# Radhey Shyam Revisionist v. Nagina Devi & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 1 ILRA 1336
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-01-03
- **Case number:** Civil Revision No. 48 of 2022
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/radhey-shyam-revisionist-v-nagina-devi-ors-49121
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Sri Ankur Mehrotra

Motor Accident Claim-Orders from Motor
Accident Claims Tribunals - Not classified as
appealable awards - Revisions questions the
1 All. Radhey Shyam Vs. Nagina Devi & Ors.
1337
maintainability of invoking Section 115 of the
C.P.C against these orders - Civil Revision No.
66 Challenges the refusal to set aside an exparte award - Civil Revision No. 48 contests the
condonation of delay in restoring a dismissed
claim - The court examines conflicting opinions
on whether a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is
a Court subordinate to the High Court,
concluding that the Full Bench decision in Kamla
Yadav is binding precedent, rendering the
revisions maintainable - Court declines to
reconsider
Kamla
Yadav,
emphasizing
its
principled reasoning - The Civil Revisions are
held maintainable, and further proceedings are
scheduled.

List of Cases cited:

## Text

1336 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
jurisdiction. The proceedings for execution
of a decree are not excepted. The
provisions of Section 105(1) of the Code
would, therefore, apply, and, in any case,
would apply on principle, if not proprio
vigore.

15. The principle behind Section 105(1)
of the Code is to enable a party to challenge
interlocutory orders passed during the course
of a suit or other proceedings against the final
order or the decree, which the party against
whom these orders are made, thinks are
erroneous, defective or irregular and further
prejudices his interest. By enabling a party to
challenge such interlocutory orders while
challenging the final decree or order, the
inevitable delay that would be caused in
laying challenges to all kinds of prejudicial
orders, that are passed during the course of
proceedings, can be obviated. The purpose of
it all is to eschew delay and speed up
conclusion of the trial or other proceedings.
But, at the same time, orders passed during
the course of proceedings, that are prejudicial
to a party, are still left open to be challenged
in an appeal or revision from the final order,
if that also goes against the party suffering
interlocutory
reverses.
The
provision
balances the competing interest of an
expeditious conclusion of proceedings on the
one hand, with rectification of errors
committed during the course of it, on the
other.

16. In our opinion, therefore, looking to
the
nature
of
the
impugned
orders
24.01.2022, 03.03.2022 and 05.03.2022, a
single revision can be maintained by the
revisionist.

17. There is another pragmatic angle of
looking at the worth of the respondent's
objection. By the order dated 05.03.2022, the
execution has been struck off in full
satisfaction. If the revisionist were asked to
file separate revision from all the three
orders, any of these cannot be individually
heard or may even be maintainable unless all
the three orders are challenged through
separate revisions and all the revisions heard
together. The orders impugned are all but part
of one challenge by the revisionist, arising
out of the same execution.

18. In the considered opinion of this
Court, therefore, the objection regarding
maintainability raised by Mr. Sahai, cannot
be sustained. The revision is, accordingly,
held to be maintainable.

19. Considering the fact that the
revision has not been heard on merits, let it be
listed for admission on 06.01.2023 at 2:00
p.m. Liberty to mention is granted to the
revisionist.
----------
(2023) 1 ILRA 1336
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.01.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Civil Revision No. 48 of 2022
And
Civil Revision No. 66 of 2022

Radhey Shyam ...Revisionist
Versus
Nagina Devi & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Prakhar Saran Srivastava

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
Sri Ankur Mehrotra

Motor Accident Claim-Orders from Motor
Accident Claims Tribunals - Not classified as
appealable awards - Revisions questions the
1 All. Radhey Shyam Vs. Nagina Devi & Ors.
1337
maintainability of invoking Section 115 of the
C.P.C against these orders - Civil Revision No.
66 Challenges the refusal to set aside an exparte award - Civil Revision No. 48 contests the
condonation of delay in restoring a dismissed
claim - The court examines conflicting opinions
on whether a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is
a Court subordinate to the High Court,
concluding that the Full Bench decision in Kamla
Yadav is binding precedent, rendering the
revisions maintainable - Court declines to
reconsider
Kamla
Yadav,
emphasizing
its
principled reasoning - The Civil Revisions are
held maintainable, and further proceedings are
scheduled.

List of Cases cited:

1. Orissa Co-operative Insurance Comp. (now)
New India Assurance Company Limited Vs
Subashini Pradhan & ors.

2. Beeran Vs Rajappan

3. Barkat Singh & ors. Vs Hans Raj Pandit &
ors.

4. Satish Chandra & ors. Vs St. of U. P. through
the Collector, Farrukhabad

5. Smt. Afsari Begum Vs Oriental Fire and
General Insurance Company & ors.

6. Kamla Yadav Vs Smt. Sushma Devi & ors.

7. Om Prakash & anr. Vs Rukmani Devi & ors.

8. Mussamant Afsari Begum Vs Oriental Fire and
General Insurance Co.

9. U.O.I., represented by its Secretary, Railway
Board, New Delhi & ors. Vs Mysore Paper Mills
Ltd., Bhadravathi, Karnataka St. & ors.

10. Oriental Insurance Comp. Ltd. through
Divisional Manager, Meerut Vs Smt. Manju &
ors.

11. New India Assurance Comp. Ltd. Vs Rakesh
Kumar & ors.

12. U.P. St. Road Transport Corp. Vs Lajwat

13. Sandhya Vaish & ors. Vs New India
Insurance Com. Ltd. & ors.

14. ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company
Vs Smt. Ramawat

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

These Civil Revisions arise out of
orders passed by the Presiding Officers of
the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals at
Ballia and Chandauli that are not awards
amenable to appeal under Section 173 of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 19881. The
revisions were not formally connected, but
since both involve an identical question
about maintainability, the issue is being
dealt with by a common order.

2. Civil Revision No. 66 of 2022
preferred under Section 115 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 19082 challenges an order
passed by the Presiding Officer, Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal, Ballia in Misc.
Case No. 22 of 2019, refusing to set aside
the ex-parte award dated 22.12.2018 passed
in Motor Accident Claims Petition No. 44
of 2022.

3. By the order impugned in Civil
Revision No. 48 of 2022, the revisionist has
invoked this Court's jurisdiction under
Section 115 of the Code to set aside the
order dated 18.10.2021 passed by the
Presiding Officer, Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal, Chandauli in Misc. Case No. 93
of 2018, whereby the Tribunal has
condoned a delay of four years and nine
months by the claimants in making an
application to restore Motor Accident
Claims Petition No. 104 of 2010, that was
dismissed in default on 10.12.2013. This
Court, noticing some conflict of opinion
about the maintainability of a civil revision
under Section 115 of the Code against an
order passed by Motor Accident Claims
1338 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Tribunal constituted under the Act, asked
the learned Counsel appearing for the
revisionists in both matters to address us on
the issue of maintainability.

4. Mr. Vikrant Pandey, learned
Counsel for the revisionist has been heard
in Civil Revision No. 66 of 2022 and Mr.
Prakhar Saran Srivastava, learned Counsel
for the revisionist in Civil Revision No. 48
of 2022. Both the learned Counsel have
been heard only on the question of
maintainability.

5. In yesteryears and in different
Courts, there has been conflict of opinion
whether a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal
constituted under the Act or the Tribunal
functioning under the Motor Vehicles Act,
1939 is a Court subordinate to the High
Court within the meaning of Section 115(1)
of the Code, so as to make an order passed
by the Tribunal amenable to the High
Court's jurisdiction in a Civil Revision.
Much of the reasoning in those decisions
has centered around the distinction between
a Court and a Tribunal. It has also been
considered
in
those
decisions
what
subordination of a Court means in the
context of Section 115 of the Code. In
particular, notice has been taken of Section
3 of the Code, which defines the
subordination of Courts.

6. Amongst older decisions holding
that the Tribunal constituted under the Act
is not a Court subordinate to the High
Court for the purpose of Section 115 of the
Code are those of a Division Bench of the
Orissa High Court in Orissa Cooperative Insurance Company (now)
New India Assurance Company Limited
v. Subashini Pradhan and others3; a
Division Bench of the Kerela High Court in
Beeran v. Rajappan4 and of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court in Barkat Singh
and others v. Hans Raj Pandit and
others5. In our Court also, there is a
decision by a learned Single Judge, holding
that under the Motor Vehicles Act, 19396,
the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is not
a Civil Court subordinate to the High
Court, within the meaning of Section 115
of the Code. The said decision is Satish
Chandra and others v. State of Uttar
Pradesh
through
the
Collector,
Farrukhabad7. In Smt. Afsari Begum v.
Oriental Fire and General Insurance
Company and others8 a Division Bench
of this Court opined that the Claims
Tribunal being a Civil Court was amenable
to the revisional jurisdiction under Section
115 of the Code. In Kamla Yadav v. Smt.
Sushma Devi and others9 a learned Single
Judge of this Court opined that the Division
Bench in Afsari Begum (supra) had not
noticed the provision of Section 3 of the
Code and Section 110-C (2) of the Act of
1939 while holding that the Tribunal under
the Act of 1939 is a Court subordinate to
the High Court. The learned Single Judge,
accordingly, referred the matter to a Full
Bench. In due course, the matter came up
before a Division Bench for consideration.
The Division Bench noticed that the
learned Single Judge had not considered
the later Bench decision of this Court in
Om Prakash and another v. Rukmani
Devi and others10. The Division Bench in
Om Prakash (supra) held that the Tribunal
is not a Court and is a creature of a special
statute. It does not enjoy the status of a
Civil Court and its orders are, therefore, not
amenable to appeal under Order XLIII of
the Code. The Division Bench, before
whom the reference by the learned Single
Judge in Kamla Yadav (supra) came up,
directed the matter to be laid before a Full
Bench to resolve the conflict of opinion
between the Division Bench in Afsari
1 All. Radhey Shyam Vs. Nagina Devi & Ors.
1339
Begum and the Division Bench in Om
Prakash. The following questions were
referred for opinion of the Full Bench, as
would appear from the report of the
decision in Kamla Yadav :

Whether
Claims
Tribunal
constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act is
a subordinate Civil Court within the
meaning of Section 115 of the Code of
Civil Procedure?

Whether in view of the provision
of Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure
for the purposes of the Civil Procedure
Code only the Courts referred to in Section
3 are the Civil Courts subordinate to the
High Court and the District Court as the
case may be and no other i.e. the authorities
and that Tribunals such as one constituted
under Motor Vehicles Act do not come
within the framework of expression "Courts
subordinate to High Court" for the purpose
of Section 115 of the Code?

Whether the view expressed by the
Division Bench in Mussamant Afsari Begum
v. Oriental Fire and General Insurance
Company, reported in (1979 ALJ page 1168)
to the effect that Claims Tribunal constituted
under Motor Vehicles Act is a Court
subordinate to High Court and its orders are
amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the High
Court under Section 115 of the Code is in
consonance with the letter and spirit of
provisions of Section 115 read with Section 3
of the Code of Civil Procedure as well as
provisions of Motor Vehicles Act and in
particular Section 110-C(2) Motor Vehicles
Act, if not, is the present revision maintainable
in this Court? If not, is it open to this Court to
entertain, hear and dispose of the same under
Article 227 of the Constitution?

7. Their Lordships of the Full Bench
answered
the
questions
referred,
in
Paragraph No. 32 of the report thus :

Our answer to question No. 1 is
in affirmative, that a revision lies against an
order of the Motor Accidents Claims
Tribunal. Our answer to question No. 2 is
that the Courts mentioned in Section 3 CPC
are not the only Civil Courts, other Courts
and Tribunals can also be Civil Courts
subordinate to the High Court, for the
purposes of Section 115 CPC. Our answer
to question No. 3 is that the judgment
rendered in the case of Mussamat Afsari
Begum v. Oriental Fire &
General
Assurance Company. 1979 ALJ 1168, has
been rightly decided and is approved.
Hence, the question of invoking Article 227
of the Constitution of India does not arise.

8. The issue was settled by the Full
Bench of this Court in the year 1997 and
the controversy ought to have come to a
quietus8. A Full Bench of the Karnataka
High Court in Union of India, represented
by its Secretary, Railway Board, New
Delhi and others v. Mysore Paper Mills
Limited, Bhadravathi, Karnataka State
and others11 was confronted with the
question whether a Tribunal constituted
under the Act was a Court subordinate to
the High Court within the meaning of
Section 115 of the Code. Their Lordship of
the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court
in Mysore Paper Mills (supra) held that
the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal
established under the Act is not a Court
subordinate to the High Court for the
purpose of Section 115 of the Code.
Noticing the said decision, a Division
Bench of this Court in Oriental Insurance
Company Limited through Divisional
Manager, Meerut v. Smt. Manju and
others12 of course, for added reasons, but
without noticing the Full Bench decision of
our Court in Kamla Yadav (supra) noted
with approval, the view of the Full Bench
of the Karnataka High Court that the
1340 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Tribunal was not a Court subordinate to the
High Court for the purpose of Section 115
of the Code. The decision of the Division
Bench in Smt. Manju (supra) was not as
such about the maintainability of a civil
revision, but about the maintainability of a
First Appeal From Order from an order of
the Tribunal that was not an award and
appealable under Section 173 of the Act.
Nevertheless, the point was discussed and
the decision of the Full Bench of the
Karnataka High Court referred to with
approval.

9. Drawing inspiration from the
decision of the Division Bench in Smt.
Manju and the Full Bench of the
Karnataka High Court in Mysore Paper
Mills, a learned Single Judge of this Court
in Virendra Yadav v. Ramesh and
another13 proceeded to hold :

19. In the light of recent apex
court judgement (supra), and keeping in
view the apex court judgements relied
upon in the five-Judge judgement, the
Division Bench judgement leaves no
scope for revisional jurisdiction to be
invoked under Section 115 CPC against
interlocutory orders passed by the
Tribunals unless prescribed under the
Special Act. The view taken seems to be a
good law for more than one reason. Firstly,
restricting
the
remedy
against
the
judgements passed by Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal to appeal under Section
173 of the Act implies that other remedies
are barred particularly when Section 169
read with Rule 221 framed thereunder
narrow down the application of the
provisions of CPC. Secondly, if the
intention of legislation on the aspect of
remedies before this court is understood on
the criteria of treating the Tribunal to be a
''court' then in that event, the requirement
of specifying the remedy of appeal under
Section 173 of the Act would stand
obliterated and the provisions of Section 96
CPC will automatically apply.

 (emphasis by Court)

10. The same view was taken by a
learned Single Judge in Prabhakar Tiwari
v. Shiv Ram and others14 holding a
revision against an interlocutory order of
the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal not
maintainable under Section 115 of the
Code. At the same time, there were other
decisions where the Full Bench in Kamla
Yadav was followed and orders of the
Motor Accident Claims Tribunal that were
not appealable were held amenable to the
revisional jurisdiction of this Court under
Section 115 of the Code. These are
decisions of learned Single Judges of this
Court in New India Assurance Company
Limited v. Rakesh Kumar and others15;
U.P. State Road Transport Corporation
v. Lajwati16; and Sandhya Vaish and
others v. New India Insurance Company
Limited and others17. Some conflict of
opinion appears to have emerged post
decision of the Full Bench in Kamla
Yadav on account of the decision of the
Division Bench in Smt. Manju following
the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court
in Mysore Paper Mills, and some
conflicting opinions of learned Single
Judges
about
the
issue
whether
an
interlocutory order of the Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal constituted under the Act
is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of
this Court, or so to speak, whether the
Tribunal established and constituted under
the Act is a Court subordinate to the High
Court for the purpose of Section 115 of the
Code. A reference on this issue in the form
of two questions was made to a larger
Bench by a learned Single Judge at the
Lucknow Bench of this Court in ICICI
1 All. Radhey Shyam Vs. Nagina Devi & Ors.
1341
Lombard General Insurance Company
v. Smt. Ramawati18. The questions
referred to the larger Bench in ICICI
Lombard General Insurance Company
(supra) read :

31. In the background stated
above and to settle the position, the
following
questions
are
framed
for
reference to the Larger Bench/Full Bench:

''(i) Whether in absence of an
enabling
provision,
the
Full
Bench
judgement in the case of Kamla Yadav v.
Shushma Devi and others, 2004 (22) LCD
40, would hold the field in contradiction to
the Apex Court judgements relied upon in
the Division Bench judgement rendered in
the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Manju and others, 2007 (2) AWC 1927; and
as to whether the view taken by this Court
in the case of Virendra Yadav v. Ramesh
and another (Civil Revision No. 102 of
2016) and similar view expressed in
Prabhakar Tiwari v. Shiv Ram was rightly
obliterated by the learned Single Judge in
the case of U.P. State Road Transport
Corporation v. Lajwati by holding that the
Full Bench view taken in the case of
Kamla Yadav v. Sushma Devi would alone
be applicable and followed.

(ii) Whether the exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code
of Civil Procedure by this Court in absence
of an enabling provision under the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 is permissible treating
the Tribunal to be a sub-ordinate Court
within the meaning of Section 3 CPC''.

11. Before the said questions could be
placed before a larger Bench, the revision,
wherein the order was made, came to be
decided by the Court. The questions were
never laid before a larger Bench. These
facts appear from the order dated dated
14.07.2017 passed on C.M. Application
No. 95241 of 2017 in Civil Revision No.
49 of 2015, which was an application for
modification/clarification of the judgement
and order dated 06.04.2017, making the
reference to a larger Bench.

12. The result was that the reference
made
in
ICICI
Lombard
General
Insurance Company was not answered.
The question before this Court is : Whether
the view of the Full Bench in Kamla
Yadav that a Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal constituted under the Act is a
Court subordinate to the High Court within
the meaning of Section 115 of the Code
requires reconsideration? This Court does
not think that it would be in keeping with
the settled principles regarding adherence
to binding precedent about making a
reference
to
a
larger
Bench
for
reconsideration, if the issues settled by the
Full Bench in Kamla Yadav were again
referred. Much doubt could be thrown up
regarding the correctness of the decision in
Kamla Yadav and the Full Bench of the
Karnataka High Court in Mysore Paper
Mills may be a strong inspiration to do that.
But, it can be nothing more than an
inspiration. A reading of the statute also,
particularly the provisions of Section 3 of
the Code and Rule 221 of the Rules framed
under the Act, which applies only certain
provisions of the Code to proceedings
before the Tribunal, may present an alluring
proposition to think that the Full Bench
decision in Kamla Yadav ought to be
reconsidered. But, on principle, nothing
appears
to
this
Court
to
be
so
fundamentally wrong about the reasoning
of the Full Bench to persuade this Court to
make a reference to a larger Bench on the
lines it was done by the learned Single
Judge
in
ICICI
Lombard
General
Insurance Company. In the opinion of this
1342 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Court, the Full Bench decision of this Court
in Kamla Yadav is binding precedent.
There is nothing for this Court not to go by
it.

13.

The
Civil
Revisions
are,
accordingly, held maintainable.

14. Since orders were reserved in
these
revisions
on
the
point
of
maintainability, when these came up before
the Court as fresh causes, lay both these
matters as fresh on 13.01.2023.

15. The interim orders passed in both
the revisions shall continue to remain in
operation till the next date of listing.
----------
(2023) 1 ILRA 1342
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 20.12.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE UMESH CHANDRA SHARMA, J.

Civil Revision No. 36 of 2017

Smt. Ratni Devi & Ors. ...Revisionist
Versus
Smt. Asha Hans ...Respondents

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Rakesh Kumar Gupta

Counsel for the Respondents:

Civil Law - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 -
Revision challenging declaratory suit - nullifying
a sale deed - Issues of improper valuation and
insufficient court fees - Emphasized valuation
based on land revenue - Criticized rejection of
amendment application - Directing lower court
to reconsider application.

Revision allowed. (E-9)
List of Cases cited:

1. Ran Vijay & anr. Vs Board of Revenue & anr.
2017 (1) C.A.R 815 Alld

2. Indal Kumar Kushwaha & anr. Vs Rajesh
Kumar Gupta & ors. 2008 A.C.J. 838

3. M/S Laxmi Sugar & Oil Mills Ltd. Hardoi & ors.
Vs St. of U.P. & anr. 2010 (111) RD 617

4. Anuruddha Kumar & anr. Vs Chief Controlling
Revenue Authority & anr. 2000 A.C.J 1397

5. Ganga Vs Vijay A.I.R 1974 S.C. 1126

6. Pirgonda Vs Kalgonda A.I.R. 1957 S.C 363

7. Ram Chandra Sakharam Vs Damodar (2007)
6 S.C.C 737

8. Rajesh Vs K.K. Modi, A.I.R 2006 SC 1647

(Delivered by Hon'ble Umesh Chandra
Sharma, J.)

1. This civil revision has been filed
against the judgement and order dated
23.11.2016 passed by the Additional Civil
Judge (Senior Division), Court No.6,
Meerut in Original Suit No.846 of 2014
(Smt. Ratni Devi Vs. Smt. Asha Hans).

2. In brief facts of the case are that
revisionist, Smt. Ratni Devi filed a suit for
declaratory decree to declare the sale deed
dated 07.05.2014 null and void registered
in the office of Sub-Registrar, Mawana,
District Meerut and to send its information
to the concerned Sub-Registrar.

3. According to the plaint and the
revision, Smt. Ratni Devi (now deceased)
was the owner and Bhumidhar with
transferable rights of khasra no.460 area
0.5060 hectare and khasra no.462 area
0.4430
hectare
situated
in
Village
Himaunpur, Pargana Hastinapur, Tehsil