# Raghunath Goel Revisionist v. Yogendra Singh Nehru

- **Citation:** (2015) 1 ILRA 406
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2015-04-03
- **Case number:** Civil Revision No. 404 of 2011
- **Bench:** Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/raghunath-goel-revisionist-v-yogendra-singh-nehru-43173
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Small Causes Court Act 1887-Section-25Revision-against order passed by Small
Causes Court-suit for arrears of rent and
eviction
decreed-rate
of
rent
and
executing
of
rent
deed-admittedwhether entire Chaudhary Bhawan or its
part-was under tenantry-being question
of fact-can not be adjudicated in revision
finding based on evidence available on
record-no interference called for.
Held: Para-29
In view of the above the next question
arises that whether this Court should
exercise its jurisdiction under Section 25
to set aside finding of facts recorded by
the
court
below.
For
the
reasons
recorded above, I find that the court
below has recorded finding of facts
against the tenant which are based on
relevant evidence on record. The learned
counsel for the revisionist failed to point
1 All] Raghunath Goel Vs. Yogendra Singh Nehru
407
out that the findings are not based on
evidence
of
record.
The
scope
of
interference under revisional jurisdiction
under Section 25 came to be considered
in long line of decisions of the Supreme
Court and this Court.
Case Law discussed:
(2008) 8 SCC 564; (2012) 8 SCC 516; (2000) 6
SCC 394; 1981 ARC 545; 1996 (2) ARC 532;
1996 (2) ARC 561; 1999 (1) ACJ 54; 1999 (1)
ACJ 431; 1999 (2) ACJ 990; AIR 1969 SC
1344; AIR 1987 SC 1782; (2002) 3 SCC 626;
(2014) 9 SCC 78; (1980) 4 SCC 259.

## Text

406
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and the Rules made thereunder. As noted
hereinbefore `Note' to sub rule (5) of Rule
12
of
1998
Rules
prescribes
the
requirement of experience for the post,
which is different from what is prescribed
in the said Appendix A and, therefore,
there being a conflict between the two
provisions, in the teeth of Section 32, the
said `Note' shall have an overriding effect
over Appendix A insofar as the question
of experience is concerned."
18. The judgment of the Supreme
Court, therefore, is a clear answer to
submission which has been urged on
behalf of the appellant. The Supreme
Court observed that the Note to sub-rule 5
of Rule 12 of the Rules of 1998
prescribed the requirement of experience
for the post which was different from
what was prescribed in the Regulations
framed
under
the
Act
of
1921.
Consequently, the Note would have an
overriding effect insofar as the question of
experience was concerned. .
19. In view of this legal position, we
would have to hold, though for the
reasons which we have indicated, that
there is no merit in the challenge to the
view which has been taken by the learned
Single Judge. The rule-making authority
in framing Rule 9 has not taken over an
essential legislative function. The rulemaking authority has not transgressed the
limitations on its statutory power under
Section 35 of the Act of 1982. Rule 9 is
perfectly
in
conformity
with
the
provisions of the Act of 1982 and cannot
be regarded as being unreasonable.
20. For these reasons, we hold that
the learned Single Judge was not in error
in dismissing the writ petition and
upholding the rejection of the candidature
of the appellant based on the provisions of
Rule 9 of the Act of 1982.
21. The special appeal accordingly
stand dismissed. There shall be no order
as to costs.
--------
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.04.2015
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE PRADEEP KUMAR SINGH
BAGHEL, J.
Civil Revision No. 404 of 2011
Raghunath Goel
 ...Revisionist
Versus
Yogendra Singh Nehru
...Opposite Party
Counsel for the Revisionist:
Anurag Khanna, Mohit Kumar Singh,
Tarun Agarwal
Counsel for the Opp. Party:
Vijaya Prakash
Small Causes Court Act 1887-Section-25Revision-against order passed by Small
Causes Court-suit for arrears of rent and
eviction
decreed-rate
of
rent
and
executing
of
rent
deed-admittedwhether entire Chaudhary Bhawan or its
part-was under tenantry-being question
of fact-can not be adjudicated in revision
finding based on evidence available on
record-no interference called for.
Held: Para-29
In view of the above the next question
arises that whether this Court should
exercise its jurisdiction under Section 25
to set aside finding of facts recorded by
the
court
below.
For
the
reasons
recorded above, I find that the court
below has recorded finding of facts
against the tenant which are based on
relevant evidence on record. The learned
counsel for the revisionist failed to point
1 All] Raghunath Goel Vs. Yogendra Singh Nehru
407
out that the findings are not based on
evidence
of
record.
The
scope
of
interference under revisional jurisdiction
under Section 25 came to be considered
in long line of decisions of the Supreme
Court and this Court.
Case Law discussed:
(2008) 8 SCC 564; (2012) 8 SCC 516; (2000) 6
SCC 394; 1981 ARC 545; 1996 (2) ARC 532;
1996 (2) ARC 561; 1999 (1) ACJ 54; 1999 (1)
ACJ 431; 1999 (2) ACJ 990; AIR 1969 SC
1344; AIR 1987 SC 1782; (2002) 3 SCC 626;
(2014) 9 SCC 78; (1980) 4 SCC 259.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Pradeep Kumar
Singh Baghel, J.)
1. The tenant/ defendant has
preferred this Civil Revision under
Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause
Courts Act, 18871 against the order dated
16 August 2011 passed by Judge Small
Causes Court, whereby the suit for the
eviction of tenant has been decreed.
2.
The essential facts are; the
plaintiff/respondent is the owner and
landlord
of
the
premises
Chaudhary
Bhawan situated at Niwari Road, Modi
Nagar, District Ghaziabad. The landlord
instituted a suit no. 72 of 2006 in the Court
of Judge, Small Causes Court, Ghaziabad
for the eviction of the tenant/ revisionist and
for the recovery of Rs. 3,18,600/- as arrears
of rent together with pendente lite and
further interest. The landlord has further
claimed damages at the rate of Rs. 25,000/-
per month for the use and occupation of the
premises from 16 July 2005 till the premises
is actually vacated by the defendant and the
possession is handed over to the landlord.
He further claimed a sum of Rs. 2 lacs as
damages for the expenses incurred by him
in making modification of the premises.
The landlord's case was that he let out a
portion of the house, Chaudhary Bhawan
consisting three halls, three rooms, two
verandas and two galleries at the rate of Rs.
18,000/- per month w.e.f. 27.1.2004. The
landlord and the tenant entered into an
agreement dated 27.1.2004 in the said
premises for a period of three years. The
tenant had taken the premises on rent for
running a Coaching Institute / Educational
Institution. On the request of the tenant the
landlord had made suitable alterations in his
premises as per the need of the tenant.
Accordingly, he has incurred a sum of
approximately
Rs.2
lacs
for
the
modifications. As the tenant wanted to run
the educational institution, the existing
kitchens were altered to make the room for
the said purposes.
3. It is stated that after the alteration
of the building the tenant took the
possession of the premises on 27.1.2004.
But the tenant did not make the payment
of rent in terms of the agreement. It is
averred in the plaint that for the reasons
best known to the tenant he has not used
the building. The furniture is lying in the
building and his associates/ employees
come to the premises and sit there for the
whole day and leave it after locking the
same. The landlord
repeatedly made
requests for the payment of arrears of the
rent but the tenant was not serious about
the payment of the rent. When the tenant
did not pay any heed to the repeated
requests of the landlord for the payment
of his arrears of rent and the current rent
the land lord had no option but to send a
notice dated 17 June 2005 under Section
106 of the Transfer of Property Act,
18822 for terminating his tenancy and
demanding arrears of rent and for
vacation of the premises. It is stated that
the said notice was duly served upon the
defendant/ tenant but neither he made the
payment of rent nor vacated the premises.
408
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
4. The tenant contested the suit. In
its written statement the tenant admitted
the fact that the tenancy commenced on
27.1.2004 in terms of the agreement at the
rate of Rs. 18,000/- per month but the
landlord had given possession of only one
hall, one room and in the rest of the
premises the landlord has been keeping
his goods and living in the same premises.
The landlord had assured the tenant that
within 8-10 days he would vacate the
remaining part of the tenanted premises
and will handover the possession of the
rest of the building in terms of the
agreement. The tenant also admitted that
an agreement was entered into between
the landlord and the tenant on 27.1.2004
but the landlord did not handover the
possession of entire premises as per the
agreement, for the said reason there was
no relationship of landlord and tenant
between the parties. It has also been stated
that the landlord has refused to accept the
rent.
5. It was further averred that after
sometime the tenant wanted to vacate the
premises by removing his effects from the
premises but the landlord did not permit
him. It is also stated that in February 2004
the landlord has taken back the possession
of one room and has let out to some other
persons and his goods lying in the
premises, has also been given to the new
tenant for their use.
6. The landlord has examined
himself as P.W.-1 and Naupal Singh as
P.W.-2 and also filed some documentary
evidence; copy of the notice dated
17.6.2005,
agreement
which
was
exhibited, reply submitted by the tenant to
the notice, the report of the amin in
another suit no. 1449 of 1996 "Yogendra
Singh vs. Nagar Palika and others" etc.
The tenant has examined himself and has
filed the affidavit of one Karamveer, who
was also examined as DW-2. The tenant
did not file any documentary evidence.
The Trial Court has framed two issues; (i)
whether on 27.1.2004 the part of the
Chaudhary Bhwan consisting of three
halls, three rooms, two varandas and two
galleries have been let out to the
defendant or entire building Chaudhary
Bhawan was let out, and (ii) Whether the
defendant is entitled for any other relief.
7. In respect of the issue no. 1, the
Trial Court found that the landlord let out
three halls, three rooms, two verandas and
two galleries to the tenant. The Trial
Court has recorded a finding that it was an
admitted case of the tenant that an
agreement was entered into on 27.1.2004
in respect of three halls, three rooms, two
verandas and two galleries at the rate of
Rs. 18,000/- per month. The court has
also relied upon the report of the amin
dated
20.4.2006
against
which
no
objection was filed by the tenant. The
Court has also referred the report of the
amin in another Suit No. 1449/1996
"Yogenera Singh Vs. Nagar Palika and
others". The court has referred some other
admissions like a paper no. 32Ga dated 2
December 2004, a communication sent by
the tenant to the landlord regarding
furniture etc.. The court has disbelieved
the case of the tenant that since the
possession of the entire accommodation
was not handed over to him, therefore, he
could not use the premises for the purpose
to run the coaching classes. In this regard
the court has referred the statement of the
tenant that when he could not get the
possession of the entire accommodation
then he sent a notice to the landlord to
give the possession of the premises as per
the agreement, however the tenant did not
1 All] Raghunath Goel Vs. Yogendra Singh Nehru
409
file the said notice as evidence on the
record. There is no explanation of the
tenant on record that why he has not filed
said evidence.
8. In view of the aforesaid findings
the Trial Court has decreed the suit for the
eviction and arrears of rent.
9. I have heard Sri Ravi Kant,
learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri
Tarun Agrawal, learned counsel for the
revisionist, and Sri Vijay Prakash, learned
Counsel for the respondent-landlord.
10. The learned Senior Advocate
submitted that from the perusal of the
agreement dated 27.1.2004 it is evident
that the entire premises was given on rent
for three years to the tenant. Since the rent
agreement does not contain any further
detail of the tenanted property then it is
explicit under the agreement that entire
Chaudhary Bhawan premises was given
on the rent. It was further submitted that
the premises was let out for a period of
three years, therefore, it was required to
be compulsorily registered as per Section
107 of the Act No. 4 of 1882. He further
urged that the rent agreement was
executed on a stamp-paper of Rs. 100/-,
thus having regard to Section 49 of the
Registration Act, the rent deed was
clearly inadmissible in the evidence,
therefore, Trial Court grievously erred in
placing reliance on the said document.
For the above reasons, none of the clauses
of the rent agreement including the clause
relating to fixation of rent of Rs. 18,000/-
per month could have been received in
evidence. The reliance has been placed on
a judgement of the Supreme Court in the
case of K.B. Saha and Sons Private
Limited
v.
Development
Consultant
Limited3.
11. It was also submitted that since
the
attesting
witnesses
were
not
examined, hence it could not have been
relied upon by the Trial Court. Lastly it
was urged that the Trial Court has
wrongly placed the burden of proof on the
defendant.
12.
The learned counsel for the
revisionist Sri Vijay Prakash submitted that
the defendant/ revisionist was a tenant of a
portion of the above premises, Chaudhary
Bhawan, consisting of three halls, three
rooms, two verandas and two galleries on
monthly rent of Rs. 18,000/- w.e.f.
27.1.2004. The defendant/ revisionist did not
pay rent from 27.1.2004 to 16.7.2005 in spite
of repeated demand, thus a notice was sent
on 17 June 2005 terminating the tenancy of
the defendant and in spite of the said notice
he did not make the payment. It is further
submitted that the amin made a spot
inspection of the tenanted accommodation on
20.4.2006 in the presence of both the parties
and defendant/ revisionist did not file any
objection to the report submitted by the
amin. The Trial Court has rightly relied on
the said report, other evidence and has
recorded a finding of fact which should not
be disturbed under the revisional jurisdiction
under Section 25 of the Act No. 9 of 1887.
13. Lastly, it was urged that the Trial
Court has decreed the suit on the basis of
the admission of the defendant/ revisionist
on the point of rate of rent and the
existence of the tenant and landlord
relationship between him and the plaintiff.
The revisionist has failed to point out any
jurisdictional error in the judgement
passed by the learned court below. Lastly,
it was urged that the findings recorded by
the Trial Court on the issue of existence
of tenancy and rate of rent are the findings
of facts which do not require any
410
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
interference by this Court under Section
25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts
Act.
14. I have heard learned counsel for
the parties, considered their submissions
and perused the record.
15. The parties are not in conflict on
the fact that they entered into an
agreement dated 27.1.2004 for creating a
tenancy of the premises and according to
the tenant he got the possession of one
hall, one room. From the evidence on the
record it is evident that the Chaudhary
Bhawan is a huge building, in which some
tenants like Pragyan Classes, IIT, Medical
Entrance etc. were running their coaching
classes/ institutions at the time of
institution of the suit.
16. In the written statement the
tenant has admitted about the agreement
dated 27.1.2004 and the rate of rent also
at the rate of Rs. 18,000 per month. It is
apposite to extract paragraph-2 of the
written statement, thus:
**2- ;g fd okni= dh /kkjk 2 ftl izdkj
of.kZr gS] xyr gS] Lohdkj ugha gS A lgh rF; ;g
gS fd izfroknh us oknh ls iz'uxr lEifRr dks
fdjk, ij fy;k Fkk vkSj fdjk,nkjh 27-1-2004 ls
'kq: gksuh Fkh rFkk iwjs Hkou dk fdjk;k
18000@&:i;s izfrekg r; gqvk Fkk A oknh }kjk
izfroknh dks lEiw.kZ Hkou e; leLr fuekZ.k ds
fdjk, ij nsuk r; gqvk Fkk ijUrq ftl le;
fdjk,nkjh 'kq: gqbZ Fkh] ml le; Hkou dk ,d gky
,oa ,d dejk [kkyh Fkk vkSj 'ks"k Hkou esa oknh dk
lkeku j[kk Fkk] ftlesa oknh jg jgk Fkk A oknh }kjk
izfroknh ls ;g dgk x;k Fkk fd og vkB&nl fnu
esa vius lkeku dks dgha vkSj f'kQ~V dj nsxk vkSj
iwjs Hkou dk dCtk oknh dks ns nsxk A dFku blds
foijhr oknh xyr gS] Lohdkj ugha gS A**
17. The only dispute raised by the
tenant was that the landlord had agreed to
let out the entire premises and not only a
part of the premises. In the written
statement the tenant has averred that in
the said premises three other educational
institutions were running. Thus the case
of the tenant that the entire premises was
let out to him, has been rightly
disbelieved by the Trial Court. The Trial
Court has recorded a finding of fact with
regard to a part of the tenancy on the basis
of two Amin reports.
18. It is noteworthy that the tenant
has not filed any objection against the
amin's report of this case. It is also not
disputed that the tenant has not filed any
documentary evidence in support of his
case. The
tenant has examined one
Karamveer as DW-2, who has admitted
that he had not seen the house, and is also
not aware of the fact that the entire house
is consisting of 100 rooms, which has
been let out to the tenant.
19.
The oral statement of the tenant
also failed to inspire the confidence of the
court. He has also admitted that he had sent a
notice to the landlord when he could not get
the possession of the entire premises but the
Trial Court has rightly recorded that he has
not filed the notice as an evidence.
20. Now I may deal with the
submissions
of
the
learned
Senior
advocate.
21. It was contended on behalf of
the revisionist that the premises was let
out for a period of three years, therefore,
the rent agreement dated 27.1.2004 was
required to be compulsorily registered as
per Section 107 of the Act No. 4 of 1882.
It is further urged that the court below has
erred by placing reliance on such an
unregistered document. He has placed
1 All] Raghunath Goel Vs. Yogendra Singh Nehru
411
reliance on a judgement of the Supreme
Court in K.B. Saha and Sons Private Limited
(supra). In the said case a residential flat was
let out to M/s Development Consultant
Limited by the landlord by a memorandum
dated 30 March 1976. The flat was let out for
a particular officer, Keshab Das and
members of his family, and for not other
purposes. One of the terms of the
memorandum was that if the tenant intended
to use the flat in question for any purpose
other
than
providing
residential
accommodation to its employee Keshab Das,
the tenant would seek written consent from
the landlord.
22. The Company informed the
landlord that its employee Mr. Keshab
Das had vacated the flat and the Company
wanted to repair it and to allot it to some
other employee. The landlord refused to
give his consent for the same and he
protested that the Company has no right
to allot the premises to another employee,
therefore, it must surrender the same once
vacated by Mr. Keshab Das. The landlord
instituted Title Suit No. 19 of 1992 for
declaration and permanent injunction that
as per terms of memorandum dated
30.3.1976 the Company had no right to
allot the said premises to any other
employee after its employee Mr. Keshab
Das had vacated the premises. The Trial
Court granted an interim injunction. Later
on, the landlord issued a notice under
Section 13(6) of the West Bengal
Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 calling upon
the Company to vacate the suit premises.
In response to the said notice when the
Company refused to vacate the premises,
he filed another suit being Title Suit No.
39 of 1995 praying for ejectment of the
respondents from the suit premises. The
Company filed a written statement and
one of the plea taken on it was that they
have paid the rent to the appellant and as
such the tenancy was protected by the
provisions of the West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, 1956. A further plea was
taken by it was that the tenancy
agreement entered into by the parties, was
illegal and invalid and as such the
agreement
was against
the
Statute.
Therefore, no injunction could be granted
against them.
23. The Trial Court recorded a finding
inter alia that the respondent had deposited
the rent in the office of the Rent Controller,
Calcutta, therefore, he was not a defaulter
and was not liable to be evicted on the
ground of default. The tenant could be
directed to vacate the suit premises only on
proof of grounds mentioned in Section 13(1)
of the Act. The agreement was not registered
which was required to be registered under
Section 49 of the Registration Act, therefore,
the agreement was not admissible in
evidence. The trial court dismissed both the
suits. Against the order of the trial court two
first appeals were filed. The High Court
affirmed the judgement and decree passed by
the Assistant District Judge whereby both the
suits were dismissed.
24. The matter was carried to the
Supreme Court by the landlord. The
Supreme Court, after considering large
number of the judgements on the point of
requirement of registration, held as under:
"34. From the principles laid down in
the various decisions of this Court and the
High Courts, as referred to hereinabove, it
is evident that:
1. A document required to be
registered,
if
unregistered
is
not
admissible into evidence under Section 49
of the Registration Act.
412
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
2. Such unregistered document can
however be used as an evidence of
collateral purpose as provided in the
proviso to Section 49 of the Registration
Act.
3.A collateral transaction must be
independent of, or divisible from, the
transaction to effect which the law
required registration.
4.A collateral transaction must be a
transaction not itself required to be
effected by a registered document, that is,
a transaction creating, etc. any right, title
or interest in immovable property of the
value of one hundred rupees and upwards.
5.If a document is inadmissible in
evidence for want of registration, none of
its terms can be admitted in evidence and
that to use a document for the purpose of
proving an important clause would not be
using it as a collateral purpose."
25.
From a perusal of the law laid
down by the Supreme Court it is evident that
an unregistered document can be used as the
evidence of collateral purpose as provided
under the proviso to Section 49 of the
Registration Act. In the said case, the
landlord had relied on clause-9 of the lease
agreement for the purpose that the tenant was
liable to be evicted because of violation of
clause-9 of the lease agreement. The court
found that since the suit was filed only on the
ground of clause-9 of the unregistered
document, therefore, it was not for a
collateral purpose.
26. In the present case the tenant has
admitted the terms of the agreement with
regard to the rate of rent and the possession,
therefore, the case relied by the learned
Senior Advocate stands on completely
different footing.
27. In the case of Ahmedsaheb
(Dead) By Lrs. and others v. Sayed Imail4
the landlord filed a civil suit for the
recovery of arrears of rent. The tenant
admitted the fact that the premises was let
out to him at the rate of Rs. 800/- per
year. It was also admitted that the rent
was due from him. The High Court
observed that it is needless to emphasize
that an admission of a party in the
proceedings, either in the pleading or oral,
is the best evidence and the same does not
need any further corroboration. The Court
observed as under:
"12.... In our considered opinion, that
vital aspect in the case viz. the admission
of the respondent in the written statement
about the rate of rent and the further
admission about its non-payment for the
entire period for which the claim was
made in the three suits was sufficient to
support the suit claim. The High Court
failed to note the said factor while
deciding the second appeal which led to
the dismissal of the appeals. Even while
eschewing Exhibit 69 from consideration,
the High Court should have noted that the
relationship of landlord and tenant as
between the plaintiffs and defendants was
an established factor and the rate of rent
was admitted as Rs. 800 per year."
28. In the same judgement the
Supreme Court has referred and relied its
earlier judgement in the case of Anthony
v. K.C. Ittoop & Sons5. Following
discussion and conclusion are apt and
relevant for the purpose of the case:
"14.When it is admitted by both sides
that the appellant was inducted into the
possession of the building by the owner
thereof and that the appellant was paying
monthly rent or had agreed to pay rent in
1 All] Raghunath Goel Vs. Yogendra Singh Nehru
413
respect of the building, the legal character
of the appellant's possession has to be
attributed to a jural relationship between
the parties. Such a jural relationship, on
the fact situation of this case, cannot be
placed anything different from that of
lessor and lessee falling within the
purview of the second paragraph of
Section 107 of the TP Act extracted
above. From the pleadings of the parties
there is no possibility for holding that the
nature of possession of the appellant in
respect of the building is anything other
than as a lessee."
29.
In view of the above the next
question arises that whether this Court
should exercise its jurisdiction under Section
25 to set aside finding of facts recorded by
the court below. For the reasons recorded
above, I find that the court below has
recorded finding of facts against the tenant
which are based on relevant evidence on
record. The learned
counsel for the
revisionist failed to point out that the findings
are not based on evidence of record. The
scope of interference under revisional
jurisdiction under Section 25 came to be
considered in long line of decisions of the
Supreme Court and this Court.
30. A Division Bench of this Court
in the case of Laxmi Kishore and another
v. Har Prasad Shukla6, has elaborately
considered the scope of interference under
Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act
and held as under:
"3. This provision confers a supervisory
and not a appellate power. The record can be
called for seeing that the decree is according
to law. If it is not, the revisional court can
pass such order with respect thereto as it may
think fit. This power is conditional on the
revisional court finding that the decree or
order sought to be revised was not according
to law. The phrase 'pass such orders with
respect thereto as it thinks fit' has come up
for consideration before the Supreme Court
in several decisions..."
31.

Similar
view
has
been
consistently taken by this Court in a long
line of decisions. Reference may be made
to the judgements in the cases of Om
Prakash Gupta v. Vth Additional District
& Sessions Judge, Aligarh and others7;
Man Mohan Dixit v. Additional District
Judge/ Special Judge (E.C. Act), Jalaun at
Orai and others8; Anwar Uddin v. Ist
Additional District Judge, Aligarh and
others9; Rajendra Nath Tripathi and
another v. Jagdish Dutt Gupta and
another10; and Har Swarup Nigam v.
District Judge, Allahabad and others11.
32. The Supreme Court in the case
of Malini Ayyappa Naicker v. Seth
Manghraj
Udhavdas
Firm
&
others12,held as under:
"9. It may be remembered that Shah, J.
was also a party to the decision in Hari
Shankar's case, 1962 Supp 1 SCR 933 =
(AIR 1963 SC 698) (supra). We see no
conflict between the two decisions. The
former decision enumerates some of the
circumstances under which the High Court
can interfere while considering whether the
decision under review was made according
to law. All that it laid down in Abdul
Shakur's case is that the High Court is not
competent to disturb a finding of fact reached
by the District Court even if in reaching that
finding it was required to take into
consideration a statutory presumption."
33. The Supreme Court in the case
of
Girdharbhai
v.
Saiyed
Mohmad
Mirasaheb Kadri13,held thus:
414
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
"16...We
must,
however,
guard
ourselves against permitting in the guise
of revision substitution of one view where
two views are possible and the Court of
Small Causes has taken a particular view.
If a possible view has been taken, the
High Court would be exceeding its
jurisdiction to substitute its own view
with that of the courts below because it
considers it to be a better view. The fact
that the High Court would have taken a
different view is wholly irrelevant. Judged
by the standard, we are of the opinion that
the High Court in this case had exceeded
its jurisdiction."
34. The Supreme Court in the case
of Harsavardhan Chokkani v. Bhupendra
N. Patel and others14, held as under:
"7... Nonetheless, the High Court is
exercising the revisional power which in
its very nature is a truncated power. The
width of the powers of the revisional
court cannot be equated with the powers
of the appellate court. In examining the
legality and the propriety of the order
under challenge, what is required to be
seen by the High Court is whether it is in
violation of any statutory provision or a
binding
precedent
or
suffers
from
misreading of the evidence or omission to
consider relevant clinching evidence or
where the inference drawn from the facts
proved is such that no reasonable person
could arrive at or the like. It is only in
such situations that interference by the
High Court in revision in a finding of fact
will be justified. Mere possibility of a
different view is no ground to interfere in
exercise of revisional power..."
35. The Supreme Court in Hindustan
Petroleum
Corporation
Limited
v.
Dilbahar
Singh15,
has
elaborately
considered the scope of the revision in the
following words:
"31. We are in full agreement with
the view expressed in Sri Raja Lakshmi
Dyeing
Works16
that
where
both
expressions "appeal" and "revision" are
employed in a statute, obviously, the
expression "revision" is meant to convey the
idea of a much narrower jurisdiction than
that conveyed by the expression "appeal".
The use of two expressions "appeal" and
"revision" when used in one statute
conferring appellate power and revisional
power, we think, is not without purpose and
significance.
Ordinarily,
appellate
jurisdiction involves a rehearing while it is
not so in the case of revisional jurisdiction
when the same statute provides the remedy
by way of an "appeal" and so also of a
"revision". If that were so, the revisional
power would become coextensive with that
of the trial Court or the subordinate tribunal
which is never the case. The classic
statement in Dattonpant17 that revisional
power under the Rent Control Act may not
be as narrow as the revisional power under
Section 115 of the Code but, at the same
time, it is not wide enough to make the High
Court a second court of first appeal,
commends to us and we approve the same.
We are of the view that in the garb of
revisional jurisdiction under the above three
Rent Control Statutes, the High Court is not
conferred a status of second court of first
appeal and the High Court should not enlarge
the scope of revisional jurisdiction to that
extent."
36. In the present case the tenant has
admitted that he got the possession on
27.1.2004. He has also not disputed the rate
of the rent at the rate of Rs. 18000/- per
month, thus in my view a jural relationship
between the parties came into existence. The
1 All] Smt. Richa Khare & Ors. Vs. Ankit Gupta & Ors.
415
parties are on conflict with regard to the fact
whether the landlord had given the
possession of entire premises or not. As
noted above, the said disputed question of
fact cannot be adjudicated in revisional
jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Small
Cause Courts Act. The court below has
recorded a finding of fact on the basis of the
unrebutted report of the Amin and the other
evidence on the record.
37. In view of the above, the
revision lacks merit and it is accordingly
dismissed.
38. The tenant-revisionist is granted
three months' time to vacate the premises
subject to the following conditions;
(i) the tenant shall submit an
undertaking in the court below that he
will handover the vacant and peaceful
possession to the landlord on or before 3
July 2015;
(ii) he will continue to pay the rent
on each succeeding month till vacation of
the accommodation on 07th day of each
month.
(iii) he will not create any third party
interest in the disputed premises.
39. No order as to costs
--------
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.04.2015
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE PRADEEP KUMAR SINGH
BAGHEL, J.
Civil Revision No. 412 of 2013
Smt. Richa Khare & Ors. ...Revisionist
Versus
Ankit Gupta & Ors.
...Opp. Parties
Counsel for the Revisionist:
Amit Kumar Shukla
Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
Arun Kumar Shukla
C.P.C.-Section
115-Civil
Revision
-
against rejection-application to amend
heading in provision-instead of 163 Ashould
be
Section
166-held-Tribunal
taken
hyper
technical
view-in
both
sections-the vehicle owner or insurance
company-on fault of injured or deceasedcan be defeat claim-no prejudice caused.
Held: Para-12
Significantly,
in
the
amendment
application
no
amendment
of
the
pleading or the relief has been sought by
the claimants. Thus, there is no question
of
change
of
nature
of
the
case.
Moreover, if the amendment is allowed,
no prejudice will be caused either to the
owner or to the insurance company as
under both the provisions i.e. Sections
163A and 166, the owner and the
insurance company can defeat the claim
of the claimants on the ground of fault on
the part of the claimants or injured.
Case Law discussed:
AIR 2004 SC 2107:(2004) 5 SCC 385; 2007
ACJ 2067 Gujrat (DB); 2008 ACJ 909
Rajasthan (FB); 2012 Law Suit (SC) 200:
(2012) 5 SCC 337; 2012 Law Suit (SC)
642:(2012) 11 SC 341; 1998 Law Suit (AP
243:AIR 1998 AP 337; 2007 Law Suit (KAR)
439; Laws (APH)-2006-9-10; (2012) 2 SCC
356; (2012) 2 SCC 300; (2005) 7 SCC 534;
(2006) 12 SCC 1; (2008) 5 SCC 117; (2008) 14
SCC 364; (2009) 2 SCC 409:(2009) 1 SCC
(Civ) 562; (2010) 10 SCC 512:(2010) 4 SCC
(Civ) 239; (2011) 12 SCC 268; (2009) 10 SCC
626:(2009) 4 SCC (Civ) 294.(2006) 4 SCC 385;
(2009) 10 SCC 84.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Pradeep Kumar
Singh Baghel, J.)
1. This civil revision under Section
115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,