# Raj Kumar Singh v. District Inspector of Schools and others

- **Citation:** (2013) 1 ILRA 36
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2012-12-10
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1647 of 2008
- **Bench:** Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/raj-kumar-singh-v-district-inspector-of-schools-and-others-42417
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Constitution
of
India,
Article
226payment of salary-dismissal of petitioner
set-a-side-subject to outcome of criminal
proceeding-even
after
acquittal
in
criminal case-management decided not
to
initiate
disciplinary
proceedingconsidering charges to be non serious in
nature-inspite of reinstatement could
not join as the person being appointed
during intervening period got interim
order concealing material facts-D.I.O.S.
Also not bring correct position inspite of
1 All] Raj Kumar Singh V. District Inspector of Schools and others
37
direction of show cause-held-petitioner
entitled for salary from the date of
reinstatement and not from date of
judgment-Government to recover the
amount of salary from erring officerprinciple of "No Work No Pay" not
applicable.

Held: Para-25

After bearing in the mind the principles
culled out from the aforementioned
judgments of the Supreme Court as well
as of this Court in facts of the present
case a direction may be issued upon the
District
Inspector
of
Schools,
Bulandshahr to make the payment of the
petitioner
from
the
date
of
his
reinstatement i.e. 26.8.1988 and not
from the date of acquittal. Petitioner is
entitled for the salary from his joining
upto 2003. As regards payment made to
Kunwarpal
Singh
it
was
a
sheer
negligence/connivance of the office of
the
District
Inspector
of
Schools.
Therefore the State Government is at
liberty to fix the responsibility for the
illegal payment made to Kunwarpal
Singh and recover the said amount from
the Officer who is found to guilty of
negligence
or
connivance
with
the
Kunwarpal Singh.
Case Law discussed:
1997 (5) SCC 772; 2006 (5) SCC 446; 1999 (3)
SCC 679; 2004 (1) SCC 121; AIR 1964 SC
787; AIR (1984) 626; 1979 (2) SCC 80; 1980
(4) SCC 443; 1981 (3) SCC 225; 2005 (5) SCC
124; 2006 (1) SCC 479; 2005 (2) SCC 363;
2007 (2) SCC 433; 1979 (2) SCC 80; 2009 (1)
UPLBEC 321

## Text

36 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
the appellate court is bound to consider the
entire evidence on record and come to an
independent finding that adduction of
additional evidence is necessary for arriving
at a just decision.

18. In view of what has been held by
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of K. R.
Mohan Reddy (supra), it is concluded that
the submission made by the learned counsel
for the petitioners carries weight. As
discussed above, though the application
moved by the petitioners before the learned
appellate court below contained two grounds,
however, no finding has been returned by the
court below as regards the issue raised by the
petitioners in their application that since the
documents sought to be furnished as
evidence contained certain admission on the
part of the respondents, as such, in case the
said evidence is permitted to be taken on
record, the same would enable the court to
pronounce the judgment by arriving at a just
decision. In absence of the aforesaid finding,
learned appellate court below has clearly
erred in law which renders the impugned
order dated 05.04.1995 vitiated.

19. In the result, the writ petition
deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, it is
allowed.
The
impugned
order
dated
05.04.1995, passed by the Additional Civil
Judge, Bahraich in Civil Appeal No.34 of
1991;
Imamuddeen
and
others
vs.
Mujibullah and others is hereby quashed.
Further, a direction is issued to the learned
appellate court below to decide the
application Ka-48 moved by the petitioners
afresh keeping in view the observations
made hereinabove in the judgment.

20. Sri Mohd. Arif Khan, learned
Senior
Advocate
appearing
for
the
respondents has also submitted that the
application moved by the petitioners seeking
production of the additional evidence was
nothing but a dilatory measure adopted by
the petitioners. Keeping in view the fact that
the appeal is pending since 1991, the learned
appellate court below is also directed to
decide the entire appeal itself within a period
of three months from the date a certified
copy of this judgment is produced before it.

21. In the circumstances of the case,
however, there will be no order as to cost.
---------
 ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.12.2012

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE PRADEEP KUMAR SINGH
BAGHEL, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1647 of 2008

Raj Kumar Singh

 ...Petitioner
Versus
District Inspector of Schools and others

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Ravi Agrawal
Sri Pankaj Lal
Sri P.K. Chaurasia
Sri G.K. Dwivedi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.
Sri Gireesh Chandra Dwivedi

Constitution
of
India,
Article
226payment of salary-dismissal of petitioner
set-a-side-subject to outcome of criminal
proceeding-even
after
acquittal
in
criminal case-management decided not
to
initiate
disciplinary
proceedingconsidering charges to be non serious in
nature-inspite of reinstatement could
not join as the person being appointed
during intervening period got interim
order concealing material facts-D.I.O.S.
Also not bring correct position inspite of
1 All] Raj Kumar Singh V. District Inspector of Schools and others
37
direction of show cause-held-petitioner
entitled for salary from the date of
reinstatement and not from date of
judgment-Government to recover the
amount of salary from erring officerprinciple of "No Work No Pay" not
applicable.

Held: Para-25

After bearing in the mind the principles
culled out from the aforementioned
judgments of the Supreme Court as well
as of this Court in facts of the present
case a direction may be issued upon the
District
Inspector
of
Schools,
Bulandshahr to make the payment of the
petitioner
from
the
date
of
his
reinstatement i.e. 26.8.1988 and not
from the date of acquittal. Petitioner is
entitled for the salary from his joining
upto 2003. As regards payment made to
Kunwarpal
Singh
it
was
a
sheer
negligence/connivance of the office of
the
District
Inspector
of
Schools.
Therefore the State Government is at
liberty to fix the responsibility for the
illegal payment made to Kunwarpal
Singh and recover the said amount from
the Officer who is found to guilty of
negligence
or
connivance
with
the
Kunwarpal Singh.
Case Law discussed:
1997 (5) SCC 772; 2006 (5) SCC 446; 1999 (3)
SCC 679; 2004 (1) SCC 121; AIR 1964 SC
787; AIR (1984) 626; 1979 (2) SCC 80; 1980
(4) SCC 443; 1981 (3) SCC 225; 2005 (5) SCC
124; 2006 (1) SCC 479; 2005 (2) SCC 363;
2007 (2) SCC 433; 1979 (2) SCC 80; 2009 (1)
UPLBEC 321

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pradeep Kumar
Singh Baghel, J.)

1. The petitioner who is a Clerk in
an Intermediate College preferred this
writ petition for issuance of a writ of
certiorari to quash the order dated
5.12.2007 whereby his representation for
payment of his salary from May, 1990 to
9.11.2003 was rejected by the respondent
no.1, the District Inspector of Schools,
Bulandshahar.

2. A brief reference to the factual
aspect would suffice.

3. The Janta Intermediate College
(for short Institution), Panchgai, district
Bulandshahr is a recognized institution. A
Society registered under the provisions of
the Societies Registration Act, 1860 has
established this institution. The institution
is administered by the Committee of
Management. It receives the aid from the
State fund, at the level of the High
School. The affairs of the institution, its
teachers and employees are governed by
the U.P. Intermediate Education Act,
1921; the regulations framed thereunder
and U.P. Secondary Education Service
Selection Board Act, 1982.

4. The petitioner was initially
appointed in the year 1976. He was
suspended on 29.10.1980 as he was made
accused in a criminal case. On the said
ground his services were terminated by
the
Committee
of
Management
on
30.11.1980.
The
Committee
of
Management sent the papers to the
District Inspector of Schools for the
approval. The District Inspector of
Schools accorded the approval for his
termination. Aggrieved by the said order
the petitioner filed an Appeal before the
Deputy Director of Education who set
aside the order of termination and
approval of the District Inspector of
Schools vide order dated 11.2.1999. He
directed that the petitioner would be
placed
under
suspension
and
his
termination would be subject to the
outcome of the criminal proceedings. In
the
meantime
the
Committee
of
Management appointed one Kunwarpal
38 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
Singh on 18.11.1981 on temporary basis.
The
District
Inspector
of
Schools
approved his appointment on 2.2.1982
and he started functioning as Assistant
Clerk and he was paid salary.

5. In criminal case no. 299 of 1980
the petitioner was acquitted of all the
charges by order dated 24.7.1987 passed
by the court of II Additional Munsif
Magistrate, Khurja, Bulandshahar. The
petitioner submitted the copy of the
judgment of the trial court to the
Committee of Management and on 26th
August, 1988 it took a resolution to
reinstate the petitioner and by the same
order the salary of Kunwarpal Singh was
stopped. Aggrieved by the said order
Kunwarpal Singh preferred Writ Petition
No. 1281 of 1990 in which on 16.1.1990
interim mandamus was issued by this
Court to respondent no.1 to pay the salary
of the petitioner therein (Kunwarpal
Singh) or show cause. Copy of the said
order of this Court is placed on record as
Annexure-7 to the writ petition. The order
of the Division bench is extracted
hereunder for the sake of convenience:-

"Issue notice.

An interim mandamus is issued to the
respondent no.1 to pay the salary to the
petitioner from July, 1988 to December,
1989 and in future within a period of one
month from the date a certified copy of
this order is produced before him or
show cause within the said period."

6. It appears that the authorities
concerned for the reasons best known to
them did not show cause and they failed
to bring the correct fact to the notice of
this Court that the petitioner's termination
was disapproved by the Deputy Director
of Education by order dated 22.1.1983
and the petitioner stood acquitted by the
trial court on 24.7.1987 and in compliance
of the order of the Deputy Director of
Education the Committee of Management
had passed a resolution to reinstate the
petitioner. Without showing cause the
concerned authorities preferred to comply
the interim mandamus by order dated
20.7.1992 and issued an order for
payment of salary to Kunwarpal Singh.
The writ petition remained pending for
thirteen years and ultimately it came to be
dismissed on merit in the year 2003.
Feeling aggrieved by the order of the
learned Single Judge dated 10.11.2003 a
Special Appeal No. 1301 of 2003 was
filed by Kunwarpal Singh which was
dismissed by order dated 3.12.2003, copy
of the said order is placed on record as
Annexure-8
to
the
writ
petition.
Aggrieved by the said order he filed
Special Leave Petition (SLP) in the
Supreme Court and his Special Leave
Petition was also dismissed on 1.10.2004,
copy of which is Annexure-9 to the writ
petition.

7. Petitioner also preferred Writ
Petition No. 23506 of 1991 for payment
of his salary. This Court directed the
District Inspector of Schools to decide his
representation by a reasoned and speaking
order in accordance with law within two
months. Copy of the order of the learned
Single Judge dated 24.7.2007 is placed on
record as Annexure-10 to the writ
petition.
In
compliance
thereof the
District Inspector of Schools has passed
the impugned order whereby he has
rejected
the
representation
of
the
petitioner for the payment of his salary
from May, 1990 to 9.11.2003, only on the
ground that during that period the
Committee of Management had appointed
1 All] Raj Kumar Singh V. District Inspector of Schools and others
39
Kunwarpal Singh who was working on
the strength of the interim order dated
16.1.1990.

8. Sri Pankaj Lal, learned counsel
for the petitioner submits that there was
no fault of the petitioner. His appeal
against termination order was allowed by
the Deputy Director of Education and in
criminal case he was also acquitted. The
Committee of Management has made
illegal appointment of Kunwarpal Singh
and the petitioner is entitled for his salary
in terms of the order of the Deputy
Director of Education dated 22.1.1983
whereby he had issued a direction that the
petitioner will remain under suspension
subject to the decision of the criminal
court. After the acquittal on 24.7.1987 he
was entitled to continue on his post.

9. Learned Standing Counsel
submits that the petitioner did not work
from May, 1990 to 9.11.2003 and as such
he is not entitled for his salary during that
period on the principle of no work and no
pay. He further urged that Kunwarpal
Singh was allowed to continue in
compliance of the interim order and as
such for the same period salary to two
employees cannot be made.

10. I have heard learned counsel for
the respective parties and perused the
record.

11. The petitioner was appointed as
a Clerk in the year 1976, he was
implicated in a criminal case. In the said
criminal case he stood acquitted on
24.7.1987. The committee of management
had terminated his services which was
ultimately dis-approved by the Deputy
Director of Education with a direction that
he would be under suspension and his
continuance shall be subject to the
decision of the criminal case. In the
meantime the Committee of Management
had appointed one Kunwarpal Singh who
had worked as Assistant Clerk in the
institution.

12. However, after the petitioner's
acquittal in criminal case the Committee
of Management resolved in the year 1988
to reinstate him and terminate the services
of Kunwarpal Singh. Aggrieved by the
order of the Committee of Management
terminating Kunwarpal Singh services
and permitting the petitioner to join his
post after acquittal from the criminal
court, Kunwarpal Singh preferred a writ
petition. In the said writ petition on
16.1.1990 an interim mandamus was
issued to pay his salary or show cause.
The then District Inspector of Schools
ought to have filed a reply/show cause by
way of counter affidavit bringing the facts
to the notice of this Court the order of the
Deputy Director of Education whereby
the petitioner was reinstated subject to the
decision of the criminal court and his
subsequent acquittal on 24.7.1987, by
which he was entitle for reinstatement and
the Committee of Management has rightly
reinstated him. However, for the reasons
best known to the then District Inspector
of Schools this important fact was not
brought on the record of this Court, and
he also preferred not to file reply/show
cause to the interim mandamus dated
16.1.1990 and preferred to comply
interim mandamus by issuing an order for
payment of salary of Kunwarpal Singh.
The order of the District Inspector of
Schools for payment of salary to
Kunwarpal Singh is placed on record as
Annexure-CA-7 to the counter affidavit
filed on behalf of respondent no.1. After
the dismissal of Writ Petition Kunwarpal
40 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
Singh preferred Special Appeal before
this Court and SLP before Supreme Court
which came to dismissed on dates
mentioned above.

13. The only question which falls for
determination by this Court is as to
whether the petitioner is entitle for the full
salary
and
other
benefits
or
not.
Indisputably, the petitioner's termination
order was set aside by the Deputy
Director of Education in the appeal filed
by the petitioner and a direction was
issued that his suspension order shall be
subject to the order of the criminal
proceedings. In the criminal proceedings
he was acquitted. After the acquittal of the
petitioner the committee of management
passed a resolution on 28.6.1988 that the
petitioner may be reinstated as thee is no
serious allegations against him and it was
also resolved for payment of his salary.
The said resolution was unanimously
passed. A copy of the minutes of the said
resolution has been placed as Annexure-4
to the writ petition. This fact establishes
that against the petitioner there was no
serious charge of any kind of mis-conduct
as after his acquittal the committee of
management did not take a decision to
initiate
any
disciplinary
proceedings
against him on the same charge of
misconduct.

14. The Principal of the College the
respondent no.3 has filed a counter
affidavit. The stand taken in the counter
affidavit is that that the petitioner joined
his services on 1.7.1988. The relevant part
of the paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit
is extracted as under :-

"the respondent no.1 has malafidely
and arbitrarily rejected the representation
of the petitioner without application of
mind and evidence on record i.e.
attendance register, service book etc.
given by the deponent regarding the
petitioner's regularly working as a Clerk
in the College after his reinstatement
since 1.7.1988. the deponent again wrote
a letter to the respondent no.2 on 9.12.07
seeking the similar query as aforesaid."

15. From the aforesaid averments
and some of the communication which
has been attached with the counter
affidavit filed by the respondent, it is
evident that the petitioner was permitted
to join the Institution in pursuance of the
resolution passed by the committee of
management on 1.7.1988.

16. In case interim order is vacated
,it is the duty of the Court to put the
parties to the same term. The Supreme
Court in the case of Kanodia Chemicals &
Industries
Ltd.
and
others
v.
U.P.Electricity Board and others reported
1997 (5) SCC 772 held that an order of
stay granted pending disposal of a writ
petition/suit or other proceedings, comes
to an end with the dismissal of the
substantive proceedings and it is the duty
of the Court in such a case to put the
parties in the same position they would
have been but for the interim orders of the
Court.

17. In the present case on account of
connivance/negligence of the office of the
District Inspector of Schools, Kunwarpal
Singh continued to receive his salary in
pursuance of an interim order from the
year 1990 to 2003 when his writ petition,
special appeal and SLP were dismissed.
During this period from 1998 onwards the
petitioner was permitted to join his duty
and in his Writ Petition No. 23506 of
1991 interim mandamus was issued on
1 All] Raj Kumar Singh V. District Inspector of Schools and others
41
22.8.1991. Copy of which is placed on
record as Annexure-CA-5 to the counter
affidavit field by the District Inspector of
Schools the respondent no.1 herein.

18. In case an employee is acquitted
in a criminal case there are two options
before the employer if the charges of the
criminal case and the departmental
proceedings are identical and same then in
the case of acquittal from the criminal
trial the departmental proceedings can be
dropped and the employee can be
reinstated . The second option before the
employer is to continue the departmental
proceedings as scope of the departmental
proceedings and the criminal proceedings
are different.

19. Reference may be made to the
following judgment of the Supreme Court
G.M.Tank v. State of Gujrat and others
reported 2006 (5) SCC 446; Captain
M.Pal Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd.
reported 1999 (3) SCC 679 ; Union of
India v. Jai Pal Singh reported 2004(1)
SCC 121; R.P.Kapoor v. Union of India
reported AIR 1964 SC 787; Corpn. of the
City of Nagpur v. Ram Chandra reported
AIR (1984) 626.

20. In the case on hand the
committee of management, the employer
itself has found that charges against the
petitioner were not serious enough and as
such it did not take any decision to initiate
domestic inquiry on those charges against
the petitioner.

21. The only question remains to
answer is whether the petitioner is entitle
for the full salary ? In case where the order
of dismissal or removal are set aside the
reinstatement is automatic with full back
wages is no more res integra . The earlier
view of the Supreme Court was that if the
dismissal/removal/termination order is set
aside the reinstatement with the full back
wages is a normal rule as held by the
Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan
Tin Works (P) Ltd. v, Employees reported
1979 (2) SCC 80. This view was followed
in Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Govt.
Industrial Tribunal/Labour court reported
1980 (4) SCC 443 and Mohan Lal vs.
Bharat Electronics Ltd. reported 1981 (3)
SCC 225.

22. But the recent trend is not
automatic reinstatement with full back
wages. Reference may be made to some of
the recent judgment of the Supreme Court
where the reinstatement and full back
wages has not been held to be automatic,
as held in Allahabad Jal Sansthan v. Daya
Shanker Rai reported 2005 (5) SCC 124,
U.P.State Brassware Corporation Ltd. v.
Udai Narain Pandey reported 2006 (1)
SCC 479; Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan
v. S.C.Sharma reported 2005 (2) SCC 363.
However, the Supreme Court in the case of
J.K.Synthetics Ltd. v. K.P.Agarwal and
another reported 2007 (2) SCC 433 after
noticing
the
recent
trend
that
the
reinstatement and full back wages is not
automatic
held
that
there
are
two
exceptions. The Supreme Court while
carving out the exceptions observed as
under :-

"But there are two exceptions. The
first is where the court sets aside the
termination as a consequence of employee
being exonerated or being found not guilty
of the misconduct. Second is where the
court reaches a conclusion that the inquiry
was held in respect of a frivolous issue or
petty misconduct, as a camouflage to get
rid of the employee or victimise him, and
the
disproportionately
excessive
42 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
punishment is a result of such scheme or
intention. In such cases, the principles
relating to back wages, etc. will be the
same as those applied in the cases of an
illegal termination."

23. The aforesaid exceptions can be
applied safely in the present case as the
petitioner was acquitted in the criminal
case and no disciplinary proceeding under
the regulations of Intermediate Act was
conducted by the appointing authority
albeit it decided to reinstate the petitioner
as it found that there was no serious
charges against the petitioner. Therefore
the law laid down by the Supreme Court in
Hindustan
Tin
Works
(P)
Ltd.
v,
Employees reported 1979 (2) SCC 80
(supra) would be applicable in the present
case and the principle of no work and no
pay would not be applicable in the facts of
this case.

24. This Court has also followed the
same law in the case of Tasneem Fatma v.
State
of
U.P.
Thru
Secy./Director
Secondary Education and Ors. Reported
2009 (1) UPLBEC 321. The relevant part
is extracted here under below:-

"64. In view of the discussion made
herein above, I am of the view that the
order impugned in this writ petition is not
sustainable. The petitioner is entitled for
reinstatement
with
all
consequential
benefits for the reason that she has been
made to suffer on account of wholly illegal
act of the respondents. Here is not a case
where the petitioner should be denied
benefit of back wages. The circumstances
which would justify denial of back wages
and where the employee must be allowed
full back wages or partly, are discussed in
detail by this court in Brijendra Prakash
Kulshrestha vs. Director of Education,
U.P. and others 2007 (3) ADJ 1, where it
was held that in the kind of a case as in
hand, where the termination of the
employee was wholly attributable to the
arbitrary and illegal case of the employer,
the employee cannot be made to suffer. If
the petitioner here is not allowed arrears of
salary, it would cause prejudice to her
without any fault on her part."

25. After bearing in the mind the
principles
culled
out
from
the
aforementioned judgments of the Supreme
Court as well as of this Court in facts of
the present case a direction may be issued
upon the District Inspector of Schools,
Bulandshahr to make the payment of the
petitioner
from
the
date
of
his
reinstatement i.e. 26.8.1988 and not from
the date of acquittal. Petitioner is entitled
for the salary from his joining upto 2003.
As regards payment made to Kunwarpal
Singh
it
was
a
sheer
negligence/connivance of the office of the
District Inspector of Schools. Therefore the
State Government is at liberty to fix the
responsibility for the illegal payment made
to Kunwarpal Singh and recover the said
amount from the Officer who is found to
guilty of negligence or connivance with the
Kunwarpal Singh.

26. For the aforestated reasons the
impugned order dated 5.12.2007 passed by
the District Inspector of Schools, the
respondent no.1 is liable to be quashed.
Accordingly, it is quashed.

27. The petitioner shall be paid his
salary from the year 1998 to 2003 within
three
months
from
the
date
of
communication of this order.

28. The writ petition is allowed.
1 All] U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd V. M/S K.S.M. Bashir Mohammad & Sons & another
43

29. No order as to cost.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 08.01.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ANIL KUMAR, J.

MISC. SINGLE No. - 1673 of 2001

U.P.Cooperative Federation Limited

 ...Petitioner
Versus
M/S K.S.M. Bashir Mohammad & Sons &
Another

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri P.K. Khare
Sri S.K.Pandey
Sri Shrish Kumar

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.
Sri N.K. Seth

Arbitration and Reconciliation Act 1996execution of interim award given by the
arbitrator-execution-proceeding initiated
before Civil Judge (Senior Division)-
order passed therein challenged on the
ground
of
jurisdiction-according
to
definition of Section 2(1) (c) Court
means the "Principle Civil Court" of
Original Jurisdiction i.e. District Judgehence order passed by Civil Judge-heldwithout jurisdiction-set-a-side.

Held: Para-12

In view of the facts stated above as well
as the law as laid down by this Court in
the case of I.T.I. Ltd, Allahabad ( Supra)
,
opposite
party
no.2
has
got
no
jurisdiction to entertain the application
for execution proceedings in the matter
in question hence the order dated
22.5.2001 is without jurisdiction , liable
to be set aside.
Case Law discussed:
AIR 1998 Allahabad 313; 2005 (1) RAJ 209

(Delivered by Hon'ble Anil Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Sri P.K. Khare and Sri
Shirish Kumar ,learned counsel for the
petitioner, Sri Nirmal Seth , learned
Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Sachin
Garg Advocate for opposite party no.1 as
well as learned Standing Counsel and
perused the record.

2. Facts, in brief, of the present case
are that for construction of commercial
Complex at 6 , Cooper Road , Lucknow,
petitioner/
M/S
U.P.
Cooperative
Federation Limited entered into an
agreement on 20.12.1995 with M/S
K.S.M. Bashir Mohammad & Sons (
hereinafter referred to as 'Contractor') .

3. Thereafter some dispute and
deferences have arisen between the
parties arising out of the agreement so for
adjudication of the same referred to the
Arbitrator Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.C.
Saksena( former judge of this Court)
under the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996( hereinafter referred to as 'Act')
and the sole Arbitrator on 24.10.2000 has
given an interim award in favour of the
Contractor, challenged by way of appeal (
F.A.F.O. No.530 of 2000) by the
petitioner , dismissed by judgment and
order dated 30.11.2000 again challenged
before Hon'ble the Supreme Court by way
of Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.
5215 of 2001 etc. dismissed by order
dated
10.5.2001.The
said
order
on
reproduction reads as under:-

"SLP(C) No.5215/2001 This Matter
will be heard only on the merits of the
interim award. So far challenge to the
jurisdiction
of
the
Arbitrator
is
concerned, we decline to exercise our