# Pooran Lal v. Saurabh Kumar

- **Citation:** (2025) 9 ILRA 621
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-09-02
- **Case number:** Matters Under Article 227 No. 9600 of 2025
- **Bench:** Manish Kumar Nigam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/pooran-lal-v-saurabh-kumar-53944
- **Pages:** 19

## Headnote

622 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Issue for Consideration
Whether plaint was liable be rejected
under Order VII Rule 11 of C.P.C. for on
ground that the suit filed by the plaintiffrespondent was barred under Section 14 of the
Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises
Tenancy Act, 2021?

Head Notes
The Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban
Premises Tenancy Act, 2021-Section 14;
The Constitution of India, 1950-Article
227; The Code of Civil Procedure,1908Order VII Rule 11; The Uttar Pradesh
Revenue Code,2006-Sections 94,95 & 96-
No averment in the plaint to the effect
that the property taken by the plaintiff on
lease
from
the
defendant
was
an
agricultural property- Property leased out
to the plaintiff is described as part of Gata
No. 340, which was leased out for the
purposes of running a petrol pump for a
period of thirty years -In the lease deed
also
there
is
no
mention
that
the
agricultural property is being leased out to
the plaintiff-respondent- Court has to
consider whether the application filed by
the defendant-petitioner under Order 7
Rule 11 of the C.P.C. has been rightly
rejected or not. Of course, the plea of
jurisdiction as to whether the civil court or
the
revenue
court
will
have
the
jurisdiction can always be decided after
considering the evidence of the parties.
Similarly, the plea that the suit is barred
by statute can also be considered after
evidence of the party- Petition dismissed.

Held-From the bare reading of the plaint, it
cannot be said that the suit was barred either
by the provisions of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 or
the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises
Tenancy Act, 2021. (E-15)
(Para 27, 29, 41 & 42)

Case Law Cited
Saleem Bhai vs. State of Maharashtra; (2003) 1
SCC 557; Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy
Vs. Syed Jalal; (2017) 13 SCC 174: (2017) 5
SCC (Civ) 602; Srihari Hanumandas Totala vs.
Hemant Vithal Kamat and others; (2021) 9 SCC;
Secretary of State Vs. Mask and Company A.I.R.
1940 PC 105, Privy Council; Abdul Waheed Khan
Vs. Bhawani and others reported in 1966 (SC)
1718; Dhulabhai etc. Vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh A.I.R. reported in 1969 SC(78); State of
Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam
reported in A.I.R. 1986 (SC) 794; Nagri
Pracharini Sabha and another Vs. Vth Additional
District and Sessions Judge, Varanasi and others
reported in 1991 Supp (2) SCC 36; Vinod Infra
Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia and others
reported in AIR 2025 SC 2933; Smt. Kushma
Devi Vs. Darshan Singh And 4 Others in Matters
Under Article 227 No. 113 of 2024 decided on
12.02.2024; Rame Gowda (dead) by LRS. v. M.
Varadappa Naidu (dead) by LRS. reported in
(2004) 1 SCC 769; Kum. Geetha, D/o Late
Krishna & others v. Nanjundaswamy & others
passed in Civil Appeal No. 7413 of 2023;
Mangleshwar Prasad Vs. State Of U.P. And 6
Others in Writ C No. 24877 of 2023 decided on
03.10.2023; Ashik Ali Vs. Harigen in Second
Appeal No. 439 of 1985 decided on 21.09.2015;

List of Acts
The Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises
Tenancy Act, 2021; The Constitution of India,
1950; The Code of Civil Procedure,1908; The
Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code,2006

List of Keywords
Bare reading of the plaint; Cannot be said that
the suit was barred; Order VII Rule 11; Suit
barred by statute; Can be considered after
evidence

Case Arising From
Order dated 26.05.2025 passed by Civil Judge
(Junior Division), Pilibhit in Original Suit no. 261
of 2025 (Saurabh Kumar Vs. Pooran Lal) by
which an application filed by the defendantpetitioner under Order VII Rule 11 of C.P.C. has
been rejected.

Appearances for Parties
Counsel for Petitioners(s) : Gaurav Tripathi

## Text

_Characters 0–39,913 of 64,531. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39913 for what follows._

9 All. Pooran Lal Vs. Saurabh Kumar
621
judgment is reserved and is pronounced
later, a column be added in the judgment
where, on the first page, after the causetitle, date of reserving the judgment and
date of pronouncing it be separately
mentioned by the court officer concerned.

(ii) That Chief Justice of the High
Courts, on their administrative side, should
direct the Court Officers/ Readers of the
various Benches in the High Courts to
furnish every month the list of cases in the
matters where the judgments reserved are
not pronounced within the period of that
months.

(iii) On noticing that after
conclusion
of
the
arguments
the
judgment is not pronounced within a
period of two months, the concerned
Chief Justice shall draw the attention of
the Bench concerned to the pending
matter. The Chief Justice may also see
the
desirability
of
circulating
the
statement of such cases in which the
judgments have not been pronounced
within a period of six weeks from the
date of conclusion of the arguments
amongst the Judges of the High Court
for their information. Such communication be conveyed as confidential and
in a sealed cover.

(iv) Where a judgment is not
pronounced within three months, from the
date of reserving it, any of the parties in the
case is permitted to file an application in
the High Court with prayer for early
judgment. Such application, as and when
filed, shall be listed before the Bench
concerned within two days excluding the
intervening holidays.

(v) If the judgment, for any
reason, is not pronounced within a period
of six months, any of the parties of the said
lis shall be entitled to move an application
before the Chief Justice of the High Court
with a prayer to withdraw the said case
and to make it over to any other Bench for
fresh arguments. It is open to the Chief
Justice to grant the said prayer or to pass
any other order as deems fit in the
circumstances."

6. In light of the above, let the matter
be re - heard and the arguments completed
within two weeks from the date a certified
copy of this order is produced before the
court concerned and the judgment be
pronounced within a period of six weeks
thereafter, in accordance with law.

7. We further direct the authorities to
follow the directions of Supreme Court in
the case of Anil Rai (supra) in deciding
the disputes before them.

8. Let a copy of this judgment be sent
to Additional Chief Secretary (Revenue),
Government of Uttar Pradesh for necessary
compliance and for information to all the
authorities concerned.

9. With aforesaid observations and
directions the petition stands disposed of.
----------
(2025) 9 ILRA 621
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.09.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANISH KUMAR NIGAM, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 9600 of 2025

Pooran Lal ...Petitioner
Versus
Saurabh Kumar ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Gaurav Tripathi

Counsel for the Respondent:
622 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Issue for Consideration
Whether plaint was liable be rejected
under Order VII Rule 11 of C.P.C. for on
ground that the suit filed by the plaintiffrespondent was barred under Section 14 of the
Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises
Tenancy Act, 2021?

Head Notes
The Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban
Premises Tenancy Act, 2021-Section 14;
The Constitution of India, 1950-Article
227; The Code of Civil Procedure,1908Order VII Rule 11; The Uttar Pradesh
Revenue Code,2006-Sections 94,95 & 96-
No averment in the plaint to the effect
that the property taken by the plaintiff on
lease
from
the
defendant
was
an
agricultural property- Property leased out
to the plaintiff is described as part of Gata
No. 340, which was leased out for the
purposes of running a petrol pump for a
period of thirty years -In the lease deed
also
there
is
no
mention
that
the
agricultural property is being leased out to
the plaintiff-respondent- Court has to
consider whether the application filed by
the defendant-petitioner under Order 7
Rule 11 of the C.P.C. has been rightly
rejected or not. Of course, the plea of
jurisdiction as to whether the civil court or
the
revenue
court
will
have
the
jurisdiction can always be decided after
considering the evidence of the parties.
Similarly, the plea that the suit is barred
by statute can also be considered after
evidence of the party- Petition dismissed.

Held-From the bare reading of the plaint, it
cannot be said that the suit was barred either
by the provisions of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 or
the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises
Tenancy Act, 2021. (E-15)
(Para 27, 29, 41 & 42)

Case Law Cited
Saleem Bhai vs. State of Maharashtra; (2003) 1
SCC 557; Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy
Vs. Syed Jalal; (2017) 13 SCC 174: (2017) 5
SCC (Civ) 602; Srihari Hanumandas Totala vs.
Hemant Vithal Kamat and others; (2021) 9 SCC;
Secretary of State Vs. Mask and Company A.I.R.
1940 PC 105, Privy Council; Abdul Waheed Khan
Vs. Bhawani and others reported in 1966 (SC)
1718; Dhulabhai etc. Vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh A.I.R. reported in 1969 SC(78); State of
Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam
reported in A.I.R. 1986 (SC) 794; Nagri
Pracharini Sabha and another Vs. Vth Additional
District and Sessions Judge, Varanasi and others
reported in 1991 Supp (2) SCC 36; Vinod Infra
Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia and others
reported in AIR 2025 SC 2933; Smt. Kushma
Devi Vs. Darshan Singh And 4 Others in Matters
Under Article 227 No. 113 of 2024 decided on
12.02.2024; Rame Gowda (dead) by LRS. v. M.
Varadappa Naidu (dead) by LRS. reported in
(2004) 1 SCC 769; Kum. Geetha, D/o Late
Krishna & others v. Nanjundaswamy & others
passed in Civil Appeal No. 7413 of 2023;
Mangleshwar Prasad Vs. State Of U.P. And 6
Others in Writ C No. 24877 of 2023 decided on
03.10.2023; Ashik Ali Vs. Harigen in Second
Appeal No. 439 of 1985 decided on 21.09.2015;

List of Acts
The Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises
Tenancy Act, 2021; The Constitution of India,
1950; The Code of Civil Procedure,1908; The
Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code,2006

List of Keywords
Bare reading of the plaint; Cannot be said that
the suit was barred; Order VII Rule 11; Suit
barred by statute; Can be considered after
evidence

Case Arising From
Order dated 26.05.2025 passed by Civil Judge
(Junior Division), Pilibhit in Original Suit no. 261
of 2025 (Saurabh Kumar Vs. Pooran Lal) by
which an application filed by the defendantpetitioner under Order VII Rule 11 of C.P.C. has
been rejected.

Appearances for Parties
Counsel for Petitioners(s) : Gaurav Tripathi

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manish Kumar
Nigam, J.)

1. Heard Shri Gaurav Tripathi, learned
counsel for the petitioner and perused the
record.
9 All. Pooran Lal Vs. Saurabh Kumar
623

2. This petition has been filed
challenging the order dated 26.05.2025
passed by Civil Judge (Junior Division),
Pilibhit in Original Suit no. 261 of 2025
(Saurabh Kumar Vs. Pooran Lal) by which
an application filed by the defendantpetitioner under Order VII Rule 11 of
C.P.C. has been rejected. The revision filed
against the order dated 26.05.2025 has also
been dismissed by the revisional court i.e.
District Judge, Pilibhit by order dated
30.05.2025. The order passed by the
revisional court is also under challenge in
the present writ petition.

3. Brief facts of the case are that
Original Suit No. 261 of 2025 was
instituted by the plaintiff-respondent for the
relief of permanent injunction restraining
the defendant, his agents from interfering
with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff
over the land which was given to the
plaintiff on the basis of a lease deed. The
second prayer made in the plaint was that a
mandatory injunction be granted directing
the defendant to accept the rent from the
plaintiff and issue a receipt for the same
and in case, the same is not done, the
plaintiff be permitted to deposit the rent in
the court. Case of the plaintiff as set up in
the plaint is that the property in dispute was
leased to the plaintiff vide lease deed dated
11.10.2019 and the plaintiff-respondent is
in peaceful possession over the land in
dispute. The defendant-petitioner started
interfering with the possession of the
plaintiff of which he had no right and
therefore, the suit for permanent injunction
was filed for restraining the defendant from
interfering with the possession of the
plaintiff. The averments were also made
that the defendant has accepted rent till
31.12.2020
and
thereafter,
though,
defendant received rent till 2023 but did not
issue receipts. Later on, the defendant did
not accept the rent for the year 2024, other
pleas were also taken. The defendant in the
suit moved an application under Order VII
Rule 11 of C.P.C. for rejection of the plaint
on ground that the suit filed by the
plaintiff-respondent
was
barred
under
Section 14 of the Uttar Pradesh Regulation
of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021
(hereinafter referred as 'Act of 2021') and
therefore, the plaint was liable to be
rejected. The plaintiff-respondent filed
objection to the said application. The trial
court by its order dated 28.05.2025 rejected
the application filed by the defendantpetitioner under Order VII Rule 11 of
C.P.C. The revision filed by the defendantpetitioner was also rejected by the order
impugned dated 30.05.2025. Hence the
present petition.

4. Though the initial application was
filed only on the ground that the suit was
barred by the provisions of Section 14 of
Act of 2021 but at the stage of argument, it
was also contended by defendant-petitioner
before trial court that the suit was barred by
Sections 94, 95 and 206 of U.P. Revenue
Code, 2006.

5. Contention of learned counsel for
the petitioner is that lease of agricultural
land can be granted only for a period of
fifteen years as per Section 94 of the U.P.
Revenue Code, 2006 at a time and since the
lease in the present case relied upon by the
plaintiff, is of thirty years therefore, the
same is not valid. It has also been
contended by counsel for the petitioner that
sub-Section 7 of Section 94 of the U.P.
Revenue Code, 2006 provides that in case
of any dispute arising out of private lease
agreement
granted
by
bhumidhar
or
regarding any term and condition thereof
the lessee and lessor shall make all efforts
to amicably resolve and settle the dispute
624 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
amongst themselves or if, mutually agreed
by using mediation by a third party,
arbitrator or Gram Panchayat or Village
Revenue Committee. It has been further
contented that as per sub-Section (7)(b) of
Section 94 of the U.P. Revenue Code,
2006, if the dispute is not settled through
mechanism mentioned in clause (a) either
party may file a petition before the Sub
Divisional Magistrate and Sub Divisional
Magistrate shall adjudicate the dispute
using summary procedure within a period
of 30 days from its institution. Against the
order of Sub Divisional Magistrate, an
appeal is provided under sub-Section 7(d)
of Section 94 of the U.P. Revenue Code,
2006. It has also been submitted by counsel
for the petitioner that Section 206 of U.P.
Revenue
Code,
2006
provides
for
jurisdiction of civil and revenue courts and
in view of the provisions of Section 94, 95
read with Section 206 U.P. Revenue Code,
2006, the civil suit is not maintainable
before the civil court as the Revenue Code
provides for a mechanism to settle the
dispute. Learned counsel also submitted
that the suit even otherwise is bad as the
same was hit by Section 14 of the Act of
2021.

6. Before considering the submissions
made by counsel for the petitioner, it would
be appropriate to look into the provisions of
U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 as well U.P.
Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy
Act, 2021. Sections 94, 95(7) and 206 of
U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 are quoted as
under:-

"[94].
Private
Lease
by
a
Bhumidhar. (1) A Bhumidhar may lease
out his holding or any part thereof to any
person, firm, company, partnership firm,
limited lability partnership firm, trust,
society or any other legal entity for
agriculture or for setting up a solar energy
plant. Such lease shall be known as the
private lease by a bhumidhar.

(2) Private lease by a Bhumidhar
means a contract based on an agreement,
with mutually agreed terms and conditions,
between Lessor, who may be a Bhumidhar
and the Lessee who wishes to undertake
agricultural activities or set up a solar
energy plant, by which the Lessor grants
permission to the Lessee to use the land or
holding or any part thereof for agricultural
purposes or for establishment of solar
energy plant, against a consideration in
cash or kind or a share of produce, payable
to the Lessor as per the lease agreement.

(3) Period of private lease by a
bhumidhar- maximum period of the private
lease by a Bhumidhar shall not exceed
fifteen years at a time. Provided that, after
the expiration of the first lease period, the
duration of lease period may be further
extended by mutual consent of the Lessor
and the Lessee: Provided further that for
purpose of establishing a solar energy
plant, the maximum period may be upto
thirty years.

(4) Conditions of the private
Lease by a bhumidhar- The terms and
conditions of the private lease by a
bhumidhar shall be as mutually agreed
between the Lessor and Lessee. The
general conditions of the lease shall be in
such manner as may be prescribed."

'95.

1...6....

(7) Disputes arising out of
private lease by a bhumidhar-

(a) In an event of a dispute
arising out of the private lease agreement
by
a
bhumidhar,
or
anyterms
and
conditions thereof; the Lessee and the
Lessor shall make all efforts to amicably
resolve and settle the dispute amongst
themselves or if mutually agreed, by using
9 All. Pooran Lal Vs. Saurabh Kumar
625
mediation by a third party arbitrator or
Gram Panchayat or Village Revenue
Committee.

(b) If the dispute is not settled
through the mechanism mentioned in
clause

(a)either party may file a
petition before the Sub-Divisional Officer.

(c) The Sub-Divisional Officer
shall adjudicate the dispute using the
summary procedure within a period of
thirty days of its institution.

(d) An appeal against the order,
other than an interim order, passed by a
Sub-Divisional Officer, shall lie before the
Commissioner.
The
decision
of
Commissioner shall subject to the provision
of section 210, be final."

"206.Jurisdiction of civil Courts
and revenue courts

"(1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in any law for the time being in
force, but subject to the provisions of this
Code, no Civil Court shall entertain any
suit, application or proceeding to obtain a
decision or order on any matter which the
State Government, the Board, any Revenue
Court or revenue Officer is, by or under
this Code, empowered to determine, decide
or dispose of.

(2) Without prejudice to the
generality of the provisions of sub-section
(1), and save as otherwise expressly
provided by or under this Code-

(a) no Civil Court shall exercise
jurisdiction over any of the matters
specified in the Second Schedule;and

(b) no Court other than the
revenue Court or the revenue officer
specified in column 3 of the Third Schedule
shall entertain any suit, application or
proceeding specified in column 2 thereof.

(3)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in this Code, an objection that a
Court or officer mentioned in sub-section
(2)(b) had or had no jurisdiction with
respect
to
any
suit,
application
or
proceeding, shall not be entertained by any
appellate, revisional or executing Court,
unless the objection was taken before the
Court or officer of the first instance, at the
earliest opportunity, and in all cases where
issues are settled at or before such
settlement, and unless there has been a
consequent failure of justice."

7. Section 14 of the Uttar Pradesh
Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy
Act, 2021 is also quoted as under:-

"14.Deposit of Rent with Rent
Authority (1) Where the landlord refuses to
accept any rent and other charges payable
or refuses to give a receipt, the rent and
other charges shall be paid to the landlord
by postal money order or any other
method, in such manner as may be
prescribed, consecutively for two months,
and if the landlord refuses to accept the
rent and other charges within such period,
then the tenant may deposit the same with
the Rent Authority in such manner as may
be prescribed.

(2)
The
deposit
shall
be
accompanied by an application by the
tenant containing the following particulars,
namely:-

(a) the premises for which the
rent and other charges payable are
deposited alongwith a description sufficient
for identifying the premises;

(b) the period for which the rent
and other charges payable are deposited;

(c) the name and address of the
landlord or the person or persons claiming
to be entitled to such rent and other
charges payable;

(d)
the
reasons
and
circumstances for which the application for
depositing the rent and other payable
charges is made;
626 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(e) such other particulars as may
be necessary.

(3) Where the tenant is unable to
decide as to whom the rent is payable
during the period of tenancy agreement, the
tenant may, in such case, deposit the rent
with the Rent Authority in such manner as
may be prescribed.

(4) Where the rent is deposited
under sub-section (3), the Rent Authority
shall enquire the case as to whom the rent
is payable and pass orders as he may deem
fit on the basis of the facts of the case.

(5) The withdrawal of rent and
other charges payable, deposited under
subsection

(1) or sub-section (2), shall not
by itself operate as an admission against
the landlord or any other claim made by
the tenant, if the landlord withdraws it to
the extent of rent upon under the tenancy
agreement."

8. So far as contention of counsel
for the petitioner that the present suit is
barred by Section 14 of Act of 2021 is
concerned, it would be relevant to note
that The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings
(Regulation
of
Letting,
Rent
and
Eviction) Act, 1972 was repealed and
the present Act of 2021 was passed by
the U.P. Legislature in view of the
directions given by the Supreme Court
in certain matters, the Draft Model
Tenancy
Act
prepared
by
Central
Government and on the basis of
recommendations made by the U.P.
Law
Commission
in
this
regard.
Provisions of Act of 2021 applies to the
premises (as defined under the Act of
2021) let out.

9. Sub-Section (c) of Section 2 of Act
of
2021
provides
the
definition
of
'premises', which is quoted as under:-

"(2)(c) "premises" means any
building or part of a building which is, or
is intended to be, let on rent for the purpose
of residence or for commercial or for
educational use, except for industrial use
and includes,-

(i) garden, garage or closed
parking area, vacant land, grounds and
out-houses, if any, appertaining to such
building or part of the building; and

(ii) any fitting to such building or
part of the building for the more beneficial
enjoyment thereof, but does not include
premises such as hotel, lodging house,
dharamshala or inn;"

10. From the perusal of the definition
of 'premises' as provided by sub-Clause (c)
of Section 2 of Act, 2021, it is apparent that
Act of 2021 applies only to buildings or
part of buildings which is let out and not
the open land. Sub-clause (c)(i) of Section
2 of Act of 2021 though, provides that the
premises will include grounds, if the same
is appertinent to such building or part of
building. Here, in this case, the lease
granted to the plaintiff was regarding an
open piece of land.

11. Section 14 of the Act of 2021
provides for deposit of rent with rent
authority. Section 14 of the Act of 2021
only provides a mechanism for deposit of
rent and does not bar filing of any suit and
therefore, the contention of counsel for the
petitioner that the suit is barred under
Section 14 of the Act of 2021 is wholly
misconceived as firstly, the Act of 2021
does not apply to open piece of land unless
the same comes within the definition of
'premises' as provided by sub-Section (c) of
Section 2 of Act of 2021 and secondly, that
the Section 14 of the Act of 2021 only
provides for method for deposit of rent and
nothing beyond. Provisions of Act of 2021
9 All. Pooran Lal Vs. Saurabh Kumar
627
applies to urban building and not to open
piece of land.

12. It will be useful to examine the
provisions of Order VII Rule 11 CPC
before considering the submissions made
by learned counsel for the petitioner. Rule
11 of the Order VII CPC is quoted as under
:-

"11. Rejection of plaint " The
plaint shall be rejected in the following
cases:"

(a) where it does not disclose a
cause of action;

(b) where the relief claimed is
undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being
required by the Court to correct the
valuation within a time to be fixed by the
Court, fails to do so;

(c) where the relief claimed is
properly valued but the plaint is written
upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the
plaintiff, on being required by the Court to
supply the requisite stamp-paper within a
time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;

(d) where the suit appears from
the statement in the plaint to be barred by
any law;

[(e) where it is not filed in
duplicate];

[(f) where the plaintiff fails to
comply with the provisions of rule 9];

[Provided that the time fixed by
the Court for the correction of the
valuation or supplying of the requisite
stamp-papers shall not be extended unless
the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is
satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by
any cause of an exceptional nature from
correcting the valuation or supplying the
requisite stamp-papers, as the case may be,
within the time fixed by the Court and that
refusal to extend such time would cause
grave injustice to the plaintiff.]"

13. In Saleem Bhai vs. State of
Maharashtra; (2003) 1 SCC 557, the
Apex Court while considering Order VII
Rule 11 of the Code held as under: (SCC
560, Para 9) :-

"A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11
CPC. makes it clear that the relevant facts
which need to be looked into for deciding
an
application
thereunder
are
the
averments in the plaint. The trial court can
exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11
CPC at any stage of the suit-before
registering the plaint or after issuing
summons to the defendant at any time
before the conclusion of the trial. For the
purposes of deciding an application under
clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7
CPC the averments in the plaint are
germane; the pleas taken by the defendant
in the written statement would be wholly
irrelevant at that stage...."

14. In case of Madanuri Sri Rama
Chandra Murthy Vs. Syed Jalal; (2017)
13 SCC 174: (2017) 5 SCC (Civ) 602; the
Apex Court has summarized the legal
position as follows :-

"The plaint can be rejected under
Order 7 Rule 11 if conditions enumerated
in the said provision are fulfilled. It is
needless to observe that the power under
Order 7 Rule 11 CPC be exercised by the
Court at any stage of the suit. The relevant
facts which need to be looked into for
deciding the application are the averments
of the plaint only. If on an entire and
meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found
that the suit is manifestly vexatious and
meritless in the sense of not disclosing any
right to sue, the court should exercise
power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Since
the power conferred on the Court to
terminate civil action at the threshold is
628 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
drastic, the conditions enumerated under
Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC to the exercise of
power of rejection of plaint have to be
strictly adhered to. The averments of the
plaint have to be read as a whole to find
out whether the averments disclose a cause
of action or whether the suit is barred by
any law. It is needless to observe that the
question as to whether the suit is barred by
any law, would always depend upon the
facts and circumstances of each case. The
averments in the written statement as well
as the contentions of the defendant are
wholly immaterial while considering the
prayer of the defendant for rejection of the
plaint. Even when the allegations made in
the plaint are taken to be correct as a
whole on their face value, if they show that
the suit is barred by any law, or do not
disclose cause of action, the application for
rejection of plaint can be entertained and
the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can
be exercised. If clever drafting of the plaint
has created the illusion of a cause of
action, the court will nip it in the bud at the
earliest so that bogus litigation will end at
the earlier stage."

15. Recently, the Apex Court in case
of Srihari Hanumandas Totala vs.
Hemant Vithal Kamat and others; (2021)
9 SCC 99 has reiterated the same principle
(paras 25, 25.1 and 25.2), which are as
follows :-

"25. On a perusal of the above
authorities, the guiding principles for
deciding an application under Order 7
Rule 11(d) can be summarized as follows:

25.1 To reject a plaint on the
ground that the suit is barred by any law,
only the averments in the plaint will have to
be referred to;

25.2 The defense made by the
defendant in the suit must not be
considered while deciding the merits of the
application;"

16. In case of Srihari Hanumandas
Totala (Supra), the Apex Court was
considering with an objection regarding bar
of res judicata and not of limitation.

17. Section 9 of the Code of Civil
Procedure enables the civil court to try all
suits of civil nature excepting suits of
which
cognizance
is
barred
either
specifically or impliedly. A litigant having
a
grievance
of
civil
nature
has,
independently of any statue, has a right to
institute a suit in a civil court unless its
cognizance is either expressly or impliedly
barred.

18. In Secretary of State Vs. Mask
and Company A.I.R. 1940 PC 105, Privy
Council has observed that it is settled law
that exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court
is not to be readily inferred, but that such
exclusion
must
either
be
explicitly
expressed or clearly implied.

19. The Supreme Court in case of
Abdul Waheed Khan Vs. Bhawani and
others reported in 1966 (SC) 1718 has held
in paragraph no. 9 as under:

"Under s. 9 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, a civil court can entertain a suit
of a civil nature except a suit of which its
cognizance is either expressly or impliedly
barred. It is settled principle that it is for
the party who seeks to oust the jurisdiction
of a civil court to establish his contention.
It is also equally well settled that a statute
ousting the jurisdiction of a civil court must
be strictly construed."

20. In case of Dhulabhai etc. Vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh A.I.R. reported
9 All. Pooran Lal Vs. Saurabh Kumar
629
in 1969 SC(78) in paragraph no. 32 has
summarized the position as under:-

"32. Neither of the two cases of
Firm of Illuri Subayya(1) or Kamla
Mills(2) can be said to run counter to the
series of cases earlier noticed. The result of
this
inquiry
into
the
diverse
views
expressed in this Court may be stated as
follows :-

(1) Where the statute gives a
finality to the orders of the special
tribunals the Civil Courts' jurisdiction must
be held to be excluded if there is adequate
remedy to do what the Civil Courts would
normally do in a suit. Such provision,
however, does not exclude those cases
where the provisions of the particular Act
have not been complied with or the
statutory
tribunal
has
not acted
in
conformity with the fundamental principles
of judicial procedure.

(2) Where there is an express bar
of the jurisdiction of the court, an
examination of the scheme of the particular
Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency
of the remedies provided may be relevant
but
is
not
decisive
to
sustain
the
jurisdiction of the civil court.

Where
there
is
no
express
exclusion the examination of the remedies
and the scheme of the particular Act to find
out the intendment becomes necessary and
the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In
the latter case it is necessary to see if the
statute creates a special right or a liability
and provides for the determination of the
right or liability and further lays down that
all ques- tions about the said right and
liability shall be determined by the
tribunals so constituted, and whether
remedies normally associated with actions
in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said
statute or not.

(3)...

(4)...

(5)...

(6)...

(7)
An
exclusion
of
the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily
to be inferred unless the conditions above
set down apply."

21. The Supreme Court in case of
State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga
Samigal Madam reported in A.I.R. 1986
(SC) 794, in paragraph no. 14 has held as
under:-

"14. Thirdly, having regard to the
principle stated by this Court while
enunciating
the
first
proposition
in
Dhulabhai's case (supra) it is clear that
even where the statute has given finality to
the orders of the special tribunal the civil
Court's jurisdiction can be regarded as
having been excluded if there is adequate
remedy to do what the civil Court would
normally do in a suit. In other words, even
where finality is accorded to the orders
passed by the special tribunal one will have
to see whether such special tribunal has
powers to grant reliefs which Civil Court
would normally grant in a suit and if the
answer is in the negative it would be
difficult to imply or infer exclusion of civil
Court's jurisdiction."

22. Again in case of Nagri Pracharini
Sabha and another Vs. Vth Additional
District and Sessions Judge, Varanasi
and others reported in 1991 Supp (2) SCC
36 in paragraph no. 2 and 3 of the judgment
has held as under:

"2. A litigant having a grievance
of a civil nature has, independently of any
statue, a right to institute a suit in the civil
court unless its cognizance is either
expressly or impliedly barred. The position
630 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
is well settled that exclusion of jurisdiction
of the civil court is not to be readily
inferred and such exclusion must be either
express or implied.

3. Reliance has been placed by
Mr. Mukhoty before us on the ratio of the
Constitution Bench decision of this Court
in K.S. Venkataraman & Company v. State
of Madras, where reference has been made
to the Privy Council case in Raleigh
Investment
Company
Limited
v. The
Governor General in Council. It has been
laid down that the Civil Court's jurisdiction
would be presumed unless the contrary is
indicated. Mr. Mukhoty has also relied
upon two other decisions being Ganga Bai
v. Vijay Kumar and Others, and Dhulabhai
v. The State of M.P. The legal position thus
seems to be clear and it is not necessary to
quote further authorities."

23. Thus, from the case laws as
discussed above, it is clear that normally
there will be a presumption as to the
jurisdiction of the civil court unless the
same is expressly or impliedly barred and
the burden will be upon the person who
asserts the exclusion of jurisdiction of civil
court.

24. So far as contention of counsel for
the
petitioner
that
private
lease
of
agricultural land can be made by a
bhumidhar under Section 94 of the U.P.
Revenue Code, 2006. Sub-Section 3 of
Section 94 of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006
provides that the maximum period of
private lease by bhumidhar shall not exceed
15 years at a time and in case of lease for
the purpose of establishing a solar energy
plant, the maximum period may be up to
thirty years. It has been further contended
by counsel for the petitioner that admittedly
in the present case, the lease has been
granted for the purpose of running a petrol
pump for a period of thirty years which is
in violation of sub-Section (3) of Section
94 of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 and as such
the lease is not valid and is hit by Section
94(3) of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006. It has
been further submitted by learned counsel
for the petitioner that in view of subSection (7) of Section 95 of the U.P.
Revenue Code, 2006, the dispute regarding
lease, if any, has to be settled between the
bhumidhar and his lessee amicably, failing
which, either of the party may file a
petition before the Sub Divisional Officer,
who shall adjudicate the dispute within
thirty days. Any person aggrieved with the
order passed by the Sub Divisional Officer
under sub-Section (7)(c) of Section 95 of
U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 may file an
appeal before the Commissioner and the
decision of the Commissioner subject to the
provisions of Section 210 of U.P. Revenue
Code, 2006 will be final.

25. The U.P. Revenue Code is a
special law. Application of provisions i.e.
Section 94 & 95 of the U.P. Revenue Code,
2006 is only in cases where the private
lease is made of agricultural land and not
otherwise as the lease of land which is not
agricultural land can be made under general
law i.e. Transfer of Property Act.

26.
Since
while
deciding
an
application under Order VII Rule 11 of
C.P.C., it is only the averments in the plaint
has to be seen. I have perused the plaint,
with the help of learned counsel for the
petitioner, the description of the property
given in the plaint is Gata No. 340 area
0.60 hectares situated village Jiraunia,
Pargana, Tehsil and District- Pilibhit. The
boundaries of the property in dispute has
also been given. In paragraph No. 2 of the
plaint, it has been stated by plaintiff that the
plaintiff has taken the property in dispute
9 All. Pooran Lal Vs. Saurabh Kumar
631
from the defendant through a registered
lease deed dated 11.10.2019 and since the
date of lease, the plaintiff is in possession
over the property described in the plaint.
There is no averment in the plaint to the
effect that the property taken by the
plaintiff on lease from the defendant was an
agricultural property. The description of the
property in the plaint, Gata No. 340 and the
property has not been described as
bhumidhari land of the defendant.

27. Further, I have perused the lease
deed which has been annexed by the
petitioner at Page No. 68 of the writ
petition, and filed by the plaintiff before the
court below therein also the property leased
out to the plaintiff is described as part of
Gata No. 340, which was leased out for the
purposes of running a petrol pump for a
period of thirty years. In the lease deed also
there is no mention that the agricultural
property is being leased out to the plaintiffrespondent.

28.
In
case
of
Vinod
Infra
Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia and
others reported in AIR 2025 SC 2933, it
has been held by Supreme Court that
position of law is that rejection of a plaint
under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is
permissible only when the plaint, on its
face and without considering the defence,
fails to disclose a cause of action, is barred
by any law, is undervalued, or is
insufficiently stamped. At this preliminary
stage, the court is required to confine its
examination strictly to the averments made
in the plaint and not venture into the merits
or veracity of the claims. If any triable
issues arise from the pleadings, the suit
cannot be summarily rejected.

29. Thus, from the bare reading of the
plaint, it cannot be said that the property
which was leased out to the plaintiff was an
agricultural property requiring a lease
under Section 94 of the U.P. Revenue
Code, 2006. It is only the contention of the
defendant that the land leased out to
petitioner was agricultural land which in
my view cannot be seen at the stage of
deciding the application under Order 7
Rule 11 C.P.C.

30. Further in view of Section 80 of
the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, if the
agricultural land is being used for the
commercial or residential purposes, the Sub
Divisional Magistrate may suo moto or on
an application moved by the Bhumidhar,
after making such inquiry as may be
prescribed to make a declaration that the
land is used not for the purpose not
connected with the agriculture. Even under
the provisions of U.P. Revenue Code,
2006, the lease of bhumidhari plot can be
granted by the bhumidhar after getting a
declaration under Section 80 of the U.P.
Revenue Code, 2006. The effects of a
declaration under Section 80 of the U.P.
Revenue Code, 2006 are being provided
under Section 81 of the U.P. Revenue
Code, 2006 which is quoted as under:-

"81.
Consequences
of
declaration: Where a declaration has been
made under Section 80 the following
consequences shall, in respect of such
holding or part to which it relates ensue :

(a) all restrictions imposed by or
under this Chapter in respect of transfer of
land shall cease to apply to the bhumidhar
with transferable rights;

(b)
notwithstanding
anything
contained in Chapter XI, the land shall,
with effect from the commencement of the
agricultural year following the date of
declaration, be exempted from payment of
land revenue;
632 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(c) the bhumidhar shall, in the
matter of devolution be governed by the
personal law to which he is subject."

31. From the averments made in the
plaint as well as in the lease deed, it cannot
be said that the lease of the land granted by
the defendant-petitioner to the plaintiffrespondent was of an agricultural land.

32. As the property leased out is not
described as bhumidhari land, the objection
as to the validity of the lease granted by the
defendant-petitioner
to
the
plaintiffrespondent can be adjudicated only after
framing an issue in this regard and after
considering the evidence led by the parties
in the suit and not at the stage of deciding
the application under Order VII Rule 11 of
C.P.C.

33. So far as contention of counsel for
the petitioner that suit is not cognizable by
civil court in view of Section 206 of the
U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 is concerned,
this Court has taken a view in case of
Smt. Kushma Devi Vs. Darshan Singh
And 4 Others in Matters Under Article
227 No. 113 of 2024 decided on
12.02.2024,
relying
upon
various
judgments of this Court as well as of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court that for filing the
suit for injunction simpliciter there is no
prohibition in any of the clauses of
Section 206 of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006.
The jurisdiction of the civil court to
entertain a suit for injunction is neither
expressly barred nor by implication.

34. Paragraph Nos. 18, 19, 21, 22, 23,
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31 & 32 of the
judgment in case of Smt. Kushma Devi v.
Darshan Singh and 4 others passed in
Matter under Article 227 No. 113 of 2024
by this Court is quoted as under:

"18.
From
the
perusal
of
provisions of Section 206 of the U.P.
Revenue Code, 2006, it is clear that in the
first place, Section 206 of the Code makes a
general declaration that no civil court shall
entertain
any
suit,
application
or
proceeding to obtain a decision or order on
any matter which the State Government, the
Board, any revenue officer or a revenue
court is empowered to determine, decide or
dispose of under this Code.

19. Then comes Section 206 (2) of
the Code which has been divided in two
parts.

i. Clause (a) of the Section
expressly excludes the jurisdiction of civil
court on all matters specified in the Second
Schedule.

ii. Clause (b) of 206 (2) further
lays down that no court other than revenue
court or revenue officer specified in the
Third Schedule shall entertain any suit,
application or proceedings specified in the
said schedule.

21. Section 206 (2) (a) refers to
the Second Schedule and provides that no
civil court shall have jurisdiction over any
of the 16 matters specified in the said
schedule.

22. Learned counsel for the
petitioner has relied upon Clause 15 and
16 of the Second Schedule and has
contended that the suit is barred by Section
206 of the Code.