# Northern Coalfields Ltd v. The Aluminium Industries Ltd

- **Citation:** (2013) 2 ILRA 780
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2013-05-13
- **Case number:** First Appeal from Order No. 1334 of 2011
- **Bench:** Rakesh Tewari, Anil Kumar Sharma
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/northern-coalfields-ltd-v-the-aluminium-industries-ltd-42596
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996Section 2 (1)(e)-Court means-Principal
Civil Court e.g. Distt. Judge and not the
A.D.J.-order passed under section 34 of
the
Act
by
the
A.D.J.-held-without
jurisdiction-set-a-side-Distt.
Judge
to
decide the case within 3 month.

Held: Para-19
In view of the aforestated discussion we
are in full agreement with ratio given by
an Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court in
the case of M/s I.T.I., Allahabad (supra)
and hold that the Court of Additional
District Judge is not the Principal Civil
Court for the purpose of Section 2(1)(e)
of the Act and the District Judge can not
transfer the case under the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 to the Court of
Additional District Judge by invoking the
provisions of either Section 8(2) of
Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act
or Section 24 of Code of Civil Procedure,
therefore, the court of Additional District
Judge no jurisdiction to dispose of
objections u/s 34 of the Act. The
impugned
order
thus
being
without
jurisdiction cannot be sustained. The
appeal succeeds and is allowed. The
impugned order is set aside and the
matter is remitted back to the District
Judge, Sonebhadra with the request to
dispose
of
the
case
expeditiously
preferably within three months from the
date of receipt of certified copy of this
order. The interim order dated 3.5.2011 is
vacated. The parties would bear their own
costs.

Case Law discussed:
AIR 1998 Allahabad 313; 2002(1) Arb. L.R. 530
(Karnataka); 2002(2) Arb. L.R. 246(SC); C.O. No.
2285 of 2002; 2004(1) Arb. L.R. 560; 2007(2)
Arb. L.R. 363; A.P. A.I.R. 1989 SC 335.

## Text

780 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
decided ex-parte and therefore, arguments
were on the restoration application on the
grounds given therein but learned Single
Judge maintained the order by dismissing the
application without considering that aspect.

28. Be as it may, it happens to be a
case of poor litigant who was engaged as
Gateman in a project and for the alleged
authorized/unauthorized
absence
of
hardly two months he was removed from
service and his writ was entertained in
2000 and was dismissed on the ground of
alternative remedy in the year 2009 in
absence of his counsel and thus we are
satisfied that it is a fit case where order of
learned Single Judge is to be set aside.

29.

Accordingly,
the
appeal
succeeds and is allowed. The order of the
learned Single Judge dated 16.03.2012 is
hereby set aside. The matter is remitted
back to the learned Single Judge for
reconsideration of the claim of parties on
merits.

30. Office is to list the writ petition
before
appropriate
Court
under
appropriate Head in the first week of July,
2013.
---------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.05.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RAKESH TEWARI, J.
THE HON'BLE ANIL KUMAR SHARMA, J.

First Appeal from Order No. 1334 of 2011

Northern Coalfields Ltd.
 Petitioner
Versus
The Aluminium Industries Ltd.Respondent

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Greeshm Jain, Sri Shakti Dhar Dubey
Sri Neeraj Dubey

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Hari Ram Mishra, Sri Ashok Srivastava
Sri R.P. Mishra

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996Section 2 (1)(e)-Court means-Principal
Civil Court e.g. Distt. Judge and not the
A.D.J.-order passed under section 34 of
the
Act
by
the
A.D.J.-held-without
jurisdiction-set-a-side-Distt.
Judge
to
decide the case within 3 month.

Held: Para-19
In view of the aforestated discussion we
are in full agreement with ratio given by
an Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court in
the case of M/s I.T.I., Allahabad (supra)
and hold that the Court of Additional
District Judge is not the Principal Civil
Court for the purpose of Section 2(1)(e)
of the Act and the District Judge can not
transfer the case under the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 to the Court of
Additional District Judge by invoking the
provisions of either Section 8(2) of
Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act
or Section 24 of Code of Civil Procedure,
therefore, the court of Additional District
Judge no jurisdiction to dispose of
objections u/s 34 of the Act. The
impugned
order
thus
being
without
jurisdiction cannot be sustained. The
appeal succeeds and is allowed. The
impugned order is set aside and the
matter is remitted back to the District
Judge, Sonebhadra with the request to
dispose
of
the
case
expeditiously
preferably within three months from the
date of receipt of certified copy of this
order. The interim order dated 3.5.2011 is
vacated. The parties would bear their own
costs.

Case Law discussed:
AIR 1998 Allahabad 313; 2002(1) Arb. L.R. 530
(Karnataka); 2002(2) Arb. L.R. 246(SC); C.O. No.
2285 of 2002; 2004(1) Arb. L.R. 560; 2007(2)
Arb. L.R. 363; A.P. A.I.R. 1989 SC 335.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Anil Kumar Sharma,J.)
2 All] Northern Coalfields Ltd. Vs. The Aluminium Industries Ltd.
781

1. Challenge in this appeal u/s 37 of
Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (to
be referred as the 'Act' hereinafter) read
with Order XLIII Rule 1 and Section 104
Code of Civil Procedure is to the order
dated 28.3.2011 passed by Addl. District
Judge (Court No.1), Sonebhadra in Misc.
Case no. 12 of 2009 filed u/s 34 of the
Act in respect of award dated 25.8.2007.

2. At the time of hearing of appeal a
preliminary jurisdictional objection was
raised
on
behalf
of
the
appellant
contending that the Court of Additional
District Judge is not a 'Court' within the
definition of Section 2 (1) (e) of the Act,
therefore, it has no jurisdiction to dispose
of objections u/s 34 of the Act filed by the
appellant before the District Judge,
Sonebhadra against the impugned award
dated 25.8.2007. In these circumstances,
presently we are confined only to this
issue and are not dealing with the merits
of the case. Reliance has been placed by
the appellant on the case of M/s I.T.I.
Ltd. Allahabad Vs. District Judge,
Allahabad
and
others
AIR
1998
Allahabad 313. Per contra learned
counsel
for
the
respondent
fairly
conceding that the view of this Court in
the above noted case is contrary to the
findings of trial Court has valiantly tried
to contend that the Court of Additional
District Judge in a district is not inferior
to the Court of District Judge and thus the
impugned order does not suffer from any
jurisdictional error.

3. It is not disputed that the
appellant,
a
Government
company
engaged in the mining operation for
extraction of coal in the States of M. P.
and U. P. awarded a contract worth Rs.
29,73,31,100.00 and works & services for
Rs. 18,35,59,000.00 to the respondent
company for construction of 4-million ton
per year capacity Coal Handling Plant at
Khadia District Sonebhadra (U.P.) on turn
key basis. The contract was. The schedule
period of completion of plant was 24months from the date of handing over the
site i.e. 22.11.1993. However, agreed
revised date of completion was fixed as
25.6.1994 due to delay in handing over of
site by the appellant. Later on by way of
mutual agreement the plant was divided in
two phases. After completion of both
phases it was mutually agreed to conduct
the performance guarantee test of total
place from 2.3.1998 to 31.3.1998. A
committee of officers was constituted and
test was completed on 31.3.1998. The
committee thereafter recommended to
take over the total plant for commercial
operation w.e.f. 1.4.1998. The respondent
was however, given time to remove short
comings and complete balance work
within one year i.e. up to 31.3.1999.

4. As per agreement above the
balance
work/deficiencies
which
remained unattended within one year may
be dealt as per contract on risk and cost of
respondent or adjustment of cost price
available in the contract. However, due to
financial crisis the respondent could not
complete the balance work/deficiencies
within guarantee period of one year and
the appellant decided to take up work on
risk and cost of respondent from cost
price available in the contract. The
appellant also encashed bank guarantee of
the respondent and imposed penalty due
to delay in completion of work. The
respondent approached this Court by way
application
dated
7.3.2000
for
appointment of sole Arbitrator to resolve
the dispute as per the arbitration clause
contained in the contract. Consequently
vide order dated 8.2.2001 Justice R. M.
782 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
Sahai, Former Judge Supreme Court was
appointed sole Arbitrator. The parties
participated in the arbitration proceedings
and the award u/s 31 of the Act was
pronounced on 25.8.2007. The operative
part of the said award is as under:

(1) The claimant is entitled to
reduction of liquidated damages levied by
the respondent by 50%.

(2) The claimant shall, further be
entitled to the amount found due on
recalculation of interest, on extra ordinary
advance. The exercise shall be completed
within one month from 25.8.2007, the
date the award is being made.

(3) The claimant shall be entitled to
refund
on
final
accounting
after
recalculation of interest in the manner
indicated while dealing issue no.5.

(4) The claimant shall be entitled to
interest under Section 31(7)(a) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 on
the amount found due in paragraph 2 and
3 of this order to be payable at the rate of
10% from 16.4.2001 i.e. the date of
Arbitrator took cognizance of these
proceedings till 25.8.2007 the date when
the award is being made.

(5) The claimant shall be entitled to
interest under Section 31(7)(b) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 at
the rate of 12% from 25.8.2007 the date
of award till the date of payment.

(6) In view of divided success the
parties shall bear their own cost."

5. On 15.12.2007 the appellant filed
objections u/s 34 of the Act in this Court,
which were subsequently withdrawn on
29.5.2009. The appellant then filed instant
objections u/s 34 of the Act before the
District Judge, Sonebhadra on 1.7.2009,
who vide order dated 24.9.2009 excluded
the period from 15.12.2007 to 29.5.2009
in computation of limitation in filing
objections u/s 34 of the Act. After
exchange of objections/rejoinder etc. the
District Judge heard arguments of counsel
for the appellant on 28.4.2010 and
25.5.2010 and after few adjournments the
case was transferred by the District Judge
to the Court of Additional District Judge,
Court no. 1 on 5.10.2010. The Presiding
Officer of the transferee Court asked the
parties' counsel whether this Court has
jurisdiction to hear the objections u/s 34
of the Act since both the counsel agreed
that the Court has jurisdiction, so the case
was fixed for argument on 1.12.2010.
Thereafter arguments were heard by the
Additional District Judge but could not be
concluded and then on 4.3.2011 the
appellant filed application for transfer of
the case to the Court of District Judge on
the strength of case law reported in ITI
Ltd., Allahabad Vs. District Judge,
Allahabad AIR 1998 All 313. Similar
application was also filed by the appellant
in the Court of District Judge for stay of
the proceedings. However, after hearing
the parties counsel, the trial Court through
impugned
order
has
dismissed
the
appellant's objections u/s 34 of the Act.
Aggrieved, they have come up in appeal.

6. We have heard arguments of
parties' counsel at length regarding
jurisdictional issue raised before us as
also perused the law cited at the Bar.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant
has argued that in view of the provisions
of Section 2(e) & 42 of the Act of 1996
and Section 3(17) of the General Clauses
Act, the Additional District Judge has no
jurisdiction to decide the application
under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, for
the reasons that as per Section 2(e) of the
Act of 1996 the "Court" means the
2 All] Northern Coalfields Ltd. Vs. The Aluminium Industries Ltd.
783
Principal Civil Court of the district and as per
Section 3(17) of General Clauses Act the
District Judge is the Judge of a Principal
Civil Court and in view of Section 42 when
any application with respect to an arbitration
agreement is filed before the District Judge,
he or she has no authority to transfer the said
application and District Judge has to decide
the application. Reliance has been placed on
the case of I.T.I., Allahabad (supra) in
support of their contention.

8. Per contra learned counsel for the
respondent countering the above argument
submits that the appellant's counsel has
acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the
Additional District Judge at the initial stage of
the proceeding, thereafter they now cannot
take a u-turn to contend that the Court of
Additional District Judge lacks jurisdiction in
deciding the application u/s 34 of the Act. He
further submitted that the Additional District
Judge has been authorized to discharge any of
the functions of a District Judge, including the
functions of Principal Civil Court of original
jurisdiction which the District Judge may, by
general or special order, assign to him and in
the discharge of such functions he shall
exercise the same powers as of the District
Judge. Therefore, the District Judge has
rightly transferred the case to the Additional
District Judge for disposal according to law.
Learned counsel counsel for the respondent
has relied upon the following cases:

i) Valliappa Software Tehnological
Park (Pvt.) Ltd., Banglore Versus C.
Sundaram and others 2002 (1) Arb. L.R.
530 (Karnataka);

ii) I.T.I. Ltd. Vs. Siemens Public
Communications Network Ltd. 2002(2)
Arb.L.R. 246 (SC);

iii) Macro Tech India & others Vs.
Uma Roy C.O. No. 2285 of 2002 decided
on 29.11.2002;

iv)
Globsyn
Technologies
Ltd.,
Calcutta
Vs.
Eskaayecee
Infosys,
Visakahapatnam 2004(1) Arb.L.R. 560;

v) Fountain Head Developers Vs.
Maria Arcangela Sequeira with Western
Maharashtra Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs.
Kolhapur Municipal Corportation 2007(2)
Arb.L.R. 363;

vi) Madhya Pradesh State Electricity
Board
&
Another
Vs.
ANSALDO
Energia, S.P.A. And another AIR 2008
MP 328;

vii) Nand Contractors and Engineers
through G. D. Ahuja Vs. Northern
Coalfield Limited and another 2012 (9)
SCC 494.

9. In order to appreciate the rival
contentions, it is necessary to have a
quick look on the relevant provisions
regarding the point in issue. Section 2 (1)
(e) of the Act defines 'Court as under:

"Court" means the Principal Civil
Court of original jurisdiction in a district,
and includes the High Court in exercise of
its ordinary original civil jurisdiction,
having jurisdiction to decide the questions
forming
the
subject-matter
of
the
arbitration if the same had been the
subject-matter of a suit, but does not
include any Civil Court of a grade
inferior to such Principal Civil Court, or
any Court of Small Causes.

Thus, the definition of 'court' in
section 2(1)(e) is narrower than the
ordinary definition of 'court'. It is both
inclusive and exclusive. It defines 'court'
to mean the principal civil court of
original jurisdiction in a district. The
definition specifically includes the High
Court in exercise of its ordinary original
civil jurisdiction within its ambit but
excludes 'civil courts of a grade inferior to
784 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
such principal civil court' and Court of
Small Causes. Thus under the Act, 'court'
means and includes the district court and
High Court in exercise of its ordinary
original civil jurisdiction. The only
condition
is
that
it
should
have
jurisdiction to decide the questions
forming the subject matter of the
arbitration if the same would have been
the subject matter of a suit. In the case of
Mahalakshmi Oil Mills Vs. State of A.
P. AIR 1989 SC 335, the Apex Court has
observed as under:

"By
using
the
words
'means,
'includes' and 'does not include' in section
2(1)(e) of the Act, the Parliament has
exhaustively explained the meaning of the
term 'court' in that the words 'means' is a
term of restriction, while the word
'includes' is a term of enlargement and
when the words 'means' and 'includes' are
used together to define a thing, the
intendment of the legislature is to supply
restricted meaning to the terms."

Section 3(17) of the General Clauses
Act, 1897 defines the term "District
Judge" as 'the Judge of a principal civil
court of original jurisdiction but shall not
include a High Court in the exercise of its
ordinary or extraordinary original civil
jurisdiction'. Thus the definition of Court
of 'District Judge' and 'Principal Civil
Court of original jurisdiction are similar
and there is no distinction between the
two. The Courts of Civil Judges Senior
and Junior Division may also be civil
court of original jurisdiction, but none of
them can be termed as principal civil
court of original jurisdiction for the
purposes of the Act.

10. It is not in dispute that the Court
of an Additional District Judge is, a class
of civil court as enunciated by Section 3
of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Court
Act, 1887, and it exercises the same power as
the District Judge in relation to the functions
assigned to it by the District Judge under
Section 8(2) of the aforesaid Act but that by
itself, would not invest it with the trapping of
the principal civil court of original jurisdiction
in a district. Section 8 of the afore-stated Act
reads as below :

"8. Additional Judges (1) when the
business pending before any District
Judge requires the aid of Additional
Judges for its speedy disposal. State
Government may, having consulted High
Court, appoint such Additional Judges as
may be requisite.

(2) Additional Judges so appointed
shall discharge any of the functions of a
District Judge which the District Judge
may assign to them and in the discharge
of those functions they shall exercise the
same power as the District Judge."

The word 'principal' means; the first
in importance : chief, main ; and the word
"grade" used in Section 2(e) of the Act
signifies status and importance and it does
not refer to a, class or particular class
inasmuch as the grade of a Court depends
on the pecuniary or other limitations of
the jurisdiction of the particular Court.

Section 42 of the Act of 1996
envisages that:

42. Jurisdiction - Notwithstanding
anything contained elsewhere in this part
or in any other law for the time being in
force, where with respect to an arbitration
agreement any application under this Part
has been made in a Court, that Court
alone shall have jurisdiction over the
arbitral proceedings and all subsequent
2 All] Northern Coalfields Ltd. Vs. The Aluminium Industries Ltd.
785
applications arising out of that agreement
and the arbitral proceedings shall be made
in that Court and in no other Court.

Thus, Section 42 of the Act is an
overriding provision and it provides that in
respect of arbitration proceedings a single
court shall have exclusive jurisdiction. The
words 'court' must be read in the context in
which it is used in the statute and it would
not be proper for the Courts to give a liberal
meaning to it. Therefore, a conjoint reading
of Sections 2 (1) (e) & 42 of the Act, leaves
no manner of doubt that the Legislature
intended to make only one Court the
Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction
or, as the case may be, the High Court in
exercise of its ordinary original jurisdiction,
whichever Court is approached earlier, as the
venue for all matters connected with an
arbitration agreement; and award, and all
arbitral proceedings. Sections 2(e) & 42 of
the Act in simple language, would mean that,
any application with respect to an arbitration
agreement will have to be filed in the
Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction
in a district, or, as the case may be, in the
original civil jurisdiction of the High Court,
having jurisdiction to decide the questions
forming the subject-matter of the arbitration
if the same had been the subject-matter of a
suit and that Court alone to which the
application is filed shall have the jurisdiction
over the entire arbitral proceedings to the
exclusion of any other Court, having
jurisdiction to decide the questions forming
the subject-matter of arbitration.

11. This Court in the case of I.T.I,
Allahabad (supra) taking note of Section
3(17) of General Clauses Act, 1897 which
defines 'District Judge' as 'the judge of
Principal
Civil
Court
of
original
jurisdiction'
also
considered
the
provisions of Section 8(2) of the Bengal,
Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1897
under which the District Court was
constituted. It was held that in para-12 as
under:

"As a result of the foregoing discussion
and on regard being had to the definition of
the term "Court" as elucidated in Section 2(e)
and the overriding effect of Section 42 of the
Act, I am persuaded to the view that the Court
of the Additional District Judge is shorn of
jurisdiction to entertain an application under
Section 34 of the Act and the District Judge
cannot, by invoking the provisions contained
in Section 8(2) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam
Civil Courts Act, 1887, transfer the
application for its disposal to the Court of an
Additional District Judge. An application for
setting aside an award under Section 34 of the
Act is as much an application "with respect to
an arbitration agreement" as it is for "setting
aside the arbitral award" and it is a matter of
statutory compulsion that such application is
made to the principal civil court of original
jurisdiction in a district 'or' the High Court in
exercise of its ordinary original civil
jurisdiction' having jurisdiction to decide the
questions forming the subject-matter of
arbitration if the same had been the subjectmatter of a suit and it is again a matter of
statutory mandate that the Court to which the
application is made 'alone shall have
jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and
all subsequent applications arising out of that
agreement', and the arbitral proceedings shall
be made in that Court and in no other Court
except the appellate court being in seisin over
the matter. The power to transfer/assign the
application to any other Court, otherwise
having jurisdiction to decide the questions
forming the subject-matter of arbitration had
it been the subject-matter of a suit, has been
impliedly taken away by Section 42 of the Act
which is couched in a language fraught with
overriding effect. I am conscious of the fact
786 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
that the view I am taking, may result in adding
burden to the District Judge but the plain or
unambiguous words of the statute, i.e., words
which are reasonably susceptible to only one
meaning will have to be given effect
'irrespective of consequences'-- See Nelson
Motis Vs. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1981."

The facts of the aforesaid case are quite
similar to the instant case. An application u/s
34 of the Act was filed in the Court of the
District Judge for setting of the award. After
entertaining the application, the District Judge
transferred the same to the Court of III
Additional District Judge, Allahabad for
disposal. An objection was raised before the
transferee Court that it has no jurisdiction to
entertain the application. The Additional
District Judge over-ruled the objections
holding that the expression 'but does not
include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to
such Principal Civil Court or any Court of
Small Causes' used in Section 2(e) of the Act,
implies that in addition to the District Judge
there may be other Prinicipal Civil Courts of
original jurisdiction in a district and
Additional District Judge not being inferior in
grade to the District Judge comes within the
purview of the term 'Court' as defined under
Section 2(e) of the Act. Then an application
was filed before the District Judge stating that
as the application u/s 34 of the Act was
originally presented in the Court of the
District Judge, therefore, in view of provisions
section 42 of the Act, that Court alone should
deal with arbitral proceedings and transfer of
the said application from the Court of District
Judge to the Court of III Additional District
Judge was not proper. The said objection was
over-ruled. It is against the said order, the
matter was taken to this Court.

12. The Karnataka High Court in the
case
of
Valiliappa
Software
Technological
Park
(Pvt.)
Ltd.,
Banglore case (supra) distinguished the
case of M/s ITI Industries (supra) on the
premise that pursuant to the orders of the
High Court, the Principal City Civil Court
Judge has allotted all the arbitration
proceedings filed in the City Civil Court
of Banglore to the 6th Additional City
Civil Judge. It was not a case of Principal
City
Civil
Judge
entertaining
the
application u/s 9 of the Act and then
transferring the same to the Court of 6th
Additional City Civil Judge. .

13. The core question in the case of
ITI
Ltd.
Vs.
Siemens
Public
Communications
Network
Ltd.,
(supra), before the Apex court was
whether a revision under Section 115
Civil Procedure Code lies to the High
Court as against an order made by a Civil
Court in an appeal preferred under
Section 37 of the Act against an interim
order made by the arbitral tribunal? The
definition of 'Court' provided in section 2
(1)(e) of the Act was not in issue before
the Apex Court.

14. Before Calcutta High Court in
the case of Macro Tech India and
others (supra), the decision of this
Court in M/s ITI, Ltd. Allahabad (supra)
was not pressed into service. Even the
statement of objects and reasons viz- 'to
minimise the supervisory role of Courts in
arbitral
process'
as
given
in
the
Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 1995
was
not
considered,
which
was
instrumental in narrowing down the
definition of 'Court' in the Act of 1996 as
given in the Arbitration Act, 1940.

15. The Andhra Pradesh High Court
in the case of Globsyn Technologies
Ltd., Calcutta (supra) although took note
of the case of M/s ITI Ltd., Allahabad
2 All] Shammi Vs. State of U.P. and Anr.
787
(supra) but without considering the
provisions of General Clauses Act or
Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts or
the provisions of Section 42 of the Act
and their joint impact on the jurisdictional
issue took a different view.

16. The Full Bench of Bombay High
Court in the case of Fountain Head
Developers (supra) opined that the
principal
civil
court
of
original
jurisdiction in a district for the purpose of
a petition under Section 34 of the Act is a
District Court and does not include any
other Court inferior to the District Court.
In this case the Court was considering
whether Court of Civil Judge Senior
Division is inferior to principal civil court
of original jurisdiction in a district i.e.
District Judge or not? The full bench
found itself in agreement with the view
expressed by Hon'ble Single Judge of this
Court in the M/s I.T.I., Allahabad (supra).

17. In the case of Madhya Pradesh
State
Electricity
Board
(supra)
a
division bench of Madhya Pradesh High
Court as noted in para-22 of the report
observed that as far as Madhya Pradesh is
concerned, the Additional District Judge
is equated with the Principal Civil Court
of original jurisdiction. Section 21(1)(e)
does not include any civil Court of grade
inferior to such Principal Civil Court or
any Court of Samll Causes. It means that
the verdict has been squeezed to the
territory of Madhya Pradesh only.

18. The case of Nand Contractors
and Engineers through G. D. Ahuja
(supra) does not deal with the controversy
in hand as the issue involved in the case
was with regard to award of interest.

19. In view of the aforestated
discussion we are in full agreement with
ratio given by an Hon'ble Single Judge of
this Court in the case of M/s I.T.I.,
Allahabad (supra) and hold that the Court
of Additional District Judge is not the
Principal Civil Court for the purpose of
Section 2(1)(e) of the Act and the District
Judge can not transfer the case under the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to the
Court of Additional District Judge by
invoking the provisions of either Section 8(2)
of Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act
or Section 24 of Code of Civil Procedure,
therefore, the court of Additional District
Judge no jurisdiction to dispose of objections
u/s 34 of the Act. The impugned order thus
being
without
jurisdiction
cannot
be
sustained. The appeal succeeds and is
allowed. The impugned order is set aside and
the matter is remitted back to the District
Judge, Sonebhadra with the request to
dispose of the case expeditiously preferably
within three months from the date of receipt
of certified copy of this order. The interim
order dated 3.5.2011 is vacated. The parties
would bear their own costs.
---------
RIVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.05.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ADITYA NATH MITTAL, J.

Criminal Revision No. 1728 of 2010

Shammi

...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and Anr.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Raghuraj Kishore
Sri S.M. Abbas Naqvi

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.G.A.