# Om Prakash & Ors v. State of U.P. & Ors. 1194 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

- **Citation:** (2022) 5 ILRA 1193
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-04-19
- **Case number:** Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 4096 of 2022
- **Bench:** Ashwani Kumar Mishra, Rajnish Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/om-prakash-ors-v-state-of-u-p-ors-1194-indian-law-reports-allahabad-series-48457
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

(i) Criminal Law - Constitution of
India,1950 - Article 226, - Indian Penal
Code, 1860 - Sections 425 & 447 - UP
Revenue Code 2006 - Section 67 -
Public
Property
(Prevention
of
Damage) Act, 1984 - Section 3 & 6 -
Writ Petition - for quashing the FIR - on
the ground that lodging of an FIR in respect
of such allegation would be impermissible
and would amount to an abuse of process
of law - allegation encroachment of a public
utility land & change the nature of public
property - proceeding under the IPC read
with Act of 1984 are independent which are
not affected or circumscribed in any manner
- Law is settled that St.ment of objects and
reasons is in the nature of external aids and
can be seen only where the provision are
not clear or any confusion prevails -
consequentially, prayer to quash the FIR
must fail.(Para -6, 7, 18, 19)

Writ Petition Dismissed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:-

## Text

5 All. Om Prakash & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1193
frustrated as the externment order remains
in operation only for a limited period.

10.
Learned
counsel
has
next
submitted that in Ramji Pandey v. State of
U.P., 1981 All LJ 897 : 1981 All LJ 897
writ petition had been filed challenging
the notice under Section 3 of the Act and
the writ petition was allowed by a Full
Bench of this Court and therefore the
present petition also deserves to be
entertained. The judgment of the Full
Bench shows that the question whether
writ petition should be entertained against
a notice was not at all considered. The
only question which was canvassed and
was considered by the Bench was whether
the notice was in accordance with the
requirement of Section 3 of the Act. No
such argument that a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution should not
be entertained at the stage of notice seems
to have been canvassed and therefore no
decision has been given on this point. It is
what settled that a decision is an authority
for when it actually decides. What is of the
essence in a decision is its ratio and not
every observation found therein nor what
logically
flows
from
the
various
observations made in it. (See M/s Orient
Paper and Industries Ltd. v. State of
Orissa, AIR 1991 SC 672 para 19).
Doctrine of precedent is limited to the
decision itself and as to what is necessarily
involved in it. Judicial authority belongs
not to the exact words used in this or that
judgment, nor even to all reasons given,
but only to the principle accepted and
applied as necessary grounds of decision
see Krishna Kumar v. Union of India,
(1990) 4 SCC 207 : (1990 Lab IC 1490
paras 18 and 19). The Full Bench having
not,
considered
the
question
of
maintainability of the writ petition at the
stage of notice the decision rendered by it
cannot be held to be an authority or
binding (sic) precedent for holding the
writ petition to be maintainable.

11. In view of the reasons discussed
above the, writ petitions are dismissed on
the ground of alternative remedy."
 (emphasis supplied)

7. The validity of Section 3 of the Act
has been considered by this Court in Raja v.
State, 1972 All LJ 537 and in Harsh Narain v.
District Magistrate, 1972 All LJ 762. In both
of these cases, the two Division Benches
have upheld the validity of the Act.

8. It is not the case of the Petitioners
that Respondent 2 has no power or
jurisdiction to issue the show-cause
notice. The matter is under consideration
before Respondent 2. It is open to the
Petitioners to show to Respondent 2 that
on merits no case is made out against
them. If an order is passed against the
Petitioners it would be subject to an
appeal
to
the
Commissioner.
We,
therefore, do not think it appropriate to
consider the matter on merits in this
proceeding.

9. In the result, the writ petition is
dismissed on the ground of availability of an
alternative remedy.
----------
(2022)05ILR A1193
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHBAD 19.04.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ASHWANI KUMAR MISHRA, J.
THE HON'BLE RAJNISH KUMAR, J.

Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 4096 of 2022

Om Prakash & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents
1194 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Rahul Kumar Tyagi

Counsel for the Respondents:
G.A.

(i) Criminal Law - Constitution of
India,1950 - Article 226, - Indian Penal
Code, 1860 - Sections 425 & 447 - UP
Revenue Code 2006 - Section 67 -
Public
Property
(Prevention
of
Damage) Act, 1984 - Section 3 & 6 -
Writ Petition - for quashing the FIR - on
the ground that lodging of an FIR in respect
of such allegation would be impermissible
and would amount to an abuse of process
of law - allegation encroachment of a public
utility land & change the nature of public
property - proceeding under the IPC read
with Act of 1984 are independent which are
not affected or circumscribed in any manner
- Law is settled that St.ment of objects and
reasons is in the nature of external aids and
can be seen only where the provision are
not clear or any confusion prevails -
consequentially, prayer to quash the FIR
must fail.(Para -6, 7, 18, 19)

Writ Petition Dismissed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:-

1. Munshi Lal & anr. Vs St. of U.P. & anr.
(Application (U/s 482) No. 9964 of 2020),

2. Aswini Kumar Ghose & anr. Vs Arbinda Bose
& anr. (AIR 1952 SC 369),

3. Central Bank of India Vs Their Workmen (AIR
1960 SC 12),

4. Gurudevdatta VKss Maryadit & ors. Vs St. of
Mah. & ors. (2011 (4) SCC 534),

5. Anandji Haridas & Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs
Engineering Mazdoor Sangh & anr. (AIR 1975 SC
946),

6. Arul Nadar Vs Authorized Officer, Land
Reforms (1998 (7) SCC 157),

7. Bhaiji Vs SDO, Thandla & ors. (2003 (1) SCC
692),
8.
M/s
Govind
Saran
Ganga
Saran
Vs
Commissioner of Sales Tax & ors. (AIR 1985 SC
1041),

9. Commissioner of Income Tax Orissa Vs M/s
NC Budharaja & Co. & anr. (1993 AIR SCW
3317).

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ashwani Kumar
Mishra, J. & Hon'ble Rajnish Kumar, J.)

1. This petition has been filed with
prayer to quash the First Information
Report registered as Case Crime No.0096
of 2022, under Sections- 447 I.P.C. and
Section 3 of Public Property (Prevention of
Damage)
Act
1984,
Police
Station-
Babugarh, District- Hapur on the ground
that allegations made in the F.I.R. at best
can enable the authorities to initiate action
under Section 67 of the U.P. Revenue Code
2006, but lodgement of F.I.R. in respect of
such allegation would be impermissible and
would amount to an abuse of the process of
law.

2. Petition is opposed by learned
A.G.A.

3. We have perused the First
Information Report which records that
Khasra No.940 area 0.063 hectare is
recorded in the revenue records as Jauhad
(Public Utility Land). As per allegations the
petitioners are trying to encroach upon such
land and raise construction upon it.
Previously such attempt was stalled by the
revenue authorities but the petitioners have
again changed the nature of the public
property and consequently the F.I.R. has
been lodged.

4. The aforesaid First Information
Report has been lodged under Section 447
I.P.C. read with Section 3 of the Prevention
of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984.
5 All. Om Prakash & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1195
Section 3 of the Act of 1984 provides that
whoever commits mischief by doing any
act in respect of any public property shall
be punished with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to five years with fine.
Mischief specified in Section 3 carries the
same meaning as is assigned to it in Section
425 of the I.P.C. Section 425 I.P.C.
provides that whoever with intent to cause,
or knowing that he is likely to cause,
wrongful loss or damage to the public
property or to any person, causes the
destruction of any property, or any such
change in any property or in the situation
thereof or destroys or diminishes its value
or utility, or affects it injuriously, commits
"mischief". Prima facie allegations made in
the F.I.R. clearly make out a case of offence
in terms of Section 3 of the Act of 1984.
Whether these allegations are correct or not
would be an aspect to be examined during
course
of
investigation.
Petitioners
otherwise have not brought on record any
material to indicate that this land was ever
recorded in their names or have perfected
any right over it. A civil suit appears to
have been filed by the petitioners for
injunction but no proceedings have been
instituted for grant of declaration in favour
of the petitioners in respect of such land.
The statement made in the F.I.R. that the
plot in question is recorded as public utility
land is otherwise not disputed or shown to
be factually incorrect.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioners
has placed reliance upon a judgment of this
Court in petition Under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
No.9964 of 2020; Munshi Lal and Another
Vs. State of U.P. and Another, in which the
charge sheet came to be quashed by the
learned Single Judge relying upon the
statement of objects and reasons contained
in the act of 1984 so as to restrict its
application only to acts of vandalism
including destruction and damage caused to
public property during riots and public
commotion. Reasoning assigned in that
regard is contained in para 11 of the
judgment in Munshi Lal (supra), which is
reproduced hereinafter:-

"11. As far as the P.D.P.P. Act, 1984 is
concerned, the same has been enacted with
the specific purpose. The statement of
objects and reasons of the said Act shows
that it was enacted with a view to curb acts
of vandalism and damage to public
property including destruction and damage
caused during riots and public commotion.
A need was felt to strengthen the law to
enable the authorities to deal with cases of
damage to public property. The "public
property" as defined under Section 2(b) of
the P.D.P.P. Act, 1984 means any property,
whether immovable or movable (including
any machinery) which is owned by or in
possession of or under the control of the
Central or State Government or any local
authority or any Corporation or any
institution established by the Central,
Provincial or State Act or its undertaking.
Section 3 of the P.D.P.P. Act, 1984 provides
that anyone who commits mischief by
doing any act in respect of any 'public
property' including the nature referred in
sub-section (2) in the said section shall be
punished with imprisonment and a fine
depending upon the nature of the property
as per sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of
Section 3 of the P.D.P.P. Act, 1984. Section
4 provides punishment for an act of
'Mischief'
causing
damage
to
pubic
property by fire or explosive substance.
The P.D.P.P. Act, 1984 is, thus, a Special
Act enacted to punish for the offence
committed under Sections 3 and 4 of the
said Act by doing any act of vandalism
including the destruction or damage during
any riots or public demonstration in the
1196 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
name of agitations, bandhs, hartals and the
like. The "Mischief" has been defined
under Section 2(a) of the P.D.P.P. Act, 1984
having the same meaning as in Section 425
of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).
Section 6 is the saving clause which says
that the Act' 1984 covers the offence
committed under it and the provisions of it
are in addition to any other law which
provides for any proceeding (whether by
way of investigation or otherwise) which
may be instituted or taken against the
offender, apart from this Act. Special
provisions with regard to disposal of a
prayer for bail made by a person accused of
commission of offence under the Act' 1984
has been provided under Section 5 of the
P.D.P.P. Act, 1984.

The provisions oblige a person found
guilty of commission of offence to pay the
damage or loss caused to the public property.
This Act, thus, covers the specific area of
damage or loss or destruction of public
property and recovery of such damages from
the person(s) who is/are found guilty of such
damage during the course of any public
demonstration in the name of agitations,
bandhs, hartals and the like."

6. Law is settled that statement of
objects and reasons can not be relied upon so
as to interpret the specific provisions
contained in the act itself and it (statement of
objects and reasons) can be seen only where
the provision is not clear or any confusion
prevails. In Aswini Kumar Ghose and another
Vs. Arabinda Bose and another, AIR 1952 SC
369, Hon'ble Patanjali Sastri, the then CJI,
speaking for the majority emphasized the
rationale to rule out statement of objects and
reasons as an aid to the construction of statute
in following words:-

"As regards the propriety of the
reference to the statement of objects and
reasons, it must be remembered that it
seeks only to explain what reasons induced
the mover to introduce the Bill in the
House and what objects he sought to
achieve. But those objects and reasons may
or may not correspond to the objective
which the majority of members had in view
when they passed it into law. The Bill may
have undergone radical changes during its
passage through the House of Houses, and
there is no guarantee that the reasons which
led to its introduction and the objects
thereby sought to be achieved have
remained the same throughout till the Bill
emerges from the House as an Act of the
Legislature, for they do not form part of the
Bill and are not voted upon by the
members. We, therefore, consider that the
statement of objects and reasons appended
to the Bill should be ruled out as an aid to
the construction of a statute."

7. In Central Bank of India Vs. Their
Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 12, the Supreme
Court again held that statement of objects
and reasons is in the nature of external aids
to interpretation of statutes and can be
looked into, only if it is necessary to do so,
to ascertain legislative intent in case of
confusion. In Gurudevdatta Vksss Maryadit
& Others Vs. State Of Maharashtra &
Others, (2001) 4 SCC 534, the Supreme
Court while following the earlier judgments
on the issue made following observations
in para 19:-

"19.Further, after introduction of the
Bill and during the debates thereon before
the Parliament, if a particular provision is
inserted by reason of such a debate,
question of indication of any object in the
objects and reasons of the Bill does not and
cannot arise. The statements of objects and
reasons need to looked into though not by
itself a necessary aid as an aid to
5 All. Om Prakash & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1197
construction only if necessary. To assess the
intent of the Legislature in the event of
there being any confusion, statement of
objects and reasons may be looked into and
no exception can be taken therefor this is
not an indispensable requirement but when
faced with an imperative need to appreciate
the proper intent of the Legislature,
statement may be looked into but not
otherwise. The submission of Mr. Bobde
thus can only be given credence only in the
event of there being any necessity of such a
requirement in the facts of the matter under
consideration, to wit: some confusion
somewhere for assessment of the intent of
the Legislature."

8. In cases where provision in statute
is clear the need to refer to statement and
objects is clearly disapproved. In Anandji
Haridas & Co. Pvt. Ltd., Vs. Engineering
Mazdoor Sangh and Another; AIR 1975 SC
946, the Supreme Court also observed as
under in para 8 and 9:-

"8. We are afraid what the Finance
Minister said in his speech cannot be
imported into this case and used for the
construction of Clause (e) of Section 7. The
language of that provision is manifestly
clear and unequivocal. It has to be
construed as it stands, according to its plain
grammatical sense without addition or
deletion of any words.

9.
As
a
general
principle
of
interpretation, where the words of a statute
are plain, precise and unambiguous, the
intention of the Legislature is to be
gathered from the language of the statute
itself and no external evidence such as
Parliamentary Debates, Reports of the
Committees of the Legislature or even the
statement made by the Minister on the
introduction of a measure or by the framers
of the Act is admissible to construe those
words. It is only where a statute is not
exhaustive or where its language is
ambiguous,
uncertain,
clouded
or
susceptible of more than one meaning or
shades of meaning, that external evidence
as to the evils, if any, which the statute was
intended to remedy, or of the circumstances
which led to the passing of the statute may
be looked into for the purpose of ascertain-
ing the object which the Legislature had in
view in using the words in question."

9. In Arul Nadar Vs. Authorized
Officer, Land Reforms; (1998) 7 SCC 157,
the
Supreme
Court
made
following
observations in para 5 :-

"5. We may notice at this stage the
contentions advanced by the learned
counsel appearing for the respondent that
the object of the Act being to further reduce
the ceiling area. Section 21-A, if is made
applicable to the pending proceeding then
said object would be frustrated. We are
afraid that this contention cannot be
sustained in as much as when the language
of a statute is unambiguous, in interpreting
the provisions thereof it is not necessary to
look into the legislative intent or the object
of the Act. As has been stated by this Court
in the case of State of Uttart Pradesh Vs.
Vijay Anand Maharaj1963 (1) Supreme
Court Reports p.1,

"When a language is plain and
unambiguous and admits of only one
meaning no question of construction of a
statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself."

10. In Bhaiji Vs. Sub-Divisional
Officer, Thandla and Others; (2003) 1 SCC
692, the Supreme Court made following
observations in paras 11 and 12:-

"11. Reference to the Statement of
Objects and Reasons is permissible for
1198 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
understanding
the
background,
the
antecedent state of affairs, the surrounding
circumstances in relation to the statute, and
the evil which the statute sought to remedy.
The weight of judicial authority leans in
favour of the view that Statement of
Objects and Reasons cannot be utilized for
the purpose of restricting and controlling
the
plain
meaning
of
the
language
employed by the Legislature in drafting
statute and excluding from its operation
such transactions which it plainly covers.
(See Principles of Statutory Interpretation
by Justice G.P. Singh, Eighth Edition 2001,
pp.206- 209).

12. The learned senior counsel for the
appellant placed strong reliance on M/s
Girdhari Lal and Sons Vs. Balbir Nath
Mathur and Ors. (1986) 2 SCC 237 wherein
it has been held that the courts can by
ascertaining legislative intent place such
construction on statute as would advance its
purpose and object. Where the words of
statute are plain and unambiguous, effect
must be given to them. The Legislature may
be safely presumed to have intended what the
words plainly say. The plain words can be
departed from when reading them as they are
leads to patent injustice, anomaly or absurdity
or invalidation of a law. The Court permitted
the Statement of Objects and Reasons,
Parliamentary
Debates,
Reports
of
Committees and Commissions preceding the
Legislation and the legislative history being
referred to for the purpose of gathering the
legislative intent in such cases. The law so
stated does not advance the contention of Shri
Gambhir. The wide scope of transactions
covered by the plain language of Section 170B as enacted in 1980 cannot be scuttled or
narrowed down by reading the Statement of
Objects and Reasons."

11. Similar view is expressed by the
Supreme Court in M/s Govind Saran Ganga
Saran Vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax and
Others; AIR 1985 SC 1041, in Raymond
Ltd. & Another Vs. State of Chahattisgarh
and Others; AIR 2007 SC 2854, and in
Commissioner of Income Tax, Orissa, etc.
etc Vs. M/s N.C. Budharaja and Company
and Another, etc. etc; 1993 AIR SCW 3317
and it can safely be deduced that law on the
subject is consistent throughout.

12. We, therefore, are not inclined to
subscribe to the view taken by learned
Single Judge in Munshi Lal (Supra),
particularly as the provision contained in
the Act of 1984 are clear & admits of no
ambiguity.

13. So far as the petitioners argument
with regard to initiation of proceeding
under Section 67 of the U.P. Revenue Code
is concerned, we notice the argument of the
petitioners but are not persuaded to accept
it in view of the specific provision
contained in Section 6 of the Act of 1984,
which reads as under:-

"The provisions of this Act shall be in
addition to, and not in derogation of, the
provisions of any other law for the time
being in force, and nothing contained in
this Act shall exempt any person from any
proceeding
(whether
by
way
of
investigation or otherwise) which might
apart from this Act, be instituted or taken
against him."

14. Section 6, aforesaid clearly
provides that provisions of the Act of the
1984 would be in addition to and not in
derogation of the provisions of any other
law for the time being in force and nothing
contained in this Act shall exempt any
person from any proceeding which might,
apart from this Act, be instituted or taken
against him. Merely because proceedings
5 All. Amit Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1199
under Section 67 can also be initiated
against
the
petitioners
in
such
circumstances would not prohibit the
initiation of proceeding under the Act of
1984 particularly in view of Section 6.

15. The purpose of imposing penalty under
Section 67 of the U.P. Revenue Code is to
recover the damage for the wrongful use of
property whereas the penalty / punishment
stipulated under the Act 1984 is a separate and
distinct offence specified in the Act of 1984. Subsection 3 of Section 67 is extracted herein
below:-

"(3) If the person to whom a notice has
been issued under sub-section (2) fails to show
cause within the time specified in the notice or
within such extended time as the Assistant
Collector may allow in this behalf, or if the
cause shown is found to be insufficient, the
Assistant Collector may direct that such person
shall be evicted from the land, and may, for that
purpose, use or cause to be used such force as
may be necessary, and may direct that the
amount of compensation for damage or 34
misappropriation of the property or for
wrongful occupation, as the case may be, be
recovered from such person as arrears of land
revenue."

16. In the event necessary ingredients to
attract an offence under the Act of 1984 are
made out, the consequences flowing from the
statute can not be curtailed merely because a
distinct course is otherwise stipulated to recover
the damages under the Code of 2006.

17. Argument of learned counsel for
the petitioners based upon Rule 67 (7) that
only where action is taken under Section 67
that the proceedings under Section 447
I.P.C. can commence is based wholly on the
misreading of the provision itself which
reads as under:-

"67.(7) Nothing in sub-rule (5) shall debar
the Land Management Committee or the local
authority as the case may be from prosecuting
the person who encroaches upon the same land
second time in spite of having been evicted
under the Code or the rules, under section 447 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860."

18. In our opinion the proceedings
under the I.P.C. read with act of 1984 are
independent proceedings which are not
affected or circumscribed in any manner by
the provisions and the proceedings under the
Act of 2006 or the Rules framed pursuant
thereto of the year 2016. In the facts of the
case, it is otherwise noticed that the F.I.R.
contains specific allegations that initially
encroachment by the petitioners was got
stopped but since the petitioners have again
encroached
upon
the
land
therefore
proceedings have been initiated under the Act
of 1984 and the I.P.C.

19. In view of the deliberation
aforesaid, we find that prayer made by the
petitioners to quash the F.I.R. must fail. The
writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

20. The authorities shall be at liberty to
proceed with the investigation pursuant to
F.I.R. and conclude it in accordance with law.
----------
(2022)05ILR A1199
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.04.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ASHWANI KUMAR MISHRA, J.
THE HON'BLE RAJNISH KUMAR, J.

Criminal Misc. Writ Petition 11201 of 2021

Amit Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents