# Pramod Kumar Shukla & Anr v. The State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 4 ILRA 745
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-04-01
- **Case number:** Writ-A No. 4183 of 2022
- **Bench:** Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/pramod-kumar-shukla-anr-v-the-state-of-u-p-ors-48309
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

A. Service Law - UP Lokayukta and UpLokayuktas Act, 1975 - Sections 12(4) &
17(2) - Recommendation for punishment
- Jurisdiction of Lokayukta under the Act
- Challenge to the recommendation of
Lokayukta - Permissibility - Interference
by the court, when warranted - Held, the
Lokayukta has rightly recommended the
punishment of the petitioners by passing
the order dated 22.09.2021. No order or
proceeding of the Lokayukta can be
challenged,
reviewed,
canceled
or
questioned in any court unless it has been
passed without jurisdiction. (Para 15)
B. Service - Departmental enquiry -
Charge-sheet - Scope of interference by
the court - Principle laid down - Held, the
law is that the Courts are not to grant
stay/quash the disciplinary proceedings
nor they should go into the correctness or
otherwise of the charges leveled in the
charge-sheet
and
the
departmental
inquiry should be allowed to continue
uninterrupted to come to its natural
conclusion - In some very rare and
exceptional cases the High Court can
quash a charge-sheet or show-cause
notice if it is found to be wholly without
jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is
wholly illegal - However, ordinarily the
High Court should not interfere in such a
matter.(Para 24 and 26)
Writ petition dismissed. (E-1)
List of Cases cited :-

## Text

4 All. Pramod Kumar Shukla & Anr. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
745

32. In view of above, this petition
succeeds and is allowed. The order dated
16.07.2019
passed
by
the
Regional
Manager, U.P. Transport Corporation,
Kanpur, annexure 11 to the writ petition, is
hereby quashed.

33. Respondent concerned is directed
to constitute a Departmental Promotion
Committee to consider promotion of the
petitioner w.e.f. the date juniors to the
petitioner have been promoted, with all
consequential benefits and pass orders
accordingly.

34. The above task as directed
hereinabove, shall be accomplished by the
concerned respondent authority within a
period of two months from the date of
production of certified copy of the order.
----------
(2022)04ILR A745
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 01.04.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS. MANJU RANI
CHAUHAN, J.

Writ-A No. 4183 of 2022

Pramod Kumar Shukla & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
The State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Satyam Pandey, Sri R.K. Ojha (Sr. Adv.)

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Manas Bhargava

A. Service Law - UP Lokayukta and UpLokayuktas Act, 1975 - Sections 12(4) &
17(2) - Recommendation for punishment
- Jurisdiction of Lokayukta under the Act
- Challenge to the recommendation of
Lokayukta - Permissibility - Interference
by the court, when warranted - Held, the
Lokayukta has rightly recommended the
punishment of the petitioners by passing
the order dated 22.09.2021. No order or
proceeding of the Lokayukta can be
challenged,
reviewed,
canceled
or
questioned in any court unless it has been
passed without jurisdiction. (Para 15)
B. Service - Departmental enquiry -
Charge-sheet - Scope of interference by
the court - Principle laid down - Held, the
law is that the Courts are not to grant
stay/quash the disciplinary proceedings
nor they should go into the correctness or
otherwise of the charges leveled in the
charge-sheet
and
the
departmental
inquiry should be allowed to continue
uninterrupted to come to its natural
conclusion - In some very rare and
exceptional cases the High Court can
quash a charge-sheet or show-cause
notice if it is found to be wholly without
jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is
wholly illegal - However, ordinarily the
High Court should not interfere in such a
matter.(Para 24 and 26)
Writ petition dismissed. (E-1)
List of Cases cited :-
1. Secretary, Ministry of Defence & ors. Vs
Prabhash Chandra Mishra; (2012) 11 SCC
565
2. St. of U.P. Vs Shri Brahm Datt Sharma & anr.;
AIR 1987 SC 943
3. St. of H.P. Vs B.C. Thakur; 1994 SCC (L&S)
4.U.O.I. Vs Ashok Kacker; 1995 Supp (1) SCC
180
5. Secretary to Government, Prohibition &
Excise Department Vs L. Srinivasan; (1996) 3
SCC 157
6. St. of Orrisa & anr. Vs Sangram Keshari Misra
& anr.; (2010) 13 SCC 311
7. U.O.I. & ors. Vs Upendra Singh; (1994) 3 SCC
357
8. U.O.I. & anr. Vs Kunisetty Satyanarayana;
(2006) 12 SCC 28
746 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs. Manju Rani
Chauhan, J.)

1. Heard Mr. R.K. Ojha, Senior
Advocate assisted by Mr. Satyam Pandey,
learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr.
Manas Bhargava, learned counsel for the
respondent
no.2
and
Mr.
Aseem
Mukherjee, learned Standing Counsel for
the State-respondents.

2. This writ petition has been filed by
the petitioners with the following prayer:-

"(A) Issue a writ, order or direction in
nature of Certiorari quashing the impugned
orders passed by the Lokayukt respondent
no.2 dated 22.09.2021 (Annexure no.5 to
this writ petition) and the charge sheet
issued
by
the
Additional
Deputy
Commissioner of Police, Headquarter
Commissionerate,
Kanpur
Nagar
respondent
no.4
dated
22.01.2022
(Annexure no.6 to this writ petition).

(B) Issue a writ, order or direction in
the nature of mandamus commanding and
directing for restraining the respondent not
to proceed in pursuance of the charge sheet
dated 22.01.2022 issued on the basis of the
order of the Lokayukt dated 2.09.2021.

(C) Issue a writ, order or direction in
the nature of mandamus commanding and
directing the respondents authority to not
interfere in the peaceful working of the
petitioners."

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners
submits that the petitioner no.1, namely,
Pramod Kumar Shukla was selected as
Sub-Inspector in the year 1998 and,
thereafter, was promoted as Inspector on
26.01.2015. The petitioner no.2, namely,
Pramod Kumar Yadav was selected as
Constable in the year 1998 and, thereafter,
was promoted as Sub-Inspector in the year
2013. Both the petitioners have been
performing
their
duties
up
to
the
satisfaction of their superior. He further
submits that the petitioner nos.1&2 were
posted as Inspector and Sub-Inpector in
P.S.- Chakeri at the time when the incident
in question took place. One Mr. Samar
Singh moved an application before the
Additional City Magistrate-II (hereinafter
referred as ACM-II) on Tehsil Diwas on
03.04.2018 with respect to removal of
certain articles like cattle etc. and animals
lying in their property. Pursuant to which,
the ACM-II directed Revenue Inspector to
conduct an inquiry with the help of
concerned Station House Officer (SHO)
and do the needful. On the said direction,
the Lekhpal of the area submitted a report
dated 05.04.2018, on the basis of which
Mr.
Samar
Singh
moved
another
application on 10.04.2018, on which the
ACM-II passed an order directing Inspector
Chakeri to provide security force for
removal of the illegal encroachment upon
the property in question, in order to
maintain peace. The Lekhpal as well as
complainant Mr. Samer Singh went to the
Inspector, i.e. petitioner no.1, who in turn
directed to petitioner no.2 to provide
necessary force. On the aforesaid direction,
the petitioner no.2 visited at the spot with
the requisite force and found that there was
no disturbance, therefore, the petitioners
did not do anything for removing the
encroachment.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners
further submits that it was the duty of the
Revenue Officer to perform the duty of
removing the illegal encroachment upon
the property in question and the petitioners
have nothing to do with the aforesaid task.
The petitioners were responsible for
maintaining peace over the area and since
no incident took place, therefore, it cannot
4 All. Pramod Kumar Shukla & Anr. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
747
be said that the petitioners had not
performed their duty.

5.

Subsequently,
the
complainant/opposite party approached this
Court by means of filing a writ petition
bearing Writ-C No.15753 of 2018, which
was dismissed by order dated 01.05.2018
with a direction to the petitioner therein to
approach the Civil Court where the
litigation in respect to the matter is already
pending or move an application under
Section 145 of Cr.P.C. In stead of
proceeding as directed by the aforesaid
order dated 01.05.2018, the opposite party
moved an application before the Lokayukt,
Lucknow, who proceeded as per the
provision of Uttar Pradesh Lokayukta and
Up-Lokayuktas Act, 1975 (hereinafter
referred as "the Act 1975").

6. Thereafter, on the complaint of Mr.
Samar Singh, three members committee
was constituted, which submitted its report
on 22.11.2018. On the basis of which,
notices were issued to the petitioners, who
submitted their reply. Surprisingly, the
Lokayukta, without noticing the fact that
the petitioners have performed their duties
maintaining peace pursuant to the order of
ACM-II by providing requisite police
force, passed the order dated 22.09.2021
recommending for awarding of major
punishment to the petitioners. On the basis
of
the
aforesaid
recommendation,
disciplinary proceedings has been initiated
against the petitioners and the charge sheet
has been given to them on 22.01.2022.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioners
further submits that the order/direction of
Lokayukta for awarding major punishment
to the petitioners is not sustainable in the
eyes of law as the Lokayukta can only
recommend for punishment but cannot
define as to what punishment has to be
awarded. The order dated 22.09.2021
passed by the Lokayukta is patently
erroneous, illegal and arbitrary as the same
has been passed ignoring the fact that the
petitioners have performed their duties of
providing police force and maintaining
peace over the area in question. The charge
sheet so submitted is bad as the same has
been submitted without considering the
reply of the petitioners and is based on the
recommendation of the Lokayukta, the
report submitted by the Lekhpal as well as
order of ACM-II. Hence the impugned
orders 22.09.2021 and 22.01.2022 cannot
sustained in the eyes of law, therefore, the
same are liable to be set aside by this
Court.

8. On the other hand, Mr. Manas
Bhargava,
learned
counsel
for
the
respondent no.2 submits that as per Section
12 of the Act, 1975, if, after investigation
of any action in respect of any complaint
involving a grievance has been made, the
Lokayukta or an Up-Lokayukta is satisfied
that such action has resulted in injustice or
undue hardship to the complainant or any
other person, he shall by a report in writing
recommend to the public servant and the
competent authority concerned that such
injustice or undue hardship shall be
remedied or redressed in such manner and
within such time as may be specified in the
report.

9. Mr. Bhargava further submits that
if, after investigation of any action in
respect of which a complaint involving an
allegation has been made, the Lokayukta or
an Up-Lokayukta is satisfied that such
allegation can be substantiated either
wholly or partly, he shall by report in
writing communicate his findings and
recommendation alongwith the relevant
748 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
documents, materials and other evidence to
the competent authority. The competent
authority shall examine the report so
forwarded to it and intimate within three
months of the date of receipt of the report,
the Lokayukta or, as the case may be, the
Up-Lokayukta,
the
action
taken
or
proposed to be taken on the basis of the
report. Section 12 (4) of the Uttar Pradesh
Lokayukta and Up-Lokayuktas Act, 1975
reads as under:-

"(4) The competent authority shall
examine the report forwarded to it under
sub-section (3) and intimate within three
months of the date of receipt of the report,
the Lokayukta or, as the case may be, the
Up-Lokayukta,
the
action
taken
or
proposed to be taken on the basis of the
report."

In
view
of
the
aforesaid,
the
Lokayukta, in the present case, has
recommended for punishment of the
petitioners.

10. Mr. Bhargava further submits that
as per Section 17(2) of the Act 1975, no
proceedings of the Lokayukta or the UpLokayukta shall be held bad for want of
form and except on the ground of
jurisdiction, no proceedings or decision of
the Lokayukta or the Up-Lokayukta shall
be liable to be challenged, reviewed,
quashed or called in question in any Court.

11. On the cumulative strength of the
aforesaid, learned Standing Counsel as well
as counsel for the respondent no.2 submits
that the order passed by Lokayukta dated
22.09.2021 is only a recommendation,
therefore, no interference is required by this
Court and also the aforesaid order cannot
be challenged as per Section 17(2) of the
1975 Act.

12. Apart from the above, learned
Standing Counsel as well as counsel for the
respondent no.2 submits that ordinarily a
writ petition does not lie against a chargesheet or show-cause notice for the reason
that it does not give rise to any cause of
action. It does not amount to an adverse
order which affects the right of any party
unless the same has been issued by a
person who has no jurisdiction to do so. In
support of their submission, they relied
upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the
case of Secretary, Ministry of Defence &
Others VS. Prabhash Chandra Mishra
reported in (2012) 11 SCC, 565. In view of
the aforesaid, they submits that no
interference is called for by this Court in
exercise of powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. Hence, the present
writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
Hence, the present writ petition is liable to
be quashed.

13. This Court has considered the
submissions as urged by learned counsel
for the parties as well as gone through the
entire materials brought on record.

14. It would be relevant to refer
Section 17 (2) of the Uttar Pradesh
Lokayukta and Up-Lokayuktas Act, 1975,
which read as under:-

"17. Protection. -.........

(2) No proceedings of the Lokayukta
or the Up-Lokayukta shall be held bad for
want of form and except on the ground of
jurisdiction, no proceedings or decision of
the Lokayukta or the Up-Lokayukta shall
be liable to be challenged, reviewed,
quashed or called in question in any
Court."

15. From perusal of the record it
comes out that the Lokayukta has rightly
4 All. Pramod Kumar Shukla & Anr. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
749
recommended the punishment of the
petitioners by passing the order dated
22.09.2021. No order or proceeding of the
Lokayukta can be challenged, reviewed,
canceled or questioned in any court unless
it has been passed without jurisdiction.

16. So far as challenge made by the
learned counsel for the petitioners to the
impugned charge-sheet is concerned, it is
necessary for this Court to refer judgement
of the Apex Court in the case of State of
U.P. vs. Shri Brahm Datt Sharma and
another [reported in AIR 1987 SC 943),
wherein the Apex Court has held that when
a show-cause notice was issued to a
government servant under the statutory
provisions calling upon him to show cause,
ordinarily the government servant must
place
his
case
before
the
authority
concerned by showing cause and the courts
should be reluctant to interfere with the
notice at that stage unless the notice is
shown to have been issued palpably
without any authority of law. The purpose
of issuing show cause is to afford
opportunity of hearing to the government
servant and once cause is shown it is open
to the Government to consider the matter in
the light of the facts and submissions
placed by the government servant and only
thereafter a final decision in the matter
could be taken. Interference by the Court
before that stage would be premature.

17. The Apex Court in the case of
State of H.P. Vs. B.C. Thakur reported in
1994 SCC (L&S), in paragraph nos. 3 and
4 has held as follows: -

"( 3 ) HAVING heard learned counsel
for the parties, we are satisfied that in the
facts and circumstances of the case, the
impugned order of the Tribunal quashing
the order of respondents suspension does
not call for any interference, even though
the other part of the Tribunals order
quashing the charge-sheet issued to the
respondent cannot be sustained. The
quashing of the charge-sheet by the
Tribunal is not on the ground of want of
authority to issue the charge-sheet or any
other inherent defect therein. This being so,
the question of going into the merits of the
charges, which are yet to be investigated in
the departmental proceedings, did not arise
for consideration or adjudication by the
Tribunal at this stage. This being so, the
Tribunals order quashing the charge-sheet
as well, on reaching the conclusion that the
suspension order had to be set aside, is
unwarranted. The respondent had been
under suspension for nearly two years on
the date of the Tribunals order and another
year has elapsed since then. Setting aside
the suspension order in this situation,
particularly when no substantial progress
in the disciplinary proceedings has been
made as yet, does not, therefore, call for
any interference.

(4) CONSEQUENTLY, the appeal is
partly allowed to the extent that the
Tribunals order quashing the charge-sheet
issued to the respondent is set aside while
the challenge to the quashing of the
suspension order dated 10-5-1990 is
rejected. No costs."

18. The Apex Court in the case of
Union of India Vs. Ashok Kacker reported
in 1995 Supp (1) SCC 180, while hearing a
matter where the employee had challenged
the charge sheet, clearly held that the
Tribunal entertained the application at a
premature stage. It was observed as follows
:-

".........In our opinion, this was not the
stage at which the Tribunal ought to have
entertained
such
an
application
for
750 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
quashing
the
charge-sheet
and
the
appropriate course for the respondent to
adopt is to file his reply to the charge-sheet
and invite the decision of the disciplinary
authority thereon. This being the stage at
which the respondent had rushed to the
Tribunal, we do not consider it necessary
to require the Tribunal at this stage to
examine any other point which may be
available to the respondent or which may
have been raised by him."

19. Again in the case of Secretary to
Government,
Prohibition
&
Excise
Department Vs. L. Srinivasan, reported in
(1996) 3 SCC 157, the Apex Court setaside the order of the Tribunal by which the
departmental enquiry and the charge-sheet
were quashed on the ground of delay in
initiation of the disciplinary proceedings
and it was observed as follows :-

"Order dated 12.11.1993 in Nos. Nos.
1702 of 1993 and 2206 of 1993 of the
Tamil
Nadu
Administrative
Tribunal,
Madras is in question before us. The
respondent while working as Assistant
Section Officer, Home, Prohibition and
Excise Department had been placed under
suspension. Departmental inquiry is in
process. We are informed that charge-sheet
was laid for prosecution for the offences of
embezzlement and fabrication of false
records etc. and that the offences and the
trial of the case is pending.

The Tribunal had set aside the
departmental enquiry and quashed the
charge on the ground of delay in initiation
of disciplinary proceedings. In the nature
of the charge, it would take a long time to
detect embezzlement and fabrication of
false records which should be done in
secrecy. It is not necessary to go into the
merits and record any finding on the
charge levelled against the charged officer
since any finding recorded by this Court
would gravely prejudice the case of the
parties at the enquiry and also at the trial.
Therefore, we desist from expressing any
opinion on merit or recording any of the
contentions raised by the counsel on either
side.
Suffice
it
to
state
that
the
Administrative Tribunal has committed
grossest error in its exercise of the judicial
review. The member of the Administrative
Tribunal appears to have no knowledge of
the jurisprudence of the service law and
exercised power as if he is an appellate
forum dehors the limitation of judicial
review. This is one such instance where a
member had exceeded his power of judicial
review in quashing the suspension order
and charges even at the threshold. We are
coming across such orders frequently
putting heavy pressure on this Court to
examine each case in detail. It is high time
that it is remedied." (emphasis supplied)."

20. The Apex Court in the case of
State of Orrisa and another vs. Sangram
Keshari Misra and another [reported in
(2010) 13 Supreme Court Cases 311] in
para 10 has opined as under:-

"10. Though there appears to be some
merit in the said contentions of the first
respondent, it is unnecessary to examine
the correctness of these contentions as
normally a charge-sheet is not quashed
prior to the conducting of the enquiry on
the ground that the facts stated in the
charge are erroneous. It is well settled
that the correctness or truth of the charge
is the function of the disciplinary authority
(vide Union of India v. Upendra Singh1
SCC p. 362, para 6). Therefore we reject
the contention that the charge ought to
have been quashed without reserving to
the State to proceed in accordance with
law."
4 All. Pramod Kumar Shukla & Anr. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
751

21. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Union of India and others vs.
Upendra Singh [reported in (1994) 3
Supreme Court Cases 357] in para 6 has
held as under:-

"6. In the case of charges framed in a
disciplinary inquiry the tribunal or court
can interfere only if on the charges framed
(read with imputation or particulars of the
charges, if any) no misconduct or other
irregularity alleged can be said to have
been made out or the charges framed are
contrary to any law. At this stage, the
tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the
correctness or truth of the charges. The
tribunal cannot take over the functions of
the disciplinary authority. The truth or
otherwise of the charges is a matter for the
disciplinary authority to go into. Indeed,
even after the conclusion of the disciplinary
proceedings, if the matter comes to court or
tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to look
into the truth of the charges or into the
correctness of the findings recorded by the
disciplinary authority or the appellate
authority as the case may be. The function
of the court/tribunal is one of judicial
review, the parameters of which are
repeatedly laid down by this Court. It
would be sufficient to quote the decision in
H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officercum-Assessing Authority, Karnal v. Gopi
Nath & Sons5. The Bench comprising M.N.
Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) and
A.M. Ahmadi, J., affirmed the principle
thus : (SCC p. 317, para 8)

"Judicial review, it is trite, is not
directed against the decision but is
confined to the decision-making process.
Judicial review cannot extend to the
examination
of
the
correctness
or
reasonableness of a decision as a matter of
fact. The purpose of judicial review is to
ensure that the individual receives fair
treatment and not to ensure that the
authority after according fair treatment
reaches, on a matter which it is authorised
by law to decide, a conclusion which is
correct in the eyes of the Court. Judicial
review is not an appeal from a decision but
a review of the manner in which the
decision is made. It will be erroneous to
think that the Court sits in judgment not
only on the correctness of the decision
making process but also on the correctness
of the decision itself."

22. The Apex Court in the case of
Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others
vs. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha [reported
in (2012) 11 Supreme Court Cases 565] in
para nos. 10 to 12 has opined as follows: -

"11. Ordinarily a writ application
does not lie against a chargesheet or show
cause notice for the reason that it does not
give rise to any cause of action. It does not
amount to an adverse order which affects
the right of any party unless the same has
been issued by a person having no
jurisdiction/competence to do so. A writ
lies when some right of a party is infringed.
In fact, chargesheet does not infringe the
right of a party. It is only when a final
order
imposing
the
punishment
or
otherwise adversely affecting a party is
passed, it may have a grievance and cause
of action. Thus, a chargesheet or show
cause notice in disciplinary proceedings
should not ordinarily be quashed by the
Court. (Vide : State of U.P. Vs. Brahm Datt
Sharma, AIR 1987 SC 943; Executive
Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board Vs.
Ramesh Kumar Singh & Others, (1996) 1
SCC 327; Ulagappa & Ors. v. Div.
Commr., Mysore & Ors., AIR 2000 SC
3603 (2); Special Director & Anr. Vs.
Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse & Another , AIR
2004 SC 1467; and Union of India &
752 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Another Vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, AIR
2007 SC 906).

12. In State of Orissa & Anr. v. Sangram
Keshari Misra & Anr., (2010) 13 SCC 311,
this Court held that normally a chargesheet is
not quashed prior to the conclusion of the
enquiry on the ground that the facts stated in
the charge are erroneous for the reason that
correctness or truth of the charge is the
function of the disciplinary authority. (See
also: Union of India & Ors., (1994) 3 SCC
357).

13. Thus, the law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that chargesheet
cannot generally be a subject matter of
challenge as it does not adversely affect the
rights of the delinquent unless it is
established that the same has been issued by
an authority not competent to initiate the
disciplinary
proceedings.
Neither
the
disciplinary proceedings nor the chargesheet
be quashed at an initial stage as it would be a
premature stage to deal with the issues.
Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on
the grounds that proceedings had been
initiated at a belated stage or could not be
concluded in a reasonable period unless the
delay creates prejudice to the delinquent
employee. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a
relevant factor to be taken into consideration
while quashing the proceedings."

23. In the case of Union of India and
another Vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana,
reported in (2006) 12 SCC 28, Hon'ble the
Supreme Court has held as under:-

"Writ jurisdiction is discretionary
jurisdiction and hence such discretion
under Article 226 should not ordinarily be
exercised by quashing a show-cause notice
or charge sheet."

24. It was, therefore, emphasized by
the Apex Court that even by way of final
order the departmental enquiry or the
charge-sheet could not have been quashed.
The law on this point is that the Courts are,
therefore, not to grant stay/quash the
disciplinary proceedings nor they should go
into the correctness or otherwise of the
charges leveled in the charge-sheet and the
departmental inquiry should be allowed to
continue uninterrupted to come to its
natural conclusion

25. In the case of charges framed in a
disciplinary enquiry, the tribunal or Court
can interfere only if on the charges framed
(read with imputation or particulars of the
charges, if any) no misconduct or other
irregularity alleged can be said to have
been made out or the charges framed are
contrary to any law. The tribunal or the
Court cannot take over the functions of the
disciplinary
authority.
The
truth
or
otherwise of the charge is a matter for the
disciplinary authority to go into. Indeed,
even
after
the
conclusion
of
their
disciplinary proceedings, if the matter
comes to court or tribunal, they have no
jurisdiction to look into the truth of the
charges or into the correctness of the
findings recorded by the disciplinary
authority or the appellate authority as the
case may be.

26. From the aforesaid legal positions,
it is clear that in some very rare and
exceptional cases the High Court can quash
a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is
found to be wholly without jurisdiction or
for some other reason if it is wholly illegal.
However, ordinarily the High Court should
not interfere in such a matter.

27. In view of the aforesaid settled
legal positions of the Apex Court which
have been referred to above, this Court
does not find any illegality or infirmity in
4 All. Krishna Nand Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
753
the
impugned
charge-sheet
dated
22.01.2022 passed by respondent no.4 so as
to warrant any interference by this Court in
exercise of powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.

28. The present writ petition being
devoid of merits and is accordingly
dismissed.

29. However, it is provided that the
departmental inquiry be initiated against
the petitioners and brought to its logical
end, strictly in accordance with law,
keeping in view that the recommendation
of Lokayukta is only to the extent of
punishment to the petitioner as per law, at
the earliest possible preferably within a
period of three months from the date of
production of a certified copy of this order
before the disciplinary authority.
----------
(2022)04ILR A753
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 22.12.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PRAKASH PADIA, J.

Writ-A No. 18087 of 2021

Krishna Nand Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Sandeep Kumar

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Anand Kumar Pandey

A. Service Law - Appointment on the post of
Assistant Teacher - Complaint claiming the
appointment as illegal appointment was
made
-
Maintainability
-
Preliminary
objection to the locus of complainant raised
- Word 'Aggrieved person' defined - Held,
the expression 'Aggrieved person' denotes
an elastic and to extent, an elusive concept.
It cannot be confined with the bounds of a
rigid exact and comprehensive definition -
No legal rights of the petitioner have been
denied or deprived. He has not sustained
any injury to any legal protected interest by
payment
of
salary
in
favour
of
the
respondent no. 6. Therefore he is not a
'person aggrieved' and he has no locus
standi to challenge the payment of salary.
(Para 14 and 15)
B. Service Law - Intermediate Education
Act, 1921 - District Magistrate issued
direction to the educational authorities -
Power of District Magistrate challenged -
Principle of no interference by the foreign
authority laid down - Held, the District
Magistrate is a foreign authority under the
Scheme of the Act - District Magistrate has
no authority under the Act, 1921 or Act No.
24 of 1971 to take a decision in respect of
appointment or salary of teaching or nonteaching staff - If a statute impose a duty
on an authority he must exercise that power
independently and personally without any
supervisory control of some other authority.
Even a superior authority cannot interfere in
his decision which he has to take personally.
(Para 24, 26 and 33)
Writ petition dismissed. (E-1)
List of Cases cited :-
1. Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs Rashan Kumar
reported in 1976 (1) SCC 671
2. Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja Vs St. of
Guj., (1995) 5 SCC 302.
3. Tarlochan Dev Sharma Vs St. of Pun.; (2001)
6 SCC 260
4. Purtabpore Co. Ltd. Vs Cane Commissioner of
Bihar, (1969) 1 SCC 308
5. Joint Action Committee of Air Line Pilots'
Association of India (A.L.P.A.I.) & ors. Vs.
Director General of Civil Aviation & ors., (2011)
5 SCC 43

(Delivered by Hon'ble Prakash Padia, J.)