# Pramod Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 8 ILRA 238
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-07-16
- **Case number:** Crl. Misc. Writ Petition No. 728 of 2021
- **Bench:** Anjani Kumar Mishra, Shekhar Kumar Yadav
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/pramod-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-47201
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

A.G.A.

Case of false implication cannot be
accepted in Writ jurisdiction-can only be
decided after due investigation-no ground
for quashing the FIR.

W.P. dismissed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

238 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

9. Exception 2, speaks that the sexual
intercourse, with his own wife, the wife not
being under fifteen years of age and from the
perusal of Section 375-A, it includes
unnatural offence also.

10. Keeping in view of all over the facts
and circumstances of the case as well as the
definition of "rape' as defined under Section
375, wherein the act of rape has been defined
and is subjected to Exception no. 2 of the said
act. No injury was found on the body of
victim. I find that it to be a fit case for grant
of bail to accused/ husband.

11. Considering the entire facts and
circumstances of the case, submissions of
learned counsel for the parties, nature of
evidence and all attending facts and
circumstances of the case, without expressing
any opinion on merits of the case, the Court is
of the view that the applicant has made out a
case for bail. The bail application is allowed.

12. Let the applicant - Khushabe Ali
involved in Case Crime No. 337 of 2020,
under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506, 377
I.P.C & Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition
Act, 1961, Police Station - Bhojpur, District -
Moradabad, be released on bail on furnishing
each a personal bond and two sureties each in
the like amount to the satisfaction of the court
concerned subject to following conditions:-

1. The applicant shall not tamper
with the evidence during the trial.

2.
The
applicant
shall
not
pressurize / intimidate the prosecution
witness.

3. The applicant shall appear before
the trial court on the date fixed, unless
personal presence is exempted.

4. The applicant shall not commit
an offence similar to the offence of which she
is accused, or suspected, of the commission
of which she is suspected.

5. The applicant shall not directly or
indirectly make any inducement, threat or
promise to any person acquainted with the facts
of the case so as to dissuade them from
disclosing such facts to the Court or to any
police officer or tamper with the evidence.

13. In case of breach of any of the above
condition, the prosecution shall be at liberty to
seek cancellation of bail in accordance with law.

14. The party shall file computer
generated copy of such order downloaded from
the official website of High Court Allahabad,
self attested by learned counsel for the applicant
along with a self attested identity proof of the
said
persons
(preferably
Aadhar
Card)
mentioning the mobile number (s) to which the
said Aadhar Card is linked before the
concerned Court/ Authority/ Official.

15. The concerned Court/ Authority/
Official shall verify the authenticity of such
computerized copy of the order from the official
website of High Court Allahabad and shall make a
declaration of such verification in writing.
----------
(2021)08ILR A238
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.07.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ANJANI KUMAR MISHRA, J.
THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR KUMAR YADAV, J.

Crl. Misc. Writ Petition No. 728 of 2021

Pramod Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
8 All. Pramod Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
239
Sri V.P. Srivastava, Sri Ashish Mishra, Sri
Arun Kumar Mishra

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.G.A.

Case of false implication cannot be
accepted in Writ jurisdiction-can only be
decided after due investigation-no ground
for quashing the FIR.

W.P. dismissed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:

1. Ashok Dixit Vs St. of U.P. & anr., 1987, U.P.Crl.
R.

2. Romesh Thappar Vs St. of Madras, 1950 SC 124

3. The Superintendent Central Prison Vs Dr.
Lohia,1960 Cri. L.J. 1002

4. Ram Manohar Lohia Vs St. of Bihar 1966 CrLJ
608

5. Amiya Kumar Karmakar Vs The St.of W.B.
(1972) 2 Supreme Court Cases 672.

6. Ram Ranjan Chatterjee Vs The St. of
W.B.(1975) 4 Supreme Court Cases 143.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Anjani Kumar Mishra, J.
&
Hon'ble Shekhar Kumar Yadav, J.)

1. Heard Shri Arun Kumar Mishra,
learned counsel for the petitioner and
learned AGA for the State.

2. By means of this writ petition,
petitioner seeks quashing of the first
information report dated 07.11.2020 giving
rise to Case Crime No.728 of 2020, under
Section 3(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters
and Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act,
1986, Police Station Robertsganj, District
Sonebhadra.

3. The order dated 04.11.2020, passed
by the second respondent, District Magistrate,
Sonebhadra granting approval to the Gang
Chart, Annexure-5 to the writ petition is also
sought to be quashed.

4. We have heard Shri Arun Kumar
Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and
learned AGA for the State.

5. We have also heard Shri V.P.
Srivastava, learned Senior Advocate on
behalf of the petitioner, who had offered
to assisted the Court in the instant matter.

6. The submission of learned
counsel for the petitioner is that the first
information report has been lodged on the
basis of two criminal cases registered
against the petitioner; First, being Case
Crime No.387 of 2020 under Sections
307, 504, 506 Indian Penal Code, Police
Station Robertsganj, District Sonebhadra.
The first information report in this case,
which is a cross case was lodged on
24.05.2020, the other case in this regard
being case Crime No.386 of 2020. These
cases arose from a private dispute
regarding an electricity connection and
the petitioner was one of the injured in
the cross case.

7. The second case on the basis
whereof, the impugned first information
report has been registered, in Case Crime
No.543 of 2020 under Sections 307 and 323
of Indian Penal Code, Police Station
Robertsganj, District Sonebhadra. This first
information report in this regard was lodged
on 17.08.2020. As regards this case, the
submission is that the incident took place on
account of the private property dispute.
Admittedly, there is enmity between the
parties and it is a case of no injury.
240 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

8. Counsel for the petitioner has
also reiterated that he has been granted
bail in both the criminal cases lodged
against him.

9.

On
the
basis
of
the
aforementioned, it is submitted that the
facts alleged in the first information
report do not make out any violence,
threat or show of violence, intimidation,
coercion etc. which would amount to
disturbing public order. No temporal,
pecuniary, material or other advantage
having been procured by the petitioner, is
alleged in the criminal cases lodged
against him. Therefore, the requirements
of Section 2(b) & 2(b) (viii) of the Act
are not made out.

10. Sub-section (viii) referred to by
counsel for the petitioner reads as follows
-

" Preventing or disturbing the
smooth running by any person of his
lawful business, profession, trade or
employment or any other lawful business,
profession, trade or employment or any
other lawful activity connected therewith,
or".

11. It is next contended that
recovery of a pistol and empty cartridges
is from the co-accused in Case Crime
No.386 of 2020, which was registered on
the basis of an FIR lodged by one Arti
Patel. From the allegations made in the
FIR, it appears that the petitioner was
intervening in a dispute between the first
informant
and
the
other
accused,
pertaining to an electricity connection.

12.
Learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner has also relied upon the
findings returned in the order granting
bail to him in Case Crime No.387 of 2020
to canvas that the writ petition deserves
to be allowed.

13. He has further submitted that the
impugned FIR under the Gangsters Act is a
case of false implication. In any case, the
material satisfaction, allegedly recorded by
the District Magistrate, while approving the
Gang Chart is, without any basis.

14. Elaborating on the arguments
advanced by learned counsel for the
petitioner, Shri V.P. Srivastava, learned
Senior Advocate has contended that for
invocation of the provisions of the Act.
Section 2(b) of the Act, which defines a
Gang, is crucial.

15. He has submitted that there has
to be violence, or threat or show violence,
or intimidation, or coercion with the
object of disturbing public order or for
gaining any undue temporal, pecuniary,
material or other advantage for himself or
any other person.

16. The submission on the basis of
the aforenoted Section 2(b) is that the
criminal cases against the petitioner are
not such, which would fall within the
scope of the term "disturbing public
order". They might be criminal acts but
then every criminal Act cannot be
construed as disturbing public order.
Since, the public order was not disturbed
in the two cases against the petitioner.
Gangsters Act has wrongly been invoked.
The impugned first information report
deserves to be quashed. In support of his
contention, he has relied upon the
following decisions -

1. Ashok Dixit Vs. State of U.P.
another, 1987, U.P.Crl. R.
8 All. Pramod Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
241

In
paragraph
40
of
this
judgement, the following portion of a
judgement of the Apex Court has been
extracted". . . . public order' is an
expression
of
wide
connotation
and
signifies that state of tranquillity prevailing
among the members of a political society as
a result of the internal regulations enforced
by the Government which they have
instituted. Although Section 9 (1A) refers to
"securing the public safety" and "the
maintenance of public order" as distinct
purposes, it must be taken that "public
safety" is used as a part of the wider
concept of public order."

2.Romesh Thappar Vs. State of
Madras, 1950 SC 124

This judgement dealt with the
powers conferred by Section 9(1) A of the
Madras Maintenance of the Public Order Act
1949. In this judgement, it has been
observed- "........But it was urged that the
expression "public safety" in the impugned
Act, which is a statute relating to law and
order, means the security of the Province,
and, therefore,' 'the security of the State" with
the meaning of article 19 (2)as "the State"
has been defined in article 12 as including,
among other things, the Government and the
Legislature
of
each
of
the
erstwhile
Provinces. Much reli- ance was placed in
support of this view on Rex v. Wormwood
Scrubbs Prison(1) where it was held that the
phrase "for securing the public safety and
the' defence of. the realm" in section 1 of the
Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act,
1914, was not limited to securing the country
against a foreign foe but included also
protection against internal disorder such as a
rebellion. The decision is not of much
assistance to the respondents as the context
in (1) L.R. [1920] 2 K.B. 805.

which the words "public safety"
occurred in that Act showed unmistakably
that the security of the State was the aim in
view. Our attention has not been drawn to
any definition of the expression "public
safety," nor does it appear that the words
have acquired any technical signification
as words of art".

The judgement finally goes on to
hold as follows - In other words, clause (2)
of article 19 having allowed the imposition
of restrictions on the freedom of speech and
expression only in cases where danger to
the State is involved, an enactment, which
is capable of being applied to cases where
no such danger could arise, cannot be held
to be constitutional and valid to any extent.

3. The Superintendent Central
Prison Vs. Dr. Lohia,1960 Cri. L.J. 1002

The Supreme Court decision in
the Superintendent, Central Prison and
another Vs. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia was
with regard to the term "public order"
contained in Section 3 of the U.P. Special
Power Act, 1932 while in Ram Manohar
Lohia Vs. State of Bihar. The said term was
considered in the light of Rule 30(1)(b) of
the Defence of India Rules, 1962. In
paragraph 14, the Apex Court observed as
follows -

" By Section 3 of the U.P. Special
Powers Act 1932 any instigation by word
or visible representation not to pay or defer
payment
of
any
exaction
or
even
contractual dues to Government, authority
or a land-owner is made an offence. Even
innocuous speeches are prohibited by
threat of punishment. It was held that there
is no proximate or even foreseeable
connection between such instigation and
the public order sought to be protected
under this section and that it is void"
242 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

The judgement finally went on to
hold in paragraph 18 as follows -

" The foregoing discussion yields
the following results: (1) " Public order " is
synonymous
with
public
safety
and
tranquillity : it is the absence of disorder
involving breaches of local significance in
contradistinction to national upheavals, such
as revolution, civil strife, war, affecting the
security of the State; (2) there must be
proximate and reasonable nexus between the
speech and the public order; (3) S. 3, as it
now stands, does not establish in most of the
cases comprehended by it any such nexus; (4)
there is a conflict of decision on the question
of severability in the context of an offending
provision the language whereof is wide
enough to cover restrictions both within and
without
the
limits
of
constitutionally
permissible legislation; one view is that it
cannot be split up if there is possibility of its
being applied for purposes not sanctioned by
the Constitution and the other view is that
such a provision is valid if it is severable in
its application to an object which is clearly
demarcated from other object or objects
falling outside the limits of constitutionally
permissible
legislation;
and
(5)
the
provisions of the section are so inextricably
mixed up that it is not possible to apply the
doctrine of severability so as to enable us to
affirm the validity of a part of it and reject the
rest".

4. Ram Manohar Lohia Vs. State
of Bihar 1966 CrLJ 608. By this
judgement, a Habeas Corpus Petition filed
by Ram Manohar Lohia was allowed on the
ground that the expression "public order"
used in the Defence of India Rules, 1962 is
clearly distinguishable from the term "law
and
order"
and
that
detention
for
maintenance of public order is permissible
only with regard to disturbances with
special word the public order. The order
impugned in this case purported to have
been made under R. 30(1) (b) of the
Defence of India Rules, 1962.

5. Amiya Kumar Karmakar Vs.
The State of West Bengal (1972) 2
Supreme Court Cases 672.

The Apex Court in this case has
also drawn a distinction between "law and
order" and "public order" while dealing
with the provisions of Section 3(1) and read
with Section 3(2) of the Maintenance of
Internal Security Act, 26 of 1971(MISA).
In paragraph 7 of the judgement, it has
been observed as follows -

" Viewed from this angle it is
difficult to regard such an act as a mere
infraction of law and Order, for, such an
act committed with such an intent and
object and in such circumstances is one
which strikes at the normal, Orderly life of
the community in that locality. Its impact
and potentiality thus affect public Order in
the sense that it was aimed at bringing
about dis Order and chaos upsetting the
even tempo of life in that locality. It is,
therefore, not possible to agree with the
proposition that it affected the problem of
law and Order only and was for that
reason extraneous or irrelevant to the
objects specified in Section 3 of the Act, in
relation to which only a valid Order of
detention there under could be made".

6. Ram Ranjan Chatterjee Vs.
The State of West Bengal (1975) 4
Supreme Court Cases 143.

Similar is the position in this
case, where again the order of detention
under Section 3 of the Maintenance of
Internal Security Act was under challenge.
Paragraph 9 of the said judgement, reads as
follows -
8 All. Pramod Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
243

"As observed by Hidayatullah, J.
(as he then was) in Dr. Ram Manohar -
Lohia v. State of Bihar & Ors. one has to
imagine three concentric circles, in order
to understand the meaning and import of
the above expressions. 'Law and order'
represents the largest circle within which is
the next circle representing "public order"
and the smallest circle represents "security
of State". It is then easy to see that an act
may affect law and order but not public
order just as an act may affect public order
but not security of State. It is in view of the
above distinction, the Act defines the
expressions
"acting
in
any
manner
prejudicial to the security of the State" and
"acting in any manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order" separately.
An order of detention made either on the
basis that the detaining authority is
satisfied that the person against whom the
order is being made is acting in any
manner prejudicial to the security of the
State or on the basis that he is satisfied that
such person is acting in any manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order but which is attempted to be
supported by placing reliance on both the
bases in the grounds furnished to the
detenu has to be held to be an illegal one
vide decisions of this Court in Bhupal
Chandra Ghosh v. Arif Ali & Ors.(2) and
Satya Brata Ghose v. Arif Ali & Ors(3).

The
order
of
detention
is,
therefore, liable to be quashed and the
detenu is entitled to be set at liberty. The
petition is accordingly allowed".

From the arguments as also from
the judgements cited, it is clear that the
emphasis of Shri V.P. Srivastava, learned
Senior Advocate is on the words "with
object of disturbing public order" used in
Section 2(b) of the Act, which defines a
Gang. The said provision is extracted
herein below -

(b) "Gang" means a group of
persons, who acting either singly or
collectively, by violence or threat or show
of violence, or intimidation, or coercion, or
otherwise, with the object of disturbing
public order or of gaining any undue
temporal, pecuniary, material or other
advantage of himself of any other person,
indulge in anti-social activities".

Upon a bare reading of the
provision quoted above, we are unable to
accept the contention made on behalf of the
petitioner that to constitute a Gang, the
member of the Gang should be operating
only with the object of disturbing public
order. The definition no doubt includes
within its ambit acts of violence or threat,
or show of violence, carried out with the
object of disturbing public order. However,
this is just the first part of the definition.
The second part, which starts with the word
'or of gaining any as of undue temporal,
pecuniary, material or other advantage of
himself of any other person, indulge in anti
social activities.

17. We are of the considered opinion
that the definition of a Gang is therefore,
clearly in two parts and both are mutually
exclusive. Each one of the two parts by
itself would be enough to bring a case
within the ambit of the term Gang.

18. To clarify further Section 2(b) in
our opinion, provides that a group of
person,
singly
or
collectively
would
constitute a gang in either or the two
conditions below-

(i) by violence, or thereat or show
of violence or intimidation or coercion, or
otherwise try to disturb public order,

OR

(ii) by violence or threat or show
of violence or intimidation or coercion or
244 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
otherwise try to obtain undue temporal,
pecuniary, material or other advantage for
himself or any other person.

19. The words " indulge in anti-social
activities refer to the various illustrations/
conditions specified thereafter as (i) to
(xxv).

20. Under the circumstances, the
contention
that
the
impugned
first
information report deserves to be quashed
as it does not fall within the purview of the
definition of a 'Gang' in Section 2(b) of the
Act, cannot be accepted and is hereby,
repelled.

21. The contention of counsel for the
petitioner that recovery of the fire arms and
empty cartridges from the accused in Case
Crime No.286 of 2020 would necessarily
show that the said case against the
petitioner is one of the false implication,
cannot be accepted at this stage. The issue
can be decided only after due investigation.
In any case, the allegations are that the
petitioner interfered in a private dispute
between the two parties, with which, he
prima facie had no connection. It is,
therefore, clearly a case of coercion,
intimidation and use of force against a
person, who is alleged to have refused to
provide electricity to his neighbour, who is
stated to be a friend of the petitioner.

22. In any case, the existence of two
criminal cases against the petitioner is not
in dispute and therefore, in our considered
opinion, no ground exists for quashing the
impugned FIR.

23. Accordingly and for the reasons
given above, the writ petition fails and is
dismissed.
----------
(2021)08ILR A244
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 19.03.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MUNISHWAR NATH
BHANDARI, J.
THE HON'BLE SHAMIM AHMED, J.

Crl. Misc. Writ Petition No. 814 of 2021

Ranveer Singh @ Ranbir Singh
 ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Shiv Sagar Singh, Sri Manish Gupta

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.G.A., Sri Sanjay Kumar Yadav, Sri Gyan
Prakash

Sanction order granted prosecution u/s
19 of Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988-FIR lodged without departmental
enquiry-chrges
framed
against
the
Petitioner-no reason to interfere in
sanction order.

W.P. dismissed.(E-7)

List of Cases cited:-

1. C.B.I. Vs Ashok Kumar Aggrawal, reported
in (2014) 14 SCC 295

2. Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs Bharat Gold
Mines Ltd. & anr., reported in (1999) 3 SCC
679

3. State Bank of Hyderabad & anr. Vs P. Kata
Rao , JT 2008 (4) SC 577

(Delivered by Hon'ble Munishwar Nath
Bhandari, J.
&
Hon'ble Shamim Ahmed, J.)