# Prabhakar Rai v. Union of India & Ors

- **Citation:** (2015) 3 ILRA 1343
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2015-11-17
- **Case number:** Writ-A No. 22323 of 1996
- **Bench:** Ashwani Kumar Mishra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/prabhakar-rai-v-union-of-india-ors-43316
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Rules, 1965-Rule-5 read with
Central
Reserve Police Force Rules 1955-Rule 16dismissal of probationer on one month
notice-on allegation of false declarationregarding criminal case-contention after
acquittal entitled to back in service-heldnot available-termination without stigmabeing simpliciter authorities committed no
illegality-petition dismissed.
Held: Para-15
The factum of petitioner having been
subsequently acquitted in the criminal case
is not of much relevance in the facts of the
present case, inasmuch as the limited
scrutiny, which was available on part of the
employer, was to examine the continuance
of petitioner for employment in a public
office. The fact that he had submitted a
false declaration about no criminal case
pending against him, was itself a material
circumstance. As already observed above,
no stigma was attached. Protection of
Article 311 of the Constitution of India or
the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Ram Kumar (supra) and
other judgments relied upon, taking similar
view, have thus no applicability to the facts
of the present case. There is no illegality in
the
orders
impugned
passed
by
the
authorities,
which
may
require
any
interference.
Case Law discussed:
Civil Appeal No. 7106 of 2011; Civil Appeal No.
5671 of 2012; [1999 (1) SCC 246]; [2010 (2)
SCC 169]; [2011 (4) SCC 644]; [2013 (9) SCC
363][(2003) 3 SCC 437]

## Text

3 All] Prabhakar Rai Vs. Union of India. & Ors.
1343
8. On simple reading of the aforesaid
clause, it will be seen that all those
employees i.e. (1) who attained the age of
superannuation and retire thereafter; (b) who
relinquished the service of the Corporation
voluntarily after completing 20 years of
services; and (c) all those who voluntarily
retire after attaining the age of 50 years,
would be entitled to pension.
9. The dispute between the parties
before us is not with regard to qualifying
service of 20 years. The dispute is as to
whether a person who had resigned would
be covered by clause (b) or not.
10. According to Corporation, the
right to resignation is an inherent right of
an employee to give up his engagement at
any time. While in the case of voluntarily
retirement, such power can be exercised
only after 20 years of service.
11. This Court, therefore, required the
counsel for the Corporation to demonstrate
as to whether under any service rule
applicable the mode and manner of
resignation/submission of an application for
voluntary retirement is regulated.
12. Counsel for the Corporation
conceded that there is no violation of
rules in submitting of the application in
the
matter
of
resignation/voluntary
retirement.
13. In our opinion, there is hardly
any difference on the basis whereof an
employee after 20 years of service resigns
or submits a voluntarily retirement
application. In that sense, resignation and
voluntarily retirement only bring about
the break of employment between the
employee and employer. Both modes
bring an end to the contract of service.
14. In our opinion, applicability of
clause (b) can not be confined to
application which technicality use the
words voluntary retirement in the letter of
the employee concerned for excluding its
applicability if the letter says that the
employee is resigning.
15.
The Power Corporation is not
justified in refusing the claim of the petitioner
for the purpose of payment of pension etc.
even after he has completed more-than 20
years of qualifying service with the
Corporation on the ground that he has used
the words resignation in place of voluntarily
retirement in his letter of dated 14.05.2008.
The subsequent letter of petitioner is not of
much significant it is superfluous.
16.
We, therefore, hold that
petitioner application for retirement from
the employment of the respondent Power
Corporation dated 14.5.2008 squarely
falls within sub-clause (b) of clause (6) of
circular dated 24.6.1996. He is held
entitled to the post retiral benefits
including
pension
which
may
be
computed by the respondent Corporation
strictly in accordance with law within
eight weeks and actual payment may be
made immediately thereafter.
17. The writ petition is allowed.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.11.2015
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ASHWANI KUMAR MISHRA, J.
Writ-A No. 22323 of 1996
Prabhakar Rai
 ...Petitioner
Versus
Union of India & Ors.
...Opp. Parties
1344
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri D.S.P. Singh, Sri Awadhesh Rai, Sri
S.P. Singh, Sri S.R. Singhal
Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
S.C., Sri K.C. Sinha, Sri R. Sinha, Sri Rajiv
Joshi, Sri S.R. , Sri U.N. Sharma, Sri Ashish
Singh
Central Civil Services (Temporary Services)
Rules, 1965-Rule-5 read with
Central
Reserve Police Force Rules 1955-Rule 16dismissal of probationer on one month
notice-on allegation of false declarationregarding criminal case-contention after
acquittal entitled to back in service-heldnot available-termination without stigmabeing simpliciter authorities committed no
illegality-petition dismissed.
Held: Para-15
The factum of petitioner having been
subsequently acquitted in the criminal case
is not of much relevance in the facts of the
present case, inasmuch as the limited
scrutiny, which was available on part of the
employer, was to examine the continuance
of petitioner for employment in a public
office. The fact that he had submitted a
false declaration about no criminal case
pending against him, was itself a material
circumstance. As already observed above,
no stigma was attached. Protection of
Article 311 of the Constitution of India or
the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Ram Kumar (supra) and
other judgments relied upon, taking similar
view, have thus no applicability to the facts
of the present case. There is no illegality in
the
orders
impugned
passed
by
the
authorities,
which
may
require
any
interference.
Case Law discussed:
Civil Appeal No. 7106 of 2011; Civil Appeal No.
5671 of 2012; [1999 (1) SCC 246]; [2010 (2)
SCC 169]; [2011 (4) SCC 644]; [2013 (9) SCC
363][(2003) 3 SCC 437]
(Delivered by Hon'ble Ashwani Kumar
Mishra, J.)
1. This writ petition is directed
against the orders dated 29.4.1994,
17.1.1995
and
27.3.1996,
whereby
petitioner has been terminated from
employment, by giving one month's
notice, and has been affirmed in appeal
and in departmental revision.
2.
Petitioner contends that he had
participated in open competition, and was
selected for appointment as a Constable
(General Duty) in C.R.P.F. on 6.10.1993.
Pursuant to such selection, petitioner was
appointed, and he joined and worked for
about 8 months. A notice was thereafter
issued to the petitioner invoking the powers
under sub-rule 1 of Rule 5 of The Central
Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules,
1965, readwith Rule 16 of The Central
Reserve
Police
Force
Rules,
1955,
terminating his services by giving him a
month's notice. It is in pursuance to the said
notice that the services of petitioner were
actually
discharged
w.e.f.
3.6.1994.
Petitioner thereafter claims to have submitted
a representation stating that on account of a
family dispute, he had been falsely
implicated in a criminal case, in which he has
already been discharged, and therefore, no
occasion has arisen for the authorities to have
terminated his services. A departmental
appeal was also preferred by the petitioner
against the order, which has been rejected.
Aggrieved
by
such
orders,
petitioner
approached this Court by filing Writ Petition
No.7946 of 1995, which was dismissed after
noticing that petitioner has a remedy of filing
revision against the orders impugned.
Petitioner, consequently, preferred a revision
before the Director General, annexing
therewith the order passed by the criminal
court in Sessions Trial No.472 of 1993,
conducted under Sections 395, 397 and 307
I.P.C., in which the petitioner had been
acquitted in the absence of evidence. The
3 All] Prabhakar Rai Vs. Union of India. & Ors.
1345
revisional authority noticed the contentions
of the petitioner, and it was recorded that the
petitioner had in fact suppressed the
pendency of criminal case against him, while
seeking employment in the C.R.P.F. A false
disclosure had been made before the
authorities that there was no criminal case
pending against him. Since the petitioner had
obtained appointment on the strength of
suppression of material facts, therefore, the
revisional authority also found no infirmity
in action of the respondents in discharging
him from services. Aggrieved by the
aforesaid orders, petitioner has filed the
present writ petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner,
with reference to the judgment passed in
sessions trial, submits that petitioner had
been falsely implicated, inasmuch as there
was a dispute of landed property within
the family, and it was only for ulterior
reasons that he had been implicated in a
criminal case in the year 1988. It is stated
that there was neither any injury caused to
anyone nor any evidence was led, and it
appears that better sense prevailed upon
the family members, and as such, the
criminal proceedings were not pursued
any further, resulting in acquittal of the
petitioner. Learned counsel also submits
that Senior Superintendent of Police had
also issued a certificate to the petitioner
clearly
stating
that
implication
of
petitioner was in a cross case, which
apparently was for settling the inter se
disputed within the family, in which the
petitioner has already been acquitted, and
therefore, no further complaint against the
conduct of petitioner had been noticed.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner
relies upon a decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Ram Kumar
Vs. State of U.P. and others, passed in
Civil Appeal No.7106 of 2011, dated 19th
August, 2011, as well as the judgment
passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Jainendra Singh Vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh Tr. Prinl. Sec. Home, in
Civil Appeal No.5671 of 2012, dated 30th
July, 2012, wherein the matter had been
referred to a Larger Bench, after noticing
conflict in the decisions rendered by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court. Reference has
been
made
to
the
decisions
in
Commissioner of Police, Delhi Vs.
Dhaval Singh [1999 (1) SCC 246], Kamal
Nayan Mishra Vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh and others [2010 (2) SCC 169]
and Commissioner of Police and others
Vs. Sandeep Kumar [2011 (4) SCC 644].
Learned counsel, with reference to the
aforesaid decisions, contend that the
authorities were under an obligation to
independently examine as to whether on
the basis of materials brought on record,
petitioner
was
found
unfit
for
employment, and as no such exercise had
been undertaken, the order of discharge
from services is bad in law.
5. Sri Ashok Singh, learned counsel
appearing for the respondents, on the
other hand, submits that the judgments,
which have been relied upon by the
learned counsel for the petitioner do not
apply in the facts of the present case,
inasmuch as the petitioner in the instant
case was merely a probationer, and was
yet to be confirmed. Learned counsel
refers to the provisions of Rule 16 of the
C.R.P.F. Rules, 1955, which prescribes a
period of three years, as being the period
of probation. It is submitted that petitioner
was within the period of probation when
an order of discharge simpliciter had been
passed against him, and as such, the ratio
laid down in the judgment of Ram Kumar
(supra) had no applicability.
1346
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
6. Learned counsel for the respondents,
on the other hand, relies upon a Division
Bench judgment of the Gujarat High Court in
the case of Dilbag Singh Marashi Vs.
Commandant and others, passed in Special
Civil Application No.850 of 2013, dated 2nd
February, 2015, to contend that in the case of
a probationer, it is always open for the
employer to consider the suitability of the
candidate, and if it is found that he had
suppressed material facts at the time of
seeking appointment, then such fact would
be sufficient to form an opinion with regard
to non-suitability of the candidate for the post
in question, and discharge simpliciter in such
circumstances cannot be faulted. Learned
counsel has also placed reliance upon para 14
of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the
case of Kamal Nayan Mishra Vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh and others (supra), wherein
it has been clearly observed that in the case
of a probationer, his services could be
terminated without holding any enquiry in
such circumstances. Reliance has also been
placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Devendra
Kumar Vs. State of Uttaranchal [2013 (9)
SCC 363].
7. Having heard learned counsel for
the parties at length, and after perusing
the materials brought on record, this
Court finds that petitioner was selected as
a Constable (General Duty) in C.R.P.F.
Rule 14 of the C.R.P.F. Rules of 1955
requires a verification roll to be filled by
the candidate, which is retained in the
service record of the employee concerned.
Clauses 12(a) of the roll specifically
requires a disclosure to be made by the
employee
as
to
whether
he
is
involved/implicated in a criminal case.
Clause 12(a), which is part of the standard
format required under statutory rule to be
filled by the employee, reads as under:-
"12(a) Have you ever been arrested,
prosecuted, kept under detention or bound
down/find convicted, by a court of law for
any offence or debarred/disqualified by
any public service commission from
appearing at its examination/selections,
or
debarred
from
taking
any
examination/rusticated by an University
or
any
other
education
authority/institution."
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner
does not dispute that in fact such a
declaration was made by the petitioner, in
which the factum of any criminal
proceedings being pending against the
petitioner was not disclosed. Acting upon
the declaration made by the petitioner to
the employer, an offer of appointment
was issued in favour of the petitioner.
9. It transpires from the record that the
respondents, having subsequently come to
know about the false disclosure made in
verification roll by the petitioner, exercised
their power under Rule 5(1) of The C.C.S.
(Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, readwith
Rule 16 of the C.R.P.F. Rules, 1955, to pass
an order of discharge simpliciter against the
petitioner, after giving him a month's notice.
The discharge of petitioner from services is a
discharge simpliciter, and no stigma is cast.
There is no reference of any specific reason
or imposition of penalty in the order of
termination. It is further undisputed that
petitioner was a probationer, and the three
year period of probation was not over yet. It
is during the period of probation that the
order of discharge from service has been
passed against the petitioner by serving him a
month's notice. Record further shows that the
petitioner while challenging the order of
discharge simplicter has stated that his
implication in the criminal case was
unfounded, and he has already been
3 All] Prabhakar Rai Vs. Union of India. & Ors.
1347
acquitted therein. This plea of the petitioner
has been noticed in the revisional order dated
27th March, 1996. The revisional authority,
having noticed the facts brought on record by
the petitioner in this regard, observed that
there was no charge against the petitioner,
which had led to passing of order of
termination against him. It has, however,
been observed that petitioner was involved in
a criminal case at the time of enlistment with
C.R.P.F., which fact had been suppressed,
and having noticed such suppression, the
revisional authority went on to observe that
in such facts, the termination of services is in
accordance with law.
10.
The petitioner admittedly was on
probation, and the respondents were well
within their rights to terminate the temporary
services of petitioner, in accordance with
law. The fact that petitioner had submitted a
declaration incorrectly mentioning that no
criminal case is pending against him, is not
in dispute. Once that be so, the respondents
were well within their right to have formed
an opinion regarding petitioner's continuance
as an employee, who was yet to be
confirmed. The order, which has been passed
in the present case, does not inflict any
penalty nor any stigma has been attached. In
the opinion of the Court, the action of
respondents in forming an opinion with
regard to petitioner's continuance in service,
having noticed his act of suppression, cannot
be said to be arbitrary in the facts of the
present case.
11.
Turning to the decisions, which
have been relied upon by learned counsel for
the parties, it is to be noticed that the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Ram Kumar Vs. State of U.P. and
others (supra), on which heavy reliance has
been placed by learned counsel for the
petitioner, was delivered in an entirely
different factual scenario. In Ram Kumar
(supra), the employee had been acquitted
much prior to his consideration for
appointment. Para 3 of the judgment in Ram
Kumar (supra) is reproduced:-
"3. The facts very briefly are that
pursuant to an advertisement issued by
the State Government of U.P. on
19.11.2006, the appellant applied for the
post of constable and he submitted an
affidavit
dated
12.06.2006
to
the
recruiting authority in the proforma of
verification roll. In the affidavit dated
12.06.2006, he made various statements
required for the purpose of recruitment
and in para 4 of the affidavit he stated
that no criminal case was registered
against him. He was selected and
appointed as a male constable and
deputed for training. Thereafter, the
Jaswant Nagar Police Station, District
Etawah,
submitted
a
report
dated
15.01.2007 stating that Criminal Case
No.275/2001 under Sections 324/323/504
IPC was registered against the appellant
and thereafter the criminal case was
disposed of by the Additional Chief
Judicial
Magistrate,
Etawah,
on
18.07.2002
and
the
appellant
was
acquitted by the Court. Along with this
report, a copy of the order dated
18.07.2002 of the Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate was also enclosed.
The report dated 15.01.2007 of the
Jaswant Nagar Police Station, District
Etawah,
was
sent
to
the
Senior
Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad. By
order dated 08.08.2007, the Senior
Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad,
cancelled the order of selection of the
appellant on the ground that he had
submitted an affidavit stating wrong facts
and concealing correct facts and his
selection was irregular and illegal."
1348
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
It was in these facts that the Apex
Court observed as under in Para 9 of the
judgment:-
"9. The order dated 18.07.2002 of
the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate
had been sent along with the report dated
15.01.2007 of the Jaswant Nagar Police
Station to the Senior Superintendent of
Police, Ghaziabad, but it appears from
the order dated 08.08.2007 of the Senior
Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad, that
he has not gone into the question as to
whether the appellant was suitable for
appointment to service or to the post of
constable in which he was appointed and
he has only held that the selection of the
appellant was illegal and irregular
because he did not furnish in his affidavit
in the proforma of verification roll that a
criminal case has been registered against
him. As has been stated in the instructions
in
the
Government
Order
dated
28.04.1958, it was the duty of the Senior
Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad, as
the appointing authority, to satisfy himself
on the point as to whether the appellant
was suitable for appointment to the post
of a constable, with reference to the
nature of suppression and nature of the
criminal case. Instead of considering
whether the appellant was suitable for
appointment to the post of male constable,
the appointing authority has mechanically
held that his selection was irregular and
illegal
because
the
appellant
had
furnished an affidavit stating the facts
incorrectly at the time of recruitment."
12. The judgment of Apex Court in
Ram Kumar (supra) came to be noticed in
a subsequent order of the Supreme Court
in Jainendra Singh Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh (supra), and the question was
referred to a Larger Bench for resolving
the conflict noticed in various decisions.
Decisions in Commissioner of Police,
Delhi Vs. Dhaval Singh (supra), Kamal
Nayan Mishra Vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh
and
others
(supra)
and
Commissioner of Police and others Vs.
Sandeep Kumar (supra) were noticed.
Para 13 of the referring order, which
refers to Para 14 of the judgment in
Kendriya
Vidyalaya
Sangathan
and
Others Vs. Ram Ratan Yadav [(2003) 3
SCC 437], is reproduced:-
"13. In the decision in, Kamal Nayan
Mishra Vs. State of Madhra Pradesh &
Ors.(supra),
the ratio
decidendi in
Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan Vs. Ram
Ratan Yadav(supra) has been set out in
para 14:
"14. Therefore, the ratio decidendi of
Ram Ratan Yadav is, where an employee
(probationer) is required to give his personal
data in an attestation form in connection
with his appointment (either at the time of or
thereafter), if it is found that the employee
had suppressed or given false information in
regard to matters which had a bearing on his
fitness or suitability to the post, he could be
terminated from service during the period of
probation without holding any inquiry. The
decision dealt with a probationer and not a
holder of a civil post, and nowhere laid down
a proposition that a confirmed employee
holding a civil post under the State, could be
terminated from service for furnishing false
information in an attestation form, without
giving an opportunity to meet the charges
against him."
Subsequently, Civil Appeal No.5671
of 2012 (Jainendra Singh Vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh Tr. Prinl. Sec. Home), in
which the aforesaid referring order was
passed, was withdrawn, vide order dated
13th April, 2015, which is reproduced:-
3 All] Prabhakar Rai Vs. Union of India. & Ors.
1349
"Learned counsel for the applicantappellant prays for withdrawal of this
appeal.
This civil appeal is accordingly
dismissed as withdrawn. I.A. No. 4 of
2015 is accordingly allowed and disposed
off."
13. Law on the question of
suppression came to be discussed in a
subsequent decision in Devendra Kumar
Vs. State of Uttaranchal (supra). Apex
Court, having noticed the series of
judgments delivered on the issue, went on
to hold that where the applicant gets
office by misrepresenting the facts, or by
playing
fraud
upon
the
competent
authority, such an appointment is not
liable to be protected. Para 7 of the
judgment is reproduced:-
"7. So far as the issue of obtaining
the appointment by misrepresentation is
concerned, it is no more res integra. The
question is not whether the applicant is
suitable for the post. The pendency of a
criminal case/proceeding is different from
suppressing the information of such
pendency. The case pending against a
person might not involve moral turpitude
but suppressing of this information itself
amounts to moral turpitude. In fact, the
information sought by the employer if not
disclosed as required, would definitely
amount
to
suppression
of
material
information. In that eventuality, the
service becomes liable to be terminated,
even if there had been no further trial or
the
person
concerned
stood
acquitted/discharged."
14. The Division Bench judgment of
the Gujarat High Court, which has been
relied
by
learned
counsel
for
the
respondents, is closer on facts to the
present case, as it was also in respect of a
similarly placed employee of C.R.P.F.,
who
had
been
discharged
during
probation on the ground that he had
suppressed facts with regard to pendency
of criminal case against him. Paragraph 6
of the Division Bench judgment of
Gujarat High Court is reproduced:-
"6. We may record that this application
form contains all columns in English as well
as in Hindi. Applicant had filled up the form
in Hindi language. It is not his case that this
form was not filled up by him or that he did
not understand any of the questions which he
had answered. At no stage, either during his
service or after his termination, he had ever
put up in defence that the declarations made
in the said form were correct and the belief of
the department that the said criminal cases
were not pending when he filled up such form
was inaccurate. In fact, as is apparent, he did
not controvert that the details supplied by him
to the questions 12 {a} & {b} were inaccurate
and false to his knowledge.
6.1 Thus, the fact that at the time when
the petitioner filled-up the application form
for recruitment to the post of a constable in
CRPF, he was facing two criminal cases is
not in dispute. The fact that he was asked
specifically whether he was ever prosecuted
and if any criminal case was pending to give
detail thereof, his answer was in the negative.
It was under these circumstances that the
employer exercised powers under Rule 5 (1)
of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules. Rule 5
(1) of the said rules read as under :-
"5. Termination of temporary service
-
(1)(a) The service of a temporary
Government Servant shall be liable to
termination at any time by a notice in
writing given either by the Government
1350
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Servant to the appointing authority or by
the
appointing
authority
to
the
Government servant;
(b) the period of such notice shall be
one month :
Provided that the service of any such
Government servant may be terminated
forthwith by payment to him of a sum
equivalent to the amount of his pay plus
allowances for the period of the notice at
the same rates at which he was drawing
them immediately before the termination
of his service, or, as the case may be, for
the period by which such notice falls short
of one month."
6.2
This
rule
authorizes
the
Government to terminate service of a
temporary Government servant at any time
by one month notice in writing. Proviso to
sub-rule (1) authorizes the employer to waive
such notice and terminate the service
forthwith by payment of a sum equivalent to
the amount of the notice period or to an
extent it falls short of one month of the pay
and allowances.
6.3 It is undisputed that at the time
such order was passed, the petitioner was
not yet confirmed in Government service.
It may be that he had completed his
probation period. His confirmation would
not be automatic upon mere completion of
the period of probation. The employer
had yet to judge his suitability and
confirm him in service by allowing
successful completion of the probation. It
was at that time while verifying his
character and antecedents, that it was
noticed from the report received from the
Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad that
the petitioner was facing two criminal
cases. Thus, the respondents issued the
impugned order when the petitioner was
still a temporary Government servant.
The authorities had the power to do so is
not disputable in view of Rule 5 (1) of the
CCS (Temporary Service) Rules. In fact,
the sole ground pressed in service by the
counsel for the petitioner in challenge to
his termination was that such power could
not have been exercised without giving a
notice to the petitioner and by giving him
a reasonable opportunity of being heard
on the proposed order of termination.
6.4 By now, it is well-settled that the
principles of natural justice cannot be put
in straight-jacket and must vary with facts
and circumstances of each case. The
order
of
termination
was
one
of
simpliciter termination of service and not
an order of penalty. It is not even the case
of the petitioner that his services were
terminated by way of penalty or that the
termination was a stigmatic order. The
plain language of the order itself would
reveal that the services of the petitioner
were terminated in exercise of power
under Rule 5 (1) of the CCS (Temporary
Service) Rules without casting any stigma
on the petitioner. If the petitioner was
being denied the benefit of confirmation
on the ground of unsuitability of his
service, the question of the allegations
being foundation or motive for the action
could arise. Further, had the petitioner
been already confirmed in Government
service, his right to hold the lien, unless
the post is abolished or his service is
brought to an end through legal process,
would certainly arise.
6.5 In absence of confirmation, as a
temporary servant, the petitioner had
limited right to continue in service.
Particularly when it was found that his
very entry in Government service was
through doubtful means, his termination
by the authorities after considering facts
and circumstances would call for no
interference. It cannot be disputed that
had the petitioner made full disclosure
about
pending
criminal
cases,
his
3 All] IIMT College of Polytechnic, G.B. Nagar & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1351
candidature would have been rejected. He
was applying for a member of armed force
who would, upon recruitment, be posted as a
constable. As a member of CRPF, he would
be entrusted with responsible duties and
would be inducted in armed forces. The
employer thus had every right to enquire
about his full antecedents and be informed
about any criminal case pending against
such a candidate. Quite apart from his action
of not making true and full disclosure,
holding back most material information from
the prospective employer of his involvement
in such criminal case would have debarred
him from securing the employment."
15.
The factum of petitioner having
been subsequently acquitted in the criminal
case is not of much relevance in the facts of
the present case, inasmuch as the limited
scrutiny, which was available on part of the
employer, was to examine the continuance of
petitioner for employment in a public office.
The fact that he had submitted a false
declaration about no criminal case pending
against
him,
was
itself
a
material
circumstance. As already observed above, no
stigma was attached. Protection of Article
311 of the Constitution of India or the ratio
laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Ram Kumar (supra) and other
judgments relied upon, taking similar view,
have thus no applicability to the facts of the
present case. There is no illegality in the
orders impugned passed by the authorities,
which may require any interference.
16. The writ petition, consequently,
fails, and is dismissed.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 20.07.2015
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE PANKAJ MITHAL, J.
Writ-C No. 26033 of 2015
IIMT College of Polytechnic, G.B. Nagar
& Anr.
 ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr.
...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri G.K. Singh, Sri Ritesh Upadhyay
Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.
Constitution of India, Art.-226-affiliationrefusal by Technical Education Boardputting condition contrary to recognition
granted
by
AICTE-held-totally
unfair,
arbitrary-quashed.
Held: Para-26
The aforesaid affiliation was granted by
the
Board
without
ascertaining
or
adjudging the quality of its education as
at that time no student had been
admitted or had passed out. Therefore,
when the Board had granted affiliation
for running the above diploma courses
without
examining
the
quality
of
education imparted by the institute, any
condition to adjudge its quality on the
basis of passed out students at the time
of extension of affiliation is totally
unfair, arbitrary and is in contradiction
to its own method of granting affiliation
at the initial stage.
Case Law discussed:
(2013) 3 SCC 385
(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Mithal, J.)
1.
Under challenge is basically the
order dated 13.5.2015 of the Secretary of
the Pravidhik Shiksha Parishad (Technical
Education Board), U.P., Lucknow (in short
'Board') and the resolution No.7 dated
22.8.2012 of the Board and consequently
one of the prayer is for a direction to
consider the application of the petitioners
for granting affiliation to three years full