# Prem Chand and others v. Ghaziabad Development Authority Ghaziabad and others

- **Citation:** (2008) 3 ILRA 875
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2008-08-21
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.15799 of 2003
- **Bench:** Vineet Saran, Sabhajeet Yadav
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/prem-chand-and-others-v-ghaziabad-development-authority-ghaziabad-and-others-41253
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

Constitution
of
India,
Art.
226Enhancement of cost of flats-G.D.A.
allotted flats on estimated cost of
Rs.70,000/- in 1995-97-those to deposit
entire amount in one go-No interest shall
be charged-petitioners deposited entire
amount as per offer of G.D.A.-demand of
addition
Rs.24,000/-
after
7
yearswithout any justification-even in counter
affidavit no proper reply given-held-
recovery of addition cost not justifiedQuashed.

Held: Para 8

In the facts of the present case, we are
not much impressed by the submissions
and justification given on behalf of the
respondents. No explanation whatsoever
has been given in the counter affidavit
for the basis on which the price has been
enhanced and the final cost has been
fixed. In our opinion, the same cannot be
done merely because they have power to
do so, even though there may be no
basis or justification for the same. Even
otherwise, in another identically situated
case of Mahesh Chandra Jiyal, cost was
fixed at Rs.71,450/- in which no further
recovery is sought to be made from the
said allottee. Such specific averments
have been made in para 11 of the writ
petition, to which there is no specific
reply given by the respondents. As such,
the respondents have not been able to
justify their action of fixation of such
high final cost and that too after nearly
seven years of allotment and payment of
the
entire
amount,
after
which
possession
had
been
given
to
the
allottees.
Case law discussed:
S.C.C. 1989 (II) 116,
 S.C.C. 2004 (1) 606

## Text

3 All] Prem Chand and others V. G.D.A., Ghaziabad and others
875
of development and use of the funds will
still continue to vest in three member
committee of the Gram Panchayat. The
elected members of the Gram Panchayat
will continue to utilise the powers
temporarily until the Pradhan or Up-
Pradhan is exonerated of the charges
found prima facie established against him
or is removed and a new incumbent is
elected in the bye-elections.

22. Coming to the present case I find
that in the preliminary enquiry sufficient
material
was
collected
against
the
petitioner-Pradhan for failing to construct
the pond in accordance with norms; the
deficiency in the construction of an
earthquake proof room of the school;
failure to explain the distribution of
scholarship
to
17
students
and
irregularities in maintaining the muster
rolls under the Employment Guarantee
Scheme. Prima facie satisfaction of the
District Magistrate to suspend the powers
of the Pradhan is based on the material
collected and summarised in the report. A
perusal of the report, does not show that
the District Magistrate acted arbitrary or
unreasonably in exercising his powers to
cease the financial and administrative
powers of the Pradhan and in vesting
them in a three member committee. There
was no need to call for reply of the
petitioner-Pradhan to these charges, at this
stage. In any case, such reply was called
and was considered by the District
Magistrate. There is nothing to show that
the satisfaction of the District Magistrate
was vitiated by lack of material or
malafides. The challenge to the impugned
order on the ground that it does not give
reasons has no substance as elaborate
reasons are not required to be given by the
District Magistrate at this stage. He is
required to consider the preliminary
enquiry report, and not a final enquiry
report with the reply given by the
petitioner or the material collected and
produced by both the enquiry officer and
supplied by the petitioner. Such an
enquiry or recording of reasons at this
stage is wholly superfluous.

23. The reliance placed by Shri
D.K.S. Rathore on the interim order
passed by me in Naresh Kumar's case is
misconceived. While recording reasons
for giving interim order I had found that
as
against
the
expenditure
of
Rs.3,50,000/- on development works, the
District Agricultural Officer, Bijnor has
found the misuse of only Rs.12,264/-,
which is less than 3% of the amount spent
the suspension of the financial and
administrative powers of the Pradhan on
misuse of such small fraction of the total
amount, which may be a mistake either
way was not found to be sufficient to
suspend the powers of the Pradhan during
the pendency of enquiry. The facts of the
present case are entirely different.

24. The writ petition is dismissed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.08.2008

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE VINEET SARAN, J.
THE HON'BLE SABHAJEET YADAV, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.15799 of 2003

Prem Chand and others ...Petitioners
Versus
Ghaziabad
Development
Authority
Ghaziabad and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Pt. D.N. Dubey
Sri R.A. Tripathi
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
876
Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri A.K. Mishra
S.C.

Constitution
of
India,
Art.
226Enhancement of cost of flats-G.D.A.
allotted flats on estimated cost of
Rs.70,000/- in 1995-97-those to deposit
entire amount in one go-No interest shall
be charged-petitioners deposited entire
amount as per offer of G.D.A.-demand of
addition
Rs.24,000/-
after
7
yearswithout any justification-even in counter
affidavit no proper reply given-held-
recovery of addition cost not justifiedQuashed.

Held: Para 8

In the facts of the present case, we are
not much impressed by the submissions
and justification given on behalf of the
respondents. No explanation whatsoever
has been given in the counter affidavit
for the basis on which the price has been
enhanced and the final cost has been
fixed. In our opinion, the same cannot be
done merely because they have power to
do so, even though there may be no
basis or justification for the same. Even
otherwise, in another identically situated
case of Mahesh Chandra Jiyal, cost was
fixed at Rs.71,450/- in which no further
recovery is sought to be made from the
said allottee. Such specific averments
have been made in para 11 of the writ
petition, to which there is no specific
reply given by the respondents. As such,
the respondents have not been able to
justify their action of fixation of such
high final cost and that too after nearly
seven years of allotment and payment of
the
entire
amount,
after
which
possession
had
been
given
to
the
allottees.
Case law discussed:
S.C.C. 1989 (II) 116,
 S.C.C. 2004 (1) 606

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vineet Saran, J.)

1. Heard Sri D.N. Dubey along with
Sri R.A. Tripathi, learned counsel for the
petitioners as well as Sri A.K. Misra,
learned counsel for the respondent.
Pleadings have been exchanged between
the parties. With the consent of the
learned counsel for the parties, this writ
petition is being disposed of finally at the
admission stage.

2. Short case of the petitioners is
that they were allotted separate flats in
Kama Vaishali Housing Scheme of the
Ghaziabad
Development
sometime
between 1995 to 1997 by separate
allotment orders, in which the estimated
cost of the flat was shown as Rs.70,000/-.
The petitioners were required to deposit
the cost in installments and as per the
allotment order, on deposit of 70% of the
cost, possession was to be given to them.
The further condition was that the allottee
could deposit the entire amount in one go,
in which case no interest would be
payable by the allottee. All the petitioners
opted for the latter offer mentioned in the
allotment order and deposited the entire
amount in one go and got the possession
of the flats immediately, meaning thereby
that the cost, which was stated in the
allotment order to be Rs.70,000/- had
been deposited by each of the petitioners
before getting the possession of their
respective flats.

3. Now, by means of separate orders
which have been passed in December
2002 in each individual case of all the
petitioners,
a
further
demand
of
Rs.24,810/- has been raised as according
to the respondents, the final cost of the
flats in question has been determined as
3 All] Prem Chand and others V. G.D.A., Ghaziabad and others
877
Rs.94,810/-. These orders are challenged
in this writ petition.

4. The submission of the learned
counsel for the petitioner is that after
lapse of nearly seven years, such orders
have been passed requiring the petitioners
to pay a substantially higher amount.
Further it has been stated in para 11 of the
writ petition that in a similar case of one
Sri Mahesh Chandra Jiyal, an identically
situated flat was allotted on 20.2.1995 to
said Sri Jiyal in which the final cost of the
said flat was determined as 71,450/- and
no further amount has been demanded
from the said person thereafter. The
petitioners being identically placed, the
action of the respondents in raising a
further demand of Rs.24,810/- from the
petitioners
is
wholly
unreasonable,
arbitrary and discriminatory.

5. Sri A.K. Misra, learned counsel
for the respondent has, however, justified
the passing of the impugned orders and
submitted that the allotment order only
mentioned an estimated cost and the
respondent authority always had the right
to fix the final cost and realise the
difference from the petitioners. He further
submitted that at the time of taking
possession, all the petitioners had given
their affidavits to the effect that whatever
difference in the estimated cost and the
final cost would be, they would pay the
same.

6. Sri Misra has relied on the
decision
in
the
case
of
Bareilly
Development Authority & others versus
Ajai Pal Singh & others, S.C.C. 1989 (II)
116 and Bareilly Development Authority
versus Vrinda Gujarati & others, S.C.C.
2004 (1) 606, wherein the Apex Court has
held that such power to fix the final cost
later is there with the authority. The
contention thus is that since in the present
case, the development authority has the
power to fix the final cost and the
respondents have given an affidavit that
they would abide by the same and pay the
difference of the final cost and estimated
cost, hence they would be liable to pay
the same.

7. We do not have doubt with regard
to the power of the Development
Authority to fix the final cost of the flat,
even after the allotment of the flat but the
question is as to whether the same can be
exercised on the whims and fancies of the
respondent authority or they have to
justify the enhancement of such cost.

8. In the facts of the present case, we
are
not
much
impressed
by
the
submissions and justification given on
behalf of the respondents. No explanation
whatsoever has been given in the counter
affidavit for the basis on which the price
has been enhanced and the final cost has
been fixed. In our opinion, the same
cannot be done merely because they have
power to do so, even though there may be
no basis or justification for the same.
Even otherwise, in another identically
situated case of Mahesh Chandra Jiyal,
cost was fixed at Rs.71,450/- in which no
further recovery is sought to be made
from the said allottee. Such specific
averments have been made in para 11 of
the writ petition, to which there is no
specific reply given by the respondents.
As such, the respondents have not been
able to justify their action of fixation of
such high final cost and that too after
nearly seven years of allotment and
payment of the entire amount, after which
possession had been given to the allottees.
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
878
9. For the foregoing reasons, the
recovery, as is to be made from the
petitioners with regard to the enhanced
cost, cannot be justified and is thus
quashed. The other amounts which are
required to be paid by the petitioners, as
mentioned in the impugned orders, which
would be lease amount and other charges
would however be payable by the
petitioners.

Writ petition stands allowed to the
extent as indicated above. There shall be
no order as to costs.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABD 29.08.2008

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE V.M. SAHAI, J.
THE HON'BLE S.P. MEHROTRA, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.12207 of 2001

Hari Raj Prasad Kushwaha ...Petitioner
Versus
Director of Non Formal Education U.P.
and others

...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri. P.R. Maurya

Counsel for the Respondent:
S.C.

U.P. Fundamental Rules( Financial Hand
Book Volume II ) Part 2 to 4-Rule 54B(1) and (5)- forfeiture of salary after
retirement-without
notice
or
opportunity-held-illegal.

Held: Para 24

In view of the fact that the impugned
punishment order dated 14.8.2000 in so
far as it has forfeited the salary of the
petitioner for suspension period was
passed in violation of principles of
natural Justice, the said punishment
order dated 14.8.2000 is liable to be
quashed to the extent it has ordered
forfeiture
of
balance
salary of the
petitioner for the suspension period.
Case law discussed:
AIR 1999 SC 22

(Delivered by Hon'ble V.M. Sahai, J.)

1. This writ petition is of the year
2001. On 31.3.2001 the Standing Counsel
was allowed one month's time for filing
counter affidavit. A stop-order was passed
on 22.5.2001 allowing one month's and no
more further time to the Standing Counsel
for filing counter affidavit. Since no
counter affidavit has been filed by the
Standing 'Counsel in spite of stop-order,
and we are in the year 2008, we are
proceeding to dispose of the petition
finally.

2. The present Writ Petition has
been filed by the petitioner, interalia -
praying for issuance of a writ, order or
direction in the nature of mandamus
commanding the respondents to pay the
arrears of salary to the petitioner of the
suspension period, and with a further
prayer for issuance of writ, order or
direction in the nature of certiorari to
quash the order:dated 14.8.2000 passed
by the respondent no.2 in-so-far-as it has
detained the payment of salary for the
suspension period.

3. The petitoner was suspended by
the
order
dated
3.11.1999.
In
departmental proceedings, the Inquiry
Officer submitted his enquiry Report
dated 7.6.2000. In the said Enquiry
Report the Inquiry Officer has concluded
that the Charges Nos. 1,2,3 and 4 against
the petitioner were proved, and further it
was concluded by the Inquiry Officer that