# Prem Pal v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 3 ILRA 1160
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-08-04
- **Case number:** Writ-C No. 19960 of 2022
- **Bench:** Rajesh Bindal, C.J. J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/prem-pal-v-state-of-u-p-ors-49218
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

C.S.C., Ms. Meenakshi Singh (State Law
Officer), Sri Anadi Krishna Narayana

A. Civil Law - Interpretation of Statues - It
is a cardinal principle of construction of a
statute that when the language of the
statute is plain and unambiguous, then
the court must give effect to the words
used in the statute - However, if on going
through
the
plain
meaning
of
the
language
of
statutes,
it
leads
to
anomalies, injustices and absurdities, then
the court may look into the purpose for
which the statute has been brought and
would try to give a meaning, which would
adhere to the purpose of the statute.
(Para 5)

B. Civil Law - Land Acquisition - The Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 - Section 28A - Redetermination
of
the
amount
of
compensation on the basis of the award of
the Court - Where the court allows any
amount of compensation in excess of the
amount awarded by the collector u/s 11,
the persons interested in all the other land
covered by the same notification u/s 4(1),
notwithstanding that they had not made
an application to the Collector u/s 18, by
application to the Collector, require that
the amount of compensation payable to
3 All. Prem Pal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1161
them may be re-determined on the basis
of the amount of compensation awarded
by the court - interpretation of expression
'had not made an application to the
Collector u/s 18' - The expression "did not
make an application", mean, did not make
an effective application, which had been
entertained by making the reference and
the reference was answered - once the
Collector
entertains
an
application
objecting to the award and makes a
reference u/s 18, and after the reference
is made and answered by the Court, that
the right u/s 28A to seek re-determination
based on an award passed by the Court at
the instance of another landholder would
be extinguished - it is not permissible for
a landowner to make a reference and get
it answered and then subsequently make
another application when some other
person gets the reference answered and
obtains a higher amount - however, there
is no reference made at the instance of a
person whose case is withheld by the
Collector on the ground of limitation or
otherwise not adjudicated upon by the
Court on merits (Para 6)

Allowed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

1160 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

18. On the basis of the aforesaid
judgments as reproduced herein-above, the
Court is of the opinion that the case of the
present petitioner is on a much better
footing, since in the present case no
criminal case whatsoever has been lodged
against the petitioner/ arm license holder at
any point of time and only on the basis of
apprehension that the fire arm could be
used by her family members, the Arm
License of the petitioner was cancelled. It
is further clear from record that the license
of the petitioner was cancelled on the sole
ground of apprehension that the aforesaid
Arm License could be misused by the
husband
and
brother-in-law
of
the
petitioner as stated above and as per record,
the husband has already been acquitted in
the criminal case itself, insofar as the
brother-in-law (devar) is concerned, he is
no more and hence the sole ground of
cancellation, i.e., apprehension cannot
stand firm.

19. In this view of the matter, the
Court is of the firm opinion that the
petitioner has a prima facie case for the
grant of reliefs as prayed by her in the
present writ petition.

20. In view of the facts as stated
above, the order dated 01.11.2019 passed
by the Commissioner Bareilly Division
Bareilly in Appeal No. 00614 of 2018 filed
under Section 18 of the Indian Arms Act,
1959 as well as the order dated 22.03.2018
passed by the District Magistrate, Badaun
in Case No. 08 of 2014 under Section 17-
(3) of the Act of 1959 are liable to be set
aside and are hereby set aside.

21. Writ petition stands allowed.

22. No order as to costs.
----------
(2023) 3 ILRA 1160
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 04.08.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJESH BINDAL, C.J.
THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Writ-C No. 19960 of 2022

Prem Pal ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Ashish Kumar Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Ms. Meenakshi Singh (State Law
Officer), Sri Anadi Krishna Narayana

A. Civil Law - Interpretation of Statues - It
is a cardinal principle of construction of a
statute that when the language of the
statute is plain and unambiguous, then
the court must give effect to the words
used in the statute - However, if on going
through
the
plain
meaning
of
the
language
of
statutes,
it
leads
to
anomalies, injustices and absurdities, then
the court may look into the purpose for
which the statute has been brought and
would try to give a meaning, which would
adhere to the purpose of the statute.
(Para 5)

B. Civil Law - Land Acquisition - The Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 - Section 28A - Redetermination
of
the
amount
of
compensation on the basis of the award of
the Court - Where the court allows any
amount of compensation in excess of the
amount awarded by the collector u/s 11,
the persons interested in all the other land
covered by the same notification u/s 4(1),
notwithstanding that they had not made
an application to the Collector u/s 18, by
application to the Collector, require that
the amount of compensation payable to
3 All. Prem Pal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1161
them may be re-determined on the basis
of the amount of compensation awarded
by the court - interpretation of expression
'had not made an application to the
Collector u/s 18' - The expression "did not
make an application", mean, did not make
an effective application, which had been
entertained by making the reference and
the reference was answered - once the
Collector
entertains
an
application
objecting to the award and makes a
reference u/s 18, and after the reference
is made and answered by the Court, that
the right u/s 28A to seek re-determination
based on an award passed by the Court at
the instance of another landholder would
be extinguished - it is not permissible for
a landowner to make a reference and get
it answered and then subsequently make
another application when some other
person gets the reference answered and
obtains a higher amount - however, there
is no reference made at the instance of a
person whose case is withheld by the
Collector on the ground of limitation or
otherwise not adjudicated upon by the
Court on merits (Para 6)

Allowed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

1. U.O.I. & anr. Vs Hansoli Devi and others,
(2002) 7 SCC 273

2. Aswini Kumar Ghose Vs Arabinda Bose AIR
1952 SC 369 : 1953 SCR 1

3. Quebec Railway, Light Heat & Power Co. Ltd.
Vs Vandry AIR 1920 PC 181

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajesh Bindal, C.J.
&
Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. This writ petition is directed
against an order passed by the Special Land
Acquisition Officer (Joint Organization),
Aligarh dated 30.04.2022, rejecting the
petitioner's application under Section 28A
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for
short, ''the Act') as not maintainable.

2. The short facts giving rise to the
petition are that the petitioner, Prem Pal
Singh moved an application under Section
28A of the Act on 04.08.1999 saying that
his land comprising Khasra No. 404/1,
measuring 1.533 hectares, situate in the
Revenue Village Devsaini, Pargana and
Tehsil Koil, District Aligarh had been
acquired by the State for planned industrial
development by the Uttar Pradesh State
Industrial
Development
Corporation
Limited, Kanpur. L.A.R. No. 42 of 1996,
Mohd. Salim vs. State of U.P. and others,
being a reference made by the Collector on
the basis of objections to the award by the
ousted landholder in that case, was allowed
and compensation enhanced to ₹80/- per
square yard vide award dated 22.05.1999. It
was prayed that the petitioner's land was
covered by the same notification and,
therefore, he was entitled to a redetermination of the compensation awarded
to him in accordance with the award made
by the Court.

3. The Special Land Acquisition
Officer found on facts that the petitioner
had said in Paragraph No.6 of his
application under Section 28A of the Act
that against the award passed by the Special
Land Acquisition Officer, he had preferred
objections under Section 18 of the Act,
submitting them for the purpose of a
reference to be made to the Court but his
objections were not referred to the District
Judge, but were rejected as time barred.
The Special Land Acquisition Officer
construed the provisions of Section 28A of
the Act to mean that a person, whose land
was acquired under the provisions of the
Act and who is aggrieved against the
Collector's award, may make an application
1162 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
for re-determination of compensation if he
has not made an application under Section
18 for a reference to the Court against the
award. It has been opined that since the
petitioner
had
admittedly
made
an
application, seeking a reference against the
Special Land Acquisition Officer's award to
the Court, which was withheld on the
ground of limitation, his application under
Section
28A
of
the
Act
was
not
maintainable.

4. Apparently, the understanding of
the Special Land Acquisition Officer about
the scope of a person aggrieved by the
award of compensation made by the
Collector is not correct. The Special Land
Acquisition Officer has thought that the
moment a person ''aggrieved' by the
Collector/
Special
Land
Acquisition
Officer's award, moves an application to
the Collector under Section 18 of the Act
seeking a reference, the right to redetermination of the compensation under
Section 28A, based on the Court's award in
another case arising out of the same
acquisition, is extinguished.

5. To the understanding of the
Special Land Acquisition Officer, there is
no distinction whether the application
under Section 18 of the Act preferred by
a person aggrieved by the Collector's
award is withheld by the Collector and
never entertained, and a case where it is
entertained with a reference made to the
Court that is answered. In either case, the
Special Land Acquisition Officer seems
to think that an application under Section
28A of the Act, based on an award of the
Court made in the case of another
landholder
covered
by
the
same
notification for re-determination under
Section 28A of the Act, would not be
maintainable.

6.

As
already
remarked,
the
construction placed by the Special Land
Acquisition Officer upon the scope of the
right under Section 28A of the Act is
manifestly illegal, inasmuch as unless the
Collector
entertains
an
application
objecting to the Collector's award or the
Special Land Acquisition Officer's award
and makes a reference under Section 18,
there is no reference under Section 18 of
the Act at all. It is only after a reference is
made and answered by the Court, that the
right under Section 28A to seek redetermination based on an award passed by
the Court at the instance of another
landholder in a reference under Section 18
would be extinguished. The right under
Section 28A of the Act can logically not be
extinguished by the petitioner making an
unsuccessful attempt to get a reference
made to the Court. In the latter case, there
is no reference made at the instance of a
person whose case is withheld by the
Collector on the ground of limitation or
otherwise not adjudicated upon by the
Court under Section 18 on merits. This
question
has
been
authoritatively
considered
and
answered
by
the
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court
in Union of India and another v. Hansoli
Devi and others, (2002) 7 SCC 273, where
it has been held:

9. Before we embark upon an
inquiry as to what would be the correct
interpretation of Section 28-A, we think it
appropriate to bear in mind certain basic
principles of interpretation of a statute. The
rule stated by Tindal, C.J. in Sussex
Peerage case [(1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85 : 8 ER
1034] still holds the field. The aforesaid
rule is to the effect : (ER p. 1057)

"If the words of the statute are in
themselves precise and unambiguous, then
3 All. Prem Pal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1163
no more can be necessary than to expound
those words in their natural and ordinary
sense. The words themselves alone do, in
such case, best declare the intention of the
lawgiver."

It is a cardinal principle of
construction of a statute that when the
language of the statute is plain and
unambiguous, then the court must give
effect to the words used in the statute and it
would not be open to the courts to adopt a
hypothetical construction on the ground
that such construction is more consistent
with the alleged object and policy of the
Act. In Kirkness v. John Hudson & Co.
Ltd. [(1955) 2 All ER 345 : 1955 AC 696 :
(1955) 2 WLR 1135] Lord Reid pointed out
as to what is the meaning of "ambiguous"
and held that : (All ER p. 366 C-D)

"A provision is not ambiguous
merely because it contains a word which in
different contexts is capable of different
meanings. It would be hard to find
anywhere a sentence of any length which
does not contain such a word. A provision
is, in my judgment, ambiguous only if it
contains a word or phrase which in that
particular context is capable of having
more than one meaning."

It is no doubt true that if on going
through the plain meaning of the language
of statutes, it leads to anomalies, injustices
and absurdities, then the court may look
into the purpose for which the statute has
been brought and would try to give a
meaning, which would adhere to the
purpose of the statute. Patanjali Sastri, C.J.
in the case of Aswini Kumar Ghose v.
Arabinda Bose [AIR 1952 SC 369 : 1953
SCR 1] had held that it is not a sound
principle of construction to brush aside
words in a statute as being inapposite
surplusage, if they can have appropriate
application in circumstances conceivably
within the contemplation of the statute. In
Quebec Railway, Light Heat & Power Co.
Ltd. v. Vandry [AIR 1920 PC 181] it had
been observed that the legislature is
deemed not to waste its words or to say
anything in vain and a construction which
attributes redundancy to the legislature will
not be accepted except for compelling
reasons. Similarly, it is not permissible to
add words to a statute which are not there
unless on a literal construction being given
a part of the statute becomes meaningless.
But before any words are read to repair an
omission in the Act, it should be possible to
state with certainty that these words would
have been inserted by the draftsman and
approved by the legislature had their
attention been drawn to the omission before
the Bill had passed into a law. At times, the
intention of the legislature is found to be
clear but the unskilfulness of the draftsman
in introducing certain words in the statute
results in apparent ineffectiveness of the
language and in such a situation, it may be
permissible for the court to reject the
surplus words, so as to make the statute
effective. Bearing in mind the aforesaid
principle,
let
us
now
examine
the
provisions of Section 28-A of the Act, to
answer the questions referred to us by the
Bench of two learned Judges. It is no doubt
true that the object of Section 28-A of the
Act was to confer a right of making a
reference, (sic on one) who might have not
made a reference earlier under Section 18
and, therefore, ordinarily when a person
makes a reference under Section 18 but that
was dismissed on the ground of delay, he
would not get the right of Section 28-A of
the Land Acquisition Act when some other
person makes a reference and the reference
is answered. But Parliament having enacted
Section 28-A, as a beneficial provision, it
1164 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
would cause great injustice if a literal
interpretation is given to the expression
"had not made an application to the
Collector under Section 18" in Section 28A of the Act. The aforesaid expression
would mean that if the landowner has made
an application for reference under Section
18 and that reference is entertained and
answered. In other words, it may not be
permissible for a landowner to make a
reference and get it answered and then
subsequently make another application when
some other person gets the reference
answered and obtains a higher amount. In
fact in Pradeep Kumari case [(1995) 2 SCC
736] the three learned Judges, while
enumerating the conditions to be satisfied,
whereafter an application under Section 28-A
can be moved, had categorically stated (SCC
p. 743, para 10) "the person moving the
application did not make an application to the
Collector under Section 18". The expression
"did not make an application", as observed by
this Court, would mean, did not make an
effective
application
which
had
been
entertained by making the reference and the
reference was answered. When an application
under Section 18 is not entertained on the
ground of limitation, the same not fructifying
into any reference, then that would not
tantamount to an effective application and
consequently the rights of such applicant
emanating from some other reference being
answered to move an application under
Section 28-A cannot be denied. We,
accordingly answer Question 1(a) by holding
that the dismissal of an application seeking
reference under Section 18 on the ground of
delay would tantamount to not filing an
application within the meaning of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

(emphasis by Court)

7. In the present case, since on the
petitioner's application under Section 18 of
the Act, no reference was made by the
Special Land Acquisition Officer, which
was declined on the ground of limitation, it
cannot be said that there was any reference
made at the petitioner's instance that was
decided by the Court so as to curtail the
petitioner's right to take advantage of the
remedy under Section 28A of the Act.

8. This Court is, therefore, of the
opinion that the impugned order declining
to re-determine the compensation payable
to the petitioner on an application filed
under Section 28A of the Act is manifestly
illegal and based on a flawed understanding
of the provisions of Section 28A. The
petitioner's application under Section 28A
is competent and maintainable.

9. In the result, this writ petition
succeeds and is allowed. The impugned
order dated 30.04.2022 passed by the
Special Land Acquisition Officer (Joint
Organization), Aligarh (Annexure No.1 to
the writ petition) is hereby quashed. In
consequence, the petitioner's application
under Section 28A of the Act is restored to
file, which the Special Land Acquisition
Officer shall consider and decide by a
reasoned and speaking order after hearing
the parties concerned expeditiously.
----------
(2023) 3 ILRA 1164
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.02.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUNEET KUMAR, J.
THE HON'BLE RAJENDRA KUMAR-IV, J.

Writ-C No. 25126 of 2012

M/s Shiva Enterprises & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
U.O.I. & Ors. ...Respondents