# Pavan @ Pavan Singhal v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 4 ILRA 30
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-03-15
- **Case number:** Crl. Misc. W.P. No. 16202 of 2019
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/pavan-pavan-singhal-v-state-of-u-p-ors-47013
- **Pages:** 21

## Headnote

A. Externment Order - Cause of Action -
Uttar Pradesh Control of Goondas Act,
1970 - Section 3(2), 3(3) - Every person
presumed to be an honorable and respectable
man, unless that presumption is dislodged on
accordance with law. Therefore, labeling some
citizen as a goonda and externing him under the
Act of 1970, is an act that would afford a cause
of action to the person who suffers that order.
(Para 8)

B. Constitution of India - Article 21 -
Fundamental Right - Right to Life includes
Right to Reputation

An externment order, which, thus, works, as an
innate declaration about the man externed
being a goonda, is irreversibly ruinous of his
reputation. The physical consequences of an
externment order that last only for a period of
six
months,
with
the
limited
effect
of
abridgment of some liberty, are trivial when
compared to the timeless consequences of
ruining a reputation. (Para 14)

It does not appear from a perusal of the
materials available on record that the petitioner,
either by himself or in association with the
gang, habitually commits offences punishable
under Chapter XVI, XVII and XXII of the Penal
Code. Since there is no repetitive indulgence
discernible on the petitioner's part in the
specified kind of offences, so as to attract the
provisions of Section 2(b) of the Act of 1970.
(Para 19)

C. Practice & Procedure - Valid Notice -
the notice drawn under Section 3(1) of
the Act should disclose the "general
nature of material allegations". If a
person is sought to be proceeded with
against on ground that he is a goonda
under Clause (a) of Section 3(1), the
general nature of material allegations may,
for instance, indicate the number of acts
that he has habitually committed, abetted
or attempted, that constituted commission,
attempt
or
abetment
of
an
offence
punishable under Section 153-B of the
Penal Code, over a specified period of time,
in a particular locality or part of the town.
The notice must say something about the
act, which the person put under notice has
done,
rather
than
listing
the
cases
registered against him. (Para 31)
4 All. Pavan @ Pavan Singhal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
31
Writ Petition Allowed. (E-8)

List of Cases cited:-

## Text

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----------
(2021)04ILR A30
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 15.03.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Crl. Misc. W.P. No. 16202 of 2019

Pavan @ Pavan Singhal ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Anant Ram Gupta

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.G.A.

A. Externment Order - Cause of Action -
Uttar Pradesh Control of Goondas Act,
1970 - Section 3(2), 3(3) - Every person
presumed to be an honorable and respectable
man, unless that presumption is dislodged on
accordance with law. Therefore, labeling some
citizen as a goonda and externing him under the
Act of 1970, is an act that would afford a cause
of action to the person who suffers that order.
(Para 8)

B. Constitution of India - Article 21 -
Fundamental Right - Right to Life includes
Right to Reputation

An externment order, which, thus, works, as an
innate declaration about the man externed
being a goonda, is irreversibly ruinous of his
reputation. The physical consequences of an
externment order that last only for a period of
six
months,
with
the
limited
effect
of
abridgment of some liberty, are trivial when
compared to the timeless consequences of
ruining a reputation. (Para 14)

It does not appear from a perusal of the
materials available on record that the petitioner,
either by himself or in association with the
gang, habitually commits offences punishable
under Chapter XVI, XVII and XXII of the Penal
Code. Since there is no repetitive indulgence
discernible on the petitioner's part in the
specified kind of offences, so as to attract the
provisions of Section 2(b) of the Act of 1970.
(Para 19)

C. Practice & Procedure - Valid Notice -
the notice drawn under Section 3(1) of
the Act should disclose the "general
nature of material allegations". If a
person is sought to be proceeded with
against on ground that he is a goonda
under Clause (a) of Section 3(1), the
general nature of material allegations may,
for instance, indicate the number of acts
that he has habitually committed, abetted
or attempted, that constituted commission,
attempt
or
abetment
of
an
offence
punishable under Section 153-B of the
Penal Code, over a specified period of time,
in a particular locality or part of the town.
The notice must say something about the
act, which the person put under notice has
done,
rather
than
listing
the
cases
registered against him. (Para 31)
4 All. Pavan @ Pavan Singhal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
31
Writ Petition Allowed. (E-8)

List of Cases cited:-

1. Rishav Raghav (Minor) Vs St. of U.P. & 2 ors.
2015 SCC OnLine All 8978

2. Subramanian Swamy Vs U.O.I., Ministry of
Law & ors. (2016) 7 SCC 221

3. Om Prakash Chautala Vs Kanwar Bhan & ors.
(2014) 5 SCC 417

4. Sumpuranand Vs St. of U.P. & ors. 2018 (11)
ADJ 550

5. Imran @ Abdul Quddus Khan Vs St. of U.P. &
ors. 2000 CrLJ 1323

6. Harsh Narain @ Harshu Vs District Magistrate
Allahabad & anr. 1972 SCC OnLine All 146

7. St. of Gujarat & anr. Vs Mehbub Khan Usman
Khan & anr. AIR 1968 SC 1468

8. Ramji Pandey Vs St. of U.P. & ors. 1981 SCC
OnLine All 305

9. Bhim Sain Tyagi Vs St. of U.P. through D.M.
Mahamaya Nagar Criminal Misc. Writ Petition
No. 461 of 1998

10. Ballabh Chaubey Vs A.D.M. (Finance),
Mathura & anr. 1997 SCC OnLine All 1111

11. Subas Singh @s Subhash Singh Vs District
Magistrate, Ghazipur (1997) 35 ACC 262

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

The petitioner questions an order of
Ms. Selva Kumari J., the then District
Magistrate, Firozabad, dated 13.03.2019,
ordering him to be externed under Section
3(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Control of
Goondas Act, 19701. The petitioner also
challenges an appellate approval of the
externment order by the Commissioner,
Agra Division, Agra, vide his order dated
23.05.2019, passed in Case No. 00719 of
2019.

2. This petition was presented on
07.06.2019, and came up for admission
before this Court, for the first time, on
11.06.2019. On the said date, after hearing
learned counsel for the petitioner in support
of motion to admit the petition, and the
learned A.G.A. in opposition, the cause was
adjourned to 04.07.2019. On 04.07.2019, the
learned A.G.A. was granted four weeks' time
to file a counter affidavit, and the petitioner, a
rejoinder, within another two weeks. It
appears that no counter affidavit was filed,
and by the order dated 10.09.2019, two
weeks and no more time was granted to the
State to file a counter affidavit. Again, on
17.10.2019, further three weeks' time was
granted, with a repetition of the stop order.
Subsequently, on 10.09.2020 and 24.09.2020,
the matter was adjourned on the request of
learned counsel for the petitioner. The case
again came up on 07.10.2020. On the said
date, this Court took note of the fact that there
was no return filed on behalf of the State. The
petition was admitted to hearing and heard
forthwith. Judgment was reserved.

3. It was urged as a preliminary
objection on behalf of the State by the
learned A.G.A. that this petition has
become infructuous, inasmuch as the life of
the externment order impugned had come
to an end. The externment order was
effective for a period of six months, and
apparently,
its
operation
was
not
suspended. The externment order is one
dated 13.03.2019, and by a reckoning of
the calendar, the learned A.G.A. submits
that it has outlived itself. The learned
32 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
counsel for the petitioner, on the other
hand, says that the order of externment
adversely impacts his reputation in society,
and, therefore, notwithstanding the fact that
it has outlived its term of operation, the
petitioner is entitled to question its validity
and ask this Court to quash it. Learned
counsel for the petitioner, in support of his
submission, has relied on a decision of this
Court in Rishav Raghav (Minor) v. State
of U.P. & 2 Others2. In that decision, the
externment order had outlived its life,
pending
appeal,
which
had
become
infructuous, and yet this Court proceeded to
examine the merits of the externment order
and its affirmation in appeal. The orders
were quashed on merits, bearing in mind
the fact that if left undisturbed, would
affect the petitioner's career, who, in that
case, was a student and had to do a follow
up of his studies and apply for a job. There
are remarks in Rishav Raghav (supra) to
the following effect :

21. The learned Counsel for the
petitioner argued that appeal of the
petitioner was dismissed by the respondent
No. 2, who did not passed any order on the
stay application and allowed the appeal to
become infructuous.

22. Learned Counsel for the
petitioner further submits that present
petition may be decided on merits after
examining the records as the applicant is a
student and his entire career would be
spoiled, which would also affect his future,
if the externment orders is not quashed, as
he is a student and has to follow up studies
and to get a job, under these circumstances
the Court proceed to hear the matter on
merits.

4 . The learned A.G.A., on the other
hand, says that the decision in Rishav
Raghav was indicated not to serve as a
precedent by the court, when it was
specifically remarked :

30. .....The Court has interfere in
this matter in a peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case and it is made
clear that the present case shall not be
treated as a precedent, for challenging the
order passed in the appeals which have
become infructuous, due to unavoidable
circumstances.

5. This Court has considered the
matter, so far as the preliminary objection
is concerned. It is true that this Court in
Rishav Raghav said that the decision would
not serve as a precedent, for the purpose of
challenging orders passed in appeal, that
have become infructuous, but the question
is whether a person, who is externed under
the Act of 1970, is entitled to question the
order of externment, after it has outlived its
life. Apart from the decision in Rishav
Raghav, none of the parties placed any
authority that may serve as guidance on the
point.

6. To the understanding of this Court,
the fact that the Act of 1970 is a preventive
measure to exclude from a locale, persons
who are found to be goondas or anti-social
elements, in order to maintain public order
or prevent them from committing certain
crimes, does not make externment a benign
or inert measure, which attracts no stigma.
The object of the Act of 1970 and its
scheme as a whole, clearly shows it to be a
statute that is designed to be applied against
persons who are desperados or habitual
offenders, and who threaten peace and
tranquility of the society by their repeat
involvement in certain specific crimes or
their general predisposition as desperate
and dangerous persons.
4 All. Pavan @ Pavan Singhal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
33

7. Considering the scheme and object
of the Act of 1970, an order of externment
cannot be compared to a preventive
detention under the National Security Act,
1980, which may cast no stigma, or be
explained consistent with a person's upright
character. Once a person is proceeded with
against under the Act of 1970, and externed
under Section 3(3), classifying him as a
goonda, the order is certainly stigmatic. It
is for this reason also that an order of
externment
envisages
provision
of
opportunity to show cause, under Section
3(2). This is not to say that the provision
for opportunity is engrafted in the Statute,
for the reason alone of its stigmatic effect;
it is also there because an order of
externment is a serious inroad on a citizen's
liberty.

8. It was suggested during the hearing
on behalf of the State that the decision in
Rishav Raghav was rendered in the
context of the petitioner there being a
young student, who had a career before
him, which is not the case here. This Court
must remark that the petitioner is not a
convict so far, and every man has a right to
his reputation and good name in society.
Every person is presumed to be an
honourable and respectable man, unless
that presumption is dislodged in accordance
with law. Therefore, dubbing some citizen
as a goonda and externing him under the
Act of 1970, is an act that would afford a
cause of action to the person who suffers
that order, which enures beyond its
physical consequences. In the opinion of
this Court, it would not be a sound legal
proposition to say that a man may suffer
the slur of being called a goonda, because
he could not bring the order of externment
passed against him to test within the term
of its life. In the opinion of this Court, the
petitioner is entitled to question the
externment order, notwithstanding that
order outrunning its life.

9. The right to one's reputation is now
unquestionably regarded as a facet of the
Right to Life, guaranteed under Article 21
of the Constitution. The horizon of the right
guaranteed under Article 21 has been given
its true meaning and content over the years
that our polity has flourished under the
constitutional umbrella. Right to Life has
long been expanded to mean immensely
more than mere physical, animal or
biological existence. It has been interpreted
by the Supreme Court and the High Courts
over the years, to bring within its fold, all
that it means and requires to elevate the
mere physical existence of an individual to
the position of a human being, who has all
opportunity and facility to realise his
potential to its fullest. In the quest to realise
the wholesome guarantee of life in its
varied facets, the right to one's reputation
has been regarded as an inseperable part.

10. In Subramanian Swamy v.
Union of India, Ministry of Law &
Others3 challenge was laid to the vires of
Section 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal
Code, 18604 and Section 199 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on ground that
these Statutes negated the fundamental
right to freedom of speech and expression
guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution. The validity of the provisions
was upheld by their Lordships of the
Supreme Court on varied parameters, but
one of these was the right of an individual
to his reputation. The Right to Reputation
was regarded as a concomitant of the Right
to Life guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution. In was held in Subramanian
Swamy (supra) thus:
34 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

132. ........Personal liberty, as
used in Article 21, is treated as a
composition of rights relatable to various
spheres of life to confer the meaning to the
said right. Thus perceived, the right to life
under Article 21 is equally expansive and
it, in its connotative sense, carries a
collection or bouquet of rights. In the case
at hand, the emphasis is on right to
reputation which has been treated as an
inherent facet of Article 21. In Haridas Das
v. Usha Rani Banik[Haridas Das v. Usha
Rani Banik, (2007) 14 SCC 1 : (2009) 1
SCC (Cri) 750] , it has been stated that a
good name is better than good riches. In a
different context, the majority in S.P. Mittal
v. Union of India[S.P. Mittal v.Union of
India, (1983) 1 SCC 51 : AIR 1983 SC 1] ,
has opined that man, as a rational being,
endowed with a sense of freedom and
responsibility, does not remain satisfied
with any material existence. He has the
urge to indulge in creative activities and
effort is to realise the value of life in them.
The said decision lays down that the value
of life is incomprehensible without dignity.

133. [Ed.: Para 133 corrected
vide
Official
Corrigendum
No.
F.3/Ed.B.J./33/2016 dated 4-8-2016.] In
Charu Khurana v. Union of India [Charu
Khurana v.Union of India, (2015) 1 SCC
192 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 161] , it has
been ruled that dignity is the quintessential
quality of a personality, for it is a highly
cherished value. Thus perceived, right to
honour, dignity and reputation are the basic
constituents of right under Article 21. The
submission of the learned counsel for the
petitioners is that reputation as an aspect of
Article 21 is always available against the
high-handed action of the State. To state
that such right can be impinged and
remains
unprotectedinter
se
private
disputes pertaining to reputation would not
be correct. Neither can this right be
overridden and blotched notwithstanding
malice, vile and venal attack to tarnish and
destroy the reputation of another by stating
that the same curbs and puts unreasonable
restriction on the freedom of speech and
expression. There is no gainsaying that
individual rights form the fundamental
fulcrum of collective harmony and interest
of a society. There can be no denial of the
fact that the right to freedom of speech and
expression
is
absolutely
sacrosanct.
Simultaneously,
right
to
life
as
is
understood in the expansive horizon of
Article 21 has its own significance.

11. In Om Prakash Chautala v.
Kanwar Bhan & others5, the right to a
person's reputation, being a part of his
fundamental right guaranteed under Article
21 of the Constitution, was exposited by
their Lordships with reference to earlier
authority, thus :

21.
Another
facet
gaining
significance deserves to be adverted to,
when caustic observations are made which
are not necessary as an integral part of
adjudication and it affects the person's
reputation--a cherished right under Article
21 of the Constitution. InUmesh Kumar v.
State of A.P. [(2013) 10 SCC 591 : (2014)
1 SCC (Cri) 338] this Court has observed:
(SCC p. 604, para 18)

"18. ... Personal rights of a human
being include the right of reputation. A
good reputation is an element of personal
security
and
is
protected
by
the
Constitution equally with the right to the
enjoyment of life, liberty and property.
Therefore, it has been held to be a
necessary element in regard to right to life
of a citizen under Article 21 of the
Constitution. The International Covenant
4 All. Pavan @ Pavan Singhal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
35
on Civil and Political Rights, 1966
recognises the right to have opinions and
the right to freedom of expression under
Article 19 is subject to the right of
reputation of others."

22. In Kiran Bedi v. Committee
of Inquiry [(1989) 1 SCC 494] this Court
reproduced the following observations
from the decision in D.F. Marion v. Davis
[217 Ala 16 : 114 So 357 : 55 ALR 171
(1927)] : (Kiran Bedi case [(1989) 1 SCC
494] , SCC p. 515, para 25)

"25.
...
''The
right
to
the
enjoyment
of
a
private
reputation,
unassailed by malicious slander is of
ancient origin, and is necessary to human
society. A good reputation is an element of
personal security, and is protected by the
Constitution equally with the right to the
enjoyment of life, liberty, and property.'"

23. In Vishwanath Agrawal v.
Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal [(2012) 7 SCC
288 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 224 : (2012) 3
SCC (Cri) 347] , although in a different
context, while dealing with the aspect of
reputation, this Court has observed that:
(SCC p. 307, para 55)

"55. ... reputation which is not
only the salt of life, but also the purest
treasure and the most precious perfume of
life. It is extremely delicate and a cherished
value this side of the grave. It is a revenue
generator for the present as well as for the
posterity."

24. In Mehmood Nayyar Azam v.
State of Chhattisgarh [(2012) 8 SCC 1 :
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 34 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri)
733 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 449] this Court
has ruled that: (SCC p. 6, para 1)

"1. ... The reverence of life is
insegregably associated with the dignity of a
human being who is basically divine, not
servile. A human personality is endowed with
potential infinity and it blossoms when
dignity is sustained. The sustenance of such
dignity has to be the superlative concern of
every sensitive soul. The essence of dignity
can never be treated as a momentary spark of
light or, for that matter, ''a brief candle', or ''a
hollow bubble'. The spark of life gets more
resplendent when man is treated with dignity
sans humiliation, for every man is expected
to lead an honourable life which is a splendid
gift of ''creative intelligence'. When a dent is
created in the reputation, humanism is
paralysed."

25.
In
Port
of
Bombay
v.
Dilipkumar
Raghavendranath
Nadkarni
[(1983) 1 SCC 124 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 61] ,
while dealing with the value of reputation, a
two-Judge Bench expressed thus: (SCC p.
134, para 13)

"13. ... The expression ''life' has a
much wider meaning. Where therefore the
outcome of a departmental enquiry is likely
to adversely affect reputation or livelihood of
a person, some of the finer graces of human
civilisation which make life worth living
would be jeopardised and the same can be put
in jeopardy only by law which inheres fair
procedures. In this context one can recall the
famous words of Chapter II of Bhagwad
Gita:

''Sambhavitasya
cha
kirti
marnadati richyate'"

The aforesaid principle has been
reiterated in State of Maharashtra v. Public
Concern for Governance Trust[(2007) 3
SCC 587].
36 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

12. The justiciability of the right to
one's reputation and its inextricable link to
a person's fundamental right under Article
21 of the Constitution, also engaged the
attention of this Court in Sumpuranand v.
State of U.P. & others6. That was a case
where the issue arose in the context of the
right to consideration for appointment of
fair price shop dealers on compassionate
grounds, which the kin of the deceased
dealer had, under a certain Government
Order dated 17.08.2020. Clause 10 (JHA)
inter-alia provided that the good reputation
of the deceased fair price shop dealer was a
condition precedent for appointment of his
kin as a fair price shop dealer, on
compassionate grounds. The clause in the
Government Order that cast a disentitling
shadow on the son's right to compassionate
appointment as a fair price shop dealer, if
the deceased dealer did not enjoy a good
reputation, was held to be discriminatory
and violative of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of
the Constitution. It was in that context the
Court made a searching analysis of the
Right to Reputation and traced its source to
a person's Right to Life, guaranteed under
Article
21
of
the
Constitution.
In
Sumpuranand (supra) there are some very
illuminating remarks about the Right to
Life and its connection to Article 21 of the
Constitution, which read :

30. The resolve to create the
Constitution was the collective will of the
people of India. The promise of the
Constitution is to every individual citizen
of India. Part III of the Constitution is
anchored in the individual and revolves
around the individual citizens. The simple
word "life" in Article 21 of the Constitution
of
India
presented
a
complex
jurisprudential problem to the courts. The
simple word "life" did not disguise for long
the profound intent of the constitution
framers. The approach of the courts to the
provision in the Constitution progressed
from
tentative
to
visionary,
the
interpretation of the provision advanced
from literal to prophetic.

31. What was the meaning of life
for the people of India on the morrow of
our independence? If life meant physical
existence and mere survival, Indian people
had shown remarkable resilience to live
through the vicissitudes of history. The
people of India have lived in servitude,
survived famines, lived in an iniquitous
social order often dominated by prejudice,
penury and illiteracy. Trackless centuries
are filled with the record of survival of the
people of India. Surely life of the Indian
people could not remain the same after the
dawn of independence of India. Surely the
meaning of life for the people of India had
to change after the advent of the Republic
of India. The founding fathers, had the
audacity to dream of transforming the
meaning of life for the people of India. The
courts in India had the vision and the
courage to make the dreams a reality. Life
had to embrace all the attributes which
made life meaningful and all the pursuits
which made life worth living.

34. The courts in India, knew early
on that understanding the significance of life
was the key to providing the security of justice.
While
interpreting
Article
21
of
the
Constitution of India, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, embraced life in all its breadth and
profundity
and
eschewed
a
narrow
interpretation. The law laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court while construing
Article 21 of the Constitution of India brought a
citizen's reputation within its sweep.

44. The right to reputation inheres
in the right to life and it has been embedded
4 All. Pavan @ Pavan Singhal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
37
in Article 21 of the Constitution of India,
by consistent judicial authority. Reference
can be made with profit to the judgments of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the
case of Port of Bombay Vs. Dilip Kumar
Raghuvendranath Nadkarni, reported at
(1983)1 SCC 124. In Gian Kaur Vs. State
of Punjab, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
confirmed that the right to reputation is a
natural right.

13. In the context of how the Right to
Reputation is viewed by the law, it would
be almost preposterous to suggest that the
physical consequences of an externment
order having come to an end, no cause of
action survives to the petitioner to assail it.
An externment order, under the Act of
1970, has clearly two facets. One is that
which relates to the tangible consequence
of forbidding the person proceeded with
against, from entering the district for a
certain period of time. This consequence of
the externment order is indeed preventive
in nature, and, may be, of immense
importance in a given case to the
maintenance of public order. So far as the
person
against
whom
the
order
of
externment is made is concerned, it
certainly does curtail his liberty, by
preventing his movement in a defined
territory. But, the inconvenience stemming
from the abridgment of liberty, that comes
in the wake of an externment order,
prohibiting entry in the district, is of trivial
consequence to the one externed, if this
consequence were to be weighed against
the harm that it brings to the individual's
reputation.

14. The order of externment proceeds
on an innate declaration that the person
externed is a goonda. A goonda has been
defined under the Act of 1970, and
otherwise also, has an understandable
connotation in ordinary parlance. A goonda
is the anti-thesis of what a respectable or
honourable man is. An externment order,
which, thus, works as an innate declaration
about the man externed being a goonda, is
irreversibly ruinous of his reputation. It has
been said time over again that reputation
once lost can never been redeemed. The
physical consequences of an externment
order that last only for a period of six
months,
with
the
limited
effect
of
abridgment of some liberty, are trivial
when
compared
to
the
timeless
consequence of ruining a reputation, that
can perhaps never be regained. In this view
of the matter, this Court does not find any
force in the objection raised by the learned
A.G.A., that the cause of action does not
survive, and that this petition has become
infructuous. In the opinion of this Court,
this cause requires determination on merits.

15. It has been pointed out by Mr.
Anant Ram Gupta, learned counsel for the
petitioner, that the petitioner, who is a
resident of Firozabad, is a respectable
citizen, a businessman and an income tax
payee. It is urged that he is, by no means, a
goonda, within the meaning of Section 2(b)
of the Act of 1970. It is urged that a solitary
case, being Case Crime No. 648 of 2016,
under Sections 364A, 302, 404, 201, 120B
IPC, was registered against him on
24.08.2016, at Police Station - Tundla,
District - Firozabad, whereafter, there was
a consequential implication in Case Crime
No. 841 of 2016, under Section 2/3 of The
Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-social
Activities (Prevention) Act, 19867, which
is not a substantive offence. Subsequently,
the Police have implicated him in N.C.R.
No. 504/506, under Section 506 IPC, which
is based on beat report no. 59 dated
38 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
15.11.2017. It is argued that the two
matters are contemporaneous implications
and the third a dress-up, based on the beat
information engineered by the Police. It is
also pointed out that in Case Crime Nos.
648 of 2016 and 841 of 2016, the petitioner
has been granted bail by this Court. He has
not been convicted of any offence so far. It
is, particularly, pointed out that the beat
information was mala fide engineered by
Pradeep Mittal, who is the informant of
Case Crime No. 648 of 2016, and the uncle
of the victim of the crime in that case. This
beat information was lodged deliberately,
in order to secure cancellation of bail
granted to the petitioner in Case Crime No.
648 of 2016 by this Court, vide order dated
22.07.2017, passed in Criminal Misc. Bail
Application No. 40678 of 2016. Learned
counsel for the petitioner, by referring to
these facts, has attempted to impress upon
the Court that prior to registration of Case
Crime No. 648 of 2016, there was
absolutely nothing against the petitioner to
show that he is, in any way, habitually into
commission of offences of any kind.
Rather, the learned counsel for the
petitioner has drawn the Court's attention
towards the educational testimonials of the
petitioner and his income tax returns, in an
attempt to show that the petitioner is a
respectable man, engaged in business.

16. It has also been argued by the
learned counsel for the petitioner that quite
apart from the fact that the petitioner is not
a goonda, within the definition of Section
2(b) of the Act of 1970, the orders
impugned are flawed, because the notice
issued under Section 3(1) of the Act of
1970 does not conform to the requirements
of the Statute. It is urged that the said
notice does not carry the "general nature of
material allegations" against him, in respect
of matters enumerated in Clauses (a), (b)
and (c) of sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of
the Act last mentioned. Learned counsel for
the petitioner has taken this Court through
notice dated 17.01.2018, issued under
Section 3(1) of the Act of 1970. He
submitted that once this notice does not
conform to the essential requirements of
the Act of 1970, all subsequent proceedings
founded on it would stand vitiated. The
externment order and its affirmation in
appeal would be bad in law and liable to be
quashed.

17. Learned A.G.A., on the other
hand, has defended the orders impugned
and says that the proceedings taken are
strictly in accordance with the requirements
of the Act of 1970, and no exception can be
taken to the orders impugned, passed by the
two Authorities below.

18. It must be remarked here that
since there is no return on behalf of the
State, which they have not put in despite
time being granted, the allegations in the
writ petition have to be accepted as
unrebutted.

19. This Court has keenly considered
the submissions advanced by the learned
counsel. So far as the first part of the
submission is concerned, it does not appear
from a perusal of the materials available on
record that the petitioner, either by himself
or in association with a gang, habitually
commits
offences
punishable
under
Chapter XVI, XVII and XXII of the Penal
Code. This is relevant because the
petitioner has been proposed to be
proceeded with against as a goonda, in
terms of the notice dated 17.01.2018, on
the ground that he habitually commits
offences punishable under Chapter XVI,
XVII and XXII of the Penal Code, and that
his general reputation is that of a person
4 All. Pavan @ Pavan Singhal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
39
who is desperate and dangerous to the
community. What the word "habitually"
means for the purpose of Section 2(b)(i) of
the Act of 1970, is a person who is
habitually into commission of offences. It
has been held to be distinguishable from a
single
or
solitary
act.
"Habitually"
postulates repeated or persistent indulgence
in the specified kind of offences. Here, that
inference has been drawn on account of the
petitioner's involvement in Case Crime No.
648 of 2016, which is still pending trial.
The other offence, being Case Crime No.
841 of 2016, is not a substantive offence,
but a case registered under the Act of 1986,
on account of the petitioner's implication in
Case Crime No. 648 of 2016. The
registration of an offence under the Act of
1986, shortly after his implication in Case
Crime No. 648 of 2016, does not, ex-facie,
show the petitioner to be a man who
habitually
commits
offences
of
the
specified kind. The last reference to the
beat information no. 59, on the basis of
which N.C.R. No. 504/506, under Section
506 IPC has been registered, also appears
to be part of an ongoing strife between
members of the victim's family in Case
Crime No. 648 of 2016, and the petitioner.
This Court does not, in the least, mean to
say that the petitioner is involved or not in
Case Crime No. 648 of 2016, but
apparently, there is no repetitive indulgence
discernible on the petitioner's part, so as to
attract the provisions of Section 2(b) of the
Act of 1970.

20. So far as the other limb to invoke
the provisions of the Act of 1970 is
concerned, there is no tangible material
referred to in the orders impugned, on the
basis of which, an inference may be drawn
that the petitioner is a person who is
desperate and dangerous to the community.
These inferences have been drawn by the
two Authorities below, merely on the basis
that the crimes under reference have been
registered against the petitioner, and the
Police have expressed some opinion. On
the mere registration of a crime or
expression of an opinion by the Police in
the report, sans any tangible material to
conclude that the petitioner is a person who
is
desperate
or
dangerous
to
the
community,
the
satisfaction
of
the
Authorities below about the petitioner
being a goonda would be vitiated for lack
of consideration of relevant material. The
manner in which the two Authorities below
have proceeded to conclude that the
petitioner is a goonda, merely because two
crimes, contemporaneous in point of time,
have been registered against him, besides a
beat report, renders the conclusions no
more than an ipse dixit of the Officers
writing the orders impugned. The question
what "habitually" means under Section 2(b)
of the Act of 1970, fell for consideration of
a Division Bench of this Court in Imran
alias Abdul Quddus Khan v. State of
U.P. & Others8. It has been held :

11. Ex facie, a person is termed
as a 'goonda' if he is a habitual criminal.
The provisions of Section 2(b) of the Act
are almost akin to the expression 'anti
social element' occurring in Section 2(d) of
Bihar Prevention of Crimes Act, 1981. In
the context of the expression 'anti social
element'
the
connotation
'habitually
commits' came to be interpreted by the
apex Court in the case of Vijay Narain
Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 :
AIR 1984 SC 1334. The meaning put to the
aforesaid expression by the apex Court
would squarely apply to the expression
used in the Act, in question. The majority
view was that the word 'habitually' means
40 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
'repeatedly' or 'persistently'. It implies a
thread of continuity stringing together
similar repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent
and similar but not isolated, individual and
dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an
inference of habit. It connotes frequent
commission of acts or omissions of the
same kind referred to in each of the said
sub-clauses or an aggregate of similar acts
or omissions. Even the minority view
which was taken in Vijay Narain's case
(supra) was that the word 'habitually' means
'by force of habit'. It is the force of habit
inherent or latent in an individual with a
criminal
insteinct
with
a
criminal
disposition of mind, that makes a person
accustomed to lead a life of crime posing
danger to the society in general. If a person
with criminal tendencies consistently or
persistently or repeatedly commits or
attempts
to
commit
or
abets
the
commission of offences punishable under
the specified chapters of the Code, he
should be considered to be a 'anti social
element'. There are thus two views with
regard to the expression 'habitually' flowing
from the decision of Vijay Narain's case
(supra). The majority was inclined to give a
restricted meaning to the word 'habitually'
as denoting 'repetitive' and that on the basis
of a single act cannot be said to be forming
the habit of the person. That is to say, the
act complained of must be repeated more
than once and be inherent in his nature. The
minority view is that a person in habitual
criminal who by force of habit or inward
disposition inherent or latent in him has
grown accustomed to lead a life or crime.
In simple language, the minority view was
expressed that the word 'habitually' means
'by force of habit'. The minority view is
based on the meaning given in Stroud's
Judicial Dictionary, Fourth Ed. Vol. II1204 - habitually requires a continuance
and
permanence
of
some
tendency,
something that has developed into a
propensity, that is, present from day to day.
Thus, the word 'habitual' connotes some
degree of frequency and continuity.

21. Again, about the exercise of
powers under the Act of 1970, bearing in
mind reference to who is a goonda, it has
been held in Imran (supra) thus :

14. Expressions like 'by habit'
'habitual'
'desperate'
'dangerous'
and
'hazardous' cannot be flung in the face of a
man with laxity or semanitics. The Court
must insist on specificity of facts and a
consistent course of conduct convincingly
enough to draw the rigourous inference that
by confirmed habit, the petitioner is sure to
commit the offence if not externed or say
directed to take himself out of the district.
It is not a case where the petitioner has ever
involved himself in committing the crime
or has adopted crime as his profession.
There is not even faint or feeble material
against the petitioner that he is a person of
a criminal propensity. The case of the
petitioner does not come in either of the
clauses of Section 2(b) of the Act, which
defines the expression 'Goonda'. Therefore,
to outright label a bona fide student as
'goonda' was not only arbitrary capricious
and unjustified but also counter productive.
A bona fide student who is pursuing his
studies in the Post Graduate course and has
never seen the world of the criminals is
now being forced to enter the arena. The
intention of the Act is to afford protection
to the public against hardened or habitual
criminals or bullies or dangerous or
desperate class who menace the security of
a person or of property. The order of
externment under the Act is required to be
passed against persons who cannot readily
be brought under the ordinary penal law
4 All. Pavan @ Pavan Singhal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
41
and who for personal reasons cannot be
convicted for the offences said to have been
committed by them. The legislation is
preventive and not punitive. Its sole
purpose is to protect the citizens from the
habitual criminals and to secure future
good behaviour and not to punish the
innocent students. The Act is a powerful
tool for the control and suppression of the
'Goondas'; it should be used very sparingly
in very clear cases of 'public disorder' or for
the maintenance of 'public order'. If the
provisions of the Act are recklessly used
without adopting caution and descretion, it
may
easily
become
an
engine
of
operession. Its provisions are not intended
to secure indirectly a conviction in case
where a prosecution for a substantial
offence is likely to fail. Similarly the Act
should not obviously be used against mere
innocent people or to march over the
opponents who are taking recourse to
democractic process to get their certain
demands fulfilled or to wreck the private
vengeance.

22. The decision of the Division
Bench in Imran shows that powers under
the Act of 1970 are not required to be
exercised, because someone has been
reported to the Police in connection with a
serious crime. It is also not to be exercised
because that man has been admitted to bail.
It has to be exercised against a person who,
on the basis of tangible material on record
before the Authorities under the Act of
1970, can be classified as a goonda, under
one or the other clauses of Section 2(b) of
that Act. It must also be borne in mind that
the Act of 1970, being one that seriously
abridges liberty, no clause of the Statute
can be liberally construed. It has to be
strictly construed in favour of the citizen.

23.