# Rahul Gandhi v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2025) 5 ILRA 291
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-05-29
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 No. 4623 of 2025
- **Bench:** Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/rahul-gandhi-v-state-of-u-p-anr-53362
- **Pages:** 19

## Headnote

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Section
500
-
Summoning
order
-
Quashing of - Trial court, by impugned
order found that applicant's St.ment prima
facie
defamed
Indian
Army
and
its
personnel, demoralizing them and their
families - Since St.ment not made in
discharge of official duties, Section 197
Cr.P.C. does not apply - Complainant,
retired Director of BRO alleged defamation
-
Finding
sufficient
grounds,
court
summoned applicant - Impugned order,
applicant argued that alleged defamatory
St.ment made against Indian Army, not
complainant
personally
-
Since
complainant is not Indian Army officer
and applicant not target him directly, he
cannot be aggrieved person under Section
199 Cr.P.C., therefore has no right to file
complaint - Objection rejected - Trial
Court,
after
considering
complaint,
complainant's St.ment under Section 200
Cr.P.C. and witnesses St.ments under
Section 202 Cr.P.C., found applicant's
remarks defamatory - As held in Delhi
Race Club (infra), no interference is
required unless there is clear illegality,
and High Court cannot substitute its own
opinion for that of Trial Court - Applicant
292 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
made alleged defamatory St.ment while
addressing
media
correspondents,
intending it to be published in newspapers
- No case is made out for quashing
summoning order. (Para 9, 10, 19, 32)

Application dismissed. (E-13)
List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,846 of 63,991. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39846 for what follows._

5 All. Rahul Gandhi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
291
The High Court should not go into the
malus animus against the author of FIR or
the complainant. The High Court must also
refrain from making imaginary journey in
the realm of possible harassment which
may be caused to the petitioner on account
of investigation of FIR of complaint. Such a
course will result in miscarriage of justice
and would encourage those accused of
committing crimes to repeat the same.
However, if the High Court is satisfied that
the complaint does not disclose commission
of any offence or prosecution is barred by
limitation or that the proceedings of
criminal case would result in failure of
justice, then it may exercise inherent power
under Section 482 Cr.PC."

11. After having gone through
entire material on record, the following
facts apparently emerged:

(i) Private opposite party no. 2 is
wife of the applicant and she solemnized
marriage on 11.03.2018.

(ii) Various matrimonial disputes
are pending between the parties and as per
medical report, five injuries are found on
the body of the injured person/first
informant.

12. In view of the above facts and
circumstances and keeping in mind the
settled position of law with regard to
interference of High Court in exercise of
inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,
without going into the merit of the case the
present application deserves no merit and is
likely to be dismissed and is, accordingly,
dismissed.

13. It is made clear that the reasons
to decide the present application shall not
affect the merit of the case.
---------
(2025) 5 ILRA 291
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 29.05.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 4623 of 2025

Rahul Gandhi ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Mohd. Yasir Abbasi, Mohammed Samar
Ansari, Pranshu Agrawal

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Section
500
-
Summoning
order
-
Quashing of - Trial court, by impugned
order found that applicant's St.ment prima
facie
defamed
Indian
Army
and
its
personnel, demoralizing them and their
families - Since St.ment not made in
discharge of official duties, Section 197
Cr.P.C. does not apply - Complainant,
retired Director of BRO alleged defamation
-
Finding
sufficient
grounds,
court
summoned applicant - Impugned order,
applicant argued that alleged defamatory
St.ment made against Indian Army, not
complainant
personally
-
Since
complainant is not Indian Army officer
and applicant not target him directly, he
cannot be aggrieved person under Section
199 Cr.P.C., therefore has no right to file
complaint - Objection rejected - Trial
Court,
after
considering
complaint,
complainant's St.ment under Section 200
Cr.P.C. and witnesses St.ments under
Section 202 Cr.P.C., found applicant's
remarks defamatory - As held in Delhi
Race Club (infra), no interference is
required unless there is clear illegality,
and High Court cannot substitute its own
opinion for that of Trial Court - Applicant
292 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
made alleged defamatory St.ment while
addressing
media
correspondents,
intending it to be published in newspapers
- No case is made out for quashing
summoning order. (Para 9, 10, 19, 32)

Application dismissed. (E-13)
List of Cases cited:

1. G. Narasimhan Vs T.V. Chokkappa: (1972) 2
SCC 680

2. Patricia Mukhim Vs St. of Meghalaya & ors.:
(2021) 15 SCC 35

3. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. Vs St. of U.P.
(2024) 10 SCC 690, (Para 12 to 17, 32 to 34)

4. Bhushan Kumar & anr. Vs St. (NCT of Delhi) &
anr. (2012) 5 SCC 424

5. Pepsi Foods Ltd. & anr. Vs Special Judicial
Magistrate & ors. (1998) 5 SCC 749

6. Imran Pratapgadhi Vs St. of Guj.: 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 678

7. Parasa Raja Manikyala Rao Vs St. of A.P.,
(2003) 12 SCC 306, (Para 9)

8. Javed Ahmad Hajam Vs St. of Mah. & ors.:
(2024) 4 SCC 156, (Para 11)

9. Kaushal Kishor Vs St. of U.P.: (2023) 4 SCC 1,
(Para 198)

10. St. of Har. Vs Bhajan Lal: 1992 Supp (1) SCC
335, (Para 102)

11. Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH Vs
Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya: (2024) 2 SCC 86, (Para
59 to 63)

12. Naval Kishor Sharma Vs St. of U.P.: 2022
SCC OnLine All 677, (Para 20, 21, 23)

13. Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. Vs St. of
Mah.: (2009) 2 SCC 370

14. Sanjay Kumar Rai Vs St. of U.P.: (2022) 15
SCC 720

15. Akanksha Arora Vs Tanay Maben, 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 3688

16. Kaisar Jaha Vs S.P., Distt. Sultanpur: 2024
SCC OnLine All 6758, (Para 10 to 15)
(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Shri Pranshu Agrawal and
Sri. Mohd. Yasir Abbasi, the learned
counsel for the applicant, Shri Vinod
Kumar
Shahi,
the
leared
Additional
Advocate General, Dr. V. K. Singh, the
learned Government Advocate, Sri Anurag
Verma, the learned AGA-I and Shri
Shivendra Shivam Singh Rathore, the
learned State Counsel appearing on behalf
of the opposite party no. 1 - the State of
U.P.

2. The instant Application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed
challenging validity of an order dated
11.02.2025
passed
by
the
learned
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court
No.27, Lucknow in Misc. Case No.109161
of 2023, Police Station Sushant Golf City,
District Lucknow titled "Udai Shankar
Srivastava v. Rahul Gandhi", summoning
the applicant to face trial for the offence
under Section 500 of the Penal Code. The
applicant has also sought quashing of the
entire
proceedings
of
the
aforesaid
complaint case.

3. The opposite party No.2 has
filed the aforesaid complaint against the
applicant stating that the complainant is a
senior citizen, who has retired from the
post
of
Director
in
Border
Roads
Organization, which position is equivalent
to the post of Colonel in Indian Army. The
complainant has immense respect towards
the courage and valor of the Indian Army
and any disrespectful comment against the
Indian Army made with the object of
5 All. Rahul Gandhi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
293
demoralizing
the
Indian
Army
and
portraying its achievements in a demeaning
manner, amount to an insult of the Indian
Army as well of as of the entire nation,
which hurts the complainant. The applicant,
who has held the office of a Member of the
Indian Parliament several times, stated on
16.12.2022 during his 'Bharat Jodo Yatra'
in presence of media persons and a large
gathering of public regarding a face-off
that took place between the Indian Army
and the Chinese Army at the border of
India in Arunachal Pradesh on 09.12.2022
that "People will ask about Bharat Jodo
Yatra, here and there, Ashok Gahlot and
Sachin Pilot and whatnot. But they will not
ask
a
single
question
about
China
capturing 2000 square kilometers of Indian
territory, killing 20 Indian soldiers and
thrashing our
soldiers
in
Arunachal
Pradesh. But the Indian press doesn't ask a
question to them about this. Isn't it true?
The nation is watching all this. Don't
pretend that people don't know."

4. A news item was published in
this regard on a news portal - opindia.com
under the heading "Chinese troops are
thrashing
Indian
Army
soldiers
in
Arunachal Pradesh': Rahul Gandhi on
Tawang clash" wherein it is published that
on 16th December 2022, Congress leader
Rahul Gandhi said that Chinese troops are
thrashing Indian army soldiers along the
line of actual control (LAC).

5. The complainant stated that the
aforesaid statement given by the applicant is
false and baseless and it was given with an
evil intention of demoralizing the Indian
Army and to damage the faith of the Indian
population on the Indian Army, whereas the
truth is that in the scuffle that took place in
Yangsi
region
Arunachal
Pradesh
on
09.12.2022, the Indian Army successfully
restrained the Chinese Army from entering
the territory protected by it and badly chased
them away. The complainant further stated
that in the official statement issued by the
Indian Army on 12.12.2022, it was stated
that: -

"On December 09, 2022, People's
Liberation Army (PLA), troops contacted the
LAC in Tawang Sector which was contested
by Om troops in a firm and resolute manner.
This face off lead to minor injuries to a few
personnel from both sides."

6. The complaint states that the
applicant repetitively stated in a very
derogatory manner that the Chinese army is
thrashing our soldiers in Arunachal Pradesh
and the Indian Press will not ask any question
in this regard and, thereafter, the applicant
said with a very clever and mischievous smile
that it is true. The complainant further stated
that the aforesaid baseless and derogatory
statement made by the applicant has hurt the
complainant immensely. This statement has
been made by the applicant knowingly and
mischievously under a conspiracy to cause an
adverse effect on national integrity and unity
of the Indian Army and it has hurt the
complainant. The aforesaid statement of the
applicant was widely published by the
newspapers.

7. In the statement recorded under
Section 200 Cr.P.C., the complainant stated
that the aforesaid statement given by the
applicant is false and it has shocked the
complainant. This statement was made as
an attempt to demoralize the Indian Army.
Some companions of the complainant from
the military told him that they were also
feeling hurt by the statement.

8. The statements of Arun Kumar
Gupta, Shishir Beer Prasad and Mohd.
294 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Ashfaq Khan have been recorded under
Section 202 Cr.P.C. and all of them have
stated that the aforesaid statement of the
applicant had caused immense mental
agony to the witnesses as well as to several
nationalists / patriots. The complainant was
immensely hurt from this statement. The
statement had an adverse impact on the
morale of the complainant, the witnesses
and all the citizens of India due to which
certain persons have made fun of the
complainant also as he is a former soldier
(former Officer of the Border Roads
Organization)

9. Keeping in view the aforesaid
statement, the trial court passed an order
dated 11.02.2025 stating that prima facie
the statement of the applicant appears to be
resulting in demoralizing the Indian Army
and persons attached to it and their family
members. This statement was not given by
the applicant in performance of his official
duties and, therefore, it does not fall within
the purview of Section 197 Cr.P.C. As the
complainant has retired from the post of
Director,
Border
Roads
Organization,
which is equivalent to the post of Colonel
in Indian Army, and the statement of the
applicant has caused defamation of the
Indian Army and the persons attached to it,
prima facie it appears that a case for trial of
the applicant for the offence of defamation
is made out. Accordingly, the trial Court
summoned the applicant to face the trial for
the offence punishable under Section 500
IPC.

10. Assailing the validity of the
aforesaid order dated 11.04.2025, Shri
Pranshu Agarwal, the learned counsel for
the applicant has submitted that even as per
the complaint, the applicant has made a
defamatory statement against the Indian
Army whereas the complainant is not an
Officer of the Indian Army and the
applicant has not given any statement
defaming the complainant. Therefore, the
complainant is not a person aggrieved and
he has no locus standi to file the complaint
as per the provisions contained under
Section 199 Cr.P.C.

11. Section 199 Cr.P.C. provides as
follow: -

"199.
Prosecution
for
defamation.-(1) No Court shall take
cognizance of an offence punishable under
Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code (45
of 1860) except upon a complaint made by
some person aggrieved by the offence:

Provided that where such person
is under the age of eighteen years, or is an
idiot or a lunatic, or is from sickness or
infirmity unable to make a complaint, or is
a woman who, according to the local
customs and manners, ought not to be
compelled to appear in public, some other
person may, with the leave of the Court,
make a complaint on his or her behalf.

(2)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in this Code, when any offence
falling under Chapter XXI of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860) is alleged to have
been committed against a person who, at
the time of such commission, is the
President of India, the Vice-President of
India, the Governor of a State, the
Administrator of a Union Territory or a
Minister of the Union or of a State or of a
Union Territory, or any other public
servant employed in connection with the
affairs of the Union or of a State in respect
of his conduct in the discharge of his public
functions a Court of Session may take
cognizance of such offence, without the
case being committed to it, upon a
complaint in writing made by the Public
Prosecutor.
5 All. Rahul Gandhi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
295

(3) Every complaint referred to in
sub-section (2) shall set forth the facts
which constitute the offence alleged, the
nature of such offence and such other
particulars as are reasonably sufficient to
give notice to the accused of the offence
alleged to have been committed by him.

(4) No complaint under sub-section
(2) shall be made by the Public Prosecutor
except with the previous sanction-

(a) of the State Government, in the
case of a person who is or has been the
Governor of that State or a Minister of that
Government;

(b) of the State Government, in the
case of any other public servant employed in
connection with the affairs of the State;

(c) of the Central Government, in
any other case.

(5) No Court of Session shall take
cognizance of an offence under sub-section
(2) unless the complaint is made within six
months from the date on which the offence is
alleged to have been committed.

(6) Nothing in this section shall
affect the right of the person against
whom the offence is alleged to have been
committed, to make a complaint in
respect
of
that
offence
before
a
Magistrate having jurisdiction or the
power of such Magistrate to take
cognizance of the offence upon such
complaint."

12. The learned Counsel for the
applicant has relied upon the judgment in
the case of G. Narasimhan v. T.V.
Chokkappa: (1972) 2 SCC 680, wherein
the principal question for determination
was whether the respondent could be said
to be an aggrieved person entitled to
maintain the complaint within the meaning
of Section 198 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure,
1898,
which provided
as
follows: -
 "198.
No
Court
shall
take
cognizance of an offence falling under
Chapter XIX or Chapter XXI of the Penal
Code or under sections 493 to 496 (both
inclusive) of the same Code, except upon a
complaint made by some person aggrieved
by such offence:

Provided that, where the person
so aggrieved is a woman who, according to
the customs and manners of the country,
ought not to be compelled to appear in
public, or where such person is under the
age of eighteen years or is an idiot or
lunatic, or is from sickness or infirmity
unable to make a complaint, some other
person may, with the leave of the Court,
make a complaint on his or her behalf:

Provided further that where the
husband aggrieved by an offence under
section 494 of the said code is serving in
any of the armed forces of Bangladesh
under conditions which are certified by the
Commanding Officer as precluding him
from obtaining leave of absence to enable
him to make a complaint in person, some
other persons authorized by the husband in
accordance with the provisions of subsection (1) of section 199B may, with the
leave of the Court, make a complaint on his
behalf."

13. There was no provision in
Section 198 Cr.P.C., 1898 akin to the
provision contained in Sub-Section (6) of
Section 199 Cr.P.C., 1973, which provides
that nothing in Section 199 shall affect the
right of the person against whom the
offence is alleged to have been committed,
to make a complaint in respect of that
offence. This makes the intention of the
legislature clear that the provisions of
Section 199 govern the rights of the
persons other than the person against whom
the offence is alleged to have been
committed. Section 199 Cr.P.C., 1973 was
296 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
not in consideration of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in G. Narasimhan (Supra)
and, therefore, the ration of that judgment
is not relevant for decision of the present
case.

14. The phrase "some person
aggrieved by the offence" occurring in
Section 199 (1) Cr.P.C. obviously refers to
some person other than the person than
against whom the offence is alleged to have
been
committed.
The
Section
itself
contemplates filing of complaints by some
person aggrieved by the offence, although
the offence has not been committed against
him. The complainant has stated that the he
is a senior citizen, who has retired from the
post
of
Director
in
Border
Roads
Organization, which position is equivalent
to the post of Colonel in Indian Army. The
complainant has immense respect towards
the Indian Army and the disrespectful
comment against the Indian Army made
with the object of demoralizing the Indian
Army and portraying its achievements in a
demeaning manner, amount to an insult of
the Indian Army as well of as of the entire
nation, which has hurt the complainant. I
am of the view that the aforesaid averments
made in the complaint indicate that the
applicant is a person aggrieved by the
offence and he can file a complaint as per
the provision contained in Section 199
Cr.P.C. Accordingly, the first objection of
the learned Counsel for the applicant is
turned down.

15. Sri. Pranshu Agarwal has next
submitted that it has been stated in the
complaint that the statement of the
applicant had resulted into a serious shock
to the complainant due to which his soft
heart got broken, he suffered from
depression due to which he had suicidal
thoughts on several occasions. Sri. Agarwal
has relied upon the decision in the case of
Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya
and Ors.: (2021) 15 SCC 35, wherein a
press release was issued by the Assistant
Inspector General of Police on 04.07.2020
in which there was a reference to an
incident on the day prior. The incident had
led to registration of a crime at Laban
Police
Station
under
Sections
326/307/506/34 I.P.C. It was mentioned in
the press release that around 12.30 p.m.,
about 25 unidentified boys had assaulted
youngsters playing basketball in Block 4,
Lawsohtun with iron rods and sticks. Some
persons had sustained injuries in the
incident. The injured had been rushed to
Woodland Hospital for medical assistance.
It was stated in the press release that some
suspects had already been arrested and that
interrogation was in progress. An appeal
was made to the public to assist the
investigation team in identifying the
perpetrators of the crime. A warning was
given that nobody should breach communal
peace and harmony. On the same day, the
appellant uploaded a post on Facebook,
which reads as follows:

"Conrad
Sangma
CM
Meghalaya, what happened yesterday at
Lawsohtun where some non-tribal youth
playing Basketball were assaulted with
lethal weapons and are now in hospital, is
unacceptable in a State with a Government
and a functional police force. The attackers
allegedly tribal boys with masks on and
should
be
immediately
booked.
This
continued
attack
of
non-tribals
in
Meghalaya whose ancestors have lived
here for decades, some having come here
since the British period is reprehensible to
say the least. The fact that such attacker
and trouble mongers since 1979 have never
been arrested and if arrested never
penalised according to law suggests that
5 All. Rahul Gandhi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
297
Meghalaya has been a failed State for a
long time now.

We request your Government and
the police force under the present DGP, R.
Chandranathan, to take this matter with the
seriousness it deserves. Show us the public
that we have a police force we can look up
to.

And what about the Dorbar
Shnong of the area? Don't they have their
eyes and ears to the ground? Don't they
know the criminal elements in their
jurisdiction? Should they not lead the
charge and identify those murderous
elements? This is the time to rise above
community interests, caste and creed and
call out for justice.

We hope that this will not be yet
another case lost in the Police files. We
want action. Criminal elements have no
community. They must be dealt with as per
the law of the land.

Why
should
our
non-tribal
brethren continue to live in perpetual fear
in their own State? Those born and brought
up here have as much right to call
Meghalaya their State as the indigenous
Tribal does. Period."

16. In the context of the aforesaid
factual background, it was held that the
effect of the words used in the alleged
criminal speech should be judged from the
standards of reasonable, strong-minded,
firm and courageous men, and not those of
weak and vacillating minds, nor of those
who scent danger in every hostile point of
view.
The
standard
of
an
ordinary
reasonable man should be applied.

17. The learned Counsel for the
applicant next submitted that the trial Court
has not examined the entire facts and
material to examine whether a case for trial
of the applicant for the offence of
defamation is made out and it has
summoned the applicant to face the trial in
a mechanical manner. He has relied upon
the judgment in the case of Delhi Race
Club (1940) Ltd. versus State of U.P.
(2024) 10 SCC 690, in which it was held
that: -

"12. It is by now well-settled that
at the stage of issuing process it is not the
duty of the court to find out as to whether
the accused will be ultimately convicted or
acquitted. The object of consideration of
the merits of the case at this stage could
only be to determine whether there are
sufficient grounds for proceeding further
or not. Mere existence of some grounds
which would be material in deciding
whether the accused should be convicted
or acquitted does not generally indicate
that the case must necessarily fail. On the
other hand, such grounds may indicate the
need for proceeding further in order to
discover the truth after a full and proper
investigation.

13. If, however, a bare perusal of
a complaint or the evidence led in support
of it shows essential ingredients of the
offences alleged are absent or that the
dispute is only of a civil nature or that
there are such patent absurdities in
evidence produced that it would be a waste
of time to proceed further, then of course,
the complaint is liable to be dismissed at
that stage only.

14. What the Magistrate has to
determine at the stage of issue of process is
not the correctness or the probability or
improbability
of
individual
items
of
evidence on disputable grounds, but the
existence or otherwise of a prima facie case
on the assumption that what is stated can
be true unless the prosecution allegations
are so fantastic that they cannot reasonably
be
held
to be
true.
[See
:
D.N.
298 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Bhattacharjee v. State of W.B. (1972) 3
SCC 414]

 15. Further it is also well-settled
that at the stage of issuing process a
Magistrate is mainly concerned with the
allegations made in the complaint or the
evidence led in support of the same and he
is only to be prima facie satisfied whether
there
are
sufficient
grounds
for
proceeding against the accused. It is not
the province of the Magistrate to enter
into a detailed discussion of the merits or
demerits of the case nor can the High
Court go into this matter in its inherent
jurisdiction which is to be sparingly used.
The scope of the inquiry under Section
202 CrPC is extremely limited - only to
the
ascertainment
of
the
truth
or
falsehood of the allegations made in the
complaint - (i) on the materials placed by
the complainant before the Court, (ii) for
the limited purpose of finding out whether
a prima facie case for issue of process has
been made out, and (iii) for deciding the
question purely from the point of view of
the complainant without at all adverting to
any defence that the accused may have.

16. In fact in proceedings under
Section 202 CrPC, the accused has got
absolutely no locus standi and is not
entitled to be heard on the question
whether the process should be issued
against him or not. It is true that in coming
to a decision as to whether a process
should be issued the Magistrate can take
into consideration inherent improbabilities
appearing on the face of the complaint or
in the evidence led by the complainant in
support of the allegations but there appears
to be a very thin line of demarcation
between a probability of conviction of the
accused and establishment of a prima facie
case against him. The discretion given to
the Magistrate on this behalf has to be
judicially exercised by him. Once the
Magistrate has exercised his discretion, it
is not for the High Court or even the
Supreme Court to substitute its own
discretion for that of the Magistrate or to
examine the case on merits with a view to
find out whether or not the allegations in
the complaint, if proved, would ultimately
end in the conviction of the accused.

17. These considerations are
totally foreign to the scope and ambit of an
inquiry under Section 202 CrPC which
culminates into an order under Section
204. [See : Nagawwa v. Veeranna
Shivalingappa Konjalgi (1976) 3 SCC 736]
It is no doubt true that in this very decision
this
Court
has
enumerated
certain
illustrations as to when the order of the
Magistrate issuing process against the
accused can be quashed or set aside. These
illustrations are as under:

"5. ... (1) Where the allegations
made in the complaint or the statements of
the witnesses recorded in support of the
same taken at their face value make out
absolutely no case against the accused or
the complaint does not disclose the
essential ingredients of an offence which is
alleged against the accused;

(2) Where the allegations made in
the complaint are patently absurd and
inherently improbable so that no prudent
person can ever reach a conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused;

(3)
Where
the
discretion
exercised by the Magistrate in issuing
process is capricious and arbitrary having
been based either on no evidence or on
materials which are wholly irrelevant or
inadmissible; and

(4) Where the complaint suffers
from fundamental legal defects, such as,
want of sanction, or absence of a complaint
5 All. Rahul Gandhi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
299
by legally competent authority and the
like."
* * *

32.
The
principle
of
law
discernible from the aforesaid decision is
that issuance of summons is a serious
matter and, therefore, should not be done
mechanically and it should be done only
upon satisfaction on the ground for
proceeding further in the matter against a
person concerned based on the materials
collected during the inquiry.

33.
In
the
aforesaid
circumstances, the next question to be
considered is whether a summons issued by
a Magistrate can be interfered with in
exercise of the power under Section 482
CrPC. In the decisions in Bhushan Kumar
v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Pepsi Foods,
this Court held that a petition filed under
Section 482 CrPC, for quashing an order
summoning the accused is maintainable.
There cannot be any doubt that once it is
held that sine qua non for exercise of the
power to issue summons is the subjective
satisfaction "on the ground for proceeding
further" while exercising the power to
consider the legality of a summons issued
by a Magistrate, certainly it is the duty of
the Court to look into the question as to
whether the learned Magistrate had
applied his mind to form an opinion as to
the existence of sufficient ground for
proceeding further and in that regard to
issue summons to face the trial for the
offence concerned. In this context, we
think it appropriate to state that one should
understand
that
"taking
cognizance",
empowered under Section 190 CrPC, and
"issuing
process",
empowered
under
Section 204 CrPC, are different and
distinct. [See the decision in Sunil Bharti
Mittal v. CBI (2015) 4 SCC 609].
 34. In Sunil Bharti Mittal, this
Court interpreted the expression "sufficient
grounds for proceeding" and held that
there should be sufficiency of materials
against the accused concerned before
proceeding under Section 204 CrPC. It was
held thus:

"53.
However,
the
words
"sufficient
ground
for
proceeding"
appearing in Section 204 are of immense
importance. It is these words which amply
suggest that an opinion is to be formed only
after due application of mind that there is
sufficient basis for proceeding against the
said accused and formation of such an
opinion is to be stated in the order itself.
The order is liable to be set aside if no
reason is given therein while coming to
the conclusion that there is prima facie
case against the accused, though the order
need not contain detailed reasons. A
fortiori, the order would be bad in law if
the reason given turns out to be ex facie
incorrect."

18. The learned Counsel for the
applicant
has
also
relied
upon
the
judgments in the case of Bhushan Kumar
and another v. State (NCT of Delhi) and
another (2012) 5 SCC 424 and Pepsi
Foods Ltd. and another versus Special
Judicial Magistrate and others (1998) 5
SCC 749, but these judgments have been
considered in Delhi Race Club (Supra) and,
therefore, there was no need to cite these
judgments for unnecessarily multiplying
the number of judgments.

19. A perusal of the impugned
summoning order dated 11.02.2025 passed
by the trial Court shows that the trial Court
has considered the averments made in the
complaint, the statement of the complainant
recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and the
statements of the witnesses recorded under
Section 202 Cr.P.C. and after a judicious
application of mind, the trial Court has
300 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
come to a conclusion that the statement of
the applicant has caused defamation of the
Indian Army and the persons attached to it
and prima facie it appears that a case for
trial of the applicant for the offence of
defamation is made out. The trial Court has
recorded this satisfaction in a proper
manner and as per the law laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Race
Club (1940) Ltd. (Supra), this Court
cannot interfere in the summoning order in
absence of any illegality committed by the
trial Court so as to substitute the opinion of
the trial Court by its own opinion.

20. The learned Counsel for the
applicant has relied upon the judgment in
the case of Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of
Gujarat: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 678, in
which the issue arose out of the following
poem recited in the background of a video
clip which was posted by the appellant - a
Member of Rajya Sabha, on his X account:
-

"ए खून (blood) के प्यासों (thirsty) बाि
सुनो

ग़र हक़ (truth) की लडाई जुजम (excesses /
injustice) सही

हम र्जुु़जम (excesses / injustice) से इश्कक़
(love) तनभा देंगे

ग़र शम-ए-तगररया (melting of a candle
which resembles tears) आतिश (flame) है

हर राह वो शम्मा (light) र्जला देंगे

ग़र लाश हमारे अपनों की

ख़िरा है िुम्हारी मसनद (throne) का

उस रब (god) की क़सम हसिे हसिे

तकिनी लाशें दफ़ना देंगे

ए खून के प्यासों बाि सुनो"

The appellant filed a petition for
quashing of the criminal proceedings and
he stated that the poem in question is
attributed to either Faiz Ahmed Faiz or
Habib Jalib, but he could not conclusively
ascertain its authorship. He further stated
that a plain reading of the poem indicates
that it is a message of love and nonviolence. After examining the facts of that
case, The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that
no offence was made out by posting of the
video. In the aforesaid factual background,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court further held
that: -

"When an offence punishable
under Section 196 of BNS is alleged, the
effect of the spoken or written words will
have to be considered based on standards
of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and
courageous individuals and not based on
the standards of people with weak and
oscillating minds. The effect of the spoken
or written words cannot be judged on the
basis of the standards of people who
always have a sense of insecurity or of
those who always perceive criticism as a
threat to their power or position."

The aforesaid judgment was
given keeping in view the peculiar factual
background of the case and the statutory
provision contained in Section 196 BNS.
Section 500 I.P.C. or Section 199 Cr.P.C.
were not discussed in this case and it would
not apply to the facts of the present case.

21. In Parasa Raja Manikyala
Rao v. State of A.P., (2003) 12 SCC 306,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the
well established principle of the law of
precedents that: -

"9. Each case, more particularly
a criminal case, depends on its own facts
and a close similarity between one case
and another is not enough to warrant like
treatment because a significant detail may
alter the entire aspect. In deciding such
cases, one should avoid the temptation to
decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by
5 All. Rahul Gandhi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
301
matching the colour of one case against the
colour of another. To decide, therefore, on
which side of the line a case falls, the
broad resemblance to another case is not at
all decisive. The vague and cryptic
conclusion arrived at by the trial court to
treat their case differently from the manner
it dealt with that of A-1, despite its very
observation that the evidence was as
cogent against them too as it was against
A-1 lacks a judicious approach and
determination and, therefore, was rightly
interfered with by the High Court after an
objective appreciation of the evidence
independently and in the light of the
relevant and guiding principles of law
governing such determination."

22.
Therefore,
the
numerous
precedents cited by the learned Counsel for
the applicant, which were decided in view
of the peculiar factual background of those
cases which is in no manner similar to the
facts of the present case, are not relevant
for decision of the present case.

23. The learned Counsel for the
applicant has relied upon the judgment in
the case of Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State
Of Maharashtra and Ors.: (2024) 4 SCC
156, wherein the appellant had posted on
his WhatsApp status that "August 5 - a
Black Day for Jammu & Kashmir". It is the
day
on
which
Article
370
of
the
Constitution of India was abrogated.
Further, the appellant had posted that
"Article 370 was abrogated, we are not
happy". The Hon'ble Supreme Court held
that: -

"11. ... On a plain reading, the
appellant intended to criticise the action of
the abrogation of Article 370 of the
Constitution of India. He has expressed
unhappiness
over
the
said
act
of
abrogation. The aforesaid words do not
refer to any religion, race, place of birth,
residence, language, caste or community. It
is a simple protest by the appellant against
the decision to abrogate Article 370 of the
Constitution of India and the further steps
taken
based
on
that
decision.
The
Constitution of India, under Article
19(1)(a), guarantees freedom of speech
and expression. Under the said guarantee,
every citizen has the right to offer
criticism of the action of abrogation of
Article 370 or, for that matter, every
decision of the State. He has the right to
say he is unhappy with any decision of the
State."

24. The learned Counsel for the
applicant has also relied upon the judgment
in the case of Kaushal Kishor v. State of
U.P.: (2023) 4 SCC 1, wherein the Hon'ble
Court held that: -

"198. Article 19(1)(a) serves as a vehicle
through which dissent can be expressed.
The right to dissent, disagree and adopt
varying and individualistic points of view
inheres in every citizen of this Country. In
fact, the right to dissent is the essence of a
vibrant democracy, for it is only when there
is dissent that different ideas would emerge
which may be of help or assist the
Government to improve or innovate upon
its policies so that its governance would
have a positive effect on the people of the
country which would ultimately lead to
stability, peace and development which are
concomitants of good governance."

25. No doubt, Article 19(1)(a) of
the
Constitution
of
India
guarantees
freedom of speech and expression, this
freedom is subject to the reasonable
restrictions and it does not include the
freedom to make statements which are
302 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
defamatory to any person or defamatory to
the Indian Army. Therefore, the ratio laid
down in Javed Ahmad Hajam (Supra) and
Kaushal Kishore (Supra) would not apply
to the facts of the present case.

26. The learned Counsel for the
applicant has relied upon the judgment in
the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal: 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, in which the
Hon'ble Supreme had summarized the
scope of interference under Section 482
Cr.P.C. in the following passage: -

"102. In the backdrop of the
interpretation of the various relevant
provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV
and of the principles of law enunciated by
this Court in a series of decisions relating
to the exercise of the extraordinary power
under Article 226 or the inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code which we
have extracted and reproduced above, we
give the following categories of cases by
way of illustration wherein such power
could be exercised either to prevent abuse
of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice, though it may not
be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and
to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of
cases wherein such power should be
exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in
the
first
information
report
or
the
complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do
not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the
first
information
report
and
other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do
not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying
an investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted
allegations made in the FIR or complaint
and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the
accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the
FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence
but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section
155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in
the FIR or complaint are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a
just conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express
legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions
of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted)
to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the
concerned
Act,
providing
efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved
party.

 (7) Where a criminal proceeding
is manifestly attended with mala fide
and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and
with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge."

27.