# Prem Jeet Singh Gujral v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal and others

- **Citation:** (2006) 2 ILRA 745
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2005-07-20
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 49339 of 2005
- **Bench:** Arun Tandon
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/prem-jeet-singh-gujral-v-debt-recovery-appellate-tribunal-and-others-40585
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

Constitution of India, Art. 226-Writ
Petition-maintainability-against
the
remand
order
passed
by
the Debt
Recovery appellate Tribunal-order being
interlocutory-can
be
challenged
in
appeal-petition not maintainable.

Held: Para 6

In view of the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court the order of remand
being an interlocutory order of the Court,
which
has
not
terminated
the
proceedings, and hence can always be
challenged in an appeal from the final
order
by
the
petitioner
after
final
judgment.
The
writ
petition
is
accordingly dismissed. However, it shall
be open to the petitioner to challenge
the order of remand in an appeal from
the final order as an when cause for
same arises.
Case law discussed:
2005 (2) AWC-1305 (SC)
1981 (2) SCC-764
1960 (3) SCR-590

## Text

2 All] Prem Jeet Singh Gujral V. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal and others
745
contemplates the recovery of the amount
from the pension, whereas, in the present
case, the recovery has been sought from
the gratuity, as such, Regulation 351A
would not be applicable. In my opinion,
the submission of the learned Standing
Counsel is not correct. Regulation 351A
of the Civil Service Regulations reads as
follows:

"351-A. The Governor reserves to
himself the right of withholding or
withdrawing a pension or any part of it,
whether permanently or for a special
period and the right of ordering the
recovery from a pension of the whole or
part of any pecuniary loss caused to
Government, if the pensioner is found in
departmental or judicial proceedings to
have been guilty or gave mis-conduct, or
to have caused, pecuniary loss to
government by misconduct or negligence,
during his service, including service
rendered
on
re-employment
after
retirement;

Provided that-

[a] such departmental proceedings,
if not instituted while the officer was on
duty either before retirement or during reemployment-

[i] shall not be instituted save with
the sanction of the Governor."

Further, Regulation 41 of the Civil
Service Regulations states as under:

"41. Pension- Except when the term
"Pension is used in contradistinction to
gratuity "Pension" includes Gratuity."

7. From the aforesaid of Regulation
41, it is clear that the usage of the word
'Pension' in Regulation 351A would
include gratuity.

8. In view of the aforesaid, I find
that the disciplinary proceedings initiated
against the petitioner after his retirement
was ex-facie, illegal as it did not have the
sanction of the Governor. Consequently,
the petitioner is entitled to be relief as
moulded during the course of the hearing
of the writ petition. Since no previous
permission
was
obtained
from
the
Governor, the disciplinary proceedings
initiated against the petitioner is quashed.
The amount withheld from the gratuity is
liable to be paid to the petitioner.
Consequently, a mandamus is issued
directing the respondents to release the
balance amount of the gratuity within
three months from the date of production
of the certified copy of this order. If the
amount is released within the aforesaid
period, no interest would be payable.
However, if the amount is not paid within
the aforesaid period, interest would be
payable at the rate of 12% per annum
from the date of withholding the amount
till
the
date
of
payment.
In
the
circumstances of the case, parties will
bear their own costs. Writ petition stands
allowed.

Petition Allowed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 20.07.2005

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ARUN TANDON, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 49339 of 2005

Prem Jeet Singh Gujral
...Petitioner
Versus
Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal and
others

...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Sashi Nandan
Sri Anurag Jauhari
746 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2006
Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Sanjeev Singh

Constitution of India, Art. 226-Writ
Petition-maintainability-against
the
remand
order
passed
by
the Debt
Recovery appellate Tribunal-order being
interlocutory-can
be
challenged
in
appeal-petition not maintainable.

Held: Para 6

In view of the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court the order of remand
being an interlocutory order of the Court,
which
has
not
terminated
the
proceedings, and hence can always be
challenged in an appeal from the final
order
by
the
petitioner
after
final
judgment.
The
writ
petition
is
accordingly dismissed. However, it shall
be open to the petitioner to challenge
the order of remand in an appeal from
the final order as an when cause for
same arises.
Case law discussed:
2005 (2) AWC-1305 (SC)
1981 (2) SCC-764
1960 (3) SCR-590

(Delivered by Hon'ble Arun Tandon, J.)

1. Heard Sri Sashi Nandan, Senior
Advocate assisted by Sri Anurag Jauhari,
Advocate on behalf of the petitioner, and
Sri Sanjeev Singh, Advocate on behalf of
respondent no. 2.

2. The Bank of Baroda, Fatehpur
Main Branch though its Branch Manager
(respondent no.2), which is a banking
company duly constituted under the
Banking Companies (Acquisition and
Transfer of Undertakings), Act, 1970,
filed a civil suit in the Judgeship of
Fatehpur in the year 1995 for a money
decree of Rs.28,41,263/-, against the
principal-borrower, Sri Guru Bachan
Singh as well as against the guarantor Sri
Prem Jeet Sing Gujral. The suit was
registered as Original Suit No. 84 of
1995. During the pendency of the said suit
proceedings, a Tribunal was constituted
under Section 3 of the Recovery of Debts
Due to Banks and Financial Institution
Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the
1993 Act) at Jabalpur. Accordingly the
proceedings were transferred to the said
Tribunal at Jabalpur. However, a Tribunal
was
constituted
at
Allahabad,
the
proceedings were therefore, transferred to
the Tribunal at Allahabad under Section
31 of the 1993 Act.

3. The Presiding Officer, Debts
Recovery Tribunal at Allahabad by means
of the order dated 16th June, 2003
dismissed the suit filed by the Bank.
Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order
of the Presiding Officer Debts Recovery
Tribunal, Allahabad the respondent-bank
filed an appeal under Section 20 of the
1993 Act. The appeal was numbered as
Appeal No. 323 of 2003. The Debt
Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad
by means of the judgment and order dated
3rd June, 2005 has allowed the appeal so
filed by the respondent-bank and has
remanded the matter for reconsideration
to
the
Debt
Recovery
Tribunal,
Allahabad. The said order of demand of
the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal,
Allahabad has been challenged by means
of the present writ petition.

4. On behalf of the petitioner various
pleas and grounds have been raised for
the purposes of challenging the aforesaid
judgment and order of remand passed by
the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal,
Allahabad.

5. However, this Court is not
inclined to interfere with the order of
2 All] Prem Jeet Singh Gujral V. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal and others
747
remand passed by the Debt Recovery
Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad at this
stage, inasmuch as the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India in its recent judgment in
the case of Mangla Prasad Tamoli (D)
LRs. Versus Narvdeshwar Mishra (D)
LRs. And others reported in 2005 (2)
AWC 1305 (SC) paras 13,14 and 15, has
held as follows:

"13. When we put to the learned
counsel as to how, he could in the present
appeal filed in the year 1999, challenge
the order remand made by the judgment
of the High Court on January 18, 1966 in
Second Appeal No. 3033 of 58, the
learned counsel drew out attention to the
decision of this Court in Kshitish
Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of
Ranchi, (1981) 2 SCC 764, as authority
for the proposition that an order of
remand by the High Court being an
interlocutory judgment, which did not
terminate the proceedings, it is open to the
aggrieved party to challenge it after the
final judgment. This Court in Satyadhyan
Ghosal and others Vs. Smt. Deorajin
Debi and another, (19960) 3 SCR 590,
under similar circumstances, took the
view that an order of remand was an
interlocutory judgment which did not
terminate the proceedings and hence
could be challenged in an appeal from the
final order. This view was again reiterated
in K.C. Bose (Supra) wherein it is
observed (p.767)

"Mr.
Sinha
appearing
for
the
respondent was unable to cite any
authority of this Court taking a contrary
view or overriding the decisions referred
to above. In this view of the matter we are
of the opinion that it is open to the
appellant to assail the first judgment of
the High Court and if we hold that this
judgment was legally erroneous then all
the subsequent proceedings, namely, the
order of remand, the order passed after
remand, the appeal and the second
judgment given by the High Court in
appeal against the order of remand would
become nonest."

14. Having considered the questions
urged by the learned counsel, which
appear to be backed by the two decisions
of this Court, in the background of the
facts of the case before us, we are satisfy
that the appellants are entitled to succeed
on both counts.

15. The trial court and the first
appellate court had held that the suit for
redemption brought by the plaintiff was
premature and rightly dismissed it. It is
the High Court, by its judgment dated
18.1.1966 in Second Appeal No.3033/58,
which took an erroneous view that
because of the plaintiff's advocate had
stated that he would not seek delivery of
possession
before
stipulated
time
(26.1.1968), the suit could be continued.
It was on this wrong understanding of the
legal position that the remand order dated
January 18, 1966, came to be made by the
High Court pursuant to which the appeal
and further proceedings continued. If this
remand order was bad in law, then all
further proceedings consequent thereto
would be non-est and have to be
necessarily set aside. That the appellants
are entitled to urge this point even at this
point of time, is supported by the
authority of this Court in Gangadhar
(Supra)."

6. In view of the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court the order of
remand being an interlocutory order of the
Court, which has not terminated the
proceedings, and hence can always be
challenged in an appeal from the final
order by
the
petitioner
after final
748 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2006
judgment. The writ petition is accordingly
dismissed. However, it shall be open to
the petitioner to challenge the order of
remand in an appeal from the final order
as an when cause for same arises.

7. It has been pointed out on behalf
of the petitioner that the Presiding Officer
Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad has
fixed today as the date for final hearing
after
remand.
In
the
facts
and
circumstances of the Case it is provided
that the petitioner may make a request to
the Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery
Tribunal, Allahabad for adjournment of
the case to some other date so as to enable
them to produce a copy of the order
passed today before the Presiding Officer,
D.R.T., Allahabad. On such request being
made the Court has not room to doubt that
the Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery
Tribunal, Allahabad shall consider the
request of the petitioner sympathetically.
However, such adjournment may be
granted for a week only. Petition
dismissed.
---------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.07.2005

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS. POONAM
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 2582 of
1998

Amar Nath Gupta and another

 ...Appellant/Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P.
 ...Opposite Party

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Rajeev Gupta
Sri Dilip Kumar

Counsel for the Respondent:
A.G.A.

Code of Criminal Procedure- S-482Quashing of Criminal Proceeding offence
under N.D.P.S. Act admittedly 'Bhang'-
recovered
from
the
possession
of
applicant such narcotics substance not
covered under N.D.P.S. No chance of
conviction
if proceeding
allowed to
continue nothing but short of abase of
the process of the court charge sheet
quashed.

Para 5 and 6

In the instant case, the allegations in the
First Information Report is that the
applicants
were
in
possession
of
narcotics substance and the substance
alleged by the prosecution is "Bhang",
which is admittedly not covered under
the N,D.P.S. Act. In the circumstances,
there is no chance of conviction of the
applicants by the Special Judge N.D.P.S.
Act Etawah for the offence alleged
against them and in case proceedings
are allowed to continue, it is nothing
short of abuse of the process of the
court.

Thus it is absolutely clear that the
second category is identical to the one
detailed in R.P. Kapoor's case. The case
at hand is admittedly covered under the
categories carved out by the Apex Court
detailed above. In the Circumstances, it
is apparent that the proceedings against
the applicants, if allowed to continue will
only amount to harassment to the
applicants and an abuse of the process of
the court. In the circumstances, I come
to the conclusion that there is no reason
for continuation of the proceedings
against the applicants. Thus in view of
what has been discussed above and with
a view to meet the ends of justice the
charge sheet is quashed and the order
dated 14.5.1998 issuing non-bailable
warrants against the applicants is set
aside. This application is accordingly,
allowed.