# Plaintiff v. Union of India & another

- **Citation:** (2004) 1 ILRA 181
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2004-03-05
- **Case number:** Second Appeal No.424 of 1989
- **Bench:** Tarun Agarwala
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/plaintiff-v-union-of-india-another-40318
- **Pages:** 3

## Headnote

Constitution of India, Article 311 (2)-
Railways
Act,
1890-S.
139-Removed
from
Service
enquiry-charges
found
proved Appeal partly allowed-Second
appeal-Appellants
contention
that
appointment letter filed by opposite
party was not admitted by him so it
cannot be taken into consideration-
s.139 of Railways Act provides that
entries in records on other documents of
Railways Administration can be proved
either by production of records or by
production of copy of entries certified by
officer having custody of records-in
present case, copy of appointment letter
had been certified by Assistant Security
Officer himself and said document has
been duly proved.

Held: Para

Learned counsel for the appellant further
submitted that the appointment letter
filed by the opposite party was not
admitted by him and therefore, the said
document
cannot
be
taken
into
consideration. This contention of the
learned counsel for the appellant is
devoid of any merit. Section 139 of the
Indian Railways Act 1890 provides that
entries
in
the
records
or
other
documents of a Railway Administration
can be proved either by the production
of the records or other documents or by
the production of a copy of the entries
certified by the Officer having custody of
the records. In the present case copy of
the appointment letter, filed by the
defendants, had been certified by the
Assistant Security Officer himself and the
said document has been duly proved.
Case law discussed:
AIR 1993 SC 205
http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in
182 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2004

## Text

1 All] Sunder Lal V. Union of India and another 181
acquisition by issuing notification under
Section 48. In such a case Section 11 A of
the Act is not attracted and the acquisition
proceeding would not lapse even if no
award was made within the period
prescribed by Section 11 A.

15. In Satendra Prasad Jain and
others Vs. State of U.P. AIR 1993 SC
2517 the Supreme Court observed that
when Section 17 (1) is applied by
invoking
the
urgency
clause,
the
Government takes possession of the land
prior to the making of the award under
Section 11, and thereupon the owner is
divested of the land, which is vested in
the Government. Hence Section 11A has
no application to cases of acquisition
under Section 17 because the land has
already vested in the Government and
there is no provision in the Act by which
the land vested in the Government can be
reverted to the owner, vide Ram Gopal
Varshney Vs. State of U.P. 2004(1)
AWC 206.

16. In view of the above, we find no
merit in these petitions.

The writ petitions are dismissed and
the interim orders, if any, stand vacated.
---------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.03.2004

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE TARUN AGARWALA, J.

Second Appeal No.424 of 1989

Sunder Lal

...Plaintiff-Appellant
Versus
Union of India & another ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri A.B. Saran
Sri Paramatma Rai

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Lal Ji Sinha
S.C.

Constitution of India, Article 311 (2)-
Railways
Act,
1890-S.
139-Removed
from
Service
enquiry-charges
found
proved Appeal partly allowed-Second
appeal-Appellants
contention
that
appointment letter filed by opposite
party was not admitted by him so it
cannot be taken into consideration-
s.139 of Railways Act provides that
entries in records on other documents of
Railways Administration can be proved
either by production of records or by
production of copy of entries certified by
officer having custody of records-in
present case, copy of appointment letter
had been certified by Assistant Security
Officer himself and said document has
been duly proved.

Held: Para

Learned counsel for the appellant further
submitted that the appointment letter
filed by the opposite party was not
admitted by him and therefore, the said
document
cannot
be
taken
into
consideration. This contention of the
learned counsel for the appellant is
devoid of any merit. Section 139 of the
Indian Railways Act 1890 provides that
entries
in
the
records
or
other
documents of a Railway Administration
can be proved either by the production
of the records or other documents or by
the production of a copy of the entries
certified by the Officer having custody of
the records. In the present case copy of
the appointment letter, filed by the
defendants, had been certified by the
Assistant Security Officer himself and the
said document has been duly proved.
Case law discussed:
AIR 1993 SC 205
http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in
182 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2004
(Delivered by Hon'ble Tarun Agarwala, J.)

1. The plaintiff was appointed as a
Rakshak
in
the
Railways
vide
appointment letter dated 18.3.1966 issued
by the Assistant Security Officer. The
plaintiff was served with a charge sheet
on the basis of which an enquiry was
initiated. The inquiry officer in his
enquiry report found that the plaintiff was
guilty of the charges framed against him.
On the basis of the enquiry report, the
Assistant Security Officer passed an order
dated 12.9.1978 removing the plaintiff
from the service. The plaintiff filed an
appeal, which was also dismissed by the
appellate
authority.
The
plaintiff
thereafter, filed a suit for a declaration
praying that the order of removal dated
12.9.1978 is illegal, inoperative and void
and was hit by Article 311 [1] and [2] of
the Constitution of India. The plaintiff
also prayed that he should be deemed to
be in service with all consequential
benefits. The defendant in their written
statement contended that the enquiry was
held after following the principles of
natural justice and all the documents
which was asked by the plaintiff were
duly supplied and full opportunity was
given to the plaintiff to lead evidence. The
defendant further submitted that the order
passed by the Assistant Security Officer
removing the plaintiff in service was
validly passed, in asmuch as he was the
appointing authority.

2. The trial court after framing the
issues dismissed the suit with costs
holding that the order passed by the
Assistant Security Officer removing the
plaintiff from the service was a valid
order and that there was no violation of
Article 311 [1] and [2] of the Constitution
of India.

3. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the
suit, the plaintiff filed an appeal before
the lower appellate Court, which was
partly decreed. The lower appellate Court
found that the Assistant Security Officer
was
the
appointing
authority
and
therefore, had validly passed the order of
removal of service of the plaintiff. The
appellate Court further found that full
opportunity of hearing was given to the
plaintiff and that there was no violation
of the principles of natural justice. The
appellate Court, however, found that the
departmental appeal of the plaintiff was
not decided by the appellate authority by
a reasoned order and therefore, directed
the appellate authority to pass a reasoned
order.

4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid
decision of the Court below, the plaintiff
has preferred the present second appeal.
At time of the admission of the appeal,
the following substantial question of law
was framed, namely,

"Whether the order of termination
was
passed
by
the
appointing
authority?"

5. I have heard Sri Parmatma Rai,
the learned counsel for the appellant and
Sri Lal Ji Sinha, the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the opposite
parties.

6. Sri Parmatama Rai, the learned
counsel for the appellant contended that
the plaintiff was appointed by the Chief
Security
Officer
and
therefore,
the
appointing authority, namely, the Chief
Security Officer could only remove the
plaintiff from the service and, therefore,
the order of removal passed by the
Assistant Security Officer was invalid and
http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in
1 All] Sri Shiv Lal Pal V. District Magistrate, Mirzapur and others 183
against the provisions of the rules. The
arguments of the learned counsel for the
appellant is devoid of any merit.

7. From a perusal of the appointment
letter [Paper No.47-C], which has been
filed by the defendants before the Court
below, it is clear that the appointment
letter issued in favour of the plaintiff was
issued by the Assistant Security Officer.

8. The contention of the learned
counsel for the appellant that the
appointment letter was issued by the
Chief Security Officer is therefore,
incorrect. Since the appointment letter
was issued by the Assistant Security
Officer, he being the appointing authority
was empowered to issue an order of
removal of service of the plaintiff. In the
present case, the order of removal was
passed by the Assistant Security Officer.
Thus, I hold that the Assistant Security
Officer was the appointing authority of
the plaintiff and was empowered to pass
an order of removal of service of the
plaintiff.

9. Sri Lal Ji Sinha, the learned
Senior Counsel for the opposite parties
has invited my attention to a judgment of
the Supreme Court in Union of India v.
Rajendra Singh reported in AIR 1993
SC 205 wherein the Supreme Court held
that the power of appointment of a
Rakshak does not vest merely with the
Chief Security Officer, but also gives
power to the Assistant Security Officer to
appoint a Rakshak.

10. Learned counsel for the
appellant further submitted that the
appointment letter filed by the opposite
party was not admitted by him and
therefore, the said document cannot be
taken into consideration. This contention
of the learned counsel for the appellant is
devoid of any merit. Section 139 of the
Indian Railways Act 1890 provides that
entries in the records or other documents
of a Railway Administration can be
proved either by the production of the
records or other documents or by the
production of a copy of the entries
certified by the Officer having custody of
the records. In the present case copy of
the appointment letter, filed by the
defendants, had been certified by the
Assistant Security Officer himself and the
said document has been duly proved.

11. In view of the aforesaid, there is
no merit in the appeal and is dismissed. In
the circumstances of the case, the parties
shall bear their own costs.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.3.2004

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE V.M. SAHAI, J.
THE HON'BLE KRISHNA MURARI, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 39749 of 1999

Sri Shiv Lal Pal

...Petitioner
Versus
District Magistrate, Mirzapur and others

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Rahul Sripat
Miss Suman Jaiswal

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri V.K. Singh
Sri Y.D. Mohan
S.C.

U.P. Gaon Sabha and Bhumi Prabandhak
Mandal- Para 60 (2) (Kha)-Grant of lease
http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in