# Pramod Kumar Singh & Anr. Revisionists v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2019) 3 ILRA 409
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-07-23
- **Bench:** Pradeep Kumar Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/pramod-kumar-singh-anr-revisionists-v-state-of-u-p-ors-44767
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

A. Criminal Law -Domestic Violence Act,
2005 - Section 12 - Object - Provides for
speedy disposal of application under
section 12 by curtailing unnecessary delay
so that the wife might not be deprived of
the relief provided under the Act. The Act
prescribes a time frame of 60 days for
disposal of application. (Para 17)

B. Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - Section
2(q) - A complaint can be filed and relief
can be granted under the Act against the
female relatives of the husband also. (Para
22)

C. Domestic Violence Act,2005 - Recall of
order - when not permissible.

Held:- A very simple order against revisionist
passed that he will not commit any domestic
violence against the wife. No use in recalling
the impugned judgment.

Before the court below, father of the husbandrevisionist examined along with uncle and
maternal uncle. So closely related persons like
father were contesting the case, it cannot be
believed that the husband was not having any
information. Even though the father of the
husband was contesting before the court, the
husband did not turn up, untill the ex-parte
judgment was passed.

Application under section 12 given by wife in
September, 2012 and has been decided in
May, 2014, whereas, it should have been
decided within 60 days. Therefore, recall
thereof, if permitted, will cause great hardship
to the wife and son who have been forced to
leave the matrimonial house. (Para 15, 16, 17)

Criminal revision dismissed (E-5)
List of Cases Cited: -

## Text

3 All. Pramod Kumar Singh & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
409
the evidence was found of such level that if
the same was left unrebutted, it would result
in conviction of the said person as an accused
then accused shall be summoned. In the
present case, if the said interpretation of the
provision of section 319 Cr.P.C. is applied, I
find that the victim has consistently given her
statements in support of the prosecution case
narrated by her in FIR. The case which she
established in FIR was corroborated by her in
statements under sections 161 and 164
Cr.P.C. with slight variation and also in her
statement given before the trial court, in
which she has also been cross-examined at
length. The defence of the accusedrevisionists is that since from the side of the
revisionists several cases were filed against
the family members of the husband of the
opposite party no.2 therefore, under influence
/ pressure from the side of her husband
exerted upon opposite party no. 2, she has
lodged this false FIR, this is a subject matter
of evidence which would be decided by the
trial court. Therefore, at this stage, for this
Court it would not proper to express any
opinion in this regard in proceedings u/s 482
Cr.P.C. No doubt this Court finds that there
are several discrepancies and also it is found
that allegation of gang rape is leveled against
two brothers and uncle of accused Satish @
Satto which seems unusual that real brothers
would indulge in this kind of act together, it
appears to be subject matter of evidence. No
opinion can be expressed in this regard and as
regards accused nos. 4 to 6, they are found to
have committed offences under section 323,
504, 506 IPC only which are not serious
offences, hence this Court deems it proper to
grant them relief to the extent that they may
approach the trial court within 30 days and
seeks bail.

14. The prayer for quashing the
proceedings is refused with regard to
revisionist nos. 1 to 3.

15. However, it is provided that if
the revisionist nos. 4 to 6 appear and
surrender before the court below within
30 days from today and apply for bail,
then the bail application of the revisionist
nos. 4 to 6 be considered and decided in
view of the settled law laid-down by this
Court in the case of Amrawati and
another Vs. State of U.P. reported in
2004 (57) ALR 290 as well as judgment
passed by Hon'ble Apex Court reported in
2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC) Lal Kamlendra
Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. For a
period of 30 days from today or till the
disposal of the application for grant of
bail whichever is earlier, no coercive
action
shall
be
taken
against
the
revisionist nos. 4 to 6. However, in case,
the revisionist nos. 4 to 6 do not appear
before the Court below within the
aforesaid period, coercive action shall be
taken against them.

16. With aforesaid direction, this
revision is finally disposed of.
----------

(2019)11ILR A409

REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.07.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE PRADEEP KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Criminal Revision No. 2457 OF 2017

Pramod Kumar Singh & Anr.
 ...Revisionists
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors.
 ...Opposite Parties/Complainants

Counsel for the Revisionists:
Sri Shudhanshu Pandey, Sri V.K. Twivedi
410 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A., Sri Bipin Kumar Tripathi

A. Criminal Law -Domestic Violence Act,
2005 - Section 12 - Object - Provides for
speedy disposal of application under
section 12 by curtailing unnecessary delay
so that the wife might not be deprived of
the relief provided under the Act. The Act
prescribes a time frame of 60 days for
disposal of application. (Para 17)

B. Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - Section
2(q) - A complaint can be filed and relief
can be granted under the Act against the
female relatives of the husband also. (Para
22)

C. Domestic Violence Act,2005 - Recall of
order - when not permissible.

Held:- A very simple order against revisionist
passed that he will not commit any domestic
violence against the wife. No use in recalling
the impugned judgment.

Before the court below, father of the husbandrevisionist examined along with uncle and
maternal uncle. So closely related persons like
father were contesting the case, it cannot be
believed that the husband was not having any
information. Even though the father of the
husband was contesting before the court, the
husband did not turn up, untill the ex-parte
judgment was passed.

Application under section 12 given by wife in
September, 2012 and has been decided in
May, 2014, whereas, it should have been
decided within 60 days. Therefore, recall
thereof, if permitted, will cause great hardship
to the wife and son who have been forced to
leave the matrimonial house. (Para 15, 16, 17)

Criminal revision dismissed (E-5)
List of Cases Cited: -
1. Indra Sarma Vs V.K. Sarma AIR 2014 SC
309.
2. Sandhya Manoj Wankhade Vs Manoj
Bhimrao Wankhade 2011 Cri LJ 1687(SC).
3. Hiralal P. Harsora Vs Kusum Narottamdas
Harsora 2017 Cri LJ 509(SC).

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pradeep Kumar
Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard Shri Sudhanshu Pandey,
learned counsel for the revisionist, Shri
V.K. Twivedi, Advocate holding breif of
Shri Bipin Kumar Tripathi, learned
counsel for the opposite party no. 2 and
Shri M.P. Singh Gaur, learned AGA for
the State.

2. This revision has been filed
against the impugned judgment and order
dated 07.07.2017 passed by the learned
Additional District & Sessions Judge,
Court no. 1, Gorakhpur in Criminal
Appeal No. 226 of 2016 (Pramod Kumar
Singh vs. State of U.P.) and order dated
03.11.2016 passed by the Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate-I, Gorakhpur in
Misc. Case No. 8829 of 2014 (Pramod
Kumar Singh Vs. Pratima Singh), P.S.
Kaptanganj, District Gorakhpur by which
the learned court below has rejected the
application of the husband to set aside the
judgment and order dated 31.5.2014 by
which application of wife was allowed
under section 12 Domestic Violence Act.

3. The impugned orders have been
challenged on the ground that the
impugned orders are based on misreading
of
record,
non-
appreciation
of
fact/evidence and illegal application of
law.
Learned
Additional
Judicial
Magistrate, Gorakhpur disposed of the
application of opposite party no. 2 under
Domestic Violence Act on 31.05.2014
and the order was passed ex-parte against
the revisionist. A recall application to
3 All. Pramod Kumar Singh & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
411
recall the order dated 31.05.2014 was
given by the applicant-revisionist and the
same was rejected by the Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate-I, Gorakhpur by
impugned order dated 03.11.2016 and the
Appellate Court has committed grave
error in dismissing the appeal filed by the
appellant-revisionist. The impugned order
is based on surmises and conjecture.
Service of notice on revisionists is not in
accordance with law and the learned
Magistrate has not complied with Rule 12
of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Rules, 2006. The
revisionist no. 1 was not made party in
the application filed under section 12 of
the Act and no notice was served upon
him, but the learned court below passed
order against him, which is totally illegal
and even then the recall application has
been rejected. From perusal of the order
dated 31.05.2014, it is evident that the
learned court below proceeded in the
matter ex-parte against the revisionists
and their family members on the basis of
presumption of service of notice which is
illegal and the same is vitiated under law,
as no opportunity of hearing is provided
to the revisionist. Revisionist no. 2 is
already regularly paying Rs. 3000/- to the
respondent no. 2 under an order dated
01.08.2013 passed by the Principle Judge,
Family Court, Gorakhpur in case no. 659
of 2012 filed by respondent nos. 2 and 3,
under section 125 Cr.P.C. The impugned
orders of the courts below is contrary to
record and the same is liable to be set
aside.

4. The brief facts of the case is that
the opposite party nos. 2 and 3 gave an
application before the court of Judicial
Magistrate-II, Gorakhpur under section
12 Domestic Violence Act for providing
protection order and maintenance stating
that she was married with opposite party
no. 1 on 20.04.2006 according to Hindu
rituals. Some times after marriage the
opposite parties started mentally and
physically harassing her, demanding Rs. 2
lakhs and a house in the name of opposite
party no. 1, situated in Bharwaliya
Bujurg. On 31.03.2009 son Arsh Kumar
was born and after some time she was
sent to her parents house and while going
back, the opposite party (husband)
repeated his demand of Rs. 2 lakhs. On
being refused, he slapped her and twisted
her hand due to which her bangles were
broken and her hand started bleeding. The
wife after some time came back to her
matrimonial house and again opposite
party started harassing her for dowry. On
20.04.2009, she and her son were forced
to leave matrimonial house and her stri
dhan was also taken by them. In the last
week of April, 2012, opposite party
(husband) came to her parents house and
started talking with her younger sister
Nidhi @ Smriti Singh and on 30.04.2012,
he enticed her to run away with him and
at present he is living with her in a rented
room after marrying her in Gorakhpur.
Against it, a case was registered as Case
Crime no. 22 of 2012, under section
498A, 323, 504, 506, 406, 363, 366, 494
IPC and section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition
Act. The wife is living a dejected life and
she has no means to maintain herself.
Opposite
party
(husband)
is
Head
Constable, working as Radio Operator in
BSF and at present working on deputation
in National Security Guard, Maneshar
Hariyana and he is getting Rs. 40,000/- as
monthly pay. On that basis she claimed
Rs. 25,000/- as monthly maintenance for
herself and her son.

5. Opposite party Chhail Bihari
Singh (father of revisionists) filed his
412 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
written objection/written statement in
which marriage between revisionist no. 2
and opposite party no.1 and birth of a son
has
been
admitted
and
remaining
pleadings has been denied. Opposite party
no. 3 died during the course of
proceedings and the case was abated in
respect of her. Against the revisionists
(husband and his brother), ex-parte
proceedings took place, opposite party
nos. 2 and 3 filed their written statement.
The wife examined herself as PW-1.
Opposite party Chhail Bihari examined
himself as DW-1 and DW-2 Rama
Shankar Singh and DW-3 Durg Vijay
Singh have also been examined in
support. Thereafter, the learned court
below allowed the application by order
dated 31.05.2014 awarding protection
against domestic violence, order for
alternative residence or shared house,
monetary relief to the tune of Rs. 5000/-
for the wife and Rs. 2000/- for the son.

6. Thereafter the husband and his
brother gave an application for recall of
the said order, stating that the order was
ex-parte. On that application, he was
heard and by order dated 03.11.2016 the
recall application was rejected. An appeal
was filed against this rejection order and
the Appellate Court by order dated
07.07.2017 dismissed the appeal.

7. The submission of the learned
counsel is that the case was proceeded
against him exparte and his simple
request was that the ex-parte judgment
should be recalled and he should be given
an opportunity of hearing. The application
for recall is at page 63 and it has been
stated in that application that no summon
was issued nor was served on him and the
whole proceeding was ex-parte. The
impugned ex-parte order was obtained
secretly and the recall application is well
within time and therefore, the same
should be recalled. Similarly when the
application was rejected an appeal was
also filed in which briefly almost the
same facts were repeated.

8. In Indra Sarma Vs V.K. Sarma,
AIR 2014 SC 309, the supreme court said
that 'Domestic Violence' is undoubtedly a
human rights issue, which was not properly
taken care of in our country despite various
International Conventions and Declarations
acknowleded that domestic violence was
undoubtedly a human rights issue and the
member countries should take steps to
protect women against violence of any kind,
especially that occurring within the family, a
phenomenon widely prevalent in India.
Presently, when a woman is subjected to
cruelty by husband or his relatives, it is an
offence punishable under Section 498-A,
IPC. The Civil Law, it was noticed, did not
address this phenomenon in its entirety.
Consequently, the Parliament, to provide
more effective protection of rights of women
guaranteed under the Constitution under
Articles 14, 15 and 21, who are victims of
violence of any kind occurring in the family,
enacted the Domestic Violence Act.

9. The Domestic Violence Act
provides various measures for protection
of a woman who is facing domestic
violence
of
different
forms.
It
incorporates
remedies
in
terms
of
residence order (section 19), protection
order to stop violence (section 18),
monetary relief like maintainence (section
20), custody order (section 21) and
compensation order (section 22). Section
12 provides:

"Application to Magistrate.-(1)
An aggrieved person or a Protection
3 All. Pramod Kumar Singh & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
413
Officer or any other person on behalf of
the aggrieved person may present an
application to the Magistrate seeking one
or more reliefs under this Act:

Provided that before passing
any order on such application, the
Magistrate shall take into consideration
any domestic incident report received by
him from the Protection Officer or the
service provider.

(2) The relief sought for under
sub-section (1) may include a relief for
issuance of an order for payment of
compensation
or
damages
without
prejudice to the right of such person to
institute a suit for compensation or
damages for the injuries caused by the
acts of domestic violence committed by
the respondent:

Provided that where a decree
for any amount as compensation or
damages has been passed by any court in
favour of the aggrieved person, the
amount, if any, paid or payable in
pursuance of the order made by the
Magistrate under this Act shall be set off
against the amount payable under such
decree
and
the
decree
shall,
notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908), or any other law for the time being
in force, be executable for the balance
amount, if any, left after such set off.

(3) Every application under
sub-section (1) shall be in such form and
contain such particulars as may be
prescribed or as nearly as possible
thereto.

(4) The Magistrate shall fix the
first date of hearing, which shall not
ordinarily be beyond three days from the
date of receipt of the application by the
court.

(5)
The
Magistrate
shall
endeavour to dispose of every application
made under sub-section (1) within a
period of sixty days from the date of its
first hearing."

10. Section 17 of the Act provides
for right to reside in a shared household.
It reads:

"(1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time
being in force, every woman in a domestic
relationship shall have the right to reside
in the shared household, whether or not
she has any right, title or beneficial
interest in the same.

(2) The aggrieved person shall
not be evicted or excluded from the
shared household or any part of it by the
respondent save in accordance with the
procedure established by law."

11. Section 18 speaks of protection
orders to be issued by the Magistrate in
favour of the aggrieved person and
prohibit the respondent from committing
any act of domestic violence. Section 19
authorizes the magistrate, on being
satisfied that domestic violence has taken
place, pass a residence order restraining
the respondent from dispossessing or in
any
other
manner
disturbing
the
possession of the aggrieved person from
the shared household. Section 20 provides
for Monetary reliefs to meet the expenses
incurred and losses suffered by the
aggrieved person and any child of the
aggrieved person as a result of the
domestic violence. Section 22 authorizes
the Magistrate to pass an order directing
the respondent to pay compensation and
damages for the injuries, including mental
torture and emotional distress, caused by
the acts of domestic violence committed
against her.
414 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

12. Section 23 confers power on
magistrate to grant interim and ex parte
orders in any proceeding before him
under this Act as he deems just and
proper. Such power is exercised by the
Magistrate
on
satisfaction
that
the
application prima facie discloses that the
respondent
is
committing,
or
has
committed an act of domestic violence or
that there is a likelihood that the
respondent may commit an act of
domestic violence, he may grant an ex
parte order on the basis of the affidavit of
the aggrieved person under section 18,
section 19, section 20, section 21 or
section 22 of the Act.

13. Section 25 lays down as follows:

"Duration and alteration of
orders.-(1) A protection order made
under section 18 shall be in force till the
aggrieved person applies for discharge.

(2) If the Magistrate, on receipt
of an application from the aggrieved
person or the respondent, is satisfied that
there is a change in the circumstances
requiring alteration, modification or
revocation of any order made under this
Act, he may, for reasons to be recorded in
writing pass such order, as he may deem
appropriate."

14. For achieving the ends of justice
and statutory objective, section 28 gives
power to the court to evolve own
procedure. Even a mixed process and
procedure as provided in civil and
criminal
law
may
be
adopted
simultaneously to meet the ends of
justice.

15. From perusal of both the
impugned order, it appears that initially
the Magistrate took note of the fact that
the case was contested by the father of the
revisionist and elder father and maternal
uncle of the husband. On the point of
having knowledge of the case, the learned
Magistrate has mentioned that before the
court below, father of the husband has
been examined along with uncle and
maternal uncle, therefore, the court
concluded that where so closely related
persons like father were contesting the
case, it cannot be believed that the
husband was not having any information.
The leaned Magistrate has also noted that
even though the father of the husband was
contesting before the court, the husband
did not turn up, untill the ex-parte
judgment was passed.

16. So far as the revisionist no. 1 is
concerned, the learned Magistrate has
pointed out that a very simple order
against him was passed that he will not
commit any Domestic Violence against
the
wife.
Therefore,
the
learned
Magistrate concluded that there is no use
in recalling the impugned judgment. From
perusal of the order of the Appellate
Court, it appears that the learned
Appellate Court upheld the order of the
learned Magistrate on the basis that the
father of the husband was contesting the
matter and he had stated in his evidence
that he informed about the case to his son,
therefore, it was concluded that just to
delay the whole case the husband waited
till the disposal of the case ex-parte and
thereafter, as a second inning, he started
giving application for recall etc. On this
basis and other grounds also mentioned in
the impugned judgment, the Appellate
Court affirmed the view taken by the
learned Magistrate.

17. Clearly, the view adopted by
both the court below appears to be in
3 All. Pramod Kumar Singh & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
415
consonance with the sublime object of the
Domestic Violence Act which provides
for speedy disposal of application under
section 12 by curtailing unnecessary
delay so that the wife might not be
deprived of the relief provided under the
Act, so necessary for her and her son's
survival. The Act prescribes a time frame
of 60 days for disposal of application. In
this case the application under section 12
has been given by wife in September,
2012 and has been decided in May, 2014,
whereas, it should have been decided
within 60 days. Therefore, recall thereof,
if permitted, it will cause great hardship
to the wife and son who have been forced
to leave the matrimonial house. It should
also be noted that the application of the
wife has been allowed for a total amount
of Rs. 5000/- for her and Rs. 2000/- for
the son, even though she has claimed
maintenance of Rs. 25,000/-. Both the
court below adopted a logical approach in
awarding the said amount.

18.

Learned
counsel
to
the
revisionist has submitted that he is
already paying Rs. 3000/- to the wife
according to the order of the Family
Court passed in the Case No. 659 of 2012
under section 125 Cr.P.C. and this fact
has not been considered by the court
below. It is pertinent to mention that the
wife along with her son had claimed Rs.
25,000/- and there is no denial of the fact
that the husband is getting the salary of
Rs.
40,000/-
per
month,
therefore,
awarding only Rs. 7,000/- for both wife
and son is not excessive any way and
even
if
Rs.
3000/-
awarded
for
maintenance under section 125 Cr.P.C. is
added the whole amount will come to Rs.
10,000/- which is much less than what
was claimed by the wife and it goes to
1/4th of the pay of the husband.

19. It has been further submitted by
the learned counsel to the revisionist that
the wife is running a coaching center and
is working as lecturer of Zoology in Dr.
Ram Manohar Lohiya Girls Inter College
and she is earning about Rs. 30,000/- per
month. Learned counsel for the opposite
party nos. 2 and 3 has mentioned that this
fact has never been alleged by the
husband neither before the learned
Magistrate nor before the Appellate
Court, there is no proof at all of this
income and therefore, it has been
submitted that this cannot be believed.
Even if it is believed, section 25 (2) of the
Act provides for modification of order in
case of change in the circumstances and it
provides that If the Magistrate, on receipt
of an application from the aggrieved
person or the respondent, is satisfied that
there is a change in the circumstances
requiring alteration, modification or
revocation of any order made under this
Act, he may, for reasons to be recorded in
writing pass such order, as he may deem
appropriate.

20. Therefore, if considered from
that angle also, this fact may be brought
before the learned court below by the
husband by filing a further application
showing this fact and claiming for
reduction
of
the
amount.
This
is
permissible
within
the
scheme
of
Domestic Violence Act. But as a note of
caution, it is made clear that unless a
conclusion is arrived at by the learned
Magistrate on this point, he (revisionist)
will
continue
making
payment
of
maintenance awarded to the wife and will
not in any way flout the order of
Magistrate giving other protections to the
wife. If it is not done by the revisionists
or his relatives, the learned Magistrate
can out rightly reject such application
416 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
given under section 25(2) of the Act and
proceed further. It is also made clear that
the violation of the protection order is
crime and if the protection orders are
violated, a criminal proceeding may be
drawn
according
to
the
Domestic
Violence act.

21. There is one more argument
advanced by the learned counsel to the
revisionists that the learned magistrate
has allowed the application of the wife
against Anita singh who is a woman,
whereas, woman has been excluded from
the definition of 'Respondent' by section
2(q) of the Act.

Section 2(q) of the Domestic
Violence Act is as follows:

" 'respondent' means any adult
person who is, or has been, in a domestic
relationship with the aggrieved person
and against whom the aggrieved person
has sought any relief under this Act:

Provided that an aggrieved wife
or female living in a relationship in the
nature of a marriage may also file a
complaint against a relative of the
husband or the male partner."

22. The controversy in this regard
has been set at rest by the supreme court
in Sandhya Manoj Wankhade vs
Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade, 2011 Cri
LJ 1687(SC) where it has been held that
the Act is gender neutral and is not
restricted to husband, male partner or
their male relatives and a complaint can
be validly filed against female relatives
also. In Hiralal P. Harsora vs Kusum
Narottamdas Harsora, 2017 Cri LJ
509(SC), the court went a step further and
held that the use of expression 'adult male
person' in section 2(q) of the Act is
contrary to object of affording protection
to women who suffered from domestic
violence of any kind and is violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore,
the court struck down the words 'adult
male' occurring in section 2(q) of the Act.
In view of the aforesaid judgments, I find
no force in this argument of the learned
counsel and hold that a complaint can be
filed and relief can be granted under the
Act against the female relatives of the
husband also.

23. The Domestic Violence Act is a
special legislation which has adopted
progressive approach of protecting the
wife who is victim and who is suffering
or has suffered domestic violence of any
kind as defined under the Act, by
providing shelter, freedom from fear,
economic support, medical relief and
legal help to overcome the problem and to
survive and live with dignity. The reliefs
provided under the Act are urgent in
nature and law requires that such
applications
should
be disposed of
without delay and efforts should be made
by magistrate to dispose the same in 60
days. Domestic violence is a crime
against women which is linked to their
deprived and disadvantageous position in
the society and it refers to violence which
takes place in matrimonial home. In order
to
address
this
problem,
beneficial
provisions have been enacted and the
magistrate has been conferred authority to
adopt stringent procedure by recourse to
civil or criminal law or to evolve a
procedure to ensure expeditious and
meaningful
response
against
a
mischievous husband and his relatives. It
includes
curtailment
and
situational
alteration
in
procedure
applied
for
disposal of application. The Act is a
reminder that the Constitution of our
country
promises
justice,
equal
3 All. Priti Devi Vs. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
417
opportunity and status to all women and
they cannot be left to bear the burnt of
discrimination, disparity and injustice in
family as well as public life.

24. On the basis of above
discussion, I do not find any material
irregularity or illegality or jurisdictional
error in the impugned order and the
revision has got no force.

25. The revision is dismissed.
----------

(2019)11ILR A417

REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABD 13.09.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SANJAY KUMAR SINGH, J.

Criminal Revision No. 3369 OF 2019

Priti Devi ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Priyanka
Srivastava,
Sri
Abhishek
Srivastava

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A., Sri Rahul Saxena

A. Evidence Act,1872 - Section 32 - Multiple
Dying Declarations - Dying declaration is
relevant evidence - If in a case there are
more than one dying declaration and both
are contradictory to each other, it is the duty
of trial court to carefully examine the dying
declarations in the light of materials facts
and circumstances as well as evidence
placed before the Court. Such cases must be
decided on the facts of each case. (Para 12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 -
Section 319 - Powers under Section 319
Cr.P.C. can be exercised only where
strong and cogent evidence are found
against a person and not in a casual and
cavalier
manner.
The
decree
of
satisfaction
before
summoning
the
offence under Section 319 Cr.P.C. must
be more than prima facie, which is
warranted at the time of framing of
charges against the accused. (Para 14)

Held: - In view of Section 32 of the Evidence
Act, dying declaration is a material piece of
evidence, which is much more than prima facie
and sufficient to summon the person concerned
under Section 319 Cr.P.C. as an additional
accused - Whether first dying declaration is
genuine or second dying declaration is genuine is
a subject matter of appreciation of evidence by
the trial court at the appropriate stage -Specific
allegation as well as motive against the present
revisionist is very much on record in the second
dying declaration. - Since the specific allegation
has been levelled by the deceased in her second
dying declaration only against present revisionist,
therefore, the said evidence is sufficient to
summon the revisionist. (Para 8, 12)

Criminal revision dismissed (E-5)

List of Cases Cited: -

1. Smt. Paniben Vs St. of Guj. 1992 SCC (Cri.) 403.

2. Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam Vs St. of A.P.
(1993) SCC (Cri.) 655.

3. Jagbir Singh Vs St. (N.C.T. of Delhi) 2019
SCC Online SC 1148.

4. Hardeep Singh & ors. Vs St. of Punjab & ors
2014(3) SCC 92.

5. Brijendra Singh & ors. Vs St. of Raj. (2017)
7 SCC 706.

6.S Ahmad Ispahni Vs Yogendra Chandak &
ors. (2017) 16 SCC 226.

7. Periyasamik & ors. Vs S.Nallasamy 2019 (4)
SCC 342

(Delivered by Hon'ble Sanjay Kumar Singh, J.)