# Plaintiff v. Tula Ram and others

- **Citation:** (2008) 3 ILRA 966
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2008-08-22
- **Case number:** Second Appeal No. 1595 of 1976
- **Bench:** Pankaj Mithal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/plaintiff-v-tula-ram-and-others-41289
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Sri S. Alim Shah
Sri R.K. Shukla
Sri Jitendra Nath Singh
Sri Nagendra Kumar Srivastava
Sri Anil Shukla
Sri Neeraj Agrawal

Code of Civil Procedure-Section 100Substantial
Question
of
lawmisinterpreting
or
mis
reading
document-itself
a
question
of
lawconcurrent finding of fact recorded by
Courts
below-not
sustainable-suit
decreed.

Held: Para 17 & 23

From the legal position discussed above,
it is clear that where a document of title
has been misinterpreted, misconstrued
or even misread it involves a substantial
question of law or at-least a question of
law.

Thus, I hold that the courts below have
grossly
erred
in
holding
that
the
plaintiff/appellants are not the owners
of
the
'Rasta'
by
misreading
the
document
of
title.
The
substantial
3 All] Ram Bharose Lal and another V. Tula Ram and others
967
question
framed
above
as
such
is
answered in affirmative in favour of the
plaintiff/appellants.
Case law discussed:
AIR 2000 SC 3009, AIR 1928 PC 172, AIR
1996 SC 3111, (1999) 9 SCC 237, JT 2007(6)
SC 347, AIR 1968 Allahabad 184, 2002 (4)
AWC 2674 (S.C.), AIR 1959 SC 24, AIR 1962
SC 1314,

## Text

966 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
Subbhayamma And Others) and (2008)
1 SCC 423 (National Insurance Co.
Ltd. Vs. Cholleti Bharatamma And
Others) repeatedly this question arose
before the Supreme Court. In the latest
judgment, as aforesaid, Supreme Court
has clarified that it is well settled that the
owner of the goods means only the person
who travels in the cabin of the vehicle.
According to us, law does not say that
whether owner of the goods or his
authorised representative carried in the
vehicle means only the person travelled in
the cabin of the vehicle. Therefore, this
aspect of the matter is yet open for the
discussion. However, since in the present
case owner of the vehicle carried in the
cabin he can not be said a "gratuitous
passenger".

9. Hence, we do not find any merit
in the appeal and as such the same is
dismissed even at the stage of admission,
however, without imposing any cost.

10. Incidentally, the appellantinsurance company prayed that the
statutory deposit of Rs.25,000/- made
before this Court for preferring this appeal
be remitted back to the concerned Motor
Accidents
Claims
Tribunal
as
expeditiously as possible in order to
adjust the same with the amount of
compensation to be paid to the claimants,
however, such prayer is allowed.
---------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 22.08.2008

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

Second Appeal No. 1595 of 1976

Ram Bharose Lal and another

...Plaintiff-Appellants
Versus
Tula Ram and others

 ...Defendants-Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Anil Sharma
Sri Rishi Ram
Sri K.K. Tiwari

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri S. Alim Shah
Sri R.K. Shukla
Sri Jitendra Nath Singh
Sri Nagendra Kumar Srivastava
Sri Anil Shukla
Sri Neeraj Agrawal

Code of Civil Procedure-Section 100Substantial
Question
of
lawmisinterpreting
or
mis
reading
document-itself
a
question
of
lawconcurrent finding of fact recorded by
Courts
below-not
sustainable-suit
decreed.

Held: Para 17 & 23

From the legal position discussed above,
it is clear that where a document of title
has been misinterpreted, misconstrued
or even misread it involves a substantial
question of law or at-least a question of
law.

Thus, I hold that the courts below have
grossly
erred
in
holding
that
the
plaintiff/appellants are not the owners
of
the
'Rasta'
by
misreading
the
document
of
title.
The
substantial
3 All] Ram Bharose Lal and another V. Tula Ram and others
967
question
framed
above
as
such
is
answered in affirmative in favour of the
plaintiff/appellants.
Case law discussed:
AIR 2000 SC 3009, AIR 1928 PC 172, AIR
1996 SC 3111, (1999) 9 SCC 237, JT 2007(6)
SC 347, AIR 1968 Allahabad 184, 2002 (4)
AWC 2674 (S.C.), AIR 1959 SC 24, AIR 1962
SC 1314,

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Mithal, J.)

1. The dispute involved in this
second appeal is about an 'Abchak' (small
piece of land used for flowing water) and
a 9 ft. wide 'Rasta'.

2. The plaintiff/appellants herein i.e.
Ram Bharose Lal and Ram Autar
instituted a suit for possession and
permanent injunction in respect of the
above disputed properties. The basis of
the suit happens to be a sale deed dated
3.9.59 which was executed by Kunwar
Hari Raj Singh transferring some land in
their favour. The defendant/respondents
contested the suit denying the title of the
plaintiff/appellants over the aforesaid
properties and at the same time claiming
easementary right by prescription over the
'Rasta'. The suit was dismissed by the
court of first instance and the appeal of
the plaintiff/appellants also met the same
fate. Thus having lost from both the
courts below they have preferred this
second appeal.

3. The appeal was admitted vide
order dated 15.10.1976 and a substantial
question of law was framed on 31.3.2008
which is as under:

"Whether both the courts below
committed
an
error
of
law
in
misinterpreting the title deed of the
plaintiff-appellants?"

4. Heard Sri Anil Sharma learned
counsel for the plaintiff/appellants and Sri
S. Alim Shah, learned counsel for
respondents.

5. The contention of the learned
counsel for the plaintiff/appellants is that
the courts below have misinterpreted and
misconstrued the sale deed dated 3.5.59 in
so far as on the complete and harmonious
reading of the same it is evident that the
plaintiff/appellants have purchased not
only a piece of land but also the disputed
'Rasta' under the said sale deed.

6. As regards the 'Abchak' he has
moved
an
application
for
taking
additional evidence on record under Order
XLI Rule 27 C.P.C. He contends that the
partition
deed
between
the
family
members of the defendant/respondents
which he seeks to adduce as additional
evidence
clearly
indicates
that
the
'Abchak' in dispute is not the property of
the
defendant/respondents.
The
application has been strongly opposed by
the defendant/respondents and it has been
alleged that any such evidence which was
within
the
knowledge
of
the
plaintiff/appellants cannot be taken as
additional evidence at this stage of the
second appeal after it had remained
pending for more than 22 years as no
reasons have been disclosed for not
bringing it on record earlier or in the
courts below.

7. In my opinion, the aforesaid
controversy with regard to the ownership
right of the plaintiff/appellants over the
'Abchak' can be resolved even without
referring to any additional evidence. The
plaintiff/appellants are the persons who
are claiming ownership over the same,
968 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
therefore, it is for them to prove their title
over it. The statement of the counsel for
the plaintiff/appellants as recorded under
Order X Rule 2 C.P.C. in the lower court
on 19.7.71 in unequivocal terms states
that the plaintiff/appellants are claiming
ownership of the 'Abchak' on the basis of
the sale deed dated 3.5.59. The relevant
portion of his statement as recorded on
19.7.71 is reproduced here-in-below:

"Sri O.P. Goyal for the plaintiff
states that the plaintiffs are owners of the
'abchak' mentioned in para 5 (b) of the
plaint through the deed of sale dated
5.9.1959."

8. In view of the above statement the
entire claim of the plaintiff/appellants in
respect of the 'Abchak' is only by virtue of
the sale deed dated 3.5.1959. I have gone
through the above sale deed Ex. 1 on
record. The sale deed nowhere recites that
the said 'Abchak' is also a subject matter
of the transfer therein. The 'Abchak' as
such, has not been transferred by the said
sale
deed
in
favour
of
the
plaintiff/appellants. Therefore, the entire
thrust
of
the
claim
of
the
plaintiff/appellants in respect of the said
'Abchak' on the basis of the above sale
deed falls to the ground. Apart from the
above, P.W.1 i.e. Ram Bharose Lal
himself specifically states as per his
statement that he is not the owner of the
'Abchak'.
Thus,
the
claim
of
the
plaintiff/appellants in respect to the
ownership of 'Abchak' does not survive at
all and as such any amount of additional
evidence on this issue would not help
them particularly in view of the statement
of their counsel referred to above which is
not disputed or is said to be incorrect. The
plaintiff/appellants, therefore, cannot be
permitted to improve their claim of
ownership over 'Abchak' by the evidence
other than the sale deed and to override
the
statement
of
their
counsel.
Accordingly, application for additional
evidence is virtually insignificant and
requires no specific order and stands
disposed of.

9. In view of aforesaid, i.e. the
statement
of
the
counsel
for
the
plaintiff/appellants recorded under Order
X Rule 2 C.P.C., the recital of the sale
deed and the statement of P.W.1 Ram
Bharose Lal, the inevitable conclusion on
the point is that the plaintiff/appellants are
not the owners of the said 'Abchak'.

10. Therefore the finding about the
ownership of the 'Abchak' as recorded by
the courts below is correct and suffers
from no perversity.

11. Now I proceed to answer the
substantial question of law as has been
framed so as to adjudicate the rights of the
parties in respect of the 'Rasta'.

12. Sri S.A. Shah, learned counsel
for the respondents at the outset has
submitted
that
there
is
no
misinterpretation or mis-construction of
the sale deed by the courts below and, as
such, no substantial question of law is
involved in this second appeal.

13. In AIR 2000 SC 3009
Santakumari and others Vs. Lakshmi
Amma
Janaki
Amma
and
others
Supreme Court while considering the
ambit of substantial question of law under
Section 100 C.P.C. ruled that construction
of a document under which a claim of
property is made is a substantial question
of law is a well settled proposition of law.
This view was expressed by the Supreme
3 All] Ram Bharose Lal and another V. Tula Ram and others
969
Court relying upon the earlier decision
reported in AIR 1928 PC 172 Guran
Ditta Vs. T. Ram Ditta as reaffirmed by
the Supreme Court in AIR 1996 SC 3111
Kochikakkada Aboobacker Vs. Attah
Kasim and (1999) 9 SCC 237 Neelu
Narayani Vs. Lakshmanan.

14. A similar view has been
expressed by the Supreme Court in JT
2007(6) SC 347 P. Chandrasekharan
and others Vs. S. Kanakarajan and
others in the following words:

"13. There cannot be any doubt
whatsoever that a substantial question of
law is different from a question of law.
Interpretation of a document which goes
to the root of the title of a party to the lis
would indisputably give rise to a question
of law.
........
........
19. When thus the courts below
misread and misinterpreted a document of
title read with other documents and the
plan for the identification of the suit lands
whereupon the plaintiffs themselves relied
upon, a substantial question of law arose
for determination of the High Court in
between the parties to the suit."

15. Thus, from the above two
decisions of the Apex Court it is evident
that where a document on which the title
of the parties is based has been
misinterpreted or even misread it would
amount to a substantial question of law as
it affects the valuable rights of the parties
concerning tangible property.

16. On the other hand, Sri S.A. Shah
has placed reliance upon AIR 1968
Allahabad 184 Parmatma Prasad Vs. Mt.
Sampatti and other. In this case a single
Judge of Allahabad High Court while
considering the words "mis-construction
of a document" held that if a court has
mis-constructed the legal affect and the
nature of the document it would amount
to mis-construction or mis-interpretation
eg. where a document creates a lease deed
but the court interprets the same to be a
licence. The interpretation of the recital of
the facts in the document would not
amount
to
mis-construction
of
the
document but would only be an erroneous
view of the facts contained in the
document. A similar view has been
expressed by the Apex Court in the case
of Ram Kishore and another Vs.
Shanker Lal 2002 (4) AWC 2674 (S.C.)
and it has been laid down that a
consideration of a document of alienation
of a property as to whether it is gift or a
sale is a question of law. In AIR 1959 SC
24 Radha Sundar Dutta Vs. Mohd.
Jahadur Rahim and others it has been
laid down that the nature of the rights
granted under a document is a matter to
be decided on the consideration of the
terms of the document which is a question
of law. Further AIR 1962 SC 1314
Pattabhiramaswamy Vs. Sittarnumayya
provides that a matter with regard to the
construction of the terms of the document
is a question of law. The relevant extract
of the aforesaid ruling is reproduced herein-below:

"It is well settled that a construction
of a document of title or a document
which is the foundation of the rights of the
parties necessarily raises a question of
law."

17.

From the legal position
discussed above, it is clear that where a
document of title has been misinterpreted,
misconstrued or even misread it involves
970 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
a substantial question of law or at-least a
question of law.

18. Thus, in the instant case even
though the sale deed dated 3.5.59, which
is a document of title may not technically
involve
misconstruction
or
misinterpretation but even its misreading
by the courts below is sufficient to give
rise to a substantial question of law or at
least a question of law which do requires
consideration in this second appeal.

19. Now this second appeal was
admitted on 15.10.76 i.e. much before the
CPC Amendment Act 104 of 1976 was
enforced w.e.f. 1.2.77. Section 97(2)(m)
of the said CPC Amendment Act provides
that the amendment introduced by Section
37 of the said Act mandating framing of
substantial
question
of
law
before
deciding second appeal would not apply
to the second appeals which have been
admitted before the enforcement of the
aforesaid Section 37 and, as such, shall be
decided as if such amendment has not
come into force. Thus,. Framing of
substantial question of law is not
necessary where the second appeal has
been admitted prior to 1.2.77 and such
second appeals can be decided only on the
basis of the question of law as was
provided under the unamended CPC.

20. To examine as to whether the
courts below have actually misread the
sale deed dated 3.5.59 affecting the title
of the plaintiff/appellants over the 'Rasta'
it is appropriate to reproduce the same
which is in Hindi as a whole:

"eSa fd Jh dqWoj gjh jkt flag iq= Jh dqWoj jke
flag lkgc lkfdu o jbZl d+Lck gYnkSj ijxuk nkjkuxj
rglhy o ft+yk fctukSj dk gwWaA
tks fd ,d fd+rk vkjkth egnqnk o iSewnk tsy okds
eUMh dLck ugVkSj rglhy /kkeiqj ft+yk fctukSj fd ftldk
jkLrk vke nks jQ~r uks fQV pksM+k lgu cs:uh esa feutkfuc
iwjc gksdj cflEr mRrj [kM+Utk ljdkjh ij dks d+k;e gSA
tks c:;s rd+lh; [kkUnkuh ct+fj;s lqygukek c vnkyr
flfoy tth fctukSj c eqd+nek uEcjh 20 lu 1955 bZ-
eq> eqd+hj cuke Jh f'ko egUnz dqekj flag o+xSjk equQlyk
31 ekpZ lu 1955 bZ- c'kewy nhxj tk;nkn eq> eqdhj
dh feyfe;r gS tks iV~Vk nokeh ij c:;s QSlyk ckgeh
cvnkyr equlQh uxhuk ceqdnek uEcjh 494 lu 1949
bZ0 Jherh jkuh chch dqaoj lkfgck cuke f'k[kj pUn oxSjk
equQ+lyk 22 fnlEcj lu 1942bZ- o c:;s iV~Vk
dcwfy;r nok~eh bdjkjh f'k[kj pUn et+dwj Q+jhd vOoy o
Jherh jkuh chch dqaoj lkfgck ekSlwQk Qjhd nks;e eofjZ[kk
22 fnlEcj lu~ 1942 bZ- fd ftldh jftLV~h cgh ua0
,d ftYn 344 ds lqQ+kr 227 o 228 ij o 765 ij
crkjh[k 24 fnlEcj lu 1942 bZ0 dks nQ~rj flc
jftLVjkj /kkeiqj esa gqbZ gS fd jk;s ij nsjD~[kh gS fd ftl
ij f'k[kj pUn et+dwj cviznk;s fdjk;k
vc rd crkSj fdjk;s nkjkuk d+kfct pys vkrs gSA eq>
eqdhj dks fuLcr vkjkth et+dwjk e; tqeyk eqrJftd+kr o
gd~ gdwd ds eky dk ukvf[r;kjkr gkfly gSA vkSj gedks
etkt+ bvd+kr gSA fygktk eq> eqdhj us c+[kq'kh viuh
cnq:Lrh gokl [k+elk fdrk et+djk ckyk e; jkLrk o
tqeyk g+dwd gj fdLe tks dqN mlls rkvyqd j[krs gSa cnys
esa eq- lkr lkS :- 700@& fd vk/kks ftlds eq0 rhu lkS
ipkl 350@& :- gksrs gSa gkFk Jh jke Hkjksls yky o
jkevkSrkj filjku ykyk NnEek yky tSu lkfduku d+Lck
ugVkSj ds cS dj fn;k A vkSj dqy t+js leu gLc rQ+lhy
tSy eq> eqdhj us eq'krfj;ku ls olwy ;k fy;k vkSj drk
eqcS;k et+dwjk ls drbZ vkSj viuk d+ctk ekfydkuk mBk
fy;k vkSj d+Ctk c[k+ch vkt dh rkjh[k ls cfeLy vius
eq'krfj;ku dk djk fn;k rkjh[k bejkstk ls eq'krfj;ku dks
tqeyk vf[r;kjkr ekfydkuk olwyh fdjk;k ocSjk gj rjg
ij gkfly gks x;s vc gekjk ;k fdlh okfjlku ;k d+k;e
eqd+dke gekjs dk dksbZ gd+ek nkok fuLcr olwyh t+js leu
o 'kSeqc;~;k dh ckcr ckdg ugha jgk u vkbUnk gksxk vxj
dksbZ 'kjhd ;k lghe dkuwuh ;k 'kkLrjh iSnk gksdj fdlh
rkSj nkosnkj gksos tks tokc nsgh gj fd+Le e; okilh t+js
leu ox+Sjk ds cft+Ees eq> eqdhj gksxh fygktk ;g cSukek
fy[k fn;k fd lun jgs vkSj oDr ij dke vkosA uke d+rk
eqc;~;k et+dwjk vykok jkLrk iwjch o vkc pd ifPNeh ds
;g gSA

iwjc ifPNe NRrhl 36 fQV& nfD[ku mRrj lrkbl
fQ+V pkj bUp 27 fQ0 4 bA0 gnqn ;g gSaA iwjch&lgu ds
jkLrk fd+rk gktk fQj vkjkt+h feyfdr eq> eqd+hj ed+ctk
3 All] Ram Bharose Lal and another V. Tula Ram and others
971
eq'krfj;ku A ifPNeh vkjkth vkc psd drs gktk ckngw
edku ckcw uUn fd'kksj tSuA nfD[kuh & edku yk0 lqesj
pUnz pUnz lSu tSu A mRrjh& fdrk gosyh eq'krfj;ku
rQ+lhy olwyh tjs leu ;g gSA crkSj cSvkuk rkjh[k 30
8@59 bZ0 olwy ik;s 100@ :0 cj odz jftLVjh Jheku
lc jftLVjkj lkgc ds lueq[k olwy ik;s 600@ :0 eh0
700@ :0 1⁄4uksV1⁄2 ijr vOoy dks lrj rhu esa yQ+t 1⁄4dk1⁄2
d+yet+n gSA

vkSj ijr 3 lrj jesa yQ+t 1⁄4lgu os1⁄2 d+yetn o lrj 4
esa bckjr
1⁄4fdjk;snkj eq> eqd+hj1⁄2 fu'kku * cukdj gk'kh;s ij nkbZ rjQ+
rgjhj gSA
rgjhj rkjh[k 3 flrEcj lu 1959 bZ0 dks cd+ye dkfrc
ugVkSj"
(Emphasis supplied)

21. A plain reading of the above sale
deed reveals that under the sale deed in
the earlier part the vendor has described
himself to be the owner of the 'Rasta' and
a piece of the land of which boundary and
measurements are said to have been given
at the foot of the document. At the foot of
the document only the boundaries and
measurements of the piece of the land
have been given. However, in the body of
the document it has been specifically
stated that he is transferring the piece of
land with 'Rasta' (e; jkLrk) with complete
rights for a total sale consideration of
Rs.700/-. This part of the recital in the
sale deed has completely been totally
ignored by the two courts below and thus
they have recorded that under the sale
deed only the piece of land has been has
been
transferred.
However,
if
the
document as a whole is read it shows that
the vendor has transferred not only the
piece of land but also the 'Rasta' which
was also in the ownership of the vendor.
Therefore, I am of the view that the
aforesaid sale deed also transfers the
'Rasta' in favour of the plaintiff/appellants
along with a piece of land as described
therein.
22. At this juncture, Sri S.A. Shah,
learned counsel for the respondents
asserted that where two inferences are
possible the view taken by the courts
below
should
be
accepted.
The
submission is not devoid of merit as in
second appeal the High Court is not
ordinarily entitle to substitute its own
opinion but the said principle is not
applicable where the view or the inference
drawn from the document by the courts
below is palpably erroneous and is
beyond the comprehension of a prudent
man. Here, as said earlier the courts
below have not read the sale deed as a
whole and have completely ignored its
recitals where the 'Rasta' has also been
transferred
in
unequivocal
terms.
Therefore, I am of the view that this is not
a case where on the plain reading of the
sale deed itself two views or inferences
are possible.

23. Thus, I hold that the courts
below have grossly erred in holding that
the plaintiff/appellants are not the owners
of the 'Rasta' by misreading the document
of title. The substantial question framed
above as such is answered in affirmative
in favour of the plaintiff/appellants.

24. In the last, a faint effort has been
made by the respondents to establish their
easementary right over the aforesaid
'Rasta'. In this connection the court of first
instant had framed an issue, i.e. issue no.2
to the effect as to whether the defendants
have acquired easementary rights on the
passage in suit? The said issue was
decided against the respondents as there
were no pleadings with regard to the
same.
In
appeal
preferred
by
the
plaintiff/appellants
before
the
lower
972 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
appellate court the respondents have not
taken any cross objection in this regard or
assailed the findings on issue no.2. I have
perused the written statement of the
defendant/respondents and find that the
defendant/respondents
have
nowhere
pleaded any such easementary right over
the land. In the absence of the foundation
in the pleadings to this effect, I do not
find any error on the part of the court of
first instance in deciding issue no.2
against the defendant/respondents. Even
the appellate court has not recorded any
specific
finding
that
the
defendant/respondents have acquired any
easementary right over the said 'Rasta'.
Therefore, this submission of the learned
counsel for the defendant/respondents
cannot be sustained and must fail.

25. In view of above discussion and
the answer to the substantial question of
law the appeal deserves to be allowed and
is hereby allowed. The judgment and
orders of the two courts below dated
1.6.1976 and 14.5.1973 passed in Civil
Appeal No.128 of 1973 and Original Suit
No.553 of 1968, respectively are set aside
and the suit of the plaintiff/appellants is
decreed in part for permanent prohibitory
injunction
restraining
the
defendant/respondents from encroaching
the disputed 'Rasta' by making any
construction or projection thereon and
from interfering in the plaintiff/appellants'
use and occupation of the same. Appeal
allowed.

No costs.
---------
O
RIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.8.2008

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 32132 of 2001

Chandra Bhushan Bajpai
...Petitioner
Versus
Joint Director of Education, Kanpur
Mandal Kanpur and others ..Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Vishnu Bihari Tiwari

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C.

U.P. State Aided Educational Institution
Employees Contributory Provident Fund
Insurance Pension Rules Rule-19 (a)(b)-
Benefit of pension-retirement prior to
enforcement of Rules-petitioner claiming
to count the period of working in unaided recognized institution-institution
brought under grant in aid in March
1961-provisions of pension rule becomes
effective on 1.10.1964-held-No person
can claim particular service in particular
employment
for
counting
towards
qualifying service.

Held: Para 8

It is clear case of the respondents that
the institution in question was brought
in grant-in-aid list in March 1961 though
the
petitioner
served
therein
prior
thereto. Therefore, U.P. Contributory
Provident-Insurance-Pension
Rules
which came into force on 1.10.1964 are
not applicable at all. Learned counsel for
the petitioner could not place any other
provision to substantiate his claim that
the said service can be counted. Pension
is not a bounty but as a matter of fact, a
right, yet the mode and manner of its
payment is governed strictly by relevant
Rules. Unless the Rules provide, no