# Praveen Kumar Gupta v. District Magistrate/Collector, Allahabad and others

- **Citation:** (2003) 1 ILRA 49
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2002-12-13
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 52746 of 2002
- **Bench:** G.P. Mathur, A.C.J Ashok Bhushan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/praveen-kumar-gupta-v-district-magistrate-collector-allahabad-and-others-40056
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Act-section 281-a person cannot be
arrested and detained again in recovery
proceedings relating the same arrear - if
the arrears are different, the prohibition
from detention will not apply. (Held in
para).

## Text

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1 All] Praveen Kumar Gupta Vs. D.M./ Collector, Allahabad and others
49
8. We thus find that the writ
petitions are devoid of merit and are
accordingly dismissed. However, the
respondents have themselves stated in the
counter affidavit as well as their counsel
has made a statement at the Bar that in
case the petitioners so desire and apply to
the respondent-UPSEB for being supplied
electricity through the rural feeder for
which
charges
are
lesser,
their
applications for such change of feeder
shall be considered. We thus direct that in
case
if
the
petitioners
file
such
applications
before
the
respondentUPSEB, they shall consider the same in
accordance with law and pass appropriate
orders expeditiously, preferably within
three months from the date of filing such
application.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.12.2002

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE G.P. MATHUR, A.C.J
THE HON'BLE ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 52746 of 2002

Praveen Kumar Gupta
...Petitioner
Versus
District Magistrate/Collector, Allahabad
and others

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri A.K. Mishra
Sri U.K. Mishra

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Anurag Khanna
S.C.

U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms
Act-section 281-a person cannot be
arrested and detained again in recovery
proceedings relating the same arrear - if
the arrears are different, the prohibition
from detention will not apply. (Held in
para).

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ashok Bhushan,J.)

Heard Sri A.K. Mishra, counsel for
the
petitioner,
Sri
Anurag
Khanna
appearing for respondent no. 3 and
learned standing counsel. By this writ
petition the petitioner has prayed for a
writ
of
mandamus
directing
the
respondents not to arrest the petitioner in
pursuance of the recovery proceedings
initiated against him by citation No.
072219 dated 30th October,2002.

The facts giving rise to this writ
petition briefly stated are;

Petitioner is one of the Directors of
Private
Limited
Company
namely
Allahabad
Fertilizer
Sales
Private
Limited. A loan of Rs.73,00,000/- was
taken from the respondent no. 3 by the
aforesaid Company. The Company failed
to repay the loan as a consequence of
which proceedings for recovery was
initiated against the Directors citation
dated 14th October, 1997 for an amount
of Rs.1,46,40,165.98 was issued against
which writ petition No. 42659 of 1997
was filed. The writ petition was finally
decided on 24th April;,1998 by which
Directors were permitted to sell off its
Company and its assets. However, the
Directors
were
unable
to
sell
the
Company and repay the loan. Another
citation dated 19.7.1999 for an amount
Rs.1,87,32,191.30
was
issued
in
pursuance
of
which
petitioner
was
arrested by the revenue authority on 10th
August,1999 and was detained in custody
till 25th October,1999. Another citation
dated 13.6.2001 was issued for an amount
of Rs. 4,29,09,935.31. Petitioner filed
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50 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2003
writ petition no. 22948 of 2001 against
the citation dated 13.6.2001 in which an
interim order was passed by this Court on
20th June,2001 staying the arrest of the
petitioner till 10th September,2001. It has
been stated in paragraph 12 of the writ
petition that although the aforesaid writ
petition is still pending but the same has
become infructuous as a fresh citation has
been issued by the respondent on 10th
October 2002 being citation No. 072219
for an amount of Rs.4,29,09,935.31. The
said citation dated 30th October,2002 has
been challenged by the petitioner by
means of this writ petition.

Sri A.K. Mishra, counsel for the
petitioner submitted that the petitioner
having been already detained in civil
prison from 10.8.1999 to 25.10.1999, he
cannot be again arrested on the basis of
citation dated 30.10.2002. The counsel for
the petitioner contended that maximum
period prescribed under Section 281 of
the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land
Reforms Acr,1950 is fifteen days hence
detention beyond the aforesaid 15 days is
not permissible. In support of this
submission Mishra placed reliance of
Division Bench judgement of this Court
reported in 1969 A.L.J. page 257(Sangam
Lal Gupta Vs. Sales Tax Officer and
others) and 1977 A.W.C. page 711
(Rasul Bux Vs. State of U.P. and
others). Sri Mishra has also placed
reliance on apex Court judgement in
A.I.R.1953 Supreme Court 95 (The
Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd.
Vs. Gutta Mill Workers Union). Sri
Anurag
Khanna
appearing
for
the
respondent no. 3 refuting the submission
of counsel for the petitioner, contended
that the maximum period of detention
prescribed under Section 281 of the U.P.
Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act
is not applicable when the arrest is for
different arrears. The contention is that if
the arrears sought to be recovered are
different there is no prohibition in again
detaining the petitioner for realization of
different arrears. He submitted that the
Division Bench of this Court in Sangam
Lal Gupta's case (supra) has laid down
the aforesaid proposition when the
recovery is for the same arrears. Sri
Khanna submitted that the petitioner was
arrested on 10th August,1999 and detained
till 25th October,1999 in pursuance of the
citation dated 19.7.1999 for an amount of
Rs.1,87,32,191.30 whereas the citation
which has been challenged in the present
writ petition is dated 30th October, 2002
and is for an amount of Rs.4,29,09,935.31
plus collection charges. The submission is
that since the citation now challenged in
the present writ petition is for different
amount there is no prohibition is detaining
the petitioner under Section 281.

We have heard counsel for the
parties and perused the record. From the
facts brought on the record it is clear that
the petitioner was earlier detained in civil
prison from 10.8.1999 to 25.10.1999 for
recovery
of
an
amount
of
Rs.1,87,32,191.00 in pursuance of the
citation dated 19.7.1999. By the present
writ petition petitioner is challenging the
recovery proceedings for charges for
which citation has been issued on 30th
October, 2002. Thus it is clear that the
earlier citation dated 19th July,1999 was
for different arrears and the citation which
has now been issued is for a very huge
amount of Rs. 4,29,09,935.00. The
Division bench's judgement cited by the
counsel for the petitioner in Sangam Lal
Gupta Vs. Sales Tax officer and others
case (supra) was pertaining to realization
of arrears of sales tax. The Division
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1 All] Praveen Kumar Gupta Vs. D.M./ Collector, Allahabad and others
51
Bench in the aforesaid case has laid down
that if a person has been detained in
custody for maximum period of fifteen
days, he cannot be arrested and detained
again in recovery proceedings relating to
the same arrears of land revenue.
Following was held in the aforesaid case:-

"But in our opinion, the total period
for which he may be detained in custody
in respect of the same arrear cannot
exceed fifteen days. Section 148 declares
that a defaulter may be detained in
custody for fifteen days unless the arrear
and the costs of arrest and detention, are
paid before the expiry of that period.
There is nothing in the provision from
which we can infer that the defaulter may
be detained in custody for repeated
periods of fifteen days until the arrear is
paid up, If that inference was possible, we
would have to hold that the detaining
authority is entitled, so long as it believes
that the process of detention would result
in the payment of the arrear, so detain the
defaulter in custody almost indefinetly
provided
the
successive
periods
of
detention did not exceed fifteen days at a
time. A construction such as this would
result in serious encroachment upon the
liberty of the citizen, and we are not
prepared to accept that so unlimited an
arbitrary power was intended to be
conferred upon the detaining authority,
specially when the power to detain has
been conferred under rule 47, even upon
a Tahsildar and when the only reason for
detention is the possibility of the payment
of an arrear of land revenue. In our
judgment, the period of fifteen days
prescribed by Section 148 is the maximum
period for which a defaulter may be
detained in custody in respect of any
arrear. If he has been detained in custody
for that period he cannot be arrested and
detained again in a recovery proceeding
relating to the same arrear of land
revenue.

In the above case it has been clearly
laid down that a person cannot be arrested
and
detained
again
in
recovery
proceedings relating to same arrear. The
observation of the Division Bench,
underlined by us, clearly shows that
aforesaid proposition was laid down when
the subsequent recovery is for the same
arrear. The natural corollary of the
provision would be that if the arrears are
different, the prohibition from detention
will not apply. Thus the aforesaid
judgement of the Division Bench is
clearly distinguishable and not applicable
in the facts of the present case since in the
present case the subsequent recovery
which is impugned in the present writ
petition, is for different arrears.

The next Division Bench's judgment
in Rasul Bux's case (supra) relied by the
counsel for the petitioner follows the
Division Bench's Judgement of this Court
in Sangam Lal Gupta Vs. Sales Tax
Officer
and
others'
case
(supra).
However, paragraph 2 of the aforesaid
judgement also lays down the same
proposition. The prohibition is of arrest
for
recovery
of
same
amount.
In
paragraph 2 of the Division Bench lays
down;

"......The only bar is that if the
petitioner has already been under arrest
for 15 days, he cannot be arrested again
for the recovery of the same amount."

In
view
of
the
aforesaid
the
judgement of the Division Bench of this
Court in Sangam Lal Gupta Vs. Sales
Tax Officer and others' case (supra) and
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52 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2003
Rasul Bux's case (supra) are not
applicable in the facts of the present case.

The view which we are taking in the
present case is further reinforced from
provisions of Section 14 of the U.P.
General Clauses Act,1904. Section 14
provides that whereby any U.P. Act any
power is conferred then that power may
be exercised from time to time as
occasion requires. Section 14 of the U.P.
General Clauses Act is quoted below :-

"14. Powers conferred on the State
Government to be exercisable from time
to time: Where, by any (Uttar Pradesh)
Act, any power is conferred..(xxx), then
that power may be exercised from time to
time as occasion requires."

The power given under section 281
of U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land
Reforms Act, 1950 can be exercised from
time to time. Section 279,280 and 281 of
U.P.
Zamindari
Abolition
&
Land
Reforms Act uses the word "an arrears of
land revenue". The words "An arrears of
land revenue" refer to a particular arrears.
The words "and arrears of land revenue"
thus has to be confined to a particular
arrears, if different arrears of land revenue
are all treated "an arrears of land
revenue", it will lead to unworkable and
inequitable result, for example if a person
takes two loans from two different
agencies for which he gives different
securities and commits default in payment
of both the arrears and if he is detained
for recovery in recovery proceedings with
regard to one loan, there cannot be any
prohibition for his detention with regard
to recovery proceedings of another loan.
Thus the words "an arrears of land
revenue" have to be read as a particular
amount of arrears of land revenue. Sri
Mishra relied on the case of The
Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd.
Vs. Gutta Mill Workers' Union (supra)
for the submission that Section 14 of the
U.P. General Clauses Act,1904 are not
attracted in the present case. In the above
case the apex Court was considering the
power of the State Government given
under Sections 3,4 and 6 of the Industrial
Dispute Act 1947, It was contended that
Section 6(1) as it stood then provides that
the adjudicator was, within such times, as
may be specified submit its award to the
State Government. It was contended that
the State Government had power of
extension of time under section 6 of the
U.P. Industrial Dispute Act,1947 read
with Section 14 of the U.P. General
Clauses Act,1904. The apex court held in
paragraph 5 of the aforesaid case :-

"5.
Learned
counsel
for
the
respondents refers us to the provisions of
S. 14 of the U.P. General Clauses Act,
1904 which provides that where by any
Uttar Pradesh Act any power is conferred
on the State Government then that power
may be exercised from time to time as
occasion requires. Sections 3 and 4 of
U.P.
Industrial
Dispute
Act,
1947
certainly confer power on the State
Government to refer disputes to an
adjudicator for decision and S. 6(1) may
be read as empowering the State
government to specify the time within
which the adjudicator to whom an
industrial
dispute
is
referred
for
adjudication is to submit this award. The
combined effect of S. 14 of the U.P.
General Clauses Act and S. 6(1) of The
U.P. Industrial Dispute Act,1947 it is to
contended, is that the adjudicator is
enjoined to submit his report "within such
time as may from time to time be
specified" and that this being the
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1 All] Shyam Biri Works P. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), Kanpur
53
position, the principles laid down in the
English decisions referred to above must
be held to be applicable to the present
case.

We are unable to accept this line of
reasoning. Under S. 14 of the U.P.
General
Clauses
Act
the
State
Government may exercise the power
conferred on it by Sub-section 3,4 and 6
that is to say it can from time to time
make orders referring disputes to an
adjudicator and, whenever such an order
of reference is made to specify the time
within which the award is to be made.
This power to specify the time does not
and indeed cannot include a power to
extend the time already specified in an
earlier order. The legislative practice, as
evidenced by the provisions of the
different statutes referred to above is to
expressly confer the power of extension of
time, if and when the Legislature thinks
fit to do so. There is no question of any
inherent power of the Court and much
less of the Executive Government in this
behalf. Section 14 of the U.P. General
Clauses Act does not in terms, or by
necessary implication, give any such
power of extension of time of the State
Government
and,
therefore,
the
respondents can derive no support from
that Section."

From aforesaid it is clear that the
apex Court in the aforesaid case was
considering the question whether the State
Government will have power to extend
the time for an award. The aforesaid
judgement has no application in the facts
of the present case. In the present case
there is no question regarding any
extension of time of detention. The
question in the present case is the exercise
of power of detention under Section 281
of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land
Reforms Act. The reliance placed by the
counsel for the petitioner on the aforesaid
case is clearly misplaced.

In view of what has been said above
we are of the view that there is no
prohibition in resorting the power of
detention under Section 281 of the U.P.
Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act
in the present case since it is for different
arrears and for different citation. The
petitioner has not made out any case for
issue of writ of mandamus.

The writ petition lacks merit and is
dismissed summarily.
---------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 3.12.2002

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE M. KATJU, J.
THE HON'BLE YATINDRA SINGH, J.

Income Tax Appeal No. 3 of 2001

Shyam Biri Works Pvt. Ltd. ...Appellant
Versus
Commissioner of Income Tax (Central),
Kanpur

 ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri R.P. Agrawal

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri A.N. Mahajan

Income Tax Act 1963- S-273 (2) (a)-
Assessing officer initiated proceeding for
penalty- without recording the finding
regarding satisfactions whether can such
order be set aside on this grounds? Held-
"No".

Held- Para 5