# Prabhat Chaturvedi v. State of U.P. and Anr

- **Citation:** (2013) 3 ILRA 1190
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2013-08-29
- **Case number:** Criminal Misc. Case No.3061 of 2009
- **Bench:** Vishnu Chandra Gupta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/prabhat-chaturvedi-v-state-of-u-p-and-anr-42688
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Code
of
Criminal
Procedure-Section
188(c)- Requirement of permission by
central Govt.-offence under section 498A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and Section 3/4
D.P. Act-part of offence committed at
Riyadh and partly at India-whether
without permission of central govt order
passed
by
Magistrate
at
Lucknow
without
jurisdiction?
held-where
complete offence committed at 'Riyadh'-
sanction from central government mustpart of offence demand of dowry took
place
at
Lucknow-allegation
of
ill
treatment
at
Lucknow-held-Lucknow
court has jurisdiction.

Held: Para-22 and 23

## Text

1190 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
03.02.2010 in which the question arose
"as to whether D.T.C. is liable to pay
compensation for death of Sansar Pal due
to a bomb blast in a D.T.C. bus" and it
was held that the claimant would be
entitled to compensation.

25. This Court is of the view that the
claim petition before the Tribunal would
be maintainable.

26. Thus, the judgement and order
of the court below dated 30.04.1997 is
liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the
same is set aside inasmuch as it pertains
to Claim Petition No. 108 of 1996. The
matter is remitted back to the Tribunal to
decide the claim petition on all other
issues. It is left open to the parties to raise
all issues as they deem fit before the
Tribunal including the issue as to whether
the claim petition is maintainable under
Section 163A/166 simultaneously.

27. The Tribunal after giving
opportunity of hearing to both the parties
will decide the case preferably within a
period of six months from today keeping
in view the fact that the appellant at
present is a very senior citizen and aged
about 77 years.

28. The appeal is allowed and as
indicated above is restored to the Tribunal
to re-decide the Claim Petition No. 108 of
1996 afresh.

29. No order as to costs.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 29.08.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE VISHNU CHANDRA GUPTA, J.

Criminal Misc. Case No.3061 of 2009
(u/s 482 Cr.P.C.)

Prabhat Chaturvedi

 ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. and Anr.
 ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sri B.M. Sahai, Sri Raj Priya Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
Govt. Advocate, Sri Diwakar Nath Tiwari,
Sri I.H. Farooqui, Sri Manoj Kumar Mishra
Sri Rajendra Prasad Mishra

Code
of
Criminal
Procedure-Section
188(c)- Requirement of permission by
central Govt.-offence under section 498A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and Section 3/4
D.P. Act-part of offence committed at
Riyadh and partly at India-whether
without permission of central govt order
passed
by
Magistrate
at
Lucknow
without
jurisdiction?
held-where
complete offence committed at 'Riyadh'-
sanction from central government mustpart of offence demand of dowry took
place
at
Lucknow-allegation
of
ill
treatment
at
Lucknow-held-Lucknow
court has jurisdiction.

Held: Para-22 and 23
22. In view of factual matrix in case in
hand the offence committed at Riyad is
complete offence and has no nexus with
other
offence alleged
to have been
committed in India. This offence under
Section 326 IPC would not be triable
without permission granted by the Central
Government in view of proviso of Section
188 Cr.P.C. However the other offence
which has been committed in India as
alleged in the FIR and found to be
committed in India during investigation
would be tried and decided by the
Magistrate. Hence proceeding in respect
thereof may continue irrespective of the
fact that no permission of the Central
Government has been given in this case to
prosecute the petitioner for the offence
alleged to have been committed at Riyad
in
Saudi
Arab.
3 All] Prabhat Chaturvedi Vs. State of U.P. and Anr.
1191
23. Now question comes that on the
basis of other offence said to have been
committed in India whether the court at
Lucknow has jurisdiction to try and
decide the same. From the perusal of the
allegation made in the first information
report the dowry was given in Lucknow
according to the prosecution version in
the FIR. The opposite party No.2 and her
mother was ill treated in Lucknow.
Hence, it cannot be said that this court at
Lucknow has no jurisdiction to try and
decide the case.

Case Law discussed:
(2011) 9 SCC 527; (1993) 3 SCC (Crl.) 609;
(2004) 2 JIC 666 SC; (1997) (JIC) 827 SC;
2001 (2) JIC 166 SC; 1972(2) SCC 890;
1991(2) SCC 141; 1984(4) SCC 222; (2013)2
SCC 435; AIR 1959(SC)798; 1991(2) SCC 141;
1972(2)SCC 890; 1984(4) SCC 222; (1988) 2
SCC 269; 2001(1) SCC 534; (2006) 13 SCC
470.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vishnu Chandra
Gupta, J.)

1. By means of this petition under
Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code
(for short 'Cr.P.C.') the order dated
30.07.2009 passed by C.J.M, Lucknow in
Case No. 4311 of 2009 taking cognizance
against the petitioner for trial under
Section 498A, 323, 504, 506, 326 IPC and
Section 3⁄4 D.P. Act on the basis of charge
sheet No. 28 of 2009 dated 26.05.2009 in
Case Crime No. 69 of 2008, P.S.
Hazratganj
Mahila
Thana,
district
Lucknow sought to be quashed.

2. The brief facts to decide this
petition are as under.

3. That opposite part No.2 Smt.
Archana Chaturvedi gave a written report
against the petitioner and his family on
10.11.2008 to Police Station Aliganj,
District Lucknow. On the basis of which
FIR has been lodged on the same day
under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 IPC
and Section 3⁄4 D.P. Act in Case Crime
No.69 of 2008. The case was sent to
Mahila Thana, District Lucknow. The
matter was investigated and thereafter on
26.05.2008 Charge sheet has been filed
against the petitioner Prabhat Chaturvedi
,the husband of opposite party No.2..
After investigation family members of the
petitioner namely Dinesh Chaturvedi,
Ramesh
Chaturvedi,
Smt.
Savitri
Chaturvedi, Smt. Sudha Chaturvedi, Smt.
Rakhi Chaturvedh and Shiv Kumar
Chaturvedi were exonerated. The charge
sheet was filed under Sections 323,
326,506, 406,498A IPC and Section 3⁄4
Dowry Prohibition Act. The court took
cognizance and summon the petitioner
vide order dated 23.07.2009.

4. The allegation levelled in the first
information report in short are that
opposite party No.2 married with Prabhat
Chaturvedi the petitioner on 3rd February,
2005 at Lucknow. Sufficient dowry was
given at the time of marriage which
includes Rs. 51,000/- at the time of
'Bariksha' Rs. 51,000/- were given to
mother-in-law Smt. Savitri Chaturvedi
and father-in-law Shiv Kumar Chaturvedi
as demanded by them. The mother of
opposite
party
No.2
borne
entire
expenditure of the Barat and staying of
the same. Apart from it, other movable
item T.V., Music system, Almira, Double
bed, utensil, and other domestic use items
were given. The ornaments including
neckless, three chain, tops, ring total
measuring 16 tola and silver item about
500 gm apart from cloths and sarees
amounting to Rs.40,000/- given to the
family members of petitioner No.1. In
Kaleva two gold rings having weight
20gms and clothing of Rs. 55,000/- were
1192 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
given. After marriage she reached Sasural
on 4th February, 2005. On 5th February,
2005 she was harassed and taunted on
account of bringing less dowry by the
family members and the demand of Rs.
10,00,000/- and a flat was raised by the
in-laws. She came back to parental house.
Her mother managed to Rs.1,00,000/- and
given to in-laws on 7th March, 2005. The
petitioner went to Saudi Arab along with
his Bhabhi. His elder brother Dinesh was
already went to Saudi Arab on 07.03.2006
she was called to Riyad in Saudi Arab by
the petitioner but in Riyad she was
subjected to cruelty on account of nonfulfilment of dowry. On 20th December,
2007 in Riyad her husband Prabhat
Chaturvedi and his brother Dinesh badly
beaten
her.
Her
husband
Prabhat
Chaturvedi pored some black matrial
upon her and Dinesh with match stick
ablazed her. She was badly burnt in this
incident. She raised alarm and thereafter
neighbour assembled there. On their
persuasion she was admitted in hospital at
Riyad. She was threatened that if she will
take any action in the matter she will be
killed. After discharge from the hospital
she came back to Delhi along with
petitioner. From Delhi she was came by
Shatabdi Train on 27th March, 2008 in
bearing cloth alone to Lucknow. The inlaws
kept
all
the
belongings
and
ornaments with them. The petitioner and
his brother Dinesh and Smt. Savitri
Chaturvedi continuously extended threat
to her on phone.

5. On 5th September, 2008 the
husband of petitioner Prabhat Chaturvedi,
mother-in-law Savitri Chaturvedi, fatherin-law Shiv Kumar Chaturvedi came
alongwith husband of petitioner at Triveni
Nagar, Lucknow and demanded Rs.
10,00,000/- and a flat from her and her
mother. When they expressed inability to
fulfil the demand she and her mother was
badly beaten by them and again demand
Rs. 10,00,000/- and a flat and also
extended threat that in case any action is
taken they will be killed. She treated in
Appolo Hospital, New Delhi in which a
sum of Rs.2,00,000/- incurred in medical
treatment. These expenses were borne by
her mother

6. During the course of investigation
neither the petitioner nor other witnesses
mentioned about incident of 05.09.2008
which said to have been occurred in
Triveni Nagar, Lucknow.

7. Aggrieved by the order of
summoning
and
the
consequential
proceeding initiated by the Chief Judicial
Magistrate in pursuance of the charge
sheet and summoning order this petition
has been filed by the petitioner. From the
perusal of the pleadings of the parties the
only challenge made in the petition is
regarding lack of jurisdiction of the trial
court to proceed in the matter. Counter
affidavit has been filed wherein it has
been mentioned by the opposite Party
No.2 that investigation has not been
properly conducted so he filed protest
against dropping of the name of the other
family members in the investigation and
also filed an application before the court
for further investigation under Section
173 (8) Cr.P.C. She reiterated the
allegation made in the FIR. It was alleged
that the offence committed is continuing
offence and cause of action started from
20.12.2007 to 05.09.2008. In view of
sections 177, 178 of 209 Cr.P.C. Section
3(r) of General Clause Act the court has
jurisdiction to try the case.

8.
In rejoinder affidavit the
allegation of the counter affidavit has
3 All] Prabhat Chaturvedi Vs. State of U.P. and Anr.
1193
been refuted and stated that the petitioner
purchased the land in district Lakhimpur
Kheri in the name of opposite party No.2
having cost of Rs. 5,00,000, so ,alleged
story of demand and harassment and
cruelty is not correct. It was further
submitted that nothing was happened as
stated by the petitioner regarding the
incident of burn in Riyad but it was
actually a case of accidental burn.

9. This court for the first time vide
its order dated 19.08.2011 found that no
permission under Section 188 Cr.P.C. was
granted by Central Government, hence the
Central Government was asked to grant of
permission.

10. Initially when petition was filed
this court passed an interim order dated
03.09.2009 stating that the prosecution of
the petitioner under Section 326 IPC shall
remain stayed and permitted the trial court
to proceed for the other section. However,
on 22.09.2011 the entire proceedings
pending before the trial court were stayed
on the request of the complainant on the
ground that learned counsel for the Union
of India informed that State Government
is not moved for grant of permission
under Section 188 Cr.P.C. so, no
permission has been accorded by the
Central Government.

11. This Court thereafter proceeded
with this case and heard the parties at
length.

12. Learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the petitioner, Sri. B.M. Sahai
argued that the Apex Court in recent
judgement in Thota Venkateswarlu Vs.
State of A.P. [(2011) 9 SCC 527] posed a
question in para 12 to be considered in
this case; Whether in respect of series of
offence
arising
out
of
the
same
transaction,
some
of
which
were
committed within the India and some out
side India, such offences could be tried
together, without the previous sanction of
the Central Government, as envisaged in
the proviso to Section 188 Cr.P.C.?

13.

In
the
case
of
Thota
Venkateswarlu's case (supra) the Apex
Court in para 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17
explained the legal aspect of Section 188
Cr.P.C., is reproduce herein below;

"12.The question which we have
been called upon to consider in this case
is whether in respect of a series of
offences
arising
out
of
the
same
transaction,
some
of
which
were
committed within India and some outside
India, such offences could be tried
together, without the previous sanction of
the Central Government, as envisaged in
the proviso to Section 188 Cr.P.C.

13. From the complaint made by the
Respondent No.2 in the present case, it is
clear that the cases relating to alleged
offences under Section 498-A and 506 I.P.C.
had been committed outside India in
Botswana, where the Petitioner and the
Respondent No.2 were residing. At best it
may be said that the alleged offences under
Sections 3 and 4 of the 10 Dowry Prohibition
Act occurred within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Criminal Courts in India and could,
therefore, be tried by the Courts in India
without having to obtain the previous
sanction
of
the
Central
Government.
However, we are still left with the question
as to whether in cases where the offences are
alleged to have been committed outside
India, any previous sanction is required to be
taken by the prosecuting agency, before the
trial can commence.
1194 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

14. The language of Section 188
Cr.P.C. is quite clear that when an offence
is committed outside India by a citizen of
India, he may be dealt with in respect of
such offences as if they had been
committed
in
India.
The
proviso,
however, indicates that such offences
could be inquired into or tried only after
having obtained the previous sanction of
the Central Government. As mentioned
hereinbefore, in Ajay Aggarwal's case
(supra), it was held that sanction under
Section 188 Cr.P.C. is not a condition
precedent for taking cognizance of an
offence and, if need be, it could be
obtained before the trial begins. Even in
his concurring judgment, R.M. Sahai, J.,
observed as follows :- (SCC p. 628, para
29)

"29 Language of the section is plain
and simple. It operates where an offence
is committed by a citizen of India outside
the country. Requirements are, therefore,
one -- commission of an offence; second -
- by an Indian citizen; and third -- that it
should have been committed outside the
country.;"

15 Although the decision in Ajay
Aggarwal's case (supra) was rendered in
the background of a conspiracy alleged to
have been hatched by the accused, the
ratio of the decision is confined to what
has been observed hereinabove in the
interpretation of Section 188 Cr.P.C. The
proviso to Section 188, which has been
extracted hereinbefore, is a fetter on the
powers of the investigating authority to
inquire into or try any offence mentioned
in the earlier part of the Section, except
with the previous sanction of the Central
Government. The fetters, however, are
imposed only when the stage of trial is
reached, which clearly indicates that no
sanction in terms of Section 188 is
required till commencement of the trial. It
is only after the decision to try the
offender in India was felt necessary that
the previous sanction of the Central
Government would be required before the
trial could commence.

16. Accordingly, upto the stage of
taking cognizance, no previous sanction
would be required from the Central
Government in terms of the proviso to
Section 188 Cr.P.C. However, the trial
cannot proceed beyond the cognizance
stage without the previous sanction of the
Central Government. The Magistrate is,
therefore, free to proceed against the
accused in respect of offences having
been committed in India and to complete
the trial and pass judgment therein,
without being inhibited by the other
alleged offences for which sanction would
be required.

17.It may also be indicated that the
provisions of the Indian Penal Code have
been extended to offences committed by
any citizen of India in any place within
and beyond India by virtue of Section 4
thereof. Accordingly, offences committed
in Botswana by an Indian citizen would
also be amenable to the provisions of the
Indian Penal Code, subject to the
limitation imposed under the proviso to
Section 188 Cr.P.C."

14. On the strength of this authority
it has been submitted that incident which
alleged to have been occurred in Riyad is
an independent offence and a completed
one. It is not continuing offence of the
earlier one alleged to have been occurred
in Inida. Hence permission of Central
Government is required to prosecute the
petitioner
for
the
alleged
offence
3 All] Prabhat Chaturvedi Vs. State of U.P. and Anr.
1195
committed by the petitioner at Riyad in
Saudi Arab in view of proviso of Section
188 Cr.P.C. However for other offence
the trial may go on.

15. The learned counsel for the
opposite party No.2 Sri Manoj Kumar
Mishra submitted that the offence alleged
in the first information report are
continuing offence and in case of
continuing offence, part of cause of action
which has been taken place outside India
will not be covered by section 188(1)
Cr.P.C. In this regard reliance has been
placed upon the judgements

(i) Ajay Aggrawal Vs. State of
Union of India [ (1993) 3 SCC (Crl.)
609],

(ii) Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors Vs.
Inspector of Police, Chennai & Ors.
[(2004)2 JIC 666 SC],

(iii) Smt. Sujata Mukherji vs.
Prashant Kumar Mukherji [1997 (JIC)
827 SC],

(iv) Mohan Baitha Vs. State of
Bihar & Ors. [2001 (2) JIC 166 SC],

(v) State of Bihar Vs. Dev Karan
Nenshi [1972 (2) SCC 890]

(vi) Gokak Patel Volkart Ltd. Vs.
Dandayya Guru Shiddiah Hiramath
[1991(2) SCC 141]

(vii) Bhagirath Kanoria Vs. State
of M.P. [1984(4) SCC 222]

16. On the basis of submission made
by the counsel for the parties the sole
question for consideration before this
court is;

(i) whether proviso of Section 188
Cr.P.C would be applicable in this case
and without permission of the Central
Government the case may proceed for the
trial of the petitioner for those offence
,said to have been committed in India?.

(ii) Whether the proceedings pending
before
Lucknow
court
are
without
jurisdiction?

17. So far as question of Section 188
Cr.P.C.
is
concerned
in
Thota
Venkateswarlu's case (supra) the Apex
Court after considering the judgement
rendered by Supreme Court in Ajay
Aggarwal's
case
(Supra)
ruled that
offence which are completed in itself and
committed outside India the permission
under proviso of Section 188 Cr.P.C. of
Central Government would be required,
but for the offence which are committed
within
India
there
would
be
no
impediment in taking the cognizance and
the accused persons without previous
permission under proviso 2 of Section 188
Cr.P.C. can be prosecuted and court
would be competent to proceed with the
case and to decide the same.

18. Ajay Aggarwal's case (supra)
was a case of criminal conspiracy and the
Apex Court held that the criminal
conspiracy was hatched in India. If some
of the part of offence has taken place in
pursuance of that conspiracy to achieve
objective of the criminal conspiracy
outside India no permission of Central
Government would be required of proviso
to
Section
188
Cr.P.C.
In
Ajay
Aggarwal's case (supra) the Apex Court
held that criminal conspiracy itself a
substantive offence and is continuing one
unless object of criminal conspiracy is
achieved. This case was considered by the
1196 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Apex Court in Thota Venkateswarlu's
case (supra) and has been distinguished.
on fact. In Thota Venkateswarlu's case
(supra) the petitioner left India for
Botswana
in
January
2006
alone.
Respondent No.2, the wife went to
Botswana to join the petitioner. While she
was in Botswana the respondent No.2
alleged to have been severely ill treated
by the petitioner. Apart from the above,
various
demands
were
also
made
including demand for additional dowry of
Rs. 5,00,000/-. The court while deciding
this matter came to the conclusion that
offence pertaining to Botswana are in
itself completed offence. These are not
continuing hence permission of Central
Government would be required under the
proviso of section 188 Cr.P.C.. However,
the offence under Section 3⁄4 D.P. Act was
committed in India. Hence the same shall
be tried in India.

19. In recent judgement of the Apex
Court in Udai Shankar Awasthi Vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
[(2013) 2 Supreme Court Cases 435]
their Lordships held in para 29 is as
follows;

"29 Thus, in view of the above, the
law on the issue can be summarised to the
effect that, in the case of a continuing
offence, the ingredients of the offence
continue, i.e., endure even after the period
of
consummation,
whereas
in
an
instantaneous offence, the offence takes
place once and for all i.e. when the same
actually takes place. In such cases, there
is no continuing offence, even though the
damage resulting from the injury may
itself continue."

20. The above judgement in Udai
Shankar Awasthi has been rendered by
the Apex Court after considering the
several judgements of the Apex Court
including the following judgements;

(i) Balakrishna Savalram Pujari
Waghmare Vs. Shree Dhyaneshwar
Maharaj Santhan [AIR 1959 (SC) 798]

(ii) Gokak Patel Volkart Ltd. Vs.
Dandayya Guru Shiddiah Hiramath
[1991(2) SCC 141]

(iii) State of Bihar Vs. Dev Karan
Nenshi [1972 (2) SCC 890]

(iv) Bhagirath Kanoria Vs. State of
M.P. [1984(4) SCC 222]

(v)
Amrit
Lal
Chum
Vs.
Devoprasad Dutta Roy [(1988) 2 SCC
269]

(vi)
Raymond
Ltd. Vs.
M.P.
Electricity Board [2001 (1) SCC 534]

(vii) Sankar Dastidar Vs. Banjula
Dastidar [(2006) 13 SCC 470]

21. The Supreme Court in Uday
Shankar Awasthi's case (supra) explain
which offences are continuing offence
and which are not.

22. In view of factual matrix in case
in hand the offence committed at Riyad is
complete offence and has no nexus with
other offence alleged to have been
committed in India. This offence under
Section 326 IPC would not be triable
without permission granted by the Central
Government in view of proviso of Section
188 Cr.P.C. However the other offence
which has been committed in India as
alleged in the FIR and found to be
committed in India during investigation
3 All] Lokesh Singh Vs. State of U.P.
1197
would be tried and decided by the
Magistrate. Hence proceeding in respect
thereof may continue irrespective of the
fact that no permission of the Central
Government has been given in this case to
prosecute the petitioner for the offence
alleged to have been committed at Riyad
in Saudi Arab.

23. Now question comes that on the
basis of other offence said to have been
committed in India whether the court at
Lucknow has jurisdiction to try and
decide the same. From the perusal of the
allegation made in the first information
report the dowry was given in Lucknow
according to the prosecution version in
the FIR. The opposite party No.2 and her
mother was ill treated in Lucknow.
Hence, it cannot be said that this court at
Lucknow has no jurisdiction to try and
decide the case.

24. Hence this petition is liable to be
partly allowed.

25. The impugned order taking
cognizance
for the
alleged
offence
committed in Riyad, Saudi Arab is set
aside, but it will remain operative in
respect of offences which were committed
in India. Learned Magistrate will proceed
with the trial in respect of those offence
expeditiously in accordance with law
keeping in view the provision contained
in Section 309 Cr.P.C.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 26.08.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE VISHNU CHANDRA GUPTA, J.

Criminal Misc. Case No. 3769 of 2013(u/s
482 Cr.P.C.)
and Criminal Misc. Case No. 3770 of
2013(u/s 482 Cr.P.C.)

Lokesh Singh
 ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P.

 ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Vaibhav Kalia

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri K.K. Singh, AGA

Code of Criminal Procedure-Section 24(8),
301- whether an advocate engaged by
victim has right to address the Court after
conclusion of Trail-held-'yes'

Held: Para-35 and 38
35. Hence, this Court is of the view that
after insertion of proviso to Section
24(8) Cr.P.C. if the court permits the
victim to engage an advocate of choice,
the court thereafter cannot deprive the
Advocate to address the court in addition
to his right to file the written argument
as contained in Section 301 Cr.P.C. after
close of evidence.

38. The Advocate appointed by the
victim should be permitted to assist the
court by supplementing the arguments
already advanced by Public Prosecutor
by oral submissions in addition to
written argument if any filed by him.

Case Law discussed:
2000 JCRC 11(SC); 2012(2) JIC 887(All. H.C.);
Cr. Appeal No. 1061 of 2011; 1995(1) SCC 14;
(2010) 5 SCC 186; (2009) 8 SCC 431; (2009)
10 SCC 689; (2010) 5 SCC 246; AIR 2000 SCC
1851; (2001) 6 SCC 338; (2003) 6 SCC 230;
(2009) 1 SCC 441; (1996) 4 SCC 127; (1997)
11 SCC 720; AIR 2010 SC 1385; (2004) 4 SCC
158; 2001 Cr.L.J.; 1264; (1985) 2 SCC 537

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vishnu Chandra
Gupta, J.)

1. By means of these petitions under
Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code (for