# Pankaj Kumar & Ors v. State Of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 8 ILRA 607
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-08-21
- **Case number:** Special Appeal Defective No. 570 of 2025
- **Bench:** Manoj Kumar Gupta, Ram Manohar Narayan Mishra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/pankaj-kumar-ors-v-state-of-u-p-ors-53736
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Akanksha Sharma, C.S.C.

Issue for Consideration
Application of the principle of 'no work no pay',
when though, the appellant/petitioner was
ready and willing to offer services, but was
prevented from doing so by the respondents
themselves.

Headnotes
(A) Service law - Payment of salary -
Principle of 'no work no pay' - Application
- Earlier, the order terminating service of
the petitioner was set aside, which was
confirmed
upto
Supreme
Court
-
Petitioner was given joining after issuance
of notice in contempt proceeding
-
Another writ petition was filed claiming
salary from 20.02.2024 to 31.12.2024 -
Writ court upheld the claim for payment of
arrears of salary for the period of two and
half months after joining, but rejected the
claim for the preceding period on ground
that the respondents were availing the
legal remedies and it was not a case of
intentional delay in complying with the
direction of the writ court - Later part of
writ order was challenged.
Held : The aspect of 'no intentional delay to
comply with the direction' was relevant only for
deciding whether the respondents should be
punished under the Contempt of Courts Act. It
would not wipe out the liability incurred under
the order of the writ court - The principle of 'no
work no pay' is not of universal application, but
depends on facts of each case. As in the instant
case, though, the appellants were ready and
willing to offer their services, but were
prevented from so doing by the respondents
608 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
themselves, they cannot be permitted to take
shelter behind the doctrine of 'no work no pay'.
[Paras 12 and 14] (E-1)

Case Law Cited
Sobha Ram Raturi v. Haryana Vidyut Prasaran
Nigam Ltd. and Others, 2016 (16) SCC 663 -
referred to.

List of Keywords
Principle
of
'no
work
no
pay';
BTC
Certificate;
Termination
of
service;
Reinstatement; Joining; Salary; Liability to
pay salary; Legal remedy; Intentional delay;
Condonable
delay;
Dismissal
of
SLP;
Universal application.

Case Arising From
Judgment and Order dated 11.04.2025
passed in Writ A no. 4160 of 2025 to
the extent it denies salary to the
appellants for the period 20.02.2024 to
15.10.2024, on the principle of 'no work
no pay'.

## Text

8 All. Pankaj Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
607

18. In my opinion, once Institution is
upgraded or recognition upto High School
is granted under Section 7-A(a), provisions
of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921
would be attracted and in such a case any
vacancy of teaching staff caused in such
Institution, would have to be filled in as per
the provisions of U.P. Secondary Education
Services Selection Board Act, 1982.

19. The judgments relied upon by the
review applicant are fully applicable to the
facts and circumstance of the present case
and the judgment relied upon by learned
counsel for the petitioner in the case of
Vinod Kumar and others Vs. Union of
India and others has not applicability to
the case in hand and is distinguishable in
nature.

20. In view of the overall facts and
circumstances of the case, I am of the
considered opinion that the appointment of
the petitioner made on the post of
Headmistress
is
totally
against
the
provision of U.P. Intermediate Education
Act, 1921 and U.P. Secondary Education
Services Selection Board Act, 1982,
therefore, the petitioner is not entitled for
the
appointment
made
against
the
provisions referred hereinabove, therefore,
the petitioner is not entitled for issuance of
writ of mandamus, directing for payment of
salary to her.

21. In view of the above, the writ
petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
----------
(2025) 8 ILRA 607
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.08.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANOJ KUMAR GUPTA, J.
THE HON'BLE RAM MANOHAR NARAYAN
MISHRA, J.

Special Appeal Defective No. 570 of 2025

Pankaj Kumar & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Siddharth Khare, Sr. Advocate

Counsel for the Respondents:
Akanksha Sharma, C.S.C.

Issue for Consideration
Application of the principle of 'no work no pay',
when though, the appellant/petitioner was
ready and willing to offer services, but was
prevented from doing so by the respondents
themselves.

Headnotes
(A) Service law - Payment of salary -
Principle of 'no work no pay' - Application
- Earlier, the order terminating service of
the petitioner was set aside, which was
confirmed
upto
Supreme
Court
-
Petitioner was given joining after issuance
of notice in contempt proceeding
-
Another writ petition was filed claiming
salary from 20.02.2024 to 31.12.2024 -
Writ court upheld the claim for payment of
arrears of salary for the period of two and
half months after joining, but rejected the
claim for the preceding period on ground
that the respondents were availing the
legal remedies and it was not a case of
intentional delay in complying with the
direction of the writ court - Later part of
writ order was challenged.
Held : The aspect of 'no intentional delay to
comply with the direction' was relevant only for
deciding whether the respondents should be
punished under the Contempt of Courts Act. It
would not wipe out the liability incurred under
the order of the writ court - The principle of 'no
work no pay' is not of universal application, but
depends on facts of each case. As in the instant
case, though, the appellants were ready and
willing to offer their services, but were
prevented from so doing by the respondents
608 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
themselves, they cannot be permitted to take
shelter behind the doctrine of 'no work no pay'.
[Paras 12 and 14] (E-1)

Case Law Cited
Sobha Ram Raturi v. Haryana Vidyut Prasaran
Nigam Ltd. and Others, 2016 (16) SCC 663 -
referred to.

List of Keywords
Principle
of
'no
work
no
pay';
BTC
Certificate;
Termination
of
service;
Reinstatement; Joining; Salary; Liability to
pay salary; Legal remedy; Intentional delay;
Condonable
delay;
Dismissal
of
SLP;
Universal application.

Case Arising From
Judgment and Order dated 11.04.2025
passed in Writ A no. 4160 of 2025 to
the extent it denies salary to the
appellants for the period 20.02.2024 to
15.10.2024, on the principle of 'no work
no pay'.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manoj Kumar
Gupta, J.)
&
(Hon'ble Ram Manohar Narayan Mishra, J.)

A. Civil Misc. Delay Condonation
Application No. 01 of 2025

1. The appeal is reported to be
beyond time by 85 days.

3. Cause shown for the delay is
found to be sufficient.

4. Accordingly, the delay is
condoned.

5. The application is allowed.

6. Office is directed to allot
regular number to the instant appeal.

B. Order on Memo of Appeal

1. Heard Shri Ashok Khare, learned
Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Siddharth
Khare, Advocate for the appellants, Ms.
Akansha Sharma, learned counsel for the
respondents No. 2, 3 & 4 and Shri Rajiv
Gupta, learned Addl. Chief Standing
Counsel for the State-respondent.

2. The present intra court appeal is
directed against the order of learned Single
Judge dated 11.04.2025 in Writ-A No.
4160 of 2025 to the extent it denies salary
to the appellants (the petitioners in the writ
petition) for the period 20.02.2024 to
15.10.2024, on the principle of 'no work no
pay'.

3. The facts relevant for deciding the
said controversy are as follows:

4. The appellants were appointed as
Assistant
Teachers
in
pursuance
of
appointment orders dated 02.07.2016. After
about seven years, by orders dated
05.09.2023 and 08.09.2023, the District
Basic
Education
Officer,
Moradabad,
terminated the services of the appellants on
the ground that they did not possess BTC
certificate on the date of filing of the online
application for their recruitment in service.
The appellants, being aggrieved thereby,
filed Writ-A Nos. 15776 of 2023 and
16010 of 2023, which were disposed of by
a Single Judge Bench by a common
judgment
dated
29.01.2024.
The
termination orders were set aside, and the
respondents were directed to reinstate the
appellants on their respective posts, within
three weeks from the date of judgment. The
operative
part
of
the
judgment,
in
paragraphs No. 29, 30 and 31, is extracted
below:

"29.
Accordingly
impugned
orders dated 05.09.2023 and 08.09.2023 are
8 All. Pankaj Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
609
hereby set aside. Respondents are directed
to permit petitioners to join their services at
their respective places within three weeks
from today. Petitioners are directed to
submit separate certified copy of this
judgment within a week from today.

30.
The
writ
petitions
are
disposed of with further direction that from
the period of impugned orders till the date
of joining, since petitioners have not
worked, therefore, in view of principle of
"no work no pay" they will not be entitled
for salary for that period, however, their
services will be treated in continuity on
notional basis.

31. In aforesaid circumstances, it
is also observed that in further recruitment
process a column, namely, "status of result"
may also be included in the application
form so as to facilitate the candidates
whose result are awaited and likely to be
declared in a short period, if there is no
legal impediment."

5. The respondents challenged the
aforesaid judgment in special appeals,
which were dismissed by a common
judgment and order dated 24.04.2024. The
respondents, still aggrieved, carried the
matter to the Apex Court. The Special
Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 34039 of
2024, filed by the respondents, was also
dismissed by order dated 23.08.2024,
which is as follows:

"1 Delay condoned

2 Intervention allowed

3 There is no dispute that as on
the extended date for filing applications,
the respondents were duly qualified. It is
not in dispute that the Government Order
dated 18th December 2015 extending the
time to file applications by 15th January,
2016 was not under challenge before the
High Court. Further, there is no dispute that
as on the extended date for filing
applications, the respondents were duly
qualified and that they were duly selected
for appointment after participating in a
competitive selection process. Also, it
cannot be overlooked that the respondents
put in more than 7 (seven) years of service
before they were terminated. The Division
Bench of the High Court, considering these
factors, rightly upheld the decision of the
learned Single Judge while at the same time
clarifying that such decision shall not be
treated as a precedent.

4 We are, thus, not inclined to
interfere with the impugned judgment(s)
and order(s) of the High Court; hence, the
special leave petitions are dismissed.

5 Pending applications, if any,
stand disposed of"

6. As the appellants were not given
joining during the said period, some of the
appellants
herein
filed
Contempt
Application (Civil) No. 1655 of 2024. On
12.08.2024, the contempt court issued
notices to the opposite parties therein,
namely
Secretary,
Board
of
Basic
Education,
U.P.
and
District
Basic
Education
Officer,
Moradabad,
and
required them to comply with the order of
the writ court or appear personally for
framing of charges. While the contempt
proceedings were pending, the appellants
were permitted to join on 14.10.2024.
Thereafter, an affidavit of compliance was
filed in the contempt proceedings. The
appellants, who were paid salary only from
01.01.2025, raised the plea that full
compliance of the judgement was not
610 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
made. But the said plea was not examined
by the contempt court, and it was left open
to the appellants to exercise the legal
remedies available to them in this regard.
The contempt application was disposed of
observing that, since, the respondents were
pursuing legal remedies available to them
under law and, therefore, it was not a case
of willful disobedience. The relevant part
of the order of the contempt court dated
15.10.2024 is extracted below for ease of
reference:

"It has been argued by the
counsel for the applicants that under the
orders passed by the Court, the opposite
parties were under an obligation to allow
the applicants to join within a period of
three weeks from the date of the order.
However, the applicants have been allowed
to join only by order dated 14.10.2024
passed by the concerned District Basic
Education Officer. It has been argued that
therefore, the applicants are entitled to
salary from February, 2024 till date.

A perusal of the affidavit filed by
the opposite parties shows that against the
order passed by the Writ Court, Special
Appeals were filed by the District Basic
Education Officer which were dismissed by
order dated 24.04.2024 and subsequently,
Special Leave Petition was filed before the
Supreme Court which was also dismissed
by order dated 23.08.2024 passed by the
Supreme Court.

As the opposite parties were
pursuing remedies against the order passed
by the Writ Court, no wilful disobedience
can be imputed to the opposite parties in
failing to allow the applicants to join within
three weeks as stipulated in the order of the
Writ Court. So far as the claim of the
applicants for arrears of salary from
February, 2024 till the date of their joining
is concerned, the applicants may exercise
other legal remedy available to them in
law. It is not a case to proceed under the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

The
contempt
application
is
disposed of."

7. The appellants, thereafter, filed
Writ-A No. 4160 of 2025, claiming salary
from 20.02.2024 to 31.12.2024 and from
01.09.2023 to 05.09.2023, with interest and
consequential benefits. The claim for salary
from 20.02.2024 to 14.10.2024 i.e., for
almost 8 months, was on the ground that
the respondents were under mandate of
court to permit the appellants to join their
services at their respective places within 3
weeks from the date of judgment i.e.,
29.01.2024. But since their joining was
delayed by the respondents themselves,
they cannot shirk from their liability to pay
salary for the said period. The salary for
subsequent period of two and half months
(15.10.2024: date of actual joining to
31.12.2024) was claimed on the ground
that salary for the said period was not paid,
despite the appellants having worked in
pursuance of the joining on 15.10.2024.

8. The writ court has upheld the claim
for payment of arrears of salary for the
period of two and half months after joining,
but has rejected the claim for arrears of
salary for the preceding period, and which
part of the order is under challenge. The
learned Single Judge has held that the
respondents
were
availing
the
legal
remedies and it was not a case of
intentional delay in complying with the
direction of the writ court. The writ court
has also taken note of the fact that
immediately after dismissal of the SLP, the
appellants were permitted to join and,
8 All. Pankaj Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
611
therefore, the delay of eight months was
found to be condonable. Relevant part of
judgement of learned Single Judge is
extracted below:

"12. In the present case, this
Bench
has
passed
judgment
dated
29.01.2024. Special Appeals were filed
with small delay which were condoned and
all Special Appeals were later on dismissed
vide order dated 24.04.2024 and thereafter
Special Leave Petition was also filed before
Supreme Court with a short delay, which
was also condoned by Supreme Court and
Special Leave Petition was dismissed vide
order dated 23.08.2024. Therefore, within a
very short period of seven months,
challenge upto the Supreme Court was
concluded and judgment dated 29.01.2024
was confirmed. It cannot be held that
respondents have intentionally delayed to
comply the directions passed by this Court.
They have a legal remedy to challenge the
judgment passed by this Court upto
Supreme Court and they have availed it.

13. The Court also takes note that
delay in filing Special Appeals and Special
Leave Petition was condoned as well as
contempt proceedings were also dropped.
Therefore, the delay to allow petitioners to
join their services has sustainable reasons.

14. The Court also takes note that
immediately after dismissal of Special
Leave Petition, i.e., 23.08.2024, petitioners
were allowed to join on 14.10.2024, i.e.,
within about eight weeks, therefore, such
delay is also condonable. In view of above,
prayer for payment of salary for said period
has no legal basis."

9. We have heard learned counsel for
the parties and perused the pleadings and
the material placed on record.

10. Indisputably, the writ petition filed
by the appellants challenging termination
of their services was allowed by judgment
dated 29.01.2024. The respondents were
directed to permit the appellants to 'join
their services at their respective places
within three weeks' from the date of
judgment.

11. The respondents being aggrieved
thereby were well within their right to avail
legal remedies available to them. However,
despite the fact that there was no stay in
their favour in Special Appeal or SLP, they
chose not to comply with the order of the
writ court, anticipating that the ultimate
outcome may be in their favour. The
contempt court, having regard to the facts
of the case, has found it not to be a case of
willful disobedience, so as to punish the
respondents under the Contempt of Courts
Act but it would not mean that the
contempt court has rejected the claim of the
appellants for salary during the said period.
In fact, as noted above, the said claim was
left open for being agitated by the
appellants in separate proceedings.

12. The learned Single Judge, while
examining the claim, was influenced by the
fact that during this period the respondents
have been pursuing their legal remedies
and, thus, there was no intentional delay to
comply with the direction given by the writ
court. The said aspect was relevant only for
deciding whether the respondents should be
punished under the Contempt of Courts
Act. It would not wipe out the liability
incurred under the order of the writ court.

13. Here, it is pertinent to note that in
the previous round of litigation, the writ
court itself denied salary to the appellants
for the period prior to their reinstatement
pursuant to its judgement. Now, after the
612 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
judgement of the writ court, denying salary
to them on the principle of 'no work no
pay', albeit the respondents were at fault,
would be too harsh.

14. The principle of 'no work no pay'
is not of universal application, but depends
on facts of each case. As in the instant case,
though, the appellants were ready and
willing to offer their services, but were
prevented from so doing by the respondents
themselves, they cannot be permitted to
take shelter behind the doctrine of 'no work
no pay'.

15. The view taken by us also finds
support from the judgement of Supreme
Court in Sobha Ram Raturi vs. Haryana
Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd. and Others,
2016 (16) SCC 663. In the said case, the
employee was due to retire on 31.12.2005,
but he was illegally retired on 31.12.2002.
The order of retirement was quashed by the
writ court, but back wages was denied on
the principle of 'no work no pay'. The order
of writ court was upheld by the Division
Bench of the High Court in Letters Patent
Appeal. The Supreme Court, in challenge
to the aforesaid judgments by the employee
held that the employer being at fault, the
employee cannot be denied wages for the
period in question on the principle of 'no
work no pay'. The relevant observations
contained in this behalf in paragraphs 3 and
4 are extracted below:

3. Having given our thoughtful
consideration to the controversy, we are
satisfied, that after the impugned order of
retirement dated 31-12-2002 was set aside,
the
appellant
was
entitled
to
all
consequential benefits. The fault lies with
the respondents in not having utilised the
services of the appellant for the period from
1-1-2003 to 31-12-2005. Had the appellant
been allowed to continue in service, he
would have readily discharged his duties.
Having restrained him from rendering his
services with effect from 1-1-2003 to 3112-2005, the respondent cannot be allowed
to press the self-serving plea of denying
him wages for the period in question, on
the plea of the principle of "no work no
pay".

4. For the reasons recorded
hereinabove, we are satisfied, that the
impugned order passed by the High Court,
to the limited extent of denying wages to
the appellant, for the period from 1-1-2003
to 31-12-2005 deserves to be set aside. The
same is accordingly hereby set aside."

16. In view of the above, we allow the
instant appeal and set aside the judgment of
learned Single Judge, to the extent, it
denies salary for the period 20.02.2024 to
15.10.2024.

17. We direct the respondents to pay
salary to the appellants from 20.02.2024,
the date on which, period of three weeks
expired from the date of judgment of
learned Single Judge i.e., 29.01.2024.
----------
(2025) 8 ILRA 612
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 28.08.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ARUN BHANSALI, C.J.
THE HON'BLE KSHITIJ SHAILENDRA,J.

Special Appeal No. 788 of 2025

Alok Kumar Yadav ...Appellant
Versus
Sri Ashish Kumar Pandey ...Respondent

Counsel
for
the
Appellant: