# Pyarey Lal & Ors v. Addl. Commissioner Lko & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 10 ILRA 1042
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-10-16
- **Case number:** Writ - C No. 1000182 of 1998
- **Bench:** Irshad Ali
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/pyarey-lal-ors-v-addl-commissioner-lko-ors-54707
- **Pages:** 22

## Headnote

was justified in setting aside the order of the
Trial Court which had allowed the application
under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. and restored the
suit, and whether the impugned order dated
9.11.1997 suffers from being a "non-speaking
order" passed "against well settled principles of
law"; further, whether "publication in the daily
newspaper 'Nav Jeevan' is only a city edition"
and not sufficient service, and whether "the suit
itself was barred by S. 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act" in
view of the final adjudication by consolidation
authorities.

Headnotes
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Order 9 Rule
13 - Ex parte decree - Setting aside of -
Requirement of Reasons - Reason is the
heartbeat
of
every
conclusion
-
It
introduces clarity in an order and without
the same, it becomes lifeless - Revisional
Jurisdiction
-
Non-speaking
Order
-
Revisional court must record reasons
showing why findings of trial court are
perverse or unsupported - The revisional
Court neither recorded any such finding
nor recorded any reason in regard to
finding of trial court - Service of Summons
10 All. Pyarey Lal & Ors. Vs. Addl. Commissioner Lko & Ors.
1043
-
Substituted
Service
-
Newspaper
Publication - Publication in 'Nav Jeevan',
a "city edition" with "no wide circulation
in Gouri Bazar", held insufficient -
Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (U.P.)
- S. 49 - Bar of Suit - Consolidation
authorities had "finally decided" rights
and title; civil suit not maintainable -
Natural Justice - Fair Opportunity - Courts
to adopt a lenient approach; matters
should be decided on merits - Appellate/
Revisional Interference with Findings of
Fact - Finding on sufficiency of service is a
question of fact; cannot be interfered with
absent perversity.

Held: The revisional authority passed a nonspeaking order, "neither considered the reasons
recorded by the learned trial Court nor recorded
his own reason differing from those of the
learned trial Court - The issue of service of
summons and knowledge of the suit were
questions of fact, and "could not be interfered
with in exercise of the power unless the
revisional Court recorded specific finding that
the findings recorded by the learned trial Court
were perverse - "The newspaper on which
reliance has been placed is only a 'city edition'
and the petitioner resides in a village Gouri
Bazar, therefore the said newspaper has no
wide circulation" - Rights and title of the
petitioners and opposite parties have been
finally decided by the Consolidation Authorities -
civil suit was barred by S. 49 U.P.C.H. Act -
Courts should proceed leniently in matters of
setting aside ex parte decrees; "insofar it is
possible the case should be decided on merits" -
The revisional court's order "is contrary to the
law laid down" regarding necessity of reasons -
Accordingly, the order dated 9.11.1997
passed by the opposite party no.1 is set aside -
Writ petition succeeds and is allowed. (Paras
27,28,29,30,31,33,34) (E-7)

Case Law Cited
Ramji
Dass
v.
Mohan
Singh,
MANU/SC/0533/1978; Sant Lal Gupta v.
Modern Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd.,
(2010) 13 SCC 336; Secretary & Curator,
Victoria Memorial Hall v. Howrah Ganatantrik
Nagrik Samity, (2010) 3 SCC 732; Maya Devi
v. Raj Kumari Batra, 2011 (112) RD 372;
Rabindra Singh v. Financial Commissioner,
Cooperation, Punjab, (2008) 7 SCC 663;
Babita Kasaudhan v. State of U.P., (2016) 2
UPLBEC 1040; Vinod Rani Lamba v. Babu Ram
Yadav, 2017 (135) RD 427; Prashant Singh v.
Meena, (2024) 6 SCC 818; My Palace Mutually
Aided Co-operative Society v. B. Mahesh,
(2022) 19 SCC 806; Electrosteel Castings Ltd.
v. UV Asset Reconstruction Co., (2022) 2 SCC
573; Ram Prakash Agarwal v. Gop Krishan,
(2013) 11 SCC 296; Vijay Singh v. Shanti
Devi, (2017) 8 SCC 837; Mahabir Singh v.
Subhash, (2008) 1 SCC 358; Basant Singh v.
Roman Catholic Mission, (2002) 7 SCC 531;
Parimal v. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545;
Sunil Poddar v. Union Bank of India, (2008) 2
SCC 326

List of Acts
Code of Civil Procedu

## Text

_Characters 0–39,959 of 72,837. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39959 for what follows._

1042 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
may forthwith be sold by auction under the
orders of the Superintendent of Police and
the provisions of sections 457 and 458
shall, as nearly as may be practicable,
apply to the net proceeds of such sale.

12. This provision is incorporated
verbatim under Section 106 of Bhartiya
Nyaya Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. From a
bare reading of the aforesaid provision it is
clear that a police officer is entitled to seize
property
of
accused
persons
during
investigation by passing orders and the
only duty is to report such seizure to
Magistrate
concerned.
There
is
no
obligation cast upon police to seek prior
order from Magistrate for seizure of
property.

13. In the totality of the facts and
circumstances of the case and in the light of
legal position as discussed above, in our
considered view respondent bank has acted
in accordance with law in freezing the
petitioner?s
account
pursuant
to
the
directions issued and request made by the
Cyber Crime Department and if the
petitioner is aggrieved by freezing and
wants to get her account defreezed, it is
open to her to approach the investigating
authorities or a court of competent
jurisdiction
for
appropriate
relief
in
accordance with law as observed above.
Hence, we do not find any good ground to
exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India to grant relief as prayed for.

14. Accordingly, the writ petition is
consigned to records with liberty to the
petitioner to avail such remedies as may be
available to her in law.
----------
(2025) 10 ILRA 1042
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 16.10.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.

Writ - C No. 1000182 of 1998

Pyarey Lal & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Addl. Commissioner Lko & Ors.
...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
D.C.Mukerjee,
Jai
Prakash
Yadav,
Mohammad Aslam Khan

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Alok Sinha, R.N.Gupta, Rajeiu
Kumar Tripathi, Ambrish Singh Yadav

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to: Whether the revisional court
was justified in setting aside the order of the
Trial Court which had allowed the application
under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. and restored the
suit, and whether the impugned order dated
9.11.1997 suffers from being a "non-speaking
order" passed "against well settled principles of
law"; further, whether "publication in the daily
newspaper 'Nav Jeevan' is only a city edition"
and not sufficient service, and whether "the suit
itself was barred by S. 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act" in
view of the final adjudication by consolidation
authorities.

Headnotes
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Order 9 Rule
13 - Ex parte decree - Setting aside of -
Requirement of Reasons - Reason is the
heartbeat
of
every
conclusion
-
It
introduces clarity in an order and without
the same, it becomes lifeless - Revisional
Jurisdiction
-
Non-speaking
Order
-
Revisional court must record reasons
showing why findings of trial court are
perverse or unsupported - The revisional
Court neither recorded any such finding
nor recorded any reason in regard to
finding of trial court - Service of Summons
10 All. Pyarey Lal & Ors. Vs. Addl. Commissioner Lko & Ors.
1043
-
Substituted
Service
-
Newspaper
Publication - Publication in 'Nav Jeevan',
a "city edition" with "no wide circulation
in Gouri Bazar", held insufficient -
Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (U.P.)
- S. 49 - Bar of Suit - Consolidation
authorities had "finally decided" rights
and title; civil suit not maintainable -
Natural Justice - Fair Opportunity - Courts
to adopt a lenient approach; matters
should be decided on merits - Appellate/
Revisional Interference with Findings of
Fact - Finding on sufficiency of service is a
question of fact; cannot be interfered with
absent perversity.

Held: The revisional authority passed a nonspeaking order, "neither considered the reasons
recorded by the learned trial Court nor recorded
his own reason differing from those of the
learned trial Court - The issue of service of
summons and knowledge of the suit were
questions of fact, and "could not be interfered
with in exercise of the power unless the
revisional Court recorded specific finding that
the findings recorded by the learned trial Court
were perverse - "The newspaper on which
reliance has been placed is only a 'city edition'
and the petitioner resides in a village Gouri
Bazar, therefore the said newspaper has no
wide circulation" - Rights and title of the
petitioners and opposite parties have been
finally decided by the Consolidation Authorities -
civil suit was barred by S. 49 U.P.C.H. Act -
Courts should proceed leniently in matters of
setting aside ex parte decrees; "insofar it is
possible the case should be decided on merits" -
The revisional court's order "is contrary to the
law laid down" regarding necessity of reasons -
Accordingly, the order dated 9.11.1997
passed by the opposite party no.1 is set aside -
Writ petition succeeds and is allowed. (Paras
27,28,29,30,31,33,34) (E-7)

Case Law Cited
Ramji
Dass
v.
Mohan
Singh,
MANU/SC/0533/1978; Sant Lal Gupta v.
Modern Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd.,
(2010) 13 SCC 336; Secretary & Curator,
Victoria Memorial Hall v. Howrah Ganatantrik
Nagrik Samity, (2010) 3 SCC 732; Maya Devi
v. Raj Kumari Batra, 2011 (112) RD 372;
Rabindra Singh v. Financial Commissioner,
Cooperation, Punjab, (2008) 7 SCC 663;
Babita Kasaudhan v. State of U.P., (2016) 2
UPLBEC 1040; Vinod Rani Lamba v. Babu Ram
Yadav, 2017 (135) RD 427; Prashant Singh v.
Meena, (2024) 6 SCC 818; My Palace Mutually
Aided Co-operative Society v. B. Mahesh,
(2022) 19 SCC 806; Electrosteel Castings Ltd.
v. UV Asset Reconstruction Co., (2022) 2 SCC
573; Ram Prakash Agarwal v. Gop Krishan,
(2013) 11 SCC 296; Vijay Singh v. Shanti
Devi, (2017) 8 SCC 837; Mahabir Singh v.
Subhash, (2008) 1 SCC 358; Basant Singh v.
Roman Catholic Mission, (2002) 7 SCC 531;
Parimal v. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545;
Sunil Poddar v. Union Bank of India, (2008) 2
SCC 326

List of Acts
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Limitation Act,
1963; U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953;
General Clauses Act, 1897; SARFAESI Act.

List of Keywords
Ex parte decree; substituted service; 'Nav
Jeevan'; city edition; wide circulation; nonspeaking order; reasons; heartbeat of every
conclusion; natural justice; sufficient cause;
consolidation
operation;
final
adjudication;
condonation of delay; knowledge of suit;
summons;
publication;
revisional
court;
perversity; bar of jurisdiction.

Case Arising From
Writ - C No. 1000182 of 1998, against the
judgment and order dated 9.11.1997 passed by
Additional
Commissioner,
Lucknow
Division
restoring ex parte decree dated 22.3.1990.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioners:
D.C. Mukerjee
Jai Prakash Yadav
Mohammad Aslam Khan
Advs. for the Respondents:
C.S.C.
Alok Sinha
R.N. Gupta
Rajeiu Kumar Tripathi
Ambrish Singh Yadav
(Delivered by Hon'ble Irshad Ali, J.)

1. Heard Shri M.A. Khan, learned
Senior Advocate assisted by Mohd. Aslam
1044 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners
and Shri Divesh Misra, learned Standing
Counsel for the respondents-State and Shri
Rajeiu Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel for
the respondents assisted by Shri Ambrish
Singh Yadav, learned Advocate.

2. By means of the present writ
petition, the petitioner has prayed for
issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari
quashing the impugned judgment and order
dated 9.11.1997 passed by opposite party
no.1 as contained in Annexure no.1 to the
writ petition, with further prayer for
issuance of a writ in the nature of
Mandamus
commanding
the
opposite
parties except the opposite party no.4 not to
interfere in the peaceful possession at the
petitioner and also not to transfer the land
in question to any one else.

3. Facts of the case are that the
opposite party nos.2 and 3 filed a suit for
declaration of their rights in respect of
agricultural plot no.601(k), 601 and 639
situated at Village Gouri Tehsil and District
Lucknow
before
the
Sub-Divisional
Officer,
Lucknow
and
subsequently
transferred to the court of Additional Sub
Divisional Officer, Lucknow arraying the
petitioners and opposite party nos.4 to 6 as
defendants in the said suit. No notice or
summons
were
ever
served
on the
petitioner and opposite party no.4 to 6 and
finally the suit was ex parte decreed.

The opposite party no.4 in the
present writ petition was also arrayed as
defendant alongwith the petitioners and he
also moved application alongwith the
petitioner under order 9 rule 13 C.P.C. for
setting aside the ex parte judgment and
decree
dated
22.3.90
but
since
in
connection
with
employment
he
is
presently residing at Delhi, as such he had
not been able to join as petitioner in the
present writ petition and as has been
arrayed as opposite party no.4 in the
present writ petition.

In respect of these very agriculture
plots the rights and title of the petitioners
and opposite parties have been finally
decided by consolidation authorities during
the consolidation operation which took
place in village in the year 1975 decided by
the Consolidation Officer against which the
opposite party nos.2 and 3 who went up in
appeal which was dismissed by the
Settlement Officer Consolidation of 5-5-75
and the revision of the opposite party nos.2
and 3 was also dismissed on 6.5.1977 by
the Deputy Director, Consolidation and the
final record of C.H. form 45 was prepared
in the names of the petitioners and opposite
party no.4. Thus, the matter between the
parties become final as regard the right and
title of the plots mentioned above ijn
respect of which the suit out of which the
present proceedings have been arisen was
filed.
That
the
petitioners
and
the
opposite party no.4 had no knowledge
about the suit or about the ex parte
judgment dated 22.3.1990 which for the
first time came to their knowledge on
15.9.1991/17.9.1991 when the certified
copy of the Khatauni containing the
reference of the ex parte judgment and
decree was brought on record in another
Civil Suit No.385-1991 pending in the
Court of Munsif Hawali, Lucknow which
was instituted by opposite party nos.2 and 3
against the petitioner for a decree for
permanent injunction. This was revealed
when the petitioners appeared in the said
civil suit their counsel Sri P.D. Verma,
Advocate, Lucknow who inspected the file.
On getting this information on
15.9.91 the petitioners and opposite party
10 All. Pyarey Lal & Ors. Vs. Addl. Commissioner Lko & Ors.
1045
no.4 got the file inspected of the case under
Section 229(B) of the Act and it was found
that the service on the petitioners were
deemed
sufficient
on
the
basis
of
publication in the news paper 'Nav Jeevan'
dated 7.6.89. It is also important to mention
here that the service of the notice through
the court as well as through the registered
post were not accepted to be sufficient
service by the learned trial Court.

The petitioners and opposite party
no.4 without wasting any time moved an
application on 18.9.91 under order 9 rule
13 C.P.C. for setting aside ex parte decree.
A perusal of the said application will show
that factum of service of summon and
notice were specifically denied and it was
specifically asserted that the petitioners and
opposite paryt no.4 never refused to accept
the summons and notice. It was further
asserted that suit itself was barred by
Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act as the
dispute in respect of plots involved in the
suit had finally being decied by the
Consolidation Authorities and the said suit
was not maintainable in law.

On 14.9.1993 the petitioners also
filed their affidavit for condonation of
delay in moving the application in case it is
found
to
be
delayed.
Against
the
application for setting aside ex parte decree
the opposite party nos.2 and 3 filed an
objection denying the allegation made in
the application.

Learned Trial Court after hearing
both the parties by a detailed order dated
26.8.1994 allowed the application of the
petitioners and set aside the ex parte
judgment and decree dated 22.3.90 and
restored the suit to its original number and
directed the opposite party nos.2 and 3 for
making the necessary amendments in the
plaint and taking steps for service on State
of U.P. and directed the petitioner for filing
written statement on 26.9.94.

The opposite party nos.2 and 3
filed a revision under Section 333 of the
Act before the Commissioner, Lucknow
Division, Lucknow against the order dated
31.8.1994 passed by the learned trial Court.
The said revision was transferred to the
Court of opposite party no.1 who after
hearing both the parties by his impugned
order dated 5.11.1997 erroneously and by
non-speaking order allowed the said
revision and set aside the order dated
31.8.1994 and restored the ex parte the
judgment and decree dated 20.3.90 against
well settled principles of law.

4.
Learned
Senior
Advocate
submits that conclusion of the order is
heartbeat of recording reason and in the
order of the revisional Court, no reason has
been recorded in regard to finding recorded
by the trial Court.

5.
Learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner next submits that the impugned
order passed by the opposite party no.1 is a
non-speaking
order
which
neither
considered the reasons recorded by the
learned trial Court nor recorded his own
reason differing from those of the learned
trial Court.

6.
Learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner next submits that the opposite
party no.1 did not consider that in view of
final
adjudication
made
by
the
consolidation proceeding, the suit was fully
not maintainable and the effect of restoring
the said ex parte judgment and decree will
result in setting at naught the final decision
of the consolidation authorities which is
legally not permissible.
1046 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
7.
Learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner
submits
that
it
is
the
responsibility of the plaintiff to prove that
notice was served which has never been
done at any point of time. It is also
submitted by learned counsel for the
petitioner that newspaper on which reliance
has been placed is only a 'City Edition' and
the petitioner resides in a village Gouri
Bazar, therefore the said paper has no wide
circulation in Gouri Bazar, therefore
presumption cannot be drawn that by
publication notice was assumed to be
served upon the petitioner.

8. In support of his submission,
learned counsel for the petitioenr has
placed
reliance
upon
the
following
judgments.

 "(i) Ramji Dass and others v.
Mohan
Singh
reported
in
MANU/SC/0533/1978

 (ii) Sant Lal Gupta and others v.
Modern
Cooperative
Group
Housing
Society Limited and others reported in
(2010) 13 Supreme Court cases 336
 (iii)
Secretary
and
Curator,
Victoria
Memorial
Hall
v.
Howrah
Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity and others
reported in (2010)3 Supreme Court Cases
732.

 (iv) Maya Devi (Dead) through
Lrs. v. Smt. Raj Kumari Batra (dead)
through L.Rs. And others reported in 2011
(112) RD 372
 (v) Rabindra Singh v. Financial
Commissioner, Cooperation, Punjab and
others reported in (2008) 7 Supreme Court
Cases 663.
 (vi) Babita Kasaudhan v. State of
U.P. and others reported in (2016)2
UPLBEC 1040.
 (vii) Smt. Vinod Rani Lamba and
another v. Babu Ram Yadav and others
reported in 2017 (135) RD 427."

9.
Learned
counsels
for
the
respondents submitted that in view of
provisions contained in Section 27, there is
provision in regard to service of summons
and also relied on the provisions of order 5
rule 20 sub-rule 1(1) and sub-rule 2 and
second proviso to order 9 rule 13 and on
the said basis, submission of learned
counsel for the respondents is that there
was sufficient service of summons upon the
petitioner. They also invited intention on
paragraph 22 of the counter affidavit and
pointed out that through registered post
notices were sent to the private respondents
and publication was made in the daily
newspaper 'Nav Jeevan' dated 7.6.1991,
therefore
notices
upon
the
private
respondents were duly served and in spite
of that, he did not appear in the case and
the case was decided ex parte vide order
dated 20.3.1990.

10. Submission of learned counsel
for the respondents is that the order of the
revisional Court setting aside the order of
the trial Court does not suffer from any
infirmity or illegality. He has rightly
recorded that notices were duly serviced
upon the petitioner and thereafter order was
passed on 22.9.1990, therefore the order
passed was not ex parte and does not suffer
from infirmity or illegally.

11. Submission of learned counsel
for the respondents is that notice of service
was found to be sufficient upon the
defendants who were party to the suit and
thereafter, the order dated 22.3.1990 was
passed which does not suffer from infirmity
or illegality, therefore the revisional Court
has set aside the order passed by the trial
10 All. Pyarey Lal & Ors. Vs. Addl. Commissioner Lko & Ors.
1047
Court setting aside the order dated
22.3.1990.

12.
Learned
counsel
for
the
respondents has placed reliance upon
certain judgment on the point of summons
to be served upon the petitioner which are
given below:

 "(i) Prashant Singh and others v.
Meena and others reported in (2024)6
Supreme Court Cases 818

 (ii) My Palace Mutually Aided
Co-operative Society v. B. Mahesh and
others reported in (2022) 19 Supreme
Court Cases 806.

 (iii) Electrosteel Castings Limited
v. UV Asset Reconstruction Company
Limited and others reported in (2022) 2
Supreme Court cases 573

 (iv) Ram Prakash Agarwal and
another v. Gop Krishan (Dead through Lrs)
and others reported in (2013) 11 Supreme
Court Cases 296

 (v) Vijay Singh v. Shanti Devi and
another reported in (2017)8 Supreme Court
Cases 837

 (vi) Mahabir Singh v. Subhash
and others reported in (2008) 1 Supreme
Court Cases 358

 (vii) Basant Singh and another v.
Roman Catholic Mission reported (2002) 7
Supreme Court Cases 531
 (viii) Parimal v. Veena @ Bharti
reported in (2011) 3 Supreme Court Cases
545
 (ix) Sunil Poddar and others v.
Union Bank of India reported in (2008)2
Supreme Court Cases 326."
13.
Perusal
of
the
material
available on record shows that opposite
party nos.2 and 3 filed a suit for declaration
of their rights in respect of agriculture plots
no.601 and 639 situated at the Village
Gouri. Petitioner and opposite party no.4
moved an application under order 9 rule 13
for setting aside ex parte decree dated
22.3.90. In the year 1975 consolidation
operation took place, in which the right and
title
has
been
finally
decided
by
consolidation authority on 5.5.75. Appeal
and revision also dismissed by the Dy.
Director of Consolidation.

Petitioner
also
filed
their
application for condonation of delay on
14.9.1993.
Opposite
party
also filed
objection. On 26.8.94, the trial Court
allowed the application of the petitioner
and set aside judgment and decree and
restored to suit to its original number and
directed to opposite party no.2 and 3 for
making necessary amendments in the plaint
and directed the petitioners to file written
statement. On 31.8.1994, opposite party
nos.2 and 3 filed a revision under Section
333 of the Act before the Commissioner,
Lucknow
Division,
Lucknow.
On
5.11.1997 the opposite party no.1 allowed
the revision of the opposite party nos.2 and
3 and set aside the order dated 31.8.1994
passed by the learned trial Court and
restored the judgment and decree dated
20.3.90 passed ex parte.

14.
Learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner
relied
upon
the
various
judgments, operative portion of which are
extracted hereinbelow:-

 (i) Ramji Dass (supra):-

 1. An ex parte decree passed
eight years ago was set aside by the court
1048 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
which passed it and the order was
confirmed in revision by the District Court
The High Court, in exercise of its powers
Under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code,
set aside on various grounds. After having
heard counsel, we are inclined to the view
that, as far as possible, Courts' discretion
should be exercised in favour of hearing
and not to shut out hearing. Therefore, we
think that the order of the High Court
should not have been passed in the interests
of Justice which always informs the power
Under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code.
We, therefore, set aside that order and also
the ex parte decree. We direct the trial
court to take back the suit on file and
proceed forthwith to trial. The suit is very
old and it should be disposed of within six
months from the receipt of this order by the
trial court. We further direct that as a
condition for setting aside the ex parte
decree, the Appellants shall pay to the
Respondent, within one month from today a
sum of Rs. 250/- by way of costs.

 (ii) Sant Lal Gupta (supra):-
 27.It
is
a
settled
legal
proposition that not only administrative but
also judicial orders must be supported by
reasons recorded in it. Thus, while
deciding an issue, the court is bound to
give reasons for its conclusion. It is the
duty and obligation on the part of the court
to record reasons while disposing of the
case. The hallmark of order and exercise of
judicial power by a judicial forum is for the
forum to disclose its reasons by itself and
giving of reasons has always been insisted
upon as one of the fundamentals of sound
administration of the justice delivery
system, to make it known that there had
been proper and due application of mind to
the issue before the court and also as an
essential requisite of the principles of
natural justice.
 3. The giving of reasons for a
decision is an essential attribute of judicial
and judicious disposal of a matter before
courts, and which is the only indication to
know about the manner and quality of
exercise undertaken, as also the fact that
the court concerned had really applied its
mind.

 The reason is the heartbeat of
every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an
order and without the same, the order
becomes
lifeless.
Reasons
substitute
subjectivity with objectivity. The absence of
reasons
renders
an
order
indefensible/unsustainable
particularly
when the order is subject to further
challenge
before
a
higher
forum.
Recording of reasons is the principle of
natural justice and every judicial order
must be supported by reasons recorded in
writing. It ensures transparency and
fairness in decision making. The person
who is adversely affected must know why
his application has been rejected.

 (iii)
Secretary
and
Curator,
Victoria Memorail Hall (supra):-

 41. Reason is the heartbeat of
every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an
order and without the same, it becomes
lifeless. Reasons substitute subjectivity by
objectivity. Absence of reasons renders the
order
indefensible/
unsustainable
particularly when the order is subject to
further
challenge
before
a
higher
forum.(Vide Raj Kishore Jha v. State of
Bihar, SCCp. 527, para 19; Vishnu Dev
Sharma v. State of U.P., SAIL v. STO, State
of Uttaranchal v. Sunil Kumar Singh Negi,
U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Jagidsh Prasad Gupta,
Ram Phal v. State of Haryana, Mohd. Yusuf
v. Faij Mohammad and State of H.P. v.
Sada Ram.)
10 All. Pyarey Lal & Ors. Vs. Addl. Commissioner Lko & Ors.
1049
 (iv) Maya Devi (supra):-

 16.In appeal against the order
dated 30-8-1979 passed by the executing
court, the learned Single Judge of the High
Court affirmed the view taken by the
executing court and declared that a
compromise could be recorded even in
execution proceedings and that the bald
allegations suggesting a fraud were wholly
untenable. The dismissal of the letters
patent appeal and the special leave petition
against the said orders by this Court has
placed all these aspects beyond the pale of
any further challenge or controversy. It
follows that all contentions relating to the
validity of the confirmation of sale in
favour of the decree-holder and the issue of
a sale certificate in her favour which stand
finally determined against the appellants in
terms of the judgments and orders of the
executing court and the High Court in the
first round, stand concluded and cannot be
reagitated. Reliance upon the decisions of
this Court cited by Mr Kapoor, is therefore
of no assistance to him.

 17.In the second round which
started with a fresh set of objections raised
by the judgment-debtor, the executing court
once again examined the matter and
rejected the objections by an order dated
25-9-1984. The executing court held that
the questions raised by the judgment-debtor
stood answered by the earlier orders
passed by the executing court and upheld
by the High Court in appeal. The
contention that the compromise between
the parties extinguished the decree and was
a complete adjustment within the meaning
of Order 21 Rule 2 was also repelled. The
court held that the decree continued to
subsist till the judgment-debtor delivered
possession of the premises in terms of the
compromise. The court accordingly issued
warrants for delivery of possession to the
decree-holder. It is common ground that
the view taken by the executing court in the
said order has also attained finality as no
appeal or other proceedings were filed
against the same. In the above background,
any effort to rekindle the controversy
surrounding aspects which stand finally
decided must necessarily fail.

 (v) Rabindra Singh (supra):-

 18.The
Tahsildar,
in
his
judgment, has resorted to a peculiar logic.
According to him, the provisions of review
were attracted and not under Order 9 Rule
13
for
setting
aside
the
ex
parte
proceeding. Even if that be so, the ex parte
decree, in our opinion, could have been set
aside. He could have exercised his power
of review. The commentary on which
reliance was placed, was made on the basis
of
a
decision
of
the
Financial
Commissioner
inHukam
Chandv.Malak Ram[(1932) 11 Lah
LT 42] . The said decision, with respect,
does not lay down the correct law. All
courts in a situation of this nature have the
incidental power to set aside an ex parte
order on the ground of violation of the
principles of natural justice. We will deal
with this aspect of the matter a little later.

 25.Knowledge on the part of the
constituted attorney would not be such
which would come on the way of the
appellant in maintaining an application for
setting aside an ex parte decree. Such a
contention
cannot
be
raised
in
a
proceeding for setting aside an ex parte
decree. The Collector as also the Financial
Commissioner, therefore, while exercising
their appellate and revisional jurisdiction
respectively posed unto themselves wrong
questions and, thus, misdirected themselves
1050 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
in law. The Commissioner, as also the High
Court, in our opinion, committed a serious
error insofar as they proceeded on the
basis that the appellant had not suffered
any prejudice.

 (vi) Babita Kasaudhan (supra):-

 23.A bare reading of proviso
goes to show that where the conditions
mentioned
therein
are
satisfied,
the
president of the municipality shall cease to
perform and discharge financial and
administrative
powers
until
he
is
exonerated of charges mentioned in the
notice
till
the
finalization
of
the
proceedings. In order to attract the
proviso, the conditions required to be
fulfilled are:

 (i) State Government must have
reason to believe that allegations do not
appear to be groundless.

 (ii) State Government must have
reason to believe that president isprima
facieguilty of any of the grounds
contained in the sub-section which has
resulted into the proceedings for removal.

 (iii) Notice to show cause must
contain the charges.

 29.In
the
case
ofRavi
Yashwant
Bhoirv.Collector1,
the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of removal
of
president,
has
reiterated
that
proceedings are quasi-judicial in nature
and has emphasized on recording of
reasons as follows:

 43.
InKrishna
Swamiv.Union of India, this Court
observed that the rule of law requires that
any action or decision of a statutory or
public authority must be founded on the
reason stated in the order or borne-out
from the record. The Court further
observed:

 47. Reasons are the links
between the material, the foundation for
their erection and the actual conclusions.
They would also demonstrate how the mind
of the maker was activated and actuated
and their rational nexus and synthesis with
the facts considered and the conclusions
reached. Lest it would be arbitrary, unfair
and unjust, violating Article 14 or unfair
procedure offending Article 21.

 44. This Court while deciding the
issue inSant Lal Guptav.Modern
Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd2,
placing reliance on its various earlier
judgment held as under:

 27. It is a settled legal
proposition that not only administrative but
also judicial order must be supported by
reasons, recorded in it. Thus, while
deciding an issue, the Court is bound to
give reasons for its conclusion. It is the
duty and obligation on the part of the Court
to record reasons while disposing of the
case. The hallmark of order and exercise of
judicial power by a judicial forum is for the
forum to disclose its reasons by itself and
giving of reasons has always been insisted
upon as one of the fundamentals of sound
administration of the justice delivery
system, to make it known that there had
been proper and due application of mind to
the issue before the Court and also as an
essential requisite of the principles of
natural justice.

 3. The giving of reasons for a
decision is an essential attribute of Judicial
and judicious disposal of a matter before
10 All. Pyarey Lal & Ors. Vs. Addl. Commissioner Lko & Ors.
1051
Courts, and which is the only indication to
know about the manner and quality of
exercise undertaken, as also the fact that
the Court concerned had really applied its
mind.

 The reason is the heartbeat of
every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an
order and without the same, the order
becomes
lifeless.
Reasons
substitute
subjectivity with objectivity. The absence of
reasons
renders
an
order
indefensible/unsustainable
particularly
when the order is subject to further
challenge
before
a
higher
forum.
Recording of reasons is principle of natural
justice and every judicial order must be
supported by reasons recorded in writing.
It ensures transparency and fairness in
decision
making.The
person
who
is
adversely affected must know why his
application has been rejected.

 45. InInstitute of Chartered
Accountants of Indiav.L.K. Ratna1, this
Court held that on charge of misconduct
the authority holding the inquiry must
record reasons for reaching its conclusion
and record clear findings. The Court
further held:

 30. In fairness and justice, the
member is entitled to know why he has
been found guilty. The case can be so
serious that it can attract the harsh
penalties provided by the Act. Moreover,
the member has been given a right of
appeal to the High Court under section 22A of the Act. The exercise his right of
appeal effectively he must know the basis
on which the Council has found him guilty.
We have already pointed out that a finding
by the Council is the first determinative
finding on the guilt of the member. It is a
finding by a Tribunal of first instance. The
conclusion of the Disciplinary Committee
does not enjoy the status of a finding.
Moreover, the reasons contained in the
report by the Disciplinary Committee for
its conclusion may or may not constitute
the basis of the finding rendered by the
Council. The Council must, therefore, state
the reasons for its finding.

 46. The emphasis on recording
reason is that if the decision reveals the
inscrutable face of the sphinx, it can be
its silence, render it virtually im possible
for the Courts to perform their appellate
function or exercise the power of judicial
review in adjudging the validity of the
decision.
Right
to
reason
is
an
indispensable part of a sound judicial
system, reasons at least sufficient to
indicate an application of mind of the
authority
before
the
Court.
Another
rationale is that the affected party can
know why the deci sion has gone against
him. One of the salutary requirements of
natural jus tice is spelling out reasons for
the order made. In other words, a speaking
out, the inscrutable face of the sphinx is
ordinarily incongruous with a judi cial or
quasi-judicial performance."

 35.This view finds support from
the following observations of the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case ofKrishna
Swamiv.Union of India1, that the
Rule of law requires that an action or
decision of a statutory or public authority
must be founded on the reason stated in the
order or borne-out from the record.

 Part IX A of the Constitution
contains provisions in relation to munici
palities introduced by 74th Amendment to
the Constitution. Municipalities are local
self-Government having a constitutional
status having well defined powers, duties
1052 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and responsibilities. They are institutions
of self-governance having been conferred
with the degree of autonomy. They are not
merity ad ministrative agency of the State
and, thus, the control which the agencies of
the State exercise over institutions of local
self-Government must conform to the
constitutional
standards.
InRavi
Yashwant Bhoir(supra), the Hon'ble Apex
Court while emphasising the importance
of Parts IX and IX-A of the Constitution in
respect of position of the elected head of a
local self-governing institution, observed as
follows:

 Amendment in the Constitution
by adding Parts IX and IX-A confers upon
the local self-Government a complete
autonomy on the basic democratic unit
unshackled from official control. Thus,
exercise of any power having effect of
destroying the Constitutional institution
besides being outrageous is dangerous to
the democratic set-up of this country.
Therefore,
an
elected
official
cannot_be_permitted
to
be
removed
unceremoniously without following the
procecdure prescribed by law, in violation
of the provisions of Article 21 of the
Constitution, by the State by adopting a
casual
approach
and
resorting
to
manipulations to achieve ulterior purpose.
The Court being the custodian of law
cannot tolerate any attempt to thwart the
institution.

 Dealing with the aspect of
observing the principles of natural justice,
the Supreme Court held that:

 There can also be no quarrel
with the settled legal proposition that
removal of a duly elected member on the
basis of proved misconduct is a quasijudicial
proceeding
in
nature.
[Vide:Indian
National
Congress
(I)v.Institute of Social Welfare]. This
view stands further fortified by the
Constitution Bench judgments of this Court
inBachhitar
Singhv.State
of
PunjabandUnion
of
Indiav.H.C.
Goel. Therefore, the principles of natural
justice are required to be given full play
and strid compliance should be ensured,
even in the absence of any provision
providing for the same. Principles of
natural justice require a fair opportunity of
defence to such an elected office bearer.

 (vii) Smt. Vinod Rani Lamba
(supra):-

 5.have
considered
the
arguments of Counsel for the parties and
examined the record. It is admitted that
there was no personal service of the
summons and service of summons has been
effected through publication, which is
substituted service. Within the meaning of
Explanation to Article 123 of Limitation
Act, it is not due service. On the basis of
publication, the presumption regarding
service was made. Bench of three Hon'ble
Judges of Supreme Court inPuumda
Venkates-wara
Raov.Chidamam
Venkata Ramarn,1had held that the
presumption stood rebutted on its denial. In
this case, the petitioner has denied service
of summons or knowledge of the suit, thus,
on denial, the presumption stood rebutted
and burden shifted upon the plaintiffrespondents to prove that summons were
served upon them, but the plain-tiffrespondents could not lead any evidence in
this respect. This judgment has been
followed
subsequently
inA.
Rama
Raov.Raghunath Patnaik,2State of
West
Bengalv.E.1.T.A
India
Ltd.,3V.S. Krishmnv.M/s. Westfort
Hi-Tech
Hospital
Ltd.1andM.S.
10 All. Pyarey Lal & Ors. Vs. Addl. Commissioner Lko & Ors.
1053
Madhusoodhananv.Kerala
Kaumudi
Pvt.
Ltd..2The
Counsel
for
the
respondents relied upon the judgment of
this Court inMohd. Sadabv.Naseetn
Ahmad,3in which, it has been held that
the presumption could not be rebutted on
denial. The law laid down in this case is
contrary to the law laid down by Supreme
Court in the aforementioned case, which
has
been
subsequently
followed
in
aforementioned four cases. This Court
respectfully
disagrees
to
follow
the
judgment of Hon'ble Single Judge.

 8.In the result, the petition
succeeds and is allowed. The orders of
Additional Civil Judge (JD), Kanpur Nagar
dated 28.8.2015 as well as Additional
District Judge dated 19.1.2016, are set
aside. Theex partedecree passed in O.S.
No. 813/2012 dated 30.11.2013 is also set
aside. The suit is restored to its original
number.

15.
Learned
counsel
for
the
respondents relied upon the following
judgment:

 (i) Prashant Singh (supra):-
 13.The object of the 1953 Act is
to prevent fragmentation of the land
holdings and consolidate them in such a
fair and equitable manner that each tenureholder gets nearly equivalent land rights in
the
same
revenue
estate
[Attar
Singhv.State of U.P., 1958 SCC OnLine
SC 165 : 1959 Supp (1) SCR 928, para 3 :
AIR 1959 SC 564] . The duty of a
Consolidation Officer under Section 49 of
the 1953 Act is to prevent fragmentation
and consolidate the different parcels of
land of a tenure-holder. Such a power can
be exercised only in respect of those
persons who are already the tenure-holders
of the land. Conversely, the power under
Section 49 of the 1953 Act cannot be
exercised to take away the vested title of a
tenure-holder. No such jurisdiction is
conferred upon a Consolidation Officer or
any other authority under the 1953 Act
[Amar Nathv.Kewla Devi, (2014) 11
SCC 273, para 17 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 85]
.

 14.The power to declare the
ownership in an immovable property can
be exercised only by a civil court save and
except when such jurisdiction is barred
expressly or by implication under a law.
Section 49 of the 1953 Act does not and
cannot be construed as a bar on the
jurisdiction of the civil court to determine
the ownership rights.

 15.Having held so, it is not
difficult to explain that Kalyan Singh had
acquired ancestral rights as a tenureholder. He was co-owner in the suit land
much before the consolidation proceedings
commenced. Hence, the only declaration
and adjudication of rights of Ramji Lal or
Kalyan Singh that a Consolidation Officer
could undertake under Section 49 of the
1953 Act was to avoid the fragmentation of
their
respective
land
holdings
and
consolidate or redistribute the parcels of
land among them. As analysed above, the
provision
does
not
enable
the
Consolidation Officer to grant ownership
to Ramji Lal in respect of a property,
which,
before
the
consolidation
proceedings, never vested in him. Vice
versa, the Consolidation Officer could not
take away the ownership rights of Kalyan
Singh which he had already inherited much
before
the
commencement
of
the
consolidation proceedings.

 (ii) My Palace Mutually Aided
Co-operative Society (supra):-
1054 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
 29.The
respondents
in
the
present case had access to recourse under
Section 96CPC, which allows for appeals
from an original decree. It must be
remembered that the present matter was
being heard by the High Court exercising
its original jurisdiction. The High Court
was in effect conducting a trial, and the
final decree passed by the High Court on
19-9-2013
[Anish
Constructions
Co.v.Sultan Jahan Begum, Application
No.