# Rahul Agarwal & Anr v. Govt. of India Railway Ministry & Anr

- **Citation:** (2022) 8 ILRA 1083
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-07-04
- **Case number:** Matters under Article 227 No. 8472 of 2017
- **Bench:** Saral Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/rahul-agarwal-anr-v-govt-of-india-railway-ministry-anr-48717
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

- Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 -
Sections 34, 34(3) & 43 - Railway Act,
1989 - Sections 20(A) & 20(E) - Railways
Amendment Act, 2008 - Section 20H(6) -
It is settled in law that provision of
Section
5
of
Limitation
Act
is
not
applicable in proceeding u/s 34 of the Act,

## Text

8 All. Rahul Agarwal & Anr. Vs. Govt. of India Railway Ministry & Anr.
1083
Court will pass an appropriate order after
ascertaining that the application is not filed
6.4 While allowing a request for video
conferencing, the Court may also fix the
schedule
for
convening
the
video
conferencing.

6.5 In case the video conferencing
event
is
convened
for
making
oral
submissions, the order may require the
Advocate or party in person to submit
written arguments and precedents, if any, in
advance on the official email ID of the
concerned Court.

6.6 Costs, if directed to be paid, by the
order convening proceeding through video
conferencing shall be deposited within the
time specified in the said order."

10. Comprehensive rules have been put
in place to adopt the technology in judicial
proceedings in order to enable the litigants to
approach the court through digital mode. The
Rules of 2020 gives choice to the litigant to
approach court using digital technology.
Various checks and balances have been
provided under the aforesaid Rules of 2020 to
protect the sanctity of the judicial process.

11. The Rules of 2020 effectively
address the concern of the litigants including
the distance factor and threat perception.
Once the Rules of 2020 have been notified in
exercise of powers under Article 225 and 227
of the Constitution of India, for providing
video conferencing to the litigant in the
Courts and such an alternative channel will
be able to address the concerns of the litigant
as has been raised in the present transfer
application. No ground for transfer of the
case from one district to another is made out
in
view
of
the
observations
made
hereinabove.

12. Under the circumstances, the
present transfer application is disposed of
with the liberty to the applicant to apply
under Rules for Video Conferencing for
Courts in the State of Uttar Pradesh, 2020
for video conference facility in judicial
proceedings. It is hereby provided that in
case any application is preferred by the
applicant under the aforesaid Rules, the
court/authority concerned shall be obliged
under law to pass an appropriate order in
accordance with law at the earliest. It is
hereby
directed
that
all
courts
and
authorities shall act in aid of the Rules for
Video Conferencing for Courts in the State
of Uttar Pradesh, 2020.
----------
(2022) 8 ILRA 1083
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 04.07.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SARAL SRIVASTAVA, J.

Matters under Article 227 No. 8472 of 2017

Rahul Agarwal & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
Govt. of India Railway Ministry & Anr.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Pankaj Agarwal, Sri Sudhir Bharti

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Land Acquisition - Condonation of
Delay - Application against arbitral award
- Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 -
Sections 34, 34(3) & 43 - Railway Act,
1989 - Sections 20(A) & 20(E) - Railways
Amendment Act, 2008 - Section 20H(6) -
It is settled in law that provision of
Section
5
of
Limitation
Act
is
not
applicable in proceeding u/s 34 of the Act,
1996. There is no error in the finding of
the
court
below
that
provisions
of
Limitation Act are not applicable to
1084 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
proceeding u/s 34 of the Act, 1996 and
application has to be filed within time
prescribed u/s 34(3) of the Act, 1996.
(Para 18, 19)

Limitation Act: Section 5 - The perusal of
application u/s 5 does not reflect any plea as
argued by the petitioners that copy of the award
was not sent to the petitioners, and they came
to know about the award for the first time on
03.03.2014, therefore, there was no delay in
filing the objections u/s 34 of the Act, 1996
rather petitioners have admitted in para 3 of the
application u/s 5 that they had obtained
certified copy of the award, but on account of
ignorance of provisions contained in S. 34 of the
Act, 1996 w.r.t. limitation in filing the objection,
they could not file the objections u/s 34 of the
Act, 1996. (Para 17)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 -
Section 43 - It is submitted by the petitioners
that in view of S.43 of the Act, 1996, provision
of S.5 of Limitation Act is applicable to
application u/s 34 of the Act, 1996. This Court
does not find any merit in the said submission
inasmuch as S.43 of the Act, 1996 refers to its
applicability only with reference to S.3 of the
Limitation Act which confers power upon the
court to see as to whether the suit is within time
as provided in Limitation Act, whereas S.34
provides period of limitation for filing
objections against an award, and S.34
being special provision incorporated in
special act i.e. Act, 1996 shall prevail over
the Limitation Act. (Para 12, 21)

Writ Petition dismissed. (E-4)
Precedent followed:

1. St. of U.P. & ors. Vs M/s Harnam Singh, 2015
All. C.J. 1763 (Para 10, 18)

Precedent distinguished:

1. Project Director, National Highways Nos. 45E
& 220, National Highways Authority of India Vs
M. Hakeem & ors., AIR 2021 SC 3471 (Para 20)

Present writ petition assails order dated
12.09.2017, passed by District Judge,
Aligarh.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Saral Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard Sri Pankaj Agarwal, learned
counsel for petitioners and learned Standing
Counsel for respondent no.2.

2. The petitioners by means of the
present writ petition have assailed the order
dated 12.09.2017 passed by District Judge,
Alilgarh in Arbitration Misc. Case No.10 of
2014 whereby he has rejected the application
of the petitioners under Section 5 of
Limitation Act for condoning the delay in
filing the application under Section 34 of
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(hereinafter referred to as 'Act, 1996').

3. The facts in brief are that
petitioners claim that they are the owner of
Gata No.78/3 situated at village Padiyawali,
Tehsil- Koil, District Aligarh. The land was
acquired under Railways Act, 1989 as
amended in 2008 and a notification was
issued under Section 20 (A) and 20 (E) of the
Act, 1989. Consequently, an award was made
on 18.05.2012 in respect of land of
petitioners
respondent
no.2-Competent
Authority/Special Land Acquisition Officer
(Joint Organisation), Aligarh.

4. It is stated that though it was
mentioned in the award that copy of award
shall be dispatched to the tenure holder, but at
no point of time, petitioners were ever
informed about the award dated 18.05.2012
or certified copy of award duly signed by the
competent authority was ever sent or served
upon the petitioners or to any of their family
members. It is further stated that the
petitioners never came to know about the
award dated 18.05.2012 and came to know
about the award through other villagers.

5. The petitioners, thereafter, on
03.03.2014 applied for certified copy of the
8 All. Rahul Agarwal & Anr. Vs. Govt. of India Railway Ministry & Anr.
1085
award which was made available to them
on 12.03.2014. After obtaining certified
copy of award, petitioners contacted their
counsel who advised them to challenge the
award under Section 34 of the Act, 1996.
The
petitioners,
thereafter,
filed
an
application under Section 34 read with
Section 20 H (6) of the Railways
Amendment Act, 2008 on 15.04.2014.

6.

According
to
petitioners,
application under Section 34 of the Act,
1996 was filed by them was within time
from the date of receiving the certified
copy of the award.

7. The application under Section 34 of
the Act, 1996 was contested by respondents
by filing objection stating therein that
application under Section 34 of the Act,
1996 was barred by limitation and hence,
deserves to be dismissed.

8. According to petitioners, though
objection with regard to limitation raised
by the respondents was frivolous, but as
abandoned
caution,
they
moved
an
application
under
Section
5
of
the
Limitation Act for condoning the delay in
filing the application under Section 34 of
the Act, 1996. The application was filed on
the ground that the petitioners were not
aware about the legal provision that under
the new Arbitration Act, 1996, limitation of
filing application under Section 34 is 90
days with one month grace period. It is
stated that petitioners filed application
under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 within
time after obtaining certified copy of the
award dated 18.05.2012.

9. The respondents filed objection to
the said application contending inter alia
that Act, 1996 is a special act and
provisions contained therein are special
provisions,
therefore,
provisions
of
limitation act are not applicable. The
further objection raised by the respondents
was that ignorance of law is not an excuse
to condone the delay in filing the
application.

10. The court below vide order dated
12.09.2017 dismissed the application under
Section 5 of limitation act holding that in
view of the judgement of this Court in the
case of State of U.P. and Others Vs. M/s
Harnam Singh reported in 2015 All. C.J.
1763, provisions of Limitation Act are not
applicable in proceeding in application
under Section 34 of the Act, 1996.
Accordingly, the court below found that as
the application under Section 34 of the Act,
1996 was to be filed maximum within 120
days i.e. 90 days plus 30 days grace period
as provided in Section 34 (3), but the same
has been filed after the period of limitation
as provided under Section 34(3) of the Act,
1996 has expired, the court below found
that it has no power to condone the delay if
delay in filing the appeal is beyond the
period provided in Section 34 (3) of the
Act, 1996. Consequently, it dismissed the
same.

11. Challenging the aforesaid order,
learned counsel for the petitioners has
contended that though it is specifically
mentioned in the award that copy of the
award shall be sent to all the land owners,
but it was never sent or dispatched to the
petitioners, and petitioners for the first time
came to know about the award on
03.03.2014 and application was filed on
15.04.2014, therefore, application under
Section 34 of the Act, 1996 was in time,
and court below has erred in holding that
there is delay in filing the application under
Section 34 of the Act, 1996. It is further
contended that the limitation for filing the
1086 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
award commences from the date the
certified copy of the award had been
received by the petitioners as provided
under Section 34 (3) of the Act, 1996,
therefore, order passed by the court below
is based upon misinterpretation of law.

12. It is further submitted that in
view of Section 43 of the Act, 1996,
provision of Section 5 of Limitation Act
is applicable to application under Section
34 of the Act, 1996, and thus, the
approach adopted by the court below
ignoring Section 43 of the Act, 1996
suffers from manifest error of law and
requires interference by this Court in its
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227
of Constitution of India.

13. On the other hand, learned
Standing Counsel would contend that it is
settled in law that limitation provided
under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 for
filing objection against the award shall
prevail over the Limitation Act being
special act. He further submits that there
is no pleading in the application under
Section 5 of Limitation Act of the
petitioners that certified copy of the
award was never sent to them, and since
no such plea had been taken by the
petitioners in Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, therefore, such plea cannot be
allowed to be taken for the first time in
writ petition.

14. I have considered the rival
submissions of the parties and perused
the record.

15.

Before
appreciating
the
controversy in hand, it would be apposite
to reproduce application under Section 5
of the Limitation Act filed by the
petitioner dated 09.08.2017:-

"In the Court of District Judge,
Aligarh

Misc. Arbitration Case No.10 of
2015

Rahul Agrawal and another V/s
Govt. of India and another

Application under Section 05 of
Limitation Act:

Sir,

1. That the applicants have filed
objections against award dated 18.5.2012
under Section 34 of Arbitration and
Reconciliation Act.

2.
That,
objectors
received
compensation under protest on 1.2.2013
and certified copy of award was made
available on 12.3.2014.

3. That from the date of obtaining
certified copy, the objections were filed
within time, but the O.Ps have taken
defence that objections should have been
filed within three months from the date of
award and there is relaxation period of one
month and such objections are barred by
time.

4. That, objectors were not aware
with the amended provisions of Section 34
of Arbitration Act and were under the
impression that objections can be filed
after obtaining certified copy of award.

5. That, delay in filing objections
was not deliberate but on account of
ignorance of said legal provision.

6. That, objectors have been
advised to move this application for
condonation of delay in filing objections.
PRAYER

It
is,
therefore,
respectfully
prayed that Hon'ble Court may be pleased
to condone the delay in filing objections
and treat the objections as is filed within
time."

16. The perusal of the application
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
8 All. Rahul Agarwal & Anr. Vs. Govt. of India Railway Ministry & Anr.
1087
extracted above, reveals that petitioners
have stated in paragraph 3 of the
application that objections were filed
within time, but respondents have taken
defence that objections should have been
filed within three months. In paragraph 5 of
the said application, it is stated that
petitioners could not file objections within
time after obtaining the award and delay in
filing the objections occurred due to
ignorance of relevant provision, therefore,
delay in filing the objections deserves to be
condoned.

17. The perusal of application under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not
reflect any plea as argued by the learned
counsel for the petitioners that copy of the
award was not sent to the petitioners, and
the petitioners came to know about the
award for the first time on 03.03.2014,
therefore, there was no delay in filing the
objections under Section 34 of the Act,
1996 rather petitioners have admitted in
paragraph 3 of the application under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act that they
had obtained certified copy of the award,
but on account of ignorance of provisions
contained in Section 34 of the Act, 1996
with respect to limitation in filing the
objection, they could not file the objections
under Section 34 of the Act, 1996.

18. This Court in the case of M/s
Harnam Singh (supra) has held that
provision of Section 5 of Limitation Act is
not applicable in a proceeding under
Section 34 of the Act, 1996. Paragraph 10
of the said judgement is reproduced herein
below:-

"10. The issue having been settled
by the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court
in M/s. Popular Construction Co (supra),
the argument advanced by the learned
Standing Counsel for the appellant that the
provisions of the Limitation Act will be
applicable in proceedings under Section 34
of the Act, 1996 is rendered without any
force and are not liable to be accepted. We
find no illegality in the impugned order
passed by the District Judge rejecting the
application of the appellant for setting
aside the arbitral award as barred by
limitation."

19. Since, it is settled in law that
provision of Section 5 of Limitation Act is
not applicable in proceeding under Section
34 of the Act, 1996, this Court does not
find any error in the finding of the court
below that provisions of Limitation Act are
not applicable to proceeding under Section
34 of the Act, 1996 and application has to
be filed within time prescribed under
Section 34 (3) of the Act, 1996.

20. Now, so far as the judgement of
Apex Court in the case of Project Director,
National Highways Nos.45E and 220,
National Highways Authority of India Vs.
M. Hakeem and Others reported in AIR
2021 SC 3471 relied upon by the learned
counsel for the petitioner is concerned, the
said judgement is not applicable in the facts
of the present case inasmuch as in the said
judgement, Apex Court has considered the
question as to whether power of Court
under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 to set
aside the award of an Arbitrator would
include the power to modify such award,
and the question raised therein is not
involved in the instant case.

21. Now, coming to the other
submission of learned counsel for the
petitioners that in view of Section 43 of the
Act, 1996, provision of Limitation Act is
applicable, this Court does not find any merit
in the said submission inasmuch as Section
1088 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
43 of the Act, 1996 refers to its applicability
only with reference to Section 3 of the
Limitation Act which confers power upon the
court to see as to whether the suit is within
time as provided in Limitation Act, whereas
Section 34 provides period of limitation for
filing objections against an award, and
Section
34
being
special
provision
incorporated in special act i.e. Act, 1996 shall
prevail over the Limitation Act.

22. Thus, for the reasons given above,
the writ petition lacks merit and is
accordingly, dismissed with no order as to
costs.
----------
(2022) 8 ILRA 1088
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 20.05.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SIDDHARTH, J.

Writ A No. 7114 of 2022

Gitanjali Pandey ...Petitioner
Versus
U.O.I. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri P.K. Upadhyay, Sri Rahul Kumar Pandey,
Sri R.K. Ojha (Senior Adv.)

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I.,
Sri
Kshitij
Shailendra,
Sri
Dhananjay Awasthi

A. Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950 -
Art. 226 - Interference in the report of the
expert committee - whether a candidate is
fit for a particular post or not has to be
decided by the duly constituted Selection
Committee which has the expertise on the
subject, it is not for the High Court to
address questions of comparative merit of
the candidates - courts have very limited
discretion to interfere, in the report of the
expert committee - Only where malafides
are proved or violation of any regulation
is proved or if there is patent material
irregularity in the Constitution of the
Committee or its procedure vitiaties the
selection, the court may interfere but it
cannot enter into roving and fishing
inquiry
on
the
basis
of
irrelevant
considerations - Principles of Natural
Justice - principles of natural justice do
not require an administrative authority or
a Selection Committee or an examiner to
record reasons for the selection or nonselection of a person in the absence of
statutory requirement - function of the
Selection Committee is neither judicial nor
adjudicatory, it is purely administrative -
selection
committee
is
not
under
obligation
to
record
reasons
for
its
decision (Para 18, 19, 20 24)

B.
Civil
Law
-
University
Grants
Commission Act, 1956 - UGC Regulations
On
Minimum
Qualifications
For
Appointment
Of
Teachers
And
Other
Academic
Staff
In
Universities
And
Colleges
And
Measures
For
The
Maintenance Of Standards In Higher
Education, 2018 - as per Regulation 6 the
selection procedure is to be conducted in
accordance with the Appendix II, Table 1,
2, 3-A, 3B, 4, 5 and 6 of the UGC
regulations - Short listing of candidates
for interview is to be done as per Apendix
II, Table 3-A, of UGC regulations 2018 -
Table 3-A provides for two marks for one
year each of teaching experience and
maximum 10 marks are to be granted for
teaching experience - regulation 10 (e)
provides that the previous appointment of
such a candidate should not have been as
guest
lecturer
for
any
duration
-
regulation 10(f)(3) provides that any
previous
adhoc
or
temporary
or
contractual services by the candidates for
direct recruitment would be counted
towards his / her experience of teaching
only if the incumbent was drawing total
emoluments equal to monthly gross salary
of a regularly appointed teacher as
monthly gross salary - regulation 13
provides that where the incumbent was
appointed on contract his / her salary