# Om Prakash Lakhina Revisionist v. Administrator of Specified Undertaking of U.T. I. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 1 ILRA 1
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-12-12
- **Case number:** Civil Revision No. 523 of 2012
- **Bench:** Jayant Banerji
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/om-prakash-lakhina-revisionist-v-administrator-of-specified-undertaking-of-u-t-44980
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Code of civil Procedure, 1908 - Section
115 -challenge to- rejection of suit under
order 7 rule 11-suit can be dismissed if
the same is barred by limitation from a
bare
reading
of
plaint-plaintiffsrespondents
had
discovered
the
commission of fraud by the defendantrevisionist prior to lodging FIR-date on
which the cause of action arose, is
misplaced and is not consonance with the
provision of section 17 of Limitation Act.
(Para 10 to 28)

Civil Revision allowed. (E-6)

List of cases cited: -

## Text

1 All. Om Prakash Lakhina Vs. Administrator of Specified Undertaking of U.T.I. & Ors.
1
(2020)1ILR A1

REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 12.12.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE JAYANT BANERJI, J.

Civil Revision No. 523 of 2012

Om Prakash Lakhina ...Revisionist
Versus
Administrator of Specified Undertaking of
U.T. I. & Ors.
 ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Ajay Kumar Singh, Sri Ashish Kumar Singh

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
Sri Prabodh Gaur, Sri S.K. Rai

A. Code of civil Procedure, 1908 - Section
115 -challenge to- rejection of suit under
order 7 rule 11-suit can be dismissed if
the same is barred by limitation from a
bare
reading
of
plaint-plaintiffsrespondents
had
discovered
the
commission of fraud by the defendantrevisionist prior to lodging FIR-date on
which the cause of action arose, is
misplaced and is not consonance with the
provision of section 17 of Limitation Act.
(Para 10 to 28)

Civil Revision allowed. (E-6)

List of cases cited: -

1. Mahabir Kishore & Ors. Vs. St. of M. P.,
MANU/SC/0051/1990

2. Kamlesh Babu & ors. Vs. Lajpat Rai Sharma
& Ors. 2008 (3) AWC 2903 (SC)

3. Raghwendra Saran Singh Vs. Ram Prashnna
Singh MANU/SC/0367/2019

4. Satya Prakash Sharma Vs. Arif Khan & ors.
MANU/UP/3074/2009
5. Panna Lal Jain Vs. Jain Bank of India Ltd.
AIR 1938 Lahore 368

6. Manindra Land & Building Corporation Ltd. Vs.
Bhutnath Banerjee & ors. AIR 1964 SC 1336

(Delivered by Hon'ble Jayant Banerji, J.)

1. Heard Shri Ajay Kumar Singh,
learned counsel for the revisionist and Shri
Prabodh Gaur, learned counsel for the
plaintiff-respondents.

2. This revision has been filed by the
defendant challenging the order dated
28.7.2012
passed
by
the Additional
District Judge, Court No. 10, Varanasi in
Civil
Suit
No.
1007
of
2008
(Administrators of Specified Undertaking
of Unit Trust of India and another Vs. Om
Prakash Lakhina and others) whereby the
issue no. 1 which was to the effect whether
the suit being barred by limitation is liable
to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC,
was answered in the negative.

3. The aforesaid original suit was
filed by the plaintiff-respondent seeking
relief, inter alia, of a direction to the
defendants to pay to the plaintiffs jointly
and severally an amount of Rs. 43,25,346/-
as particularly set out in Exhibit 'D' at the
foot of the plaint along with interest at the
rate of 12 percent per annum from
11.11.2015 till the date of filing of the suit.

4. It is alleged in the suit that fraud
had been perpetrated by the other
defendants
in
collusion
with
the
defendant-revisionist who was then the
Branch Manager of Unit Trust of India,
Varanasi and large sums of money had
been deposited by issuance of at par
cheques in the name of the defendant no. 3
which were credited to the bank accounts
2 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of defendant no. 3. The amounts were
stated to have been credited on 23.10.2000
and thereafter. It is stated that the entries
of the cheques were not made in the
utilization register at the time of the
issuance of cheques. Other allegations are
made against all the defendants. It is stated
that a four member team of UTI, New
Delhi,
which
conducted
preliminary
verification/ reconciliation of at par
account in May 2002, collected the hard
copy of paid data from 1 June 2000 to 30
June 2001 from defendant no. 1 which
contained the signature of the defendant
no. 1 on every page. It is stated that in the
reconciliation
statement
made
on
30.6.2001, the defendant no. 1 had
deliberately and intentionally done wrong
calculation by putting some fictitious
figures to arrive at the bank figure.
Misappropriation of an amount of Rs. 3.36
crores is alleged. It is stated in paragraph
no. 38 that the defendant no. 1 had also
prepared the false reconciliation statement,
misrepresented
fact
and
committed
criminal omission of vital facts and
information due to which the UTI had
initiated criminal proceedings against the
defendant nos. 1 and 2. In paragraph no.
39 of the plaint, it has been stated that an
FIR dated 31.7.2002 had been filed against
the defendants and that the defendant nos.
1 and 2 have been served with a chargesheet. It is further stated that the CBI had
arrested the defendant no. 1 on 24.7.2003
and he remained in police/judicial custody
for a period of three months. It is further
stated that on 30.11.2004, the Enquiry
Officer had submitted his report which
clearly implicated the defendant nos. 1 and
2 for defrauding the UTI of the aforesaid
amount. The order of dismissal was passed
against the defendant nos. 1 and 2 on
11.11.2005. In the appeal filed by the
defendant no. 1, the Appellate Authority
upheld the dismissal of the defendant no. 1
by means of an order dated 9.10.2006. It is
stated in paragraph no. 40 that the
plaintiff-respondents sent a legal notice
dated 17.10.2007 demanding an amount of
Rs. 37,09,400/- from the defendant no. 1
and 2 but they failed to return the said
amount. In paragraph no. 50 of the plaint it
has been stated that the cause of action in
respect of the suit accrued on the final
dismissal order dated 11.11.2005 being
passed against the defendant nos. 1 and 2
and when they failed to respond to the
demand notice dated 17.10.2007 and
hence the present suit is not barred by the
law of limitation.

5. By means of the impugned order,
the court below observed that in paragraph
no. 50 of the plaint the cause of action has
been stated to be arisen for the first time
on 11.11.2005 when the defendant nos. 1
and 2 were dismissed and they did not file
any reply to the demand notice dated
17.10.2007 and that accordingly the suit
was not barred by the Limitation Act,
1963. The court below observed that the
defendants had argued that the cause of
action actually arose on that very day
when the defendant no.1 was dismissed
from service and that date was 11.11.2005
and therefore, it was necessary in view of
section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for
the suit to be lodged within a period of
three years from 11.11.2005 which was not
done by the plaintiff and the suit was
lodged on 28.08.2008. The Court below
further stated that no direct relationship of
the dismissal of the defendant no.1 exists
in respect of the matter in question, though
after his dismissal on the basis of the
departmental inquiry it came to knowledge
that in the above matter, the defendant
no.1 had connived in the embezzlement
and in this regard he was sent a demand
1 All. Om Prakash Lakhina Vs. Administrator of Specified Undertaking of U.T.I. & Ors.
3
notice so that the embezzled amount can
be recovered but in view of non-receipt of
an appropriate reply to the aforesaid
demand notice, the plaintiff Bank was
constrained to institute the suit for
recovering the amount which has been
instituted within the prescribed limitation
of three years under section 3 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 and thus it is not
proved that the suit was barred by
limitation. Accordingly, issue no.1 was
decided at the preliminary stage in the
negative.

6. The contention of the learned
counsel for the defendant-revisionist is
that a bare perusal of the plaint reveals that
the suit is barred by limitation. He
contends that a four member team of UTI,
New Delhi had conducted a preliminary
verification/reconciliation
of
at
par
account in May 2002, as is mentioned in
paragraph no. 15 of the plaint. Learned
counsel further referred to the paragraph
no. 39 of the plaint to contend that an FIR
dated 31.7.2002 had been filed against the
defendants and as per own statement of the
plaintiff-respondent, the defendant no. 1
was arrested by the CBI on 24.7.2003 and
the Inquiry Officer had submitted his
report on 30.11.2004. Thus, the suit that
was filed on 28.8.2008 was well beyond
the limitation prescribed in view of the
facts of the case. It is contended that the
plaintiffs have wrongly mentioned in
paragraph no. 50 of the plaint that the
cause of action accrued on the final
dismissal order dated 11.11.2005 being
passed against the defendant-revisionist.
This date, it is contended, has been
purposely referred to in the plaint only to
bring the suit within limitation.

7. Learned counsel for the revisionist
has referred to the impugned order and
stated that the court below has misquoted
the counsel for the defendant-revisionist
that the cause of action actually arose
when
the
defendant-revisionist
was
dismissed from service and that date was
11.11.2005. The learned counsel has
referred
to
Ground
No.(i)
in
the
memorandum of revision in this regard. It
has been further stated that the court below
has misdirected itself in not referring to
the contents of the application filed by the
defendant-revisionist under Order 7 Rule
11 CPC and has referred to only two dates
mentioned in paragraph no. 50 of the
plaint but has wrongly ascertained the date
when the cause of action arose. It is
contended that even if it is assumed
without admitting that the learned counsel
for the revisionist had submitted that the
cause of action arose when the revisionist
was dismissed on 11.11.2005, the court
below was bound, in view of the
provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation
Act, to independently assess the averments
in the plaint for purpose of ascertaining
that the suit was within limitation.

8.

Learned
counsel
for
the
revisionist, in support of his contentions,
has referred to the judgements of the
Supreme Court in the case of Mahabir
Kishore and others Vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh
reported
in
MANU/SC/0051/1990, Kamlesh Babu
and others Vs. Lajpat Rai Sharma and
others reported in 2008 (3) AWC 2903
(SC), Raghwendra Saran Singh VS. Ram
Prashnna
Singh
reported
in
MANU/SC/0367/2019 and the judgement
of this Court in the matter of Satya
Prakash Sharma Vs. Arif Khan and
others reported in MANU/UP/3074/2009.
Learned counsel has referred to the
provisions of Section 17 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 and Section 72 of the Indian
4 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Contract Act in support of his contention.
It is contended that the matter for which
the suit was filed pertains to some mistake
allegedly committed by the defendantrevisionist and as such that would come
within the provision of Section 17(1)(c) of
the Limitation Act. It is stated that the
fraud was discovered by the plaintiff and
thereafter they lodged an FIR on 31.7.2002
and charge-sheet was filed by the Enquiry
Officer on 24.6.2003.

9.

Countering
the
aforesaid
submissions made by the learned counsel
for the defendant-revisionist, Shri Prabodh
Gaur, learned counsel for the plaintiffrespondents stated that the issue no. 1
framed by the court below pursuant to an
application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC
was not an issue that could be considered
on the basis of a reading of the plaint
alone. Learned counsel has contended that
the
matter
would
come
under
the
provisions of Section 17(1)(a) of the
Limitation Act. He contends that the point
of time from which period of limitation
begins to run is a question of fact which
can be decided after evidence. He has
referred to paragraph nos. 34 and 35 of the
plaint to state that the defendants had
admitted their guilt and liability before the
authority concerned. He states that the
process of generating cheques that were
encashed was a complex process and
therefore fraud cannot be detected easily.
It is contended that the plaintiff is not
natural person who can derive the
knowledge instantly. It could only rely on
due process which, in the facts and
circumstances
of
the
case,
is
the
disciplinary enquiry which concluded by
imposing the penalty of dismissal on the
defendant-respondent on 11.11.2005. It is
stated that the fraud was discovered after
affording full opportunity given to the
defendants
during
the
enquiry
proceedings, on conclusion of which it can
be said that the discovery of fraud took
place. Moreover, it is stated that the
defendants will not suffer any prejudice in
case the suit continues.

10. Learned counsel for the parties
have uniformly submitted that Article 113
of the Schedule to the Limitation Act,
1963 would be applicable in the facts of
the case.

Section 17 of the Limitation Act
is as follows:

"17.
Effect
of
fraud
or
mistake.-- (1) Where, in the case of any
suit or application for which a period of
limitation is prescribed by this Act,--

(a) the suit or application is
based upon the fraud of the defendant or
respondent or his agent; or

(b) the knowledge of the right or
title on which a suit or application is
founded is concealed by the fraud of any
such person as aforesaid; or

(c) the suit or application is for
relief from the consequences of a mistake;
or

(d)
where
any
document
necessary to establish the right of the
plaintiff or applicant has been fraudulently
concealed from him,

the period of limitation shall not
begin to run until plaintiff or applicant has
discovered the fraud or the mistake or
could, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered it; or in the case of a concealed
document, until the plaintiff or the
applicant first had the means of producing
the concealed document or compelling its
production:

Provided that nothing in this
section shall enable any suit to be
instituted or application to be made to
1 All. Om Prakash Lakhina Vs. Administrator of Specified Undertaking of U.T.I. & Ors.
5
recover or enforce any charge against, or
set aside any transaction affecting, any
property which--

(i) in the case of fraud, has been
purchased for valuable consideration by a
person who was not a party to the fraud
and did not at the time of the purchase
know, or have reason to believe, that any
fraud had been committed, or

(ii) in the case of mistake, has
been purchased for valuable consideration
subsequently to the transaction in which
the mistake was made, by a person who
did not know, or have reason to believe,
that the mistake had been made, or

(iii) in the case of a concealed
document, has been purchased for valuable
consideration by a person who was not a
party to the concealment and, did not at
the time of purchase know, or have reason
to believe, that the document had been
concealed.

(2) Where a judgment-debtor
has, by fraud or force, prevented the
execution of a decree or order within the
period of limitation, the court may, on the
application of the judgment-creditor made
after the expiry of the said period extend
the period for execution of the decree or
order:

Provided that such application is
made within one year from the date of the
discovery of the fraud or the cessation of
force, as the case may be."

11. A perusal of the entire plaint
reveals that there is a guarded disclosure
of
dates
pertaining
to
disciplinary
proceedings
initiated
against
the
defendant-revisionist. In paragraph no. 17,
it is stated that the Assistant Manager of
UTI, Varanasi had stated during his
examination after he had taken charge of
at par account reconciliation of UTI,
Varanasi from July 2001 onwards that he
had noticed serious discrepancies. It is not
stated that when did that examination of
the Assistant Manager had taken place. In
paragraph no.26 of the plaint, it is stated
that in the first week of January 2002, it
came to notice that several cheques were
missing from the office. One Shri Kiran
Vohra, the then Manager of UTI, Varanasi,
during his visit to New Delhi in the last
week of January 2002 and first week of
February 2002, reported the matter of
missing cheques to the Zonal Manager and
Deputy Zonal Manager. On 25.2.2002
some important evidence was lost. In para
27 it is stated that the aforesaid facts
conclusively establishes that the defendant
no. 1 had deliberately concealed the loss of
missing cheques from the zonal office.

12. In paragraph no. 35 of the plaint
it has been stated that the defendant no. 2
had admitted his involvement in the
fraudulent withdrawal and that due to
heavy losses in the share market, he
indulged in the fraudulent encashment of
at par cheques. He is also alleged to have
stated that the defendant no.1 the then
Branch Manager was also involved in this
matter. However, no date has been
mentioned in the plaint that when the
defendant
no.
2
had
admitted
his
involvement. In paragraph no. 37 it has
been stated that the investigation revealed
that the defendant no. 1 deliberately
tampered
the
paid
file,
misplaced/destroyed the paid cheques and
fund commitment register and produced
bogus reconciliation statement before the
statutory auditor and deliberately not
provided the necessary records and papers
up to June 2001 either to the auditors or to
the officers who had taken over the charge
of at par reconciliation after July 2001.
Again in this paragraph, no dates have
been mentioned and no specifics have
6 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
been stated that when did the investigation
conclude.

13. In paragraph no. 39 of the plaint
it is alleged that an FIR dated 31.7.2002
has been filed against the defendants and
that the plaintiffs had served a chargesheets on the defendant no. 1 and 2. The
defendant no. 1 was arrested by CBI on
24.7.2003. It is stated that on 30.11.2004
the Enquiry Officer submitted his report
which clearly implicated the defendant
nos. 1 and 2 for defrauding the UTI for the
aforesaid amounts. It is not mentioned in
this paragraph that when did the plaintiffs
serve the charge-sheet on the defendant
nos. 1 and 2.

14. However, from perusal of para
39, a fact that emerges is that the plaintiffs
had discovered the alleged fraud which led
to the lodging of an FIR dated 31.7.2002
against the defendants.

15. The period of limitation of the
suit aforesaid which is based on the
alleged fraud of the defendant would not
begin to run until the plaintiff discovered
the fraud or the mistake or could, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered it.
The lodging of the FIR on 31.7.2002 is an
acknowledgment by the plaintiff of having
discovered the fraud. In the Wharton's
Law Lexicon (16th Edition), the word
'Discover' is defined as follows:

"Discover, means simply to find
out, and applies to the discovery of an
error in law and an error in fact. ........."

16. In the Concise Oxford English
Dictionary (South Asia Edition, 12th
Edition), the word 'Discover' has been
defined as follows:

"discover-
v.
1
find
unexpectedly or during a search. become
aware of. 2 be the first to find or observe
(a
place,
substance,
or
scientific
phenomenon)..............."

17. A perusal of the plaint reveals
that the plaintiffs had become aware or
rather, they found out that the alleged
fraud did take place prior to the lodging of
the FIR dated 31.07.2002. There are
exhaustive references in the plaint that the
investigations were done at various levels
into the alleged fraud, which led to lodging
of the FIR. Therefore, the FIR dated
31.07.2002 had been filed against the
defendants on discovery of the fraud.
Moreover, in paragraph no.39 of the plaint,
it has been mentioned that the defendantrevisionist was arrested by the CBI on
24.07.2003. It has further been stated in
that paragraph that the Enquiry Officer had
submitted his report on 30.11.2004.
Therefore, in respect of the aforesaid suit,
the time from which the period of
limitation
would
begin
to
run
is
31.07.2002 that is the date of the FIR.

18. Article 113 appears in Part X of
the First Division of the Schedule of the
Limitation Act, 1963 is as follows:

PART X-SUITS FOR WHICH
THERE IS NO PRESCRIBED PERIOD

Description of Suit
Period of limitation
Time from
which
period
begins
to
run
113. Any suit for which
Three years

 When the right to sue accrues
no period of limitation is provided
elsewhere in this Schedule.
1 All. Om Prakash Lakhina Vs. Administrator of Specified Undertaking of U.T.I. & Ors.
7

19. The time from which the period
begins to run would be when the right to
sue accrues and this period would have to
be seen with reference to Section 17 of the
Limitation Act, that is to say, for purpose
of this case, the point of time when the
fraud was discovered by the plaintiffs that
led to the lodging of the FIR dated
31.7.2002. Therefore, 31.7.2002 would be
the date on which the right to sue accrued
to the plaintiffs.

20. The bar of limitation appears in
Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963
provides that although limitation has not
been set up as a defence, subject to the
provisions of Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive),
every suit instituted, appeal preferred and
application made after the prescribed
period shall be dismissed. Thus, the courts
are enjoined to dismiss the suit if it is
made after the prescribed period even
though limitation is not set up as a
defence. The court below has recorded a
submission allegedly made by the learned
counsel for the plaintiff-respondent that
the cause of action in filing the suit would
accrue on 11.11.2005. The learned counsel
for
the
defendant-revisionist
has
emphatically
stated
that
no
such
submission was made by the learned
counsel for the plaintiff-respondents and
has referred to Ground No.(i) made in the
memorandum
of
revision
and
has
contended that it was for the court below
to have independently applied its mind
with regard to the time from which the
prescribed period of limitation would
begin to run.

21. The contention of the learned
counsel
for
the
defendant-revisionist
appears to be correct. When Section 3 of
the Limitation Act itself provides for
dismissal of suit instituted after the
prescribed period although limitation has
not been set up as a defence, the
submission of the learned counsel for the
defendant-revisionist before the court
below, if at all made, would be, at the
most, a submission made by a counsel on a
point of law regarding the period of
limitation, and the same would not be
binding on the defendant-revisionist.

22. In the case of Panna Lal Jain Vs.
Jain Bank of India Ltd. reported in AIR
1938 Lahore 368, the Court considered the
case of appellant judgment debtor where his
counsel had waived the objection regarding
limitation. After considering the relevant
provisions of the Limitation Act (as it then
stood), while noticing the contention of the
counsel
for
the
respondent
that
the
appellant's counsel having waived the
objection as to the limitation and therefore,
the appellant therein was estopped from
raising the objection, the Court held that
there is obviously no estoppel and counsel's
admissions on a point of law are not binding.

23. The contention of the learned
counsel for the plaintiff-respondents that
the issue no. 1 framed by the court below
was not an issue which could be
considered on the basis of a reading of the
plaint alone, is not correct. The starting
point of limitation has to be found out by
the Court itself as that is the mandate of
Section 3 of the Limitation Act, and that
entails careful perusal of the plaint given
the fact that the matter was considered
under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC. The
Supreme Court in the case of Manindra
Land and Building Corporation Ltd.
Vs. Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors. reported
in AIR 1964 SC 1336 held as follows:

"(9) Section 3 of the Limitation
Act enjoins a Court to dismiss any suit
8 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
instituted, appeal preferred and application
made, after the period of limitation
prescribed
therefor
by
Schedule
I
irrespective of the fact whether the
opponent had set up the plea of limitation
or not. It is the duty of the Court not to
proceed with the application if it is made
beyond the period of limitation prescribed.
The Court had no choice and if in
construing the necessary provision of the
Limitation Act or in determining which
provision of the Limitation Act applies, the
subordinate Court comes to an erroneous
decision, it is open to the Court in revision
to interfere with that conclusion as that
conclusion led the Court to assume or not
to assume the jurisdiction to proceed with
the determination of that matter. "

24. The erroneous decision of the
court below on the issue of limitation has
led it to assume jurisdiction which it does
not have in view of the facts of the present
case. Hence this court in exercise of its
revisional powers can interfere in that
conclusions as held by the Supreme Court
in the case of Manindra (supra).

25. The judgement in the matter of
Raghwendra
Sharan
Singh
(supra)
provides that a suit can be dismissed under
the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 of the
CPC, if the same is barred by limitation
and can be deducible from a bare reading
of the plaint. As observed above, a bare
reading of the plaint itself reveals that the
plaintiff-respondents had discovered the
commission of fraud by the defendantrevisionist prior to the lodging of the FIR
dated 30.07.2002.

26. Of course, there may be instances
where on a bare reading of the plaint it
cannot be found out whether a suit, appeal,
or application are liable to be dismissed
and, a consideration of the entire pleadings
and evidence may be required for that
purpose. However, the present case is not
such a case. Here the starting point of
limitation is evident from a bare reading of
the plaint.

27. Moreover, just because the
defendant-revisionist
has
allegedly
admitted his guilt and liability before the
authorities concerned, without there being
any reference in the plaint with regard to
the date on which the guilt or liability was
admitted by the defendant-revisionist, it
cannot be said that the suit is within
limitation. Reliance by the learned counsel
for the plaintiff-respondents on the date of
the imposition of the penalty of dismissal
on
the
defendant-revisionist
on
11.11.2005, as being the date on which the
cause of action for the suit arose, is
misplaced and is not consonance with the
provisions of Section 17 of the Limitation
Act as has been discussed hereinabove,
particularly in view of the finding recorded
above that the plaintiff-respondents had
discovered the fraud prior to the lodging of
the FIR dated 30.07.2002.

28. In view of the facts and
circumstances stated hereinabove, the
revision
succeeds
and
is
allowed.
Accordingly, the impugned order dated
28.7.2012 passed by the court below is set
aside and the issue no. 1 is decided in the
affirmative. The plaint is, therefore,
rejected. No order as to costs.
----------
(2020)1ILR A8

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 14.01.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE KARUNESH SINGH PAWAR, J.