order
dated 20.1.1988 on the ground that he had
obtained
the
employment
by
misrepresentation. While filling up the
application form for the post, every
applicant was asked to furnish the
particulars as to whether he had ever been
implicated in any criminal case. Petitioner
filled up the relevant column in negative,
and as subsequently, on inquiry while
verifying his character, it came in the
knowledge of the appointing authority
that he had been involved in a Criminal
Case No.' 42 of 1987, under Sections 279,
337, 506 I.P.c., P.S. Kandhai, District
Pratapgarh, his services were terminated
vide order dated 20.1.1988 (Annex. 1).
Being aggrieved, petitioner preferred an
appeal in 1998/asked for reinstatement,
which has been dismissed by the appellate
authority vide impugned order dated 3rd
June, 1999 (Annex.5). Hence this petition.

3. It is submitted on behalf of the
petitioner that order of termination could
not have been passed without giving
opportunity of hearing to him. Petitioner
had not been involved in a case involving
moral turpitude. More so, he has been
acquitted in the said case, therefore, the
suppression of material information, even
if it was done deliberately, did not warrant
termination of his services. After acquittal
in the said case, his involvement stood
washed off, and therefore, it was neither
desirable nor permissible to pass the order
of termination of his services. More so,
the appointing authority did not consider
the appeal in correct prospective and
dismissed it without giving any reason.
As petitioner had been acquitted of the
charges in the criminal case, he was
entitled for reinstatement. Hence both the
orders impugned are liable to be quashed.

4. On the other hand, Shri N.K.
Chatterji,
learned
counsel
for
the
respondents
has
submitted
that
suppression of the information sought by
the appointing authority at the initial stage
itself amounts to indulging in moral
turpitude. Thus, it was totally irrelevant as
to whether petitioner had been involved in
a criminal case involving moral turpitude
or not. It is the antecedents of the
applicant and not the result of the case,
which is the decisive factor. He was
acquitted in the criminal case vide
judgment and order dated 26.11.1990, i.e.,
after
12
years
of
his
termination.
Petitioner did not file any appeal against
the said order of termination, rather
applied for reinstatement on 4.12.1998 as
he was acquitted of the criminal charges.
The said application was rejected vide
2 All] No.871181334 Ex.Ct. S.G. Singh V. I.G. of Police C.S.,CRPF, Lucknow & another
853
order dated 3.6.1999 (Annex. 5). He could
not claim his reinstatement as he was not
removed on the ground of pendency of
the criminal case against him. More so,
another Criminal Case No. 79A of 1986
under Sections 147, 148, 149, 324, 504
and 506 I.P.C. was also pending against
the petitioner. Thus, no interference is
called for in equity jurisdiction. In
addition thereto, a preliminary objection
has been raised by Shri Chatterji that the
writ petition itself is not maintainable.
Though no such ground has been taken in
the counter affidavit, but he raised prime
issue that as Union of India has not been
impleaded in the array of parties as
respondent, the writ petition itself is not
liable to be entertained. The petition is
liable to be dismissed.

5. We have considered the rival
submissions made by the learned counsel
for the parties and perused the record.

6. In Ranjeet Mal Vs General
Manager, Northern Railway, New Delhi
& Anr, AIR 1977 SC 1701, the Hon'ble
Apex Court considered a case where the
writ petition had been filed challenging
the order of termination from service
against the General Manager of the
Northern Railways without impleading
the Union of India. The Apex Court held
as under:

"The Union of India represents the
Railway
Administration.
The
Union
carries administration through different
servants. These servants all represent the
Union in regard to activities whether in
the matter of appointment or in the matter
of removal. It cannot be denied that any
order which will be passed on an
application under Article 226 which will
have the effect of setting aside the
removal will fasten liability on the Union
of India, and not on any servant of the
Union. Therefore, from all points of view,
the Union of India was rightly held by the
High Court to be a necessary party. The
petition was rightly rejected by the High
Court."

While considering the similar view in
Chief
Conservator
of
Forests,
Government of A. P. Vs. Collector & Ors;
(2003) 3 SCC 472 the Hon'ble Supreme
Court accepted the submission that writ
cannot be entertained without impleading
the State if relief is sought against the
State. The Hon'ble Apex Court had drawn
the analogy from Section 79 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908/ which directs
that the State shall be the authority to be
named as plaintiff or defendant in a suit
by or against the Government and Section
80 thereof directs notice to the Secretary
of that State or the Collector of the district
before the institution of the suit and Rule
1 of Order 27 lays down as to who should
sign the pleadings. No individual officer
of the Government under the scheme of
the constitution nor under the Code of
Civil Procedure, can file a suit nor initiate
any proceeding in the name and the post
he is holding, who is not a juristic person.

7. The Court also considered the
provisions
of
Artide
300
of
the
Constitution which provide for legal
proceedings by or against the Union of
India or State and held that in a suit by or
against the Government, the authority to
be named as plaintiff or defendant, as the
case may be; in the case of the Central
Government, the Union of India and in
the case of State Government, the State,
which is suing or is being sued.
854 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2006
8. Rule 1 of Order 27 only deals
with suits by or against the Government
or by officers in their official capacity. It
provides that in any suit by or against the
Government, the plaint or the written
statement shall be signed by such person
as the Government may like by general or
special order authorise in that behalf and
shall be verified by any person whom the
Government may so appoint. The Court
further held as under:-

"It needs to be noted here that a legal
entity - a natural person or an artificial
person- can sue or be sued in his/its own
name in a court of law or a tribunal. It is
not merely a procedural formality but is
essentially a matter of substance and
considerable significance. That is why
there are special provisions in the
Constitution and the Code of Civil
Procedure
as
to
how
the
Central
Government or the Government of a State
may sue or be sued. So also there are
special provisions in regard to other
juristic persons specifying as to how they
can sue or be sued. In giving description
of a party it will be useful to remember
the distinction between misdescription or
misnomer of a party and misjoinder or
non-joinder of a party suing or being
sued. In the case of misdescription of a
party, the court may at any stage of' the
suit/proceedings permit correction of the
cause-title so that the party before the
court is correctly described; however, a
misdescription of a party will not be fatal
to
the
maintainability
of
the
Suit/proceedings. Though Rule 9 of Order
1 CPC mandates that no suit shall be
defeated by reason of the misjoinder or
non-joinder of parties, it is important to
notice that the proviso thereto clarifies
that nothing in that Rule shall apply to
non-joinder
of
a
necessary
party.
Therefore, care must be taken to ensure
that the necessary party is before the
court, be it a plaintiff or a defendant,
otherwise, the suit or the proceedings will
have to fail. Rule 10 Of order 1 CPC
provides remedy when a suit is filed in the
name
of
the
wrong
plaintiff
and
empowers the court to strike out any party
improperly joined or to implead a
necessary party at any stage of the
proceedings."

The Apex Court thus held that writ is
not maintainable unless the Union of
India or the State, as the case may be,
impleaded as a party.

9. A Full Bench of Kerala High
Court in Kerala State Vs. General
Manager, Southern Railway, Madras, AIR
1965 Ker 277 held that suit is not
maintainable if instituted against Railway
Administration. The condition precedent
for its maintainability is that it must be
instituted against the Union of India.

A similar view has been reiterated by
Hon'ble Apex Court in The State of
Kerala
Vs.
The
General
Manager,
Southern Railway, Madras, AIR 1976 SC
2538.

10. The Constitution Bench of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab
Vs. O.G.B. Syndicate Ltd., AIR 1964 SC
669, held that if relief is sought against
the State, suit lies only against the State,
but
it
may
be
filed
against
the
Government if the Government has acted
under the colour of legal title and not a
Sovereign Authority.

11. Undoubtedly non-impleadment
of the necessary party is fatal as provided
by the proviso to Order 1, Rule 9 C.P.C.,
2 All] No.871181334 Ex.Ct. S.G. Singh V. I.G. of Police C.S.,CRPF, Lucknow & another
855
but application for impleadment can be
made even at a later stage or before the
appellate forum also as held by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sal Niketan
Nursery School Vs. Kesari Prasad, AIR
1987 SC 1970. In the instant case, in spite
of such serious arguments on the issue,
learned counsel for the petitioner did not
ask for time to move application for
impleadment of the Union of India.

12. The Rajasthan High Court in
Pusha Ram Vs. Modern Construction Co.
(P) Ltd, AIR 1981 Raj 47, held that to
institute a suit for seeking relief against
the State, the State has to be impleaded as
a party. But misdescription showing the
State as Government of the State may not
be fatal and the name of party may be
permitted to be amended, if such an
application is filed.

13. Thus, we reach the inescapable
conclusion
that
the
writ
is
not
maintainable against the Government
officers or the employees of the State, it
lies only against the State/Union of India
and if State is not impleaded, the writ is
not maintainable.

14. In view of the above, we are of
the considered opinion that the writ
petition itself is not maintainable as Union
of India has not been impleaded as a party
respondent.

15. Be that as it may, undoubtedly
petitioner had obtained the employment
suppressing
the
material
information
sought
by
the
appointing
authority
regarding
the
involvement
of
the
petitioner in any criminal case. The copy
of the form has been annexed by the
respondents along with the counter
affidavit; column 12 of the same provides
for furnishing the information as to
whether the applicant had ever been
arrested, prosecuted, kept under detention,
convicted by the Court of Law for any
offence etc. etc., or he has been involved
in any criminal case. Petitioner filled up
the
said
column
by
saying
"No".
Therefore, it is evident that petitioner did
not disclose the material information
sought by the appointing authority.

16. It is settled proposition of law
that where an applicant gets an order
office by making misrepresentation or
playing
fraud
upon
the
competent
Authority, such order cannot be sustained
in the eyes of law. "Fraud avoids all
judicial acts ecclesiastical or temporal."
(Vide S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead)
by LRs. Vs. Jagannath (Dead) by LRs. &
ors., AIR 1994 SC 853. In Lazarus Estate
Ltd. Vs. Besalay, 1956 AII.E.R. 349, the
Court observed without equivocation that
"no judgment of a Court, no order of a
Minister can be allowed to stand if it has
been obtained by fraud, for fraud unravels
everything."

17. In Andhra Pradesh State
Financial Corporation Vs. Mis. Gar ReRolling Mills & Anr., AIR 1994 SC 2151;
and State of Maharashtra & ors. Vs.
Prabhu, (1994) 2 SCC 481, the Hon'ble
Apex Court has observed that a writ
Court, while exercising its equitable
jurisdiction, should not act as to prevent
perpetration of a legal fraud as the Courts
are obliged to do justice by promotion of
good faith. "Equity is, also, known to
prevent the law from the crafty evasions
and sub-Ietties invented to evade law.

18. In Shrisht Dhawan Vs. Shaw
Bros., AIR 1992 SC 1555, it has been
held as under:-
856 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2006
"Fraud and collusion vitiate even the
most solemn proceedings in any civilized
system of jurisprudence. It is a concept
descriptive of human conduct."

In United India Insurance Company
Ltd. Vs. Rajendra Singh & ors., (2000) 3
SCC 581, the Apex Court observed that
"Fraud and justice never dwell together"
(fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) and it is
a pristine maxim which has never lost its
temper over all these centuries.

19. The ratio laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in various cases is
that dishonesty should not be permitted to
bear the fruit and benefit to the persons
who
played
fraud
or
made
misrepresentation
and
in
such
circumstances the Court should not
perpetuate the fraud by entertaining the
petitions on their behalf. In Union of India
& ors. Vs. M. Bhaskaran, 1995 Suppl. (4)
SCC 100, the Apex Court, after placing
reliance upon and approving its earlier
judgment
in
District
Collector
&
Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare
Residential
School
Society
Vs.
M.
Tripura Sundari Devi, (1990) 3 SCC 655,
observed as under:-

"If
by
committing
fraud
any
employment is obtained, the same cannot
be permitted to be countenanced by a
Court of Law as the employment secured
by fraud renders it voidable at the option
of the employer."

20. Similar view has been reiterated
by the Apex Court in S. Partap Singh Vs.
State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72; Ram
Chandra Singh Vs. Savitra Devi & Ors.,
(2003) 8 SCC 319; and Vice Chairman,
Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Anr.
Vs. Girdharilal Yadav, (2004) 6 SCC 325.
The Common Law doctrine of public
policy can be enforced wherever an action
affects/ offends public interest or where
harmful result of permitting the injury to
the public at large is evident.

21. Moreso, if initial action is not in
consonance with law, the subsequent
conduct of a party cannot sanctify the
same. Subia Fundamento cedit opus"- a
foundation
being
removed,
the
superstructure falls. A person having done
wrong cannot take advantage of his own
wrong and plead bar of any law to
frustrate the lawful trial by a competent
court. In such a case legal maxim Nullus
Commodum capere Potest De Injuria Sua
Propria applies. (Vide Union of India Vs.
Maj. Gen. Madan Lal Yadav, AIR 1996
SC 1340).The violators of law cannot be
permitted to urge that their offence ~'be
subject
matter
of
inquiry,
trial
or
investigation. (Vide Lily Thomas Vs.
Union of India & Ors., AIR 2000 SC
1650).

22. Nor a person can claim any right
arising out of his wrong doing. (Juri Ex
Injuria Non Oritur).

More so, we do not find any force in
the submission made by the learned
counsel for the petitioner that as petitioner
was not involved in the case involving
moral turpitude, and even if he has
suppressed those material information's,
the order impugned could not be passed.

23. The meaning of term 'turpitude'
and 'moral turpitude' has been given in
Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition,
as follows:-

"Turpitude-In its ordinary sense,
inherent baseness or vileness of principle
2 All] No.871181334 Ex.Ct. S.G. Singh V. I.G. of Police C.S.,CRPF, Lucknow & another
857
or
action;
shameful
wickedness;
depravity. In its legal sense, everything
done
contrary
to
justice,
honesty,
modesty, or good morals. State Vs.
Anderson,117 Kan. 117, 230 P.315;
Hughes Vs. State Board of Medical
Examiners, 162 Ga. 246; 134 S.E. 42, 46.
An action showing gross depravity.
Traders & General Ins. Co. Vs. Russell,
Te & Civ. App. 99; S.W. 2-d 1079,
1084."
"Moral
Turpitude-
A
term
of
frequent occurrence in statutes, especially
those providing that a witness' conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude may
be shown as tending to impeach his
credibility. In general, it means neither
more nor less than "turpitude", i.e.
anything
done
contrary
to
justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals."

24. A Division Bench of Rajasthan
High Court in Lachuram Vs. Inderlal,
1966 ILR Raj. 1168, has considered this
aspect and took note of various Indian and
foreign judgments and also quoted Bartos
Vs. United States District Court, for
District of Nebraska, C.C.A. Neb.,19 F.2d
722, 724, wherein the Court held as
under:-

"An act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity, in the private and social duties,
which a man owes to his fellow-men, or
to society in genial, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and
duty between man and man" and "conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or
good morals."

The Court further observed as under:-

"It would appear from the above that
the meanings given to the terms 'turpitude'
and 'moral turpitude' indicate almost the
same type of failing in a man's character
or moral make-up. In our view, no
absolute standard or no hard and fast rule
can be laid down for deciding whether a
particular act should considered as one
involving moral turpitude, because it
would mostly depend on the facts and
circumstances in which the act or
omission is committed whether it involves
moral turpitude or not."

25. The Court placed reliance on the
judgment of Allahabad High Court in
Buddha Pitai Vs. Sub-Divisional Officer,
Malihabad, Lucknow & ors., AIR 1965
All. 382, wherein the Allahabad High
Court held as under:-

"Now,
coming
to
the
second
question, learned counsel has urged that
in deciding the question whether an
offence involves moral turpitude, the
Court should confine its consideration
only to the nature of the offence and it
should not be swayed in its opinion by the
facts and circumstances in which it was
committed." (Emphasis added).

The Court further observed as under:-

"Whether an offence involves moral
turpitude, will depend on its nature and
the
circumstances
in
which
it
is
committed. An offence of a certain class
may generally be considered to involve
moral turpitude but it may not be so if
committed in particular circumstances, for
example, an offence of murder may
ordinarily involve moral turpitude but if it
is committed in a spirit of patriotism or
with a laudable object, it may not shock
the public conscience and instead of being
decried by the public the offender may be
considered a hero.... Again an offence of
theft will generally be considered mean,
858 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2006
vile and anti-social and a thief would be
simply scorned at. However, if a starving·
and emaciated person steals food is
caught, prosecuted and convicted, people
will take a charitable and sympathetic
view of the offender's conduct and his
offence may not be considered as
involving moral turpitude. Thus, the case
of every offence will have to be judged in
the light of the circumstances in which it
is committed. It is not the gravity of the
offence or the quantum of punishment
imposed on a person which will determine
such question."

Similarly,
in
Mangali
Vs.
Chhakkital, AIR 1963 All. 527, it was
observed as follows:-

"From
consideration
of
the
dictionary meaning of the words 'moral'
and 'turpitude' as well as the real ratio
decidendi of the cases, the principle
which emerges appear to be that the
question
whether
a
certain
offence
involves moral turpitude or not, will
necessarily depend on the circumstances
in which the offence is committed.

In Pawan Kumar Vs. State of
Haryana, AIR 1996 SC 3300 wherein the
Apex Court has observed as under:-
"Moral turpitude' is an expression
which is used in legal as also societal
parlance to describe conduct which is
inherently base, vile, depraved or having
any connection showing depravity.

26. The aforesaid judgment in
Pawan Kumar case (supra) has been
considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
again in Allahabad Bank and another Vs.
Deepak Kumar Bhola, 1997 (4) SCC 1,
and placed reliance on Baleshwar Singh
Vs. District Magistrate and Collector,
AIR 1959 All. 71 wherein it has been held
as under:-

"The expression 'moral turpitude' is
not defined anywhere. But it means
anything
done
contrary
to
justice,
honesty, modesty or good morals. It
implies depravity and wickedness of
character or disposition of the person
charged with the particular conduct.
Every false statement made by a person
may not be moral turpitude, but it would
be so if it discloses vileness or depravity
in the doing of any private and social duty
which a person owes to his fellow men or
to the society in general. If therefore the
individual charged with a certain conduct
owes a duty, either to another individual
or to the society in general, to act in a
specific manner or not to so act and he
still acts contrary to it and does so
knowingly, his conduct must be held to be
due to vileness and depravity. It will be
contrary to accepted customary rule and
duty between man and man"

27. Thus, in view of the above, the
matter requires to be examined in the
facts and circumstances of the case. In the
instant case, as suppressing the material
information by the petitioner of his
involvement in criminal case itself is a
moral turpitude, it is of no consequence as
to whether the offence, he was tried
involved moral turpitude or not.

28. In Delhi Administration through
its Chief Secretary & Ors. Vs. Sushi
Kumar, (1996) 11 SCC 605, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court examined the similar case
where the appointment was refused on the
post of Police Constable and the Court
observed as under:-
"It is seen that verification of the
character and antecedents is one of the
2 All] No.871181334 Ex.Ct. S.G. Singh V. I.G. of Police C.S.,CRPF, Lucknow & another
859
important criteria to test whether the
selected candidate is suitable to a post
under the State. Though he was found
physically fit, passed the written test and
interview and was provisionally selected,
on account of his antecedent record, the
appointing authority found it not
desirable to appoint a person of such
record as a Constable to the disciplined
force. The view taken by the appointing
authority in the background of the case
cannot be said to be unwarranted. The
Tribunal,
therefore,
was
wholly
unjustified in giving the direction for
reconsideration of his case. Though he
was discharged or acquitted of the
criminal offence, the same has nothing to
do with the question. What would be
relevant is the conduct or character of the
candidate to be appointed to a service and
not the actual result thereof. If the actual
result happened to be in a particular way,
the law will take care of the consequence.
The consideration relevant to the case is
of the antecedents of the candidate.
Appointing
authority,
therefore,
has
rightly focussed this aspect and found it
not desirable to appoint him to the
service."

29.

In
Kendriya
Vidyalaya
Sangathan Vs. Ram Ratan Yadav, AIR
2003 SC 1709, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court examined a similar case, wherein,
the employment had been obtained by
suppressing the material fact that criminal
proceedings were pending against him at
the time of appointment. The Court
rejected the plea taken by the employee
that Form was printed in English and he
did not have good knowledge of that, and
therefore, could not understand as what
information was sought. The Apex Court
held that as he did not furnish he
information correctly at the time of filling
up the Form, the subsequent withdrawal
of the criminal case registered against him
or the nature of offences were immaterial.
"The requirement of filling column nos.
12 and 13 of the Attestation Form" was
for the purpose of verification of the
character and antecedents of the employee
as on the date of filling in the Attestation
Form.
Suppression
of
material
information and making a false statement
has a clear bearing on the character and
antecedent of the employee in relation to
his continuance in service.

30. Thus, it is the antecedent,
conduct or character of the candidate to
be appointed to the services which is of
paramount consideration, not of the result
of the criminal case in which he has been
involved, as acquittal may be on a
technical ground or for want of evidence
etc.

31. In view of the above, the
petitioner has obtained the employment
by misrepresentation, i.e., suppressing the
material
information
sought
by
the
appointing authority. The information was
required to verify his character and
antecedents. Thus, neither the result of the
prosecution nor the nature of the offence,
in which he had been involved, has any
bearing on the case. Principles of natural
justice are not attracted in such as fact
situation.

32. No fault can be found with the
impugned
termination
order
dated
20.1.1988. As his termination was not
based on pendency of the criminal case,
his representation for reinstatement has
rightly been rejected vide impugned order
dated 3.6.1999.
860 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2006
Petition is devoid of any merit, and is
accordingly dismissed. No order as to
costs.

 Petition Dismissed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 31.07.2006

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE BHARTI SAPRU, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 44755 of 2003

Bhanu Pratap Pandey

...Petitioner
Versus
Union of India and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Raj Narain Pandey
Sri K.D. Tripathi

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri. B.N. Singh
Sri Dhirendra Kumar Dwivedi
S.S.C.

Constitution of India, Art.226-Removal
from Service-Scope of interference by
writ court-Petitioner while posted in
Nagaland
as
Constable
in
C.R.P.F.-
without permission-deserted the dutyremain absent for 36 day-despite of
three opportunity to explain his conductfailed
to
explain-before
disciplinary,
appellate
as
well
before
revisional
authority-if
retained
in
force-wrong
signal will go to other members of forcewhose prime duty to protect the Nation
and
its
citizens-Held-deserves
no
sympathy-punishment of dismissal fully
justified.

Held: Para 13

I am firm in my mind that a member of
any disciplined Force has to confirm to
discipline even to the extent of making
sacrifices for the nation which he takes a
responsibility to serve. The petitioner
was a member of the disciplined Force
was posted in a sensitive area, failed to
maintain the discipline and the trust
imposed upon him. I am of the opinion
that he deserves no sympathy and I am
also finn1y of the opinion that he has
been given a fair opportunity at three
stages for defending himself. The three
orders passed against him are well
considered and in my opinion are correct
and deserve no modification from this
Court. The punishment imposed upon the
petitioner is fully justified in the-facts
and circumstances of the present case.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Bharati Sapru. J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner Shri R.N. Pandey and also
learned counsel for the Union of India
Shri D.K. Dwivedi at length.

2. The present writ petition has been
filed by the petitioner against three orders
dated 18.4.02 (Almexure-3), order dated
12.11.02 (Annexure-5) and the order
dated 17.7.03 (Annexure- 7) passed by the
respondents No.2,3 & 4. The first order is
an order passed by the disciplinary
authority. The second is an order passed
by the appellate authority and the third
order is passed by the Revisional
Authority, by which, the punishment of
removal of service has been imposed
against the petitioner under the C.R.P.F.
Act, 1945.

3. The facts of the case are that the
petitioner was posted as a Constable at
Dimapur (Nagaland) which is a sensitive
and terrorist affected area.

4. The petitioner was charged with
desertion on 8.11.01 for having left and
deserted
his
duties
without
due
permission and leave from the competent
authority. A departmental enquiry was