# Raghuraj Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. and others

- **Citation:** (2003) 3 ILRA 623
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2001-12-22
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 19655 of 2003
- **Bench:** M. Katju, R.S. Tripathi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/raghuraj-pratap-singh-v-state-of-u-p-and-others-40139
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

624 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2003
U.P. Gangsters and anti social activities
(Prevention) Act 1986- Section 7 (4)-
order passed of State Govt. under
Section 7 (4) by which petitioner's case
transferred
from
Special
Judge
(Gangster Act) Allahabad to Kanpur
challenged-Held totally administrative
nature-not a quasi judicial-does not
effects
rights
&
habilities-
No
interference-

Held-para-4

In our opinion though the dividing line
between an administrative order and a
quashi judicial has become thin but it
has not been totally obliterated. A quashi
judicial order affect rights and habitries
but the impugned order does not do so.

Case law:
AIR 1970 SC 150, 2002(4) AWC 3221 (Para
II), 2001 (2) SCC 186, AIR 1996 S.C. 11

U.P. Gangster and Anti Social activities
(Prevention) Act 1986- Section 7 (1)-
Petitioner
challenged
order
on
the
ground
that
only
special
court
at
Allahabad has jurisdiction -Held-order
passed
on
the
report
of
District
Magistrate Kelating Law & order point
valid-state Govt. can pass such order
under Section 7 (4).

Held- Para 7

In our opinion, the petitioner was a
resident of Pratapgarh and was elected
from
Kunda
Assembly
Constituency,
Pratapgarh. His activities relating to the
criminal cases are alleged to have arisen
at Pratapgarh and hence the District
Magistrate,
Pratapgarh
was
fully
competent to give such a report.

Constitution
of
India
Article
166-
Whether principal Secretary (Law) can
pass such order? On behalf of the
Governor?
Held-Order
passed
by
principal Secretary (Law) under Section
7 (4) to be deemed as an order of the
Governor.
Held- Para 9

In our opinion the Secretary or even the
Deputy Secretary, U.P. Govt. can pass
orders on behalf of the Governor under
the Rules of Business and Standing
Orders. The impugned order, though it
has
been
signed
by
the
Principal
Secretary (Law) U.P. Government, has to
be deemed as an order of the Governor.
As held by the Supreme Court in
Samsher Singh Vs. State of Punjab (AIR
1974 SC 2192 vide para 35) When a ;civil
servant takes a decision he does not do
it as a delegate of his Minister. He does it
on behalf of the Government. The
officers are the limbs of the Government,
and not its delegates.
Case law-
AIR 1974 SC 2192 (Vide para 35)

## Text

3 All] Raghuraj Pratap Singh V. State of U.P. and others
623
Chief Medical Officer and has done good
work
as
certified
by
the
District
Magistrate.

8. Thus the maximum age limit of
D.G.C./A.D.G.C. is now 62 years as
mentioned in the G.O. dated 11.12.2002.
Since the petitioner completed 62 years
on 1.1.2003 his term was not extended.

9. We see no illegality in the
impugned G.O. dated 11.12.2002. No
doubt the note of para 7.08 (6) of the L.R.
Manual contemplates continuation of
service of a government counsel beyond
60years but that does not mean that they
have a right to continue forever. It is open
to the government to fix the age limit and
they have fixed it at 62 years and we see
no illegality in the same.

10. Learned counsel for the
petitioner submitted that in the earlier
G.O. dated 22.12.2001 Annexure 10 to
the writ petition the maximum age limit
was 65 years but now it has been curtailed
to 62 years. He has submitted that this is
illegal
because
this
deprived
the
government counsels of their vested right
to continue till 65 years. We do not agree.
It is open to the government to fix the age
limit as to when the term of a government
counsel shall come to an end. The G.O.
dated 22.12.2001 is an executive order
and one executive order can be modified
by another executive order under Section
21 of the General Clauses Act and Article
166 of the Constitution. Fixing of age
limit at 65 years was not done by any
legislative enactment but only by a G.O.,
and hence it can be modified or revoked
by another G.O. and that is what has been
done in this case. We do not agree that
any accrued right has been taken away by
the impugned G.O. dated 11.12.2002.
11. Learned counsel for the
petitioner stated that some government
counsels have continued as such even
after the age of 62 years. If that is so their
term will be deemed to have come to an
end forthwith provided they have crossed
the age of 62 years.

12. Thus there is no illegality in the
impugned G.O. dated 11.12.2002. This
writ petition and all other similar writ
petitions
pending
in
this
Court
challenging the G.O. dated 11.12.2002
reducing the age limit of 62 years are
hereby dismissed. The interim order if
any is hereby vacated.

13. Let the Registrar General of this
Court send copy of this judgment
forthwith to the Law Secretary, U.P. and
all District Judges in the State.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 7.5.2003

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE M. KATJU, J.
THE HON'BLE R.S. TRIPATHI, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 19655 of 2003

Raghuraj Pratap Singh alias Raja Bhaiya

 ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri T.P. Singh
Sri Rajiv Gupta
Sri Dilip Kumar
Sri A.K. Singh
Sri J.R. Singh Tomar

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C.

http:\\allahabadhighcourt.nic.in
624 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2003
U.P. Gangsters and anti social activities
(Prevention) Act 1986- Section 7 (4)-
order passed of State Govt. under
Section 7 (4) by which petitioner's case
transferred
from
Special
Judge
(Gangster Act) Allahabad to Kanpur
challenged-Held totally administrative
nature-not a quasi judicial-does not
effects
rights
&
habilities-
No
interference-

Held-para-4

In our opinion though the dividing line
between an administrative order and a
quashi judicial has become thin but it
has not been totally obliterated. A quashi
judicial order affect rights and habitries
but the impugned order does not do so.

Case law:
AIR 1970 SC 150, 2002(4) AWC 3221 (Para
II), 2001 (2) SCC 186, AIR 1996 S.C. 11

U.P. Gangster and Anti Social activities
(Prevention) Act 1986- Section 7 (1)-
Petitioner
challenged
order
on
the
ground
that
only
special
court
at
Allahabad has jurisdiction -Held-order
passed
on
the
report
of
District
Magistrate Kelating Law & order point
valid-state Govt. can pass such order
under Section 7 (4).

Held- Para 7

In our opinion, the petitioner was a
resident of Pratapgarh and was elected
from
Kunda
Assembly
Constituency,
Pratapgarh. His activities relating to the
criminal cases are alleged to have arisen
at Pratapgarh and hence the District
Magistrate,
Pratapgarh
was
fully
competent to give such a report.

Constitution
of
India
Article
166-
Whether principal Secretary (Law) can
pass such order? On behalf of the
Governor?
Held-Order
passed
by
principal Secretary (Law) under Section
7 (4) to be deemed as an order of the
Governor.
Held- Para 9

In our opinion the Secretary or even the
Deputy Secretary, U.P. Govt. can pass
orders on behalf of the Governor under
the Rules of Business and Standing
Orders. The impugned order, though it
has
been
signed
by
the
Principal
Secretary (Law) U.P. Government, has to
be deemed as an order of the Governor.
As held by the Supreme Court in
Samsher Singh Vs. State of Punjab (AIR
1974 SC 2192 vide para 35) When a ;civil
servant takes a decision he does not do
it as a delegate of his Minister. He does it
on behalf of the Government. The
officers are the limbs of the Government,
and not its delegates.
Case law-
AIR 1974 SC 2192 (Vide para 35)

(Delivered by Hon'ble M. Katju, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner and
the learned standing
counsel.

2. The petitioner has challenged the
impugned
order
dated
29.4.2003
(Annexure VIII to the writ petition). By
the impugned order the State Government
has directed that certain criminal cases
against the petitioner be transferred under
section 7 (4) of the Uttar Pradesh
Gangsters and Anti Social Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1986 from the Court of
special Judge (Gangsters Act) Allahabad
to the Court of Special Judge (Gangsters
Act), Kanpur Nagar.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has challenged the impugned order
relying upon a Full Bench decision of the
Court in Ashok Kumar Dixit vs. State of
U.P. and another 1987 (24) ACC 169
and has invited our attention to paragraph
64 and 65 of that decision it has been
observed in paragraph 64 of that decision
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3 All] Raghuraj Pratap Singh V. State of U.P. and others
625
that the power under section 7 (4) to
transfer cases is not unconstitutional.
However, in paragraph 65 it has been
observed that this power is exceptional in
nature and cannot be exercised on mere
humour, whims of fancies. The State
Govt. will have to record reasons.

4. The State Government has relied
upon the report of the District Magistrate,
Pratapgarh, wherein it has been stated that
the petitioner has to be brought from
Kanpur to Allahabad on specific dates and
this is creating problem of law and order
and security, and traffic is also adversely
affected causing difficulties for the
general public. In our opinion an order
under section 7 (4) of the Act is an
administrative order and not a quashi
judicial order. The learned counsel for the
petitioner has relied upon a decision of
the Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak and
others vs. Union of India and others
(AIR 1970 Supreme Court 150) wherein it
has been held that the dividing line
between administrative order and a quashi
judicial power has become thin. In our
opinion though the dividing line between
an administrative order and a quashi
judicial has become thin in our opinion
though the dividing line between an
administrative order and a quasi judicial
order has become thin but it has not been
totally obliterated. A quashi judicial order
affect rights and habilities but the
impugned order does not do so.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that by the order transferring the
case under section 7 (4) from one Special
Judge to another special judge (Gangsters
Act) a lis is involved because certain
amenities which will be available at the
Naini Jail, Allahabad are not available at
Kanpur Jail. We do not agree. Mere grant
or non grant of amenities in a Jail does
not create any lis.

6. The learned counsel for the
petitioner has submitted that under section
7 (1) only the Special Court which is at
Allahabad has jurisdiction over the case.
However, section 7 (1) has to be read
along with section 7 (4) which gives
power to the State Govt. to transfer cases
under the Gangsters Act.

7. The impugned order was passed
on the basis of the report of the District
Magistrate, Pratapgarh and it is alleged by
the petitioner that he did not have any
knowledge about the law and order
situation at Allahabad or Kanpur. In our
opinion, the petitioner was a resident of
Pratapgarh and was elected from Kunda
Assembly Constituency, Pratapgarh. His
activities relating to the criminal cases are
alleged to have arisen at Pratapgarh and
hence the District Magistrate, Pratapgarh
was fully competent to give such a report.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner
then
submitted
that
the
Principal
Secretary (Law) could not have validly
passed the impugned order under section
7 (4) and it could be passed only by the
Governor. He has relied on Article 166 of
the Constitution of India for this purpose.

9. In our opinion the Secretary or
even the Deputy Secretary, U.P. Govt. can
pass orders on behalf of the Governor
under the Rules of Business and Standing
Orders. The impugned order, though it
has been signed by the Principal Secretary
(Law) U.P. Government, has to be
deemed as an order of the Governor. As
held by the Supreme Court in Samsher
Singh Vs. State of Punjab (AIR 1974 SC
2192 vide para 35) When a; civil servant
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626 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2003
takes a decision he does not do it as a
delegate of his Minister. He does it on
behalf of the Government. The officers
are the limbs of the Government, and not
its delegates. .....Constitutionally the act
or decision of the official is that of the
Minister."

10. In our opinion the order under
section 7 (4) is an Administrative order
and it is well settled that the Court has
very limited scope of interference in
administrative orders. The Court cannot
sit in appeal over administrative orders
vide
P.K.
Misra
vs.
Indian
oil
Corporation, 2002 (4) AWC 3221 (Para
11). The Court can only interfere with the
administrative orders if they are arbitrary
or mala fide. In Om Kumar vs. Union of
India, 2001 (2) SCC 386, the Supreme
Court
referred
to
the
wednesbury
Principle while discussing the scope of
judicial
review
of
administrative
decisions. In Tata Cellular vs. Union of
India, AIR 1996 SC 11, it was held that
the scope of such review is limited. In the
instant case we do not find any good
ground
for
interference
with
the
impugned order. Moreover, writ is a
discretionary remedy, and we are not to
exercise our discretion in this case.

We do not find any merit in the writ
petition and it is dismissed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.5.2003

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RAKESH TIWARI, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9600 of 1984

Ram Prasad Prajapati
...Petitioner
Versus
Labour Court, (U.P.) at Allahabad and
another

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri R.C. Singh
Sri Arvind Kumar

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri M.B. Saxena
S.C.

Constitution
of
India
Article
226Dismissal-workman found guilty of using
abusive works-riotous and disorderly
violent behaviour-finding recorded by
Labour Court-not perverse-cannot be
interfered-dismissal order held proper.

Held- Para 14
From the record and the evidence which
was looked into by the Labour Court
under Section 11-A of the Industrial
Disputes
Act
it
is
noted
that
the
workmen were found responsible in
riotous behaviour, beating the officials of
the company and using abusive language
and slogans. There are findings of fact by
the Labour Court. The Courts in catena of
decisions have held that the punishment
of dismissal for using abusive language
and beating the superior officers is
proportionate to the charge.
Case law discussed:
2002 (1985) FLR 949

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rakesh Tiwari, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
parties
and
perused
the
record.
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