# Puran Singh v. District Judge Lucknow & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 5 ILRA 1085
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-05-07
- **Case number:** Writ-A No. 1000115 of 2014
- **Bench:** Pankaj Bhatia
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/puran-singh-v-district-judge-lucknow-ors-53428
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

A. Tenancy Law - UP Urban Buildings
(Regulation of Letting, Rent &Eviction)
Act, 1972 - Section 30 (1) - Scope of
power - Deposit of rent - No adjudication
on relationship of landlord and tenant,
how far vitiate the impugned order - Held,
S.
30
itself
does
not
confer
any
adjudictory powers upon the Munsif for
deciding the relationship of landlord and
tenant,
otherwise
the
use
of
word
'claiming to be tenant' would be of no
purpose - No power of adjudication have
been granted to the Munsif by virtue of S.
30 of the Act and even if the deposit is
made by a person claiming himself to be a
tenant, and is actually not a tenant, the
benefit of deposit u/s 30 would clearly not
be available to him in suitable proceedings
initiated by the landlord and contested by
the tenant/ person in occupation and not
a tenant. (Para 11 and 13)
Writ petition dismissed. (E-1)
List of Cases cited:

## Text

5 All. Puran Singh Vs. District Judge Lucknow & Ors.
1085
from 1.8.2013 to 30.9.2014 without salary.
Therefore, even the impugned order is setaside, Court cannot direct to appoint him as
Assistant Teacher. He has not worked since
2014 till he has reached the age of
superannuation i.e. 62 years (2019) i.e. 5 to
6 years. Meanwhile, he has pursued his
L.L.B. Degree and now he is a practising
Advocate of this Court. The period for
which he has not worked will be considered
as "No work No Pay".

21. In the aforesaid circumstances and
in the interest of justice, this writ petition is
disposed of with following directions:

(a)
Impugned
orders
dated
1.10.2014, 10.3.2016 and 23.10.2018 are
set-aside.

(b) Petitioner is entitled for
payment of salary from 1.8.2013 to
30.9.2014, when undisputedly, he has
worked and his salary for said period shall
be paid within a period of 8 weeks.

(c) No direction for reinstatement
even on notional basis could be passed.

(d)
A
lump
sum
compensation/cost is determined as Rs.2.5
lakhs to be paid by respondents within 12
weeks to the petitioner.

(e) Mr. Yatindra, learned Amicus
Curaie has assisted the Court in a very
proper manner and for that High Court
Legal, Services Committee, Allahabad will
pay Rs.5500/ to him within four weeks.
----------
(2025) 5 ILRA 1085
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 07.05.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PANKAJ BHATIA, J.

Writ-A No. 1000115 of 2014
Puran Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
District Judge Lucknow & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Heera Lal Srivastava, Amit Jaiswal, Apoorva
Tewari

Counsel for the Respondents:
U.N. Misra, Ramesh Chandra Pathak

A. Tenancy Law - UP Urban Buildings
(Regulation of Letting, Rent &Eviction)
Act, 1972 - Section 30 (1) - Scope of
power - Deposit of rent - No adjudication
on relationship of landlord and tenant,
how far vitiate the impugned order - Held,
S.
30
itself
does
not
confer
any
adjudictory powers upon the Munsif for
deciding the relationship of landlord and
tenant,
otherwise
the
use
of
word
'claiming to be tenant' would be of no
purpose - No power of adjudication have
been granted to the Munsif by virtue of S.
30 of the Act and even if the deposit is
made by a person claiming himself to be a
tenant, and is actually not a tenant, the
benefit of deposit u/s 30 would clearly not
be available to him in suitable proceedings
initiated by the landlord and contested by
the tenant/ person in occupation and not
a tenant. (Para 11 and 13)
Writ petition dismissed. (E-1)
List of Cases cited:
1. M/s S. Chand & Co. Vs IInd A.D.J.; 1985 (1)
ARC 251
2. Moolchand Motuman Tekwani Vs A.D.J.; 1985
(2) ARC 142
3. St. Jones School Vs Special Judge, E.C. Act;
1999 (1) ARC 588
4. Chatur Mohan & ors. Vs Ram Behari Dixit;
1964 All LJ 256
5. Anwar Ali Vs A.D.J.; 2002 (2) ARC 562
6. Rajendra Kumar Karnwal Vs Smt. Kailash
Garg; 2005(4) AWC 3858J
1086 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
7. Fateh Chand Vs B.S. Goel; 1967 ALJ 979
8. Girdhari Lal Mehta Vs District Judge Varanasi;
1984 (1) ARC 126
9. Chatur Mohan & ors. Vs Ram Behari Dixit;
1964 All LJ 256; 1963 SCC OnLine All 55

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Bhatia, J.)

1. Heard Sri Apoorva Tiwari the
counsel for the petitioner. No one is present
on behalf the respondents.

2. The present petition has been filed
by the petitioner challenging the order
dated 29.04.2014 which was passed on an
application under section 30(1) of the U.P.
Act No. 13 of 1972 as well as the order
dated 15.09.2014 passed by the District
Judge in Civil Revision No.222 of 2014
whereby the revision preferred against the
order dated 29.04.2014 was dismissed.

3. The facts in brief are that the
respondent no.3 on 12.10.2011 filed an
application under section 30(1) of the U.P.
Act No.13 of 1972 claiming himself to be
the tenant of the premises situate at 338,
5th Street, Rajendra Nagar, Lucknow and
also claimed that the petitioner was the
landlord. It was alleged that the rent of the
premises was Rs.100/- per month and was
being deposited as the petitioner had
refused to accept the same. The said
application
was
registered
as
Misc.
Application No. 126 of 2011 (Annexure
no.3). In reply to the said application, the
petitioner filed his objection on 15.03.2014
stating that he was not the owner of the
property in question and there existed no
relationship of landlord and tenant in
between the petitioner and the respondent
no.3. It was also stated that the property in
question was owned and possessed by the
society namely Pioneer Montessori School
and the respondent no.3 was never inducted
as a tenant by the petitioner or by the
society. It was also taken as a defense that
the respondent no.3 was engaged for some
construction work in the School and was
allowed some rooms for storing the raw
materials etc. and thereafter he was trying
to retain occupation of the rooms allegedly
claiming himself to be the tenant. The said
application filed by the respondent no.3
was allowed by the Court vide order dated
29.04.2014
with
direction
that
the
respondent no. 3 may deposit the amount at
his own risk. It was also observed that the
petitioner had no right to file objection and
in any case the same could not be decided
in exercise of the power under section
30(1) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972.
Aggrieved against the said order, the
petitioner preferred a revision under section
115 of the CPC. The said revision came to
be dismissed on 15.09.2014 as not
maintainable.

4.
Challenging
the
said
two
judgments, Sri Apoorva Tiwari appearing
on behalf of the petitioner, extensively
argues that both the orders were bad in law.
He argues that it was incumbent upon the
Civil Judge to have decided the preliminary
issue with regard to the claim of tenancy by
the respondent no.3 and in any case, ought
to have considered the objections. It is
further argued that the Munsif while
passing order under section 30(1) of the
Act was exercising his original jurisdiction
as a court and it was not a 'persona
designata' and as such, his order was
revisable under section 115 of the CPC.

5. The counsel for the petitioner has
extensively relied upon the judgment in the
case of M/s S. Chand & Co. vs. IInd
Additional District Judge; 1985 (1) ARC
251 to argue that a revision would lie
5 All. Puran Singh Vs. District Judge Lucknow & Ors.
1087
against the order of a Munsif. Reliance is
also placed on the judgment in the case of
Moolchand
Motuman
Tekwani
vs.
Additional District Judge; 1985 (2) ARC
142 to ague that a revision would lie. He
has also placed reliance on St. Jones
School vs. Special Judge, E.C. Act; 1999
(1) ARC 588 and Chatur Mohan and
others vs. Ram Behari Dixit; 1964 All LJ
256 to argue that a revision would lie.

6. The counsel for the petitioner has
fairly
placed
before
this
court
the
judgments which are contrary and held that
no revision would lie against an order
passed under Section 30, the same being in
the case of Anwar Ali v. Additional
District Judge; 2002 (2) ARC 562 and
Rajendra Kumar Karnwal vs. Smt.
Kailash Garg; 2005(4) AWC 3858J

7. Reliance is also placed upon the
judgment in the case of Fateh Chand vs.
B.S. Goel; 1967 ALJ 979 to argue that the
Munsif had the jurisdiction to decide the
objections and has also placed a contrary
judgment in the case of Girdhari Lal Mehta
vs. District Judge Varanasi; 1984 (1) ARC
126 to place before this court that it has been
decided in the said case that the landlord has
no right to file objection for deciding whether
the person depositing the rent is not a tenant.

8. In the light of the said, the contentions
have to be considered. It is essential to note
that U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 was enacted for
controlling the rights of landlord specifically
the right to letting out the premises, rent and
eviction of tenants in respect of the buildings
specified and covered in the said Act. Section
30 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, prescribed
as under :

"13. Restrictions on occupation
of building without allotment or Release.
Where a landlord or tenant ceases to
occupy a building or part thereof, no
person shall occupy it in any capacity on
his behalf, or otherwise than under an
order of allotment or release under Section
16, and if a person so purports to occupy it
he shall, without prejudice to the provisions
of Section 31, be deemed to be an
unauthorised occupant of such building or
part."

9. It is also essential to note that the
mandate of Section 37 and Section 38
which are as under :

37. Finality and presumption. -
(1) No order made in exercise of any power
conferred by or under this Act shall be
called in question in any Court.

(2) Where an order purports to
have been made and signed by any
authority in exercise of any power
conferred by or under this Act, a Court
shall, unless the contrary is proved,
presume that such order was so made by
that authority.

38. Act to override T. P. Act and
Civil Procedure Code -The provisions of
this Act shall have effect notwithstanding
anything inconsistent therewith contained
in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Act
No. IV of 1882), or in the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (Act No. V of 1908)."

10. On a plain reading of the mandate
of Section 30 of the Act, it transpires that
the Section was enacted for a person who
seeks to deposit any rent, which has been
refused by the landlord and claims himself
to be the tenant. The phrase 'claiming to be
a tenant' is of importance. The mandate of
section 30 is only to see that the tenant,
cannot be permitted to escape from his
liability to deposit the rent in the event
landlord refuses to accept the same and
1088 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
thus, it was also enacted to ensure that the
tenant is not liable to be evicted on the
ground of non-payment of rent when the
landlord himself refuses to accept the same.
Similarly, in the event, of dispute with
regard to entitlement of rent, it propose to
give the protection to the tenant and also
further empowered the Court to ensure that
the deposited rent, is paid to the landlord.

11. A perusal of the said provision
makes it clear that the said section itself
does not confer any adjudictory powers
upon
the
Munsif
for
deciding
the
relationship
of
landlord
and
tenant,
otherwise the use of word 'claiming to be
tenant' would be of no purpose. No power
of adjudication have been granted to the
Munsif by virtue of Section 30 of the Act
and even if the deposit is made by a person
claiming himself to be a tenant, and is
actually not a tenant, the benefit of deposit
under Section 30 would clearly not be
available to him in suitable proceedings
initiated by the landlord and contested by
the tenant/ person in occupation and not a
tenant. All the issues with regard to
relationship of landlord and tenant have to
be
adjudicated
in
the
respective
proceedings initiated by the landlord under
Chapter II to IV or Chapter V of the U.P.
Act No.13 of 1972.

12. The judgments cited by the
counsel for the petitioner, are in relation to
the interpretation of the Act, which was
enacted prior in point of time and was
subsequently repealed when the U.P. Act
no.13 of 1972 was enacted being The U.P.
(Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction
Act, 1947. It is claimed that in the said Act,
Section 7(c) was pari materia to section 30
and was referred to in the Full Bench
Judgment in the case of Chatur Mohan
and others vs. Ram Behari Dixit; 1964
All LJ 256; 1963 SCC OnLine All 55.
The
counsel
for
the
petitioner
has
emphasizes on the observations made by
the Full Bench in paras 7 to 10, 13 to 15
and 42 to 51, which are as under :

"7. A persona designata differs
from a legal tribunal in this that its
"determinations are not to be treated as
judgments of a legal tribunal"; per Lord
Atkinson
in
Balakrishna
Udayar
v.
Vasudeva Aiyar [(44) I.A. 261 at p. 269.] .
A persona designata is "a person pointed
out or described as an individual, as
opposed to a person ascertained as a
member of a class, or as filling a particular
character"; see Ram Milan v. Bansi Lal
[A.I.R. 1958 M.P. 203.] and Central
Talkies Ltd. v. Dwarika Prasad [A.I.R.
1961 S.C. 606.] . According to the Supreme
Court he is a person selected to act in his
private capacity and not in his capacity to
act as a Judge; he exerciscs special
jurisdiction distinct from the jurisdiction
that he may be possessing under another
statute. I have given reason for my view
that the legislature has selected a Munsif to
exercise the jurisdiction conferred by Sec.
7-E not in his private capacity but in his
capacity to act as the presiding officer of a
Munsif's court. Gularn Nizamuddin v.
Akhlar Husain Khan [1933 A.L.J. 971.] ,
Municipal Corporation of Rangoon v. M.A.
Shankur
[A.I.R.
1926
Ran.
25.]
,
Municipality of Sholapur v. Tuljaram
Krishnasa Chavan [A.I.R. 1931 Bom. 682.]
should not be interpreted as laying down a
hard and fast rule that when jurisdiction is
conferred upon the presiding officer of a
court and not upon the court itself he acts
as a persona designata. "One has got to
look to the entire provision for the purpose
of determining whether the matter is to be
heard by the Judicial Officer as a Court or
in his own personal capacity;" Kiron
5 All. Puran Singh Vs. District Judge Lucknow & Ors.
1089
Chandra Bose v. Kalidas Chatterji [A.I.R.
1943 Cal. 247.] . "Whether an act is to be
performed by the one or the other is
generally to be determined by the character
of the act, rather than by such designation.
Whenever the power or duty imposed is
found from a consideration of the object
and purposes of the act to be one which is
more properly the function of the court, it
will be so construed; and whenever it is
manifest that the legislature meant the
judge, and not the court, that meaning will
be applied to the words in order to carry
out the legislative intent; see 14 Am. Jur.,
"Courts", para. 4.

8. In Din Dayal v. Ved Prakash [
C.R. No. 1034 of 1955.] our brother
Dwivedi held that a Munsif acting under
Sec. 7-E acts as a persona designata
because an order directing a landlord to
carry out repairs within a certain time is
unlike an order normally issued by a court.
With great respect I do not agree. He relied
upon the principle that a court cannot issue
a mandatory injunction for the doing of an
act which cannot be supervised by it. Sec.
55 of the Specific Relief Act (see
illustrations (a) and (b)) and Sec. 133 of
the Criminal Procedure Code permit
mandatory
injunctions
similar
to
a
mandatory injunction contemplated by Sec.
7-E to be issued and yet undoubtedly the
authorities issuing them are courts.

9. I am of the opinion that S.C.
Banerji v. Ram Kumar Das [C.R. No. 992
of 1958 decided by Mukerji and Uniyal,
JJ., on 6-4-1962.] and Mustafa Husain v.
Sewa Ram Bodh Raj [ C.R. No. 1212 of
1955.] decided on 20-4-1961 by V.
Bhargava, J. do not lay down the correct
law. I respectfully agree with the view
taken in the case of Daulat Ram Sawhney v.
Trilokinath [ S.A. No. 1889 of 1955 decided
by Beg and Srivastava, JJ., on 18-8-1961.]
and
hold
that
a
Munsif
exercising
jurisdiction under Sec. 7-E acts as a court
and not as a persona designata. His order
is, therefore, revisable by this Court under
Sec. 115, C.P.C. I would answer the
question in the affirmative.

Pathak, J.:-10. The question
referred for decision is:

"Whether a Munsif while acting
under the provisions of Sec. 7-E of the U.P.
Control of Rent and Eviction Act acts as a
mere persona designata or as a Court and
whether a revision against an order passed
under Sec. 7-E of the Act is maintainable?"

13. What we are really called
upon to decide is whether the Munsif acting
under Sec. 7-E is a Court. If he acts as a
Court, there can be no doubt that as such
Court he is subordinate to the High Court
within the meaning of Sec. 115 of the Code
of Civil Procedure and, therefore, a
revision against an order passed under Sec.
7-E would be maintainable.

14. The question whether an
adjudicating authority is a Court or a
persona designata depends, as Mootham,
C.J. observed in Kedar Nath v. Sri S.N.
Misra [1957 A.L.J. 379.] upon:

"Whether the enactment confers
on an existing court a jurisdiction which it
formerly did not possess, ...... or whether it
creates for a particular purpose a special
tribunal which derives its entire authority
from the enactment itself......"

Is it a case where additional
jurisdiction has been conferred upon an
already existing Court or one where the
statute creates a tribunal and vests special
jurisdiction in it so that but for the statute it
would not only be devoid of jurisdiction but
be non-existent in law as such tribunal?

This is a question not capable of
conclusive
determination
by
any
mechanical rules or rigid criteria. The
resolution of the problem will depend upon
the consideration of several circumstances
1090 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
which may vary from case to case, and the
answer must necessarily be given by
reference to the over-all context in which
the jurisdiction has been conferred.

15. Now it is well settled that
although a tribunal may have many of the
trappings of a Court, it may nevertheless
not be a Court in the strict sense of
exercising judicial power, and the mere
existence of certain attributes, normally
associated
with
Courts,
would
not
necessarily confer that status upon such
tribunal. In Shell Co. of Australia v.
Federal Commissioner of Taxation [L.R.
(1931) A.C. 275.] the Judicial Committee
observed:-

"A tribunal is not necessarily a
Court in this strict sense because it gives a
final decision. 2. Nor because it hears
witnesses on oath. 3. Nor because two or
more contending parties appear before it
between whom it has to decide. 4. Nor
because it gives decisions which affect the
rights of subjects. 5. Nor because there is
an appeal to a Court. 6. Nor because it is a
body to which a matter is referred by
another body."

These
principles
have
been
applied in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. The
Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd. [A.I.R.
1950 S.C. 188.], Harinagar Sugar Mills
Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunujala [A.I.R.
1961 S.C. 1669.] Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of
Uttar Pradesh [A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1621.] .

And,
Bennet,
J.,
in
Gulam
Nizamuddin v. Akhtar Husain Khan [1933
A.L.J. 971.], observed:

"the fact that a presiding officer
of a civil court is appointed to preside over
an election court will not make the election
court a civil court."

Oak, J.:-42. I have read the
judgments prepared by the learned Chief
Justice and my learned brother' Pathak, J.
In my opinion, a Munsif acting under Sec.
7-E of the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent
and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereafter referred
to as the Act) is a Court.

43. Under Sec: 7-E of the Act, a
Munsif having jurisdiction may direct a
landlord to tarry out certain repairs.
According to sub-Sec. (8) of Sec. 7-E, as it
stood originally, an appeal lay from the
order of the Munsif under sub-Sec. (5) or
sub-Sec. (6) as if it were a decree.
According to sub-Sec. (8) of Sec. 7-E, as it
stands now, no appeal shall lie from the
order of the Munsif passed under sub-Secs.
(5) sub-Secs. (6) of Sec. 7-E. If Sec. 7-E is
considered in isolation, it would be difficult
to say whether the Munsif is a Court or a
persona designata. In order to appreciate
the true status of the Munsif under Sec. 7E, one has to consider the general scheme
and other provisions of the Act.

44. According to the preamble of
the Act, the object of this legislation was to
control the letting and the rent of
accommodations, and to prevent the
eviction of tenants. Under Sec. 3 of the Act,
a District Magistrate may grant a landlord
permission to file a suit against a tenant for
his eviction. Under section 5 of the Act, a
landlord or a tenant may institute a suit for
fixation of rent. Such a suit has to be filed
in the Court of the Munsif or in the Court
of the Civil Judge, according to the
valuation of the subject-matter. Under Sec.
7 of the Act, a District Magistrate may pass
orders about allotment of houses. Under
Sec. 7-B, the landlord may apply to the
Munsif having territorial jurisdiction for
the recovery of arrears of rent and for
ejectment of the tenant. Under Sec. 7-C of
the Act, the tenant may deposit rent in the
Court of the Munsif having jurisdiction.
Under Sec. 7-D, the District Magistrate
can direct a landlord to restore amenities
to a tenant. Under Sec. 7-E of the Act, the
5 All. Puran Singh Vs. District Judge Lucknow & Ors.
1091
Munsif having jurisdiction may order a
landlord to carry out repairs.

45. To grant permission for filing
a suit for ejectment of a tenant and to allot
houses are administrative functions. These
duties have been assigned to the District
Magistrate.
To
fix
rent
for
an
accommodation and to take action against
a tenant for the recovery of rent and for
ejectment are functions of judicial nature.
At certain places in the Act the Munsif has
been expressly referred to as a Court. But
nowhere in the Act do we find any
reference to the District Magistrate as a
Court.
Under
the
Act,
the
District
Magistrate functions as an administrative
officer. Courts of District Magistrates are
constituted under Secs. 6 and 10 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. But it cannot
be seriously maintained that, a District
Magistrate functioning under the Act is a
criminal Court. It is well recognized that
the District Magistrate or the Collector is
the chief executive officer of a district. It is
in that capacity that certain duties have
been assigned to the District Magistrate
under the Act. In "Central Talkies Ltd. v.
Dwarka Prasad [A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 606.] it
was held that, under the Act the District
Magistrate is not a persona designata. But
that case does not lay down that, under the
Act the District Magistrate is a Court. Sec.
16 of the Act lays down that no order made
under this Act by the State Government or
the District Magistrate shall be called in
question in any Court. Sec. 16 makes no
reference to a Munsif or a Civil Judge. Sec.
16 suggests that an order passed by a
Munsif under the Act may be called in
question in a Court of law. The legislature
appears
to
have
placed
the
State
Government and the District Magistrate on
one hand and the Munsif and the Civil
Judge on the other hand, on different
footings.

46. Sec. 7-B throws much light on
the status of a Munsif under the Act. Under
sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 7-B, "the landlord may
make an application to the Munsif having
territorial jurisdiction for an order of
ejectment
of
the
tenant
from
the
accommodation." Under sub-Sec. (3), the
Munsif serves a notice on the tenant calling
upon him to pay up the arrears of rent.
Sub-Sec. (5) lays down that, if the tenant
does not deposit lent and does not file any
objection, the Munsif shall order the
tenant's eviction. Sub-Sec. (7) of Sec. 7-B
states:-

"If the tenant appears in reply to
the notice under sub-Sec. (3) and files an
objection, ...... the Munsif shall inform the
applicant that he may, subject to the
payment of the court fee......, have the
application treated as a plaint in a suit for
recovery of arrears of rent alone ......"

According to sub-Sec. (8), if the
applicant pays the necessary court fee, the
application has to be treated as a plaint
and the proceedings as a suit. It is to be
noted that the same Munsif has to deal with
the entire proceeding from sub-Sec. (1) to
sub-Sec. (8) of Sec. 7-B of the Act. Under
sub-Sec. (8), the application has to be
treated as a plaint, and the proceedings
constitute a suit. It is obvious that the
Munsif acting under sub-Sec. (8) of Sec. 7B is a Civil Court. It is unreasonable to
suppose that, a Munsif has one character
under sub-Sec. (1), and another character
under sub-Sec. (8). The status of the Munsif
must
be
the
same
throughout
the
proceeding under Sec. 7-B of the Act. The
status of the Munsif cannot alter, simply
because the landlord has paid court-fee in
order to convert the application into a
plaint. Throughout the proceeding under
Sec. 7-B of the Act, the Munsif is a Civil
Court.
1092 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

47. Mr. Vishnu Kumar Gupta
appearing for the opposite party, pointed
out two matters in support of his contention
that under Sec. 7-E of the Act the Munsif is
a persona designata. Mr. V.K. Gupta firstly
pointed out that, under Sec. 7-E of the Act,
the Munsif having territorial jurisdiction
has unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction. It
was, therefore, contended that, he cannot
be a Civil Court under the Bengal, Agra
and
Assam
Civil
Courts
Act,
1887
(hereafter referred to as the Civil Courts
Act). Mr. V.K. Gupta pointed out that,
under Sec. 19 of the Civil Courts Act, a
Munsif has limited jurisdiction. It has,
however, to be noted that, even under Sec.
19 of the Civil Courts Act all Munsifs have
not got the same pecuniary jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of one Munsif may be up to
Rs. 2,000/-. Another Munsif may have
jurisdiction up to Rs. 5,000/-. It was open
to the legislature to confer on Munsif
unlimited
pecuniary
jurisdiction
for
purposes of U.P. Act No. Ill of 1947.

48. Secondly, it was contended by
Mr. V.K. Gupta that, in order to recover
money spent by a tenant for repairs under
Sec. 7-E of the Act, the tenant has to file a
separate suit against the landlord to
recover the amount as a debt. The material
provision as contained in sub-Sec. (6) of
Sec. 7-E is this:

"It shall thereafter be lawful for
the tenant to make such repairs and to
deduct the cost thereof from the rent, or to
recover it otherwise from the landlord as if
it were a debt due to him by the landlord."

According to this provision, a
tenant may recover the cost of repairs in
two ways. Either he may adjust the
expenditure against rent payable by him.
Or the tenant may treat that expenditure as
a debt due to him by the landlord. This
provision has little bearing on the status of
the Munsif under sub-Secs. (5) and (6) of
Sec. 7-E.

49.
In
National
Telephone
Company v. His Majesty's PostmasterGeneral
[1913
A.C.
546.],
Viscount
Alaldane, L.C. observed that, "when a
question is stated to be referred to an
established Court without more it imports
that the ordinary incidents of the procedure
of that Court are to attach."

The broad scheme under the Act
is this. Duties under the Act have been
divided into two groups. Administrative
duties have been assigned to the District
Magistrate. Functions of judicial nature
have been assigned to Muasifs and Civil
Judges. Courts of Munsifs are constituted
under the Civil Courts Act. There is a
presumption that Munsifs under U.P. Act
No. III of 1947 are also Civil Courts. There
is no clear indication in the Act that, a
Munsif is a persona designata on the
contrary
the
Act
contains
several
references to Munsifs as Courts. In the Act
we come across three different expressions:
(i) the Munsif having jurisdiction, (ii) the
Munsif having territorial jurisdiction, and
(iii) the Court of the munsif having
jurisdiction. The three expressions appear
to
have
been
used
in
the
Act
indiscriminately. The three expressions
refer
to
the
"same
authority.
The
expression "the Court of the Munsif having
jurisdiction"
obviously
refers
to
the
authority as a Civil Court. The other two
expressions also appear to have been used
in the same sense. The expression "Munsif
having jurisdiction" used in sub-Sec. (4) of
Sec. 7-E of the Act is equivalent to the
expression, "the Court of the Munsif
having territorial jurisdiction."

50.
In
view
of
all
these
considerations, I have come to the
conclusion that, a Munsif functioning under
Sec. 7-E of the U.P. (Temp.) Control of
5 All. Puran Singh Vs. District Judge Lucknow & Ors.
1093
Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 is a Civil
Court subordinate to the High Court.
Consequently, the present Civil Revision
under Sec. 115, C.P.C. is maintainable.

By the Court:- 51. For the
reasons given in our judgments we hold
that a Munsif exercising jurisdiction under
Sec. 7-E of the U.P. (Temporary) Control
of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 is a Civil
Court and not a persona designata and that
an order passed by him is revisable by this
Court under Sec. 115, C.P.C.

Question answered."

13. The said Full Bench judgment may
not be of much avail to the petitioner as
what was referred to the Full Bench was
the nature of power of Munsif conferred
upon him by virtue of Section 7-E of the
U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and
Eviction Act, 1947. The said Full Bench
was constituted to consider the scope of
powers conferred upon the Magistrate by
virtue of Section 7-E of the U.P.
(Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction
Act, 1947. The specific question raised was
whether the Munsif exercising the power
under section 7-E would be a court
exercising the power or would be a 'persona
designata', the Full Court formed a view
that the Munsif performing the functions
conferred by virtue of Section 7-E of the
Act would be a court and the order passed
would be revisable under section 115 of the
CPC; in the present case, no such issue
arises. In the present case also, the Munsif
performing the functions conferred by
virtue of Section 30 would clearly be a
court and would not be a 'persona
designata', however, the scope of powers
conferred would be confined to the
mandate of Section 30 of the Act. It is not
required to record any categorical finding
with regard to relationship of landlord and
tenant as is being sought to be argued
before this Court. The said order would
also not be revisable as after the enactment
of U.P. Act no.13 of 1972, the appeallate
and the revisional power were specifically
conferred under Section 22 or Section 18 of
U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. The CPC was
expressly overridden by virtue of Section
38, as such, holding that a revision would
lie against the said order, would be
amounting to complete misreading of the
U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 and would be in
direct conflict with Section 38 of the U.P.
Act no.13 of 1972.

14. As regards the powers of Munsif
under Section 30 of the Act, the law was
clearly elaborated in Girdhari Lal Mehta
(supra) wherein the finding was recorded
in para 5 which is as under :

"5. From widening of the Section
it is apparent that the Legislature being
conscious of the difficulty that arose under
earlier Act deliberately extended the benefit
even to those persons who claimand to be
tenant so that the landlord by his own
conduct of refusal to accept the rent may
not create a situation by not permitting the
claiment
to
deposit
in
court
and
subsequently even if the person is found to
be tenant to turn to his advantage by
claiming default in payment for this period.
It is true that before accepting the deposit
the Munsif who is conferred with the
jurisdiction under sub-sec. (3) of S. 30 to
accept the claim has to be prima facie
satisfied but the satisfaction is only of the
fact that the person who made application
was a person claiming to be a tenant of the
building. The law does not require anything
further. At least it does not contemplate
adjudication. And how is the order
prejudiced to the landlord. If the person
claiming to be tenant deposits it but
ultimately it is found that he is not the
1094 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
tenant then he does not become so by order
under this Section. Benefit of sub-sec. (6)
shall be available only to a person who is
found to be tenant. An order which is
passed without hearing or even notice
obviously cannot operate as res judicata.
In Haji Abdul Karim's case (1978 (UP)
RCC 691) this aspect has been brought
elaborately. Distinction between nature
of jurisdiction exercised u/s 7E of old Act
and in Rule 6 was also pointed out. It was
held that no assistance could be derived
from Raj Kumar's case (AIR 1971 All
273) to establish that order under S. 30
operated as res judicata. Nor can the
order be said to suffer from infirmity of
not being a reasoned order. By very
nature of jurisdiction excercised the
order is not required to be detailed like a
judgment. It must exhibit application of
mind. To that there appears to be no
doubt."

16. In view of the reasoning recorded
above, the writ petition lacks merit and is
dismissed. The writ petition also deserves
to be dismissed as the petitioner before this
Court neither claims to be a landlord nor is
a landlord and as such, the order impugned
has no effect on him.

17. It is further clarified that mere
deposit of rent under section 30 of the Act
by the respondent no.3 would not grant any
benefit in any proceedings that are
instituted against him for his eviction or
otherwise by the landlord/owner.
----------
(2025) 5 ILRA 1094
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 19.05.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DINESH PATHAK, J.
Writ C No. 2373 of 2024

Ms Marion Biotech Pvt. Ltd. ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Neeja Srivastava, Sr. Advocate, Veerendra
Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., C.S.C., R.P.S. Chauhan

Constitution of India, Article 226 - Drugs
and Cosmetics Act, 1940 - Sections 4, 16,
17, 17A, 17B, 25(3) - Drugs and Cosmetics
Rules, 1945 - Rule 85(3) - Functus Officio
and
Review
Jurisdiction
-
Petitioner
challenged the order dated 04.10.2023, which
allowed a review application and suspended the
appellate order dated 11.08.2023, reviving
petitioner's drug license (Form 25 and Form 28)
except for drugs using Propylene Glycol, due to
substandard DOK-1 Max Syrup linked to child
deaths in Uzbekistan. Petitioner argued the
Appellate Authority lacked jurisdiction to review
its order absent statutory provisions, became
functus officio post-appeal, and passed the
review order ex parte, violating Section 25(3) of
the Act. Respondents contended the review was
justified due to public interest, substandard
drugs containing excess Diethylene Glycol
(DEG)
and
Ethylene
Glycol
(EG),
and
misrepresentation of Uzbekistan court orders,
citing inherent powers to correct fraud, per
Indian Bank vs. Satyam Fibres. The court held
that the Appellate Authority, having decided
the appeal, became functus officio under Rule
85(3), and no statutory review power existed
under the Act or Rules. No fraud, forgery, or
misrepresentation was established, as all
facts, including Uzbekistan court orders and
drug deficiencies, were known during the
appeal, per Naresh Kumar vs. Government
(NCT of Delhi) and Patel Narshi Thakershi vs.
Pradyuman Singhji. The review order, passed
ex parte on the same day as the application,
lacked new evidence or legal basis. Writ
petition
allowed,
review
order
quashed.
(Paras 15-33)

Writ petition allowed.