# Raja Ram v. Saroj Bala

- **Citation:** (2022) 12 ILRA 878
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-11-11
- **Case number:** Matter Under Article 227 No. 1459 of 2017
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/raja-ram-v-saroj-bala-48058
- **Pages:** 18

## Headnote

Civil Law -The Uttar Pradesh Urban
Buildings (Regulation of letting, Rent and
Eviction)
Act,
1972-Decree
of
evictionMonthly tenant-arrears of rent-deposits made
u/s 30 to deposit rent at own risk-invalid-no
compliance of the provisions of section 30 r/w
Rule 21 -short deposits of rent-tenant did not
remit the entire outstandings of rent-on the date
of institution of the suit-not paid within 30 days
of service of notice-case of actionable defaultcomplete payment no made on the date of first
hearing.

Petition dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,911 of 62,697. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39911 for what follows._

878 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
sum of just Rs.15,000/-, the Court was
shocked
and
made
the
following
observations:-

13.
Gramin
Bank
like
the
Appellant should stand for the benefit of the
gramins who sometimes avail of loan for
buying buffaloes, to purchase agricultural
implements, manure, seeds and so on.
Repayment, to a large extent, depends upon
the income which they get out of that. Crop
failure,
due
to
drought
or
natural
calamities, disease to cattle or their death
may cause difficulties to gramins to repay
the amount. Rather than coming to their
rescue, banks often drive them to litigation
leading them extreme penury. Assuming
that the bank is right, but once an authority
like District Forum takes a view, the bank
should graciously accept it rather than
going in for further litigation and even to
the level of Supreme Court. Driving poor
gramins to various litigative forums should
be strongly deprecated because they have
also to spend large amounts for conducting
litigation. We condemn this type of
practice, unless the stake is very high or the
matter affects large number of persons or
affects a general policy of the Bank which
has far reaching consequences."

9. In light of the above observations,
this Court does not find any illegality in the
award dated 30.09.2014 passed by the
Permanent Lok Adalat. Devoid of any
merit,
this
petition
is,
accordingly
dismissed.
----------
(2022) 12 ILRA 878
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 11.11.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.
Matter Under Article 227 No. 1459 of 2017

Raja Ram ...Petitioner
Versus
Saroj Bala ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Ashish Kumar Singh, Sri Rajesh Chandra
Gupta, Sri Abu Bakht, Sri Ajay Kumar Singh, Sri
P.K. Jain

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri Manish Goyal (Sr. Advocate),Ms. Akanksha
Sharma, Sri Siddharth Singhal

Civil Law -The Uttar Pradesh Urban
Buildings (Regulation of letting, Rent and
Eviction)
Act,
1972-Decree
of
evictionMonthly tenant-arrears of rent-deposits made
u/s 30 to deposit rent at own risk-invalid-no
compliance of the provisions of section 30 r/w
Rule 21 -short deposits of rent-tenant did not
remit the entire outstandings of rent-on the date
of institution of the suit-not paid within 30 days
of service of notice-case of actionable defaultcomplete payment no made on the date of first
hearing.

Petition dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. Smt. Chameli Devi 13 Vs VIth A.D.J., Pilibhit
& anr., 2004 All LJ 1945

2. Smt. Siddheshwari Dixit & anr. Vs Hasina
Begum & ors., 2019 (3) ALJ 725

3. Shekhar Bahuguna Vs Suresh Chandra
Kapoor, 2010 SCC OnLine All 1891,

4. Rani Devi Vs Addl. Distt. & Sessions Judge,
2018 SCC OnLine All 6406
(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

This is a tenant's petition arising out of
a decree for eviction passed by the Judge,
Small Cause Court in a suit for eviction and
recovery of arrears of rent and mesne
12 All. Raja Ram Vs. Saroj Bala
879
profits etc. The decree has been affirmed in
revision by the Additional District Judge.

2. Saroj Bala, wife of Jai Prakash
instituted S.C.C. Suit No. 30 of 2007 before
the Judge, Small Cause Court, Ghaziabad
on allegations that she is the owner and
landlady of a house bearing premises No. 5
(presently numbered as 3), situate at Purvi
Ismail Khan, Turab Nagar, Ghaziabad.
Within the said premises, she has a shop,
assigned private No. 8, wherein Raja Ram,
the defendant, is a tenant at the rate of Rs.
30/- per month (excluding taxes - water tax,
house tax and sewer tax). The tenancy is
one from month to month. Raja Ram, who
shall hereinafter be called 'the tenant',
carries on a tailor's shop in the aforesaid
tenanted premises (for short, 'the demised
shop') under the name and style of ''Samrat
Tailors'. The business he keeps on changing
and is currently engaging himself in the
retail of shoes and other footwear. The
tenancy commences on the first of every
calendar month and ends on the last day.
The premises, housing the demised shop,
are an old construction and the provisions
of The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972), for
short, ''the Act', are applicable to it. The
tenant has never paid Smt. Saroj Bala
(hereinafter referred to as 'the landlady')
rent for the demised shop on the date that it
fell due and without the service of a
demand notice upon him. In this regard, the
landlady served a notice upon the tenant on
17.07.2000, demanding rent for the period,
then in arrears, that is to say, from
01.01.2000 to July, 2000. The notice was
duly served upon the tenant.

3. It is averred that the tenant is in
arrears of rent since 01.01.2002, which the
landlady has, time and again, demanded of
him orally. The tenant, however, did not
remit all arrears of rent to the landlady. The
tenant does not carry on any gainful
business in the demised shop. On this
account, he is found, time and again,
partnering or subletting the demised shop
to persons, who are not members of his
family, without the landlady's consent. It is
averred that it had recently come to the
landlady's knowledge that in the month of
September, 1994, the tenant sublet the
demised shop to one Neeraj Garg son of
Kailash Chand Garg, a resident of Modi
Nagar, Ghaziabad, inducting the subtenant
aforesaid in the demised shop for a sum of
Rs.1500/- per mensem. The subtenancy is
for a period of five years. In this
connection, the tenant and Neeraj had
entered into a rent agreement in the
presence of witnesses. The aforesaid act of
the tenant also renders him liable for
ejectment.

4. It is pleaded by the landlady
specifically that the rent due to her,
outstanding against the tenant, is for the
period of 01.01.2002 to July, 2007. Upon
this state of default, the landlady instructed
her Counsel, Mr. Satyadev Verma to serve
the tenant a notice of demand and quit.
Accordingly, a notice of demand and quit
dated 11.07.2007 was issued to him.

5. It is pleaded that after the landlady
had caused the earlier notice of demand in
the year 2002 to be served upon the tenant,
he instituted Misc. Case No. 35 of 2002,
under Section 30(1) of the Act before the
Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), Ghaziabad, seeking
permission of the Court to deposit rent. The
case aforesaid was instituted by the tenant
on incorrect facts. Upon receipt of notice of
the said case, the landlady filed her written
objections, stating that she had never
declined to receive rent and further made a
880 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
prayer in writing as well as orally, that the
tenant may pay the due rent to her by hand.
On the aforesaid basis, the Court, seized of
the Section 30 proceedings, directed the
tenant to pay all outstandings of rent due
until then which the landlady demanded,
but the tenant did not pay the entire rent
due, despite orders of the Court.

6. It is also the landlady's case that the
Court sought the tenant's explanation about
the basis on which the tenant deposited rent
upto 31.03.2006 in Court, and further that
the tenant was permitted to deposit rent by
the Civil Judge in Misc. Case No. 35 of
2003 at his own risk. It is the landlady's
case that the rent deposited by the tenant is
not valid tender. Despite the landlady's
demand, the tenant did not pay rent to her
and, therefore, he is not entitled to the
benefit of deposit made by him in Misc.
Case No. 35 of 2002; particularly so, as
rent cannot be deposited in advance. It is
also the landlady's case that the notice to
quit dated 11.07.2007 was personally
served upon the tenant, but despite expiry
of the period, after which the tenancy was
to stand determined and the demand raised
made good, the tenant did not remit the due
rent to the landlady together with taxes
payable. Accordingly, the tenant was liable
to be evicted on the ground of actionable
default.

7. It is the further case of the landlady
that the demised shop displays the board of
Samrat Tailors, whereas the shop is utilized
by the tenant for the retail of footwear, a
purpose for which the demised shop was
never let out. The aforesaid change in user
for the demised shop is without the
landlady's consent in writing, rendering the
tenant liable to eviction. The notice to quit
dated 11.07.2007, that was served upon the
tenant on 15.07.2007, was answered by his
Counsel, Mr. Anil Vohra, Advocate on
07.08.2007, on incorrect premises. The
current rental value of the demised shop
was claimed by the landlady to be
Rs.5000/- per month.

8. Accordingly, the present suit was
instituted by the landlady against the
tenant, after the determination of his
tenancy for eviction, recovery of arrears of
rent for the past three years, that is to say,
from 14.08.2004 to 14.08.2007, amounting
to a sum of Rs.1080/-, arrears of taxes
amounting to a sum of Rs.1152/-, the
expenses of notice and Counsel fee being a
sum of Rs.1500/- and mesne profits from
the date of determination of tenancy till
delivery of actual physical possession, for
which Court fee was payable in the
Execution Department.

9. A written statement was filed by the
tenant, saying that he is in occupation of
the demised shop as such at the rate of
Rs.30/- per month, including taxes since a
long time. The suit has been filed on
incorrect facts. The tenant claimed that he
has never been a defaulter. The landlady
wants to get the demised shop vacated. The
tenant is depositing the due rent in Misc.
Case No. 35 of 2002, under Section 30 of
the Act. The tenant is not in arrears of rent.
The tenant has his business under the name
and style of Samrat Tailors and the
footwear that he sells is with the consent of
the landlady. Both the businesses are
carried on in the demised shop. The tenant
never sublet the demised shop to Neeraj
Garg.

10. It is the tenant who is in
occupation of the demised shop and carries
on his own business. No cause of action has
arisen to the landlady to institute the
present suit. Upon service of notice issued
12 All. Raja Ram Vs. Saroj Bala
881
on behalf of the landlady, the tenant has got
a reply sent, mentioning correct facts. The
tenant has deposited all due rent in Misc.
Case No. 35 of 2002, under Section 30 of
the Act and is ready to further deposit it. It
is quaintly pleaded in the written statement
that the provisions of the Act are not
applicable to the demised shop.

11. It appears that going by the law
relating to the trial of S.C.C. Suits, no
formal issues were framed, and after the
written statement was filed, the suit
proceeded to final hearing, when the parties
led evidence both oral and documentary.
However, the Trial Court while writing the
judgment, for the sake of convenience,
formulated six issues on the case of parties
suited. The issues are more like points of
determination
for
the
felicity
of
understanding and judgment. These read
(translated into English from Hindi):

(1) Whether any rent is due to the
plaintiff from the defendant, meaning
thereby whether the defendant is a
defaulter?

(2) Whether the defendant, without the
permission of the plaintiff, has established
the business of footwear in the shop in
dispute?

(3) Whether deposit of rent by the
defendant under Section 30 of U.P. Act No.
13 of 1972 is invalid? If yes, its effect?

(4) Whether the provisions of U.P. Act
No. 13 of 1972 do not apply to the shop in
dispute?

(5) To what relief is the plaintiff
entitled?

(6)
Whether
the
defendant
has
inducted a subtenant in the shop in dispute?

12. The landlady, in support of her
case, examined Sanjay Mangal as PW-1. In
her documentary evidence, a carbon copy
of the notice dated 11.07.2007, paper No.
8-Ga was filed. Likewise, the relative
registered post receipt, paper No. 9-Ga, the
U.P.C. in proof of Dispatch, paper No. 10Ga, a certified copy of the order-sheet in
Misc. Case No. 35 of 2002, paper No. 11Ga, a carbon copy of notice dated
17.07.2000, paper No. 12-Ga, the relative
registered post receipt, paper No. 13-Ga,
were also filed. Along with the affidavit,
that was filed in lieu of the examination-inchief of PW-1, a photostat copy of the
power of attorney, paper No. 23-Ga/7 and a
photostat copy of the agreement, Paper No.
23-Ga/10 were annexed.

13. On behalf of the tenant, he
examined himself as DW-1. In his
documentary evidence, the tenant filed,
through a list of documents, paper No. 30Ga, money order receipts and tender
receipts, bearing paper Nos. 31-Ga to 47Ga.

14. The Trial Court dealt with Issues
Nos. 1 and 3 together, which are the most
crucial part of the determination. The
relevant findings of the Trial Court,
wherever necessary, shall be referred to in
the course of this judgment. It was opined
by the Trial Court on Issues Nos. 1 and 3
that the deposit made by the tenant under
Section 30 of the Act was not valid and the
tenant was in actionable default. On Issue
No. 2, it was held that the tenant by
establishing a footwear retail in the
demised shop, that was taken on rent for a
tailor's shop, without the written consent of
the landlady, had indulged in inconsistent
user, prohibited by the Statute. On Issue
No.4, it was held that the provisions of the
Act apply. On Issue No. 6, the Trial Court
held for the tenant that no case of subletting
was made out. Issue No. 5 was answered
for the landlady and the suit decreed for
882 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
eviction, recovery of arrears of rent, arrears
of taxes, expenses of notices and Counsel
fee, besides mesne profits from the date of
institution of the suit till delivery of actual
physical possession at the rate of Rs.5000/-
per month. The suit was decreed by the
Trial Court as aforesaid vide judgment and
decree dated 11.01.2010.

15. Aggrieved, the tenant instituted an
S.C.C. Revision before the District Judge,
Ghaziabad, which was numbered on the file
of the District Judge as S.C.C. Revision
No. 19 of 2010. The Revision, upon
assignment, came up before the Additional
District Judge, Court No.14, Ghaziabad,
who set aside one finding of the Trial
Court, that is to say, the one relating to
inconsistent user, but upheld the findings
on the validity of deposit under Section 30
of
the
Act
and
actionable
default.
Consequently, the Court of Revision
affirmed the Trial Court's decree and
dismissed the Revision.

16. Aggrieved, the tenant has
instituted this petition under Article 227 of
the Constitution.

17. Heard Mr. Ashish Kumar Singh,
learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr.
Manish Goyal, learned Senior Advocate
assisted
by
Ms.
Akanksha
Sharma,
Advocate appearing on behalf of heirs and
LRs of the deceased landlady-respondent.

18. It may be recorded at the outset
and before noticing the contention of
parties that the suit was filed on three
grounds, to wit, actionable default in the
payment of rent, change of user without the
consent in writing of the landlady and
subletting. Both the Courts below have
discarded the tenant's case for eviction on
the ground of subletting. The Trial Court
decreed the suit on the ground of change of
user and actionable default. Upon revision
by the tenant, the learned Additional
District has set aside the finding about the
change of user without permission of the
landlady. Thus, the decree for eviction, that
has been passed by the Courts below
consistently, is one founded on the ground
of actionable default alone. The period of
default
alleged
by
the
landlady
is
01.01.2002 to July, 2007. The notice to quit
was issued on 11.07.2007 and served upon
the tenant on 15.07.2007. There was an
earlier notice of demand dated 17.07.2000
issued on behalf of the landlady, claiming
arrears for the period 01.01.2000 to July,
2000, but about that notice or the arrears of
rent for the said period, there is no issue
involved in the present suit. The issue, as
already noticed hereinabove, is about
default
for
the
period
commencing
01.01.2002. The tenant has instituted
proceedings under Section 30(1) of the Act
before the Court of the Civil Judge (Jr.
Div.), Ghaziabad, as a perusal of the
relative
order-sheet
would
show,
on
01.05.2002 alleging refusal of rent by the
landlady for the period commencing
01.01.2002 (the period of default).

19. It is upon this state of
proceedings, of which the other relevant
details shall be mentioned during the
course of judgment, that the two Courts
below have returned unanimous findings of
actionable default against the tenant.

20. Mr. Ashish Kumar Singh, learned
Counsel for the tenant has submitted that
no case for an actionable default within the
meaning of Section 20(2)(a) of the Act is
made out, because on the date of issue of
the notice to quit dated 11.07.2007,
claiming rent for the period 01.01.2000 to
July, 2007, the entire rent stood deposited
12 All. Raja Ram Vs. Saroj Bala
883
under Section 30(1) of the Act in Misc.
Case No. 35 of 2002. It is emphasized that
prior to issue of the notice to quit, the rent
for one year i.e. 11.04.2007 to April, 2008
was
deposited
on
11.05.2007
in
proceedings under Section 30 of the Act,
that is to say, around two months prior to
the issue of notice under reference. It is
submitted that money orders were sent to
the
landlady
prior
to
institution
of
proceedings under Section 30(1) of the Act,
which were refused. It was thereafter that
the last mentioned proceedings to deposit
rent were instituted. The application under
Section 30(1) of the Act was allowed on
06.04.2007.

21. The learned Counsel for the tenant
has, particularly, criticized the finding of
the Trial Court to the effect that no money
order receipt could be produced by the
tenant, bearing endorsement by the Postal
Department that rent had been refused. He
points out that the Trial Court, at Page No.
77 of the paper-book, in the second
paragraph, has mentioned paper Nos. 34Ga to 47-Ga, referring to these documents
as receipts of tender. It is submitted that
later on in this judgment, the Trial Court
has misdirected itself in holding that the
notice to quit was issued on 11.07.2007, but
the amount of rent due was deposited
thereafter on 29.07.2002, which the learned
Counsel says is an absolutely perverse
finding. It is also argued with much
vehemence that the Trial Court has held
that the tenant has not paid the entire rent
due but that finding is perverse, inasmuch
as all documents were on record before the
Trial Court regarding deposit of rent, and
those that were not, were there on record of
Case No. 35 of 2002. The entire record of
Case No. 35 of 2002 was before the Trial
Court. There is still further criticism of the
Trial Court's findings by the learned
Counsel for the tenant, saying that the
Court at Page No. 78 of the paper-book has
held that after 09.04.2008, no rent has been
deposited in Misc. Case No. 35 of 2002.
This finding is said to be manifestly illegal
as no rent could be deposited under Section
30(1) of the Act, after the institution of the
suit.

22. Before the institution of the suit,
which was done in the year 2007, it is
submitted by the learned Counsel for the
tenant that the learned Civil Judge had
allowed the application under Section 30(1)
of the Act, but the Trial Judge has
misinterpreted the said order to hold that
the Court had not allowed the application;
instead, the Court merely permitted the
tenant to deposit rent at his own risk. It has
been inferred by the Trial Court, from the
aforesaid understanding of the order passed
under Section 30, that the deposit made in
those proceedings cannot be taken into
consideration. It is emphatically argued that
after refusal of the money orders sent
remitting rent, rent for each and every
month was deposited and record of deposit
of all due rent was available to the Trial
Court. As such, the findings of the Trial
Court regarding non-deposit of rent in
proceedings under Section 30 for certain
periods of time are perverse.

23. It is pointed out by Mr. Ashish
Kumar Singh that since the Court of first
instance did not consider the record and
documents of Misc. Case No. 35 of 2002,
the tenant brought on record, through a list
of documents, receipts, including refused
money orders before the Revisional Court.
These documents are on record of the
paper-book at Page Nos. 98 to 102, bearing
paper
Nos.
34-Ga
onwards.
It
is
emphasized that paper No. 34-Ga, as
mentioned on the face of the said
884 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
document, is a paper number assigned to it
before the Trial Judge. The said documents
have been ignored from consideration by
the Revisional Court, according to the
learned Counsel for the tenant, inasmuch as
there is a finding that the receipts do not
disclose the period of tender, that is to say,
the month for which the rent deposited
relates. Likewise, it is emphasized that
about the money orders, it is said by the
Revisional Court that the period for which
rent was remitted through these money
orders is not disclosed. It is urged that in
the money orders, that were refused and
copies of which were filed before the
Revisional Court, the period of rent
remitted is clearly mentioned. It is
submitted that the finding of the Revisional
Court about non-mention of the period for
which the rent was remitted is, therefore,
perverse.

24. The learned Counsel for the tenant
has particularly criticized that finding of
the Revisional Court, where it is mentioned
that rent for certain periods of time has not
been deposited at all, whereas the entire
rent stood deposited, regarding which the
tender receipts have been brought on record
through affidavit and the documents
appended to the writ petition. There is a
finding by the Revisional Court to the
effect that rent for the period 1st June, 2003
to 31st July, 2003, being a sum of Rs.60/-,
has been deposited vide tender bearing No.
43-Ga, but the stamp of receipt by the State
Bank of India shows that it bears the date
of deposit as 30th May, 2008. From the
said fact, the Revisional Court has drawn a
conclusion that if rent due in the year 2003
was deposited in the year 2008, no benefit
thereof can be given to the tenant.

25. The learned Counsel for the tenant
has criticized the said finding as the result
of an error apparent and pointed out, from
the xerox copy of the records summoned
from the Courts below, that just above the
stamp of receipt by the Bank, the date
''30.05.2003' has been mentioned. The
stamp, which appears to show the date of
receipt as ''30.05.2008', is the result of an
aberration in the stamp marking. It is next
submitted that the landlady has consistently
refused money orders and in Misc. Case
No. 35 of 2002, where she appeared and
objected, she never showed her willingness
to receive rent. In fact, she has said in
proceedings under Section 30 of the Act
that in case the tenant would pay the entire
amount of rent due, she would think of
accepting it. According to the learned
Counsel for the tenant, the Court hearing
the case under Section 30 of the Act has
clearly observed that the entire amount of
rent has been deposited and the landlady is
free to withdraw it. It is emphasized that
the tenant never refused to pay rent. The
rent has been deposited since 2002 to 2007
in proceedings under Section 30(1) of the
Act, and thereafter, before the Judge, Small
Cause Court, Ghaziabad in the suit. It is
urged that there is no default in the
payment of rent during the entire period.
The findings regarding actionable default
recorded
by
the
Courts
below
are,
therefore, perverse.

26. About the part of the findings
recorded by the Courts below that the
deposit made under Section 30(1) of the
Act would not enure to the tenant's
benefits, because of non-compliance with
Rule 21 of the U.P. U.B. Rules, it is
submitted by the learned Counsel for the
tenant that the said rule has no application
in the present case, after the landlady had
appeared in proceedings under Section 30
and contested the same. There is no
requirement to deposit process fee and
12 All. Raja Ram Vs. Saroj Bala
885
notice for communication of each deposit
of rent in a case like the present one, in
view of the decisions of this Court in Smt.
Chameli Devi vs. VIth Addl. District
Judge, Pilibhit and another, 2004 All LJ
1945 and Smt. Siddheshwari Dixit and
another vs. Hasina Begum and others,
2019 (3) ALJ 725.

27. The learned Counsel for the
landlady, on the other hand, has refuted the
aforesaid submissions and contended that
the tenant has not remitted rent to the
landlady except upon the service of a
demand notice. And whenever he has
remitted, it has been irregular and short.
Likewise, the deposit made in the case under
Section 30 shows periods of time when the
rent was not deposited. These periods of
non-deposit of rent in proceedings under
Section 30 of the Act have been specifically
recorded in the findings returned by the
Revisional Court, based upon a perusal of
record. Those findings are pure findings of
fact, not open to scrutiny under Article 227
of the Constitution by this Court. Learned
Counsel for the landlord has also invited the
attention of the Court to the order dated
10.10.2006 passed by the Court hearing the
matter under Section 30(1) of the Act to
submit that the said order clearly shows that
the tenant, despite an offer by the landlady
to accept the entire arrears of rent in lump
sum, did not pay. It is also pointed out that
the deposit under Section 30 has been
rightly regarded as invalid, apart from the
period of non-deposit, noticed by the
Revisional Court due to the fact that there is
no compliance with the provisions of Rule
21 of the U.P. U.B. Rules, which are
mandatory.
Both
Courts
below
have
consistently held that it is a case of noncompliance with Rule 21 of the U.P. U.B.
Rules, rendering the deposit made under
Section 30 of the Act, inconsequential.

28. The principal issues are about the
actionable default under Section 20(2) (a)
of the Act and whether deposits made under
Section 30 of the Act are valid in law,
which enure to the tenant's benefit. It is not
in issue that the default alleged is for the
period 01.01.2000 to July, 2000. The
evidence shows that there were bickerings
between parties over the tender and
acceptance of rent, which led the landlady
to issue a notice of demand on 17.07.2000
as well. After January, 2002 the landlady
alleges complete non-payment and default,
but the notice of demand and quit was
issued to the tenant on 11.07.2007 and
served upon him on 15.07.2007. Much
before that, the tenant had taken steps to
deposit under Section 30(1) of the Act by
presenting an application to the Civil Judge
(Jr. Div.), Ghaziabad on 01.05.2002 for the
purpose.

29. The basis to deposit rent in Court
under Section 30 of the Act is said to be the
landlady's refusal to accept rent by hand in
the first instance and then by money order.
The Trial Court has disbelieved this part of
the tenant's case with the remark that no
money order receipt has been produced in
evidence, bearing an endorsement by the
Postal Department that the landlady has
refused to accept rent, when tendered by
money order. This part of the finding
recorded by the Trial Court is not correct.
There are on record money order receipts,
numbered as paper Nos. 34-Ga, 35-Ga, 36Ga, 37-Ga, 38-Ga and 39-Ga, which do not
bear out with the Trial Court's findings, that
no money order receipt has been filed on
record. The money order receipts, that are
on record, also bear endorsement of refusal
by the Postal Department, at the instance of
the landlady. But, that is not the end of the
matter. The money order receipts, bearing
Paper Nos. 34-Ga, 35-Ga and 36-Ga, show
886 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
that rent for the same months, when
refused, was sent over and over again, that
is to say, for the months of January,
February and March, 2002 and then
January to April, 2002. Paper No. 34-Ga
shows that rent for the months of January,
February and March, 2002 was sent by
money order on 01.04.2002 and refused by
the landlady. It was then sent again on
26.04.2002 by money order, bearing paper
No. 35-Ga, for four months from January,
2002 to 30th April, 2002, being a sum of
Rs.120/-, which was also refused. In
between, on 18.03.2002, vide Paper No.
36-Ga, rent was remitted to the landlady for
the period January, February and March,
2002. This was also refused. Again, on
11.03.2002, there is another money order
remittance, evidenced by Paper No. 37-Ga,
which shows that on that day, rent for the
months of January and February, 2002 was
sent, but refused. About these money order
receipts, the Revisional Court has remarked
that a perusal of all these receipts show that
rent for the period January, 2002 to April,
2002 was sent by the tenant time and again,
which was either refused or returned,
because no one was available. It is
remarked by the Revisional Court that
these receipts do not show that what was
the outstanding rent prior to these money
order receipts and how much of the rent
earlier due has been paid up by the tenant.
Since the position of arrears, according to
the Revisional Court, prior to the money
order receipts is not clear, the Revisional
Court has not found justification for the
tenant to deposit in Court, under Section 30
of the Act. This finding does not appear to
be much justified, because there is no clear
case on behalf of the landlady pleaded as to
what was the precise period of arrears of
rent and the amount due, when she was
declining the money orders. It is also not
endorsed on the money orders why these
were being refused or indicating that a
greater amount of rent for a longer period
was due, but the money order remittance
was short and, therefore, refused. Had that
been the case, it might have been a good
ground to refuse acceptance of a part of the
rent due.

30. Nevertheless, the remittance by
money order does show that it is not regular
and month by month. The earliest the
remittance was made was in the month of
March, 2002 and it was for the months of
January and February; not March. Rent is
normally, and in this case also, payable on the
beginning of the calendar month and not the
end of it. Therefore, remittance on 11th
March, 2002 ought to have included rent for
the month of March; not just January and
February. The next remittance was made on
18th March, 2002. This is for the months of
January, February and March, which, like the
earlier one, met with refusal. The third one
vide paper No. 34-Ga was made on 1st April,
2002, but this again is for the months of
January, February and March and does not
include April, when rent for April appears to
have fallen due. It is only on 26th April, 2002
and with the earlier money order refused that
vide paper No. 35-Ga, rent from January to
April, 2002 was remitted. Of course, as said
earlier, this too was refused. This shows that
the tenant is not a regular paymaster and has
been paying rent accumulated for a period of
three months and may be more. If the tenant
had been remitting in this fashion, this Court
is inclined to agree with the Revisional Court,
may be for slightly different reasons, that
deposit under Section 30 of the Act was not
open to the tenant. The deposit, that has been
made under Section 30, is also not month by
month.

31. In a monthly tenancy after all, rent
falls due on first day of every calendar
12 All. Raja Ram Vs. Saroj Bala
887
month and if the tenant pleads a case of the
landlord refusing rent, and seeks to deposit
in Court, he must regularly deposit on the
first of each month, or may be soon
thereafter. However, the tender of rent
before the learned Civil Judge under
Section 30 of the Act would show that the
first deposit was made on 28.05.2002 vide
paper No. 10-Ga, annexed as Annexure No.
SA-3 to the supplementary affidavit for the
period January, 2002 to June, 2002. If one
were to assume that the application under
Section 30 was filed in May and deposit
was made for an extra month after the
refusal of the four earlier money orders in
the months of March and April, 2002, the
subsequent deposits of rent in Court do not
show any regularity.

32. The next deposit, that has been
made vide paper No. 34-Ga on 27.07.2002,
is for the months of July to September,
2002. This is an advance deposit of rent
made in July upto September, 2002. But the
subsequent deposit that was made was in
December, 2002 vide deposit challan
bearing paper No. 35-Ga dated 24.12.2002
and it is for the period of October,
November and December, 2002. Thus, it is
a case of delay, default and irregular
deposit. Again, there is an advance deposit
made on 10.01.2003 for the period 1st
January to 31st March, 2002 vide challan
bearing Paper No. 36-Ga. The next deposit
was made on 02.04.2003 for the months of
April and May, 2003. This is followed by
the deposit made on 8th October, 2003 and
it is for the period 1st October, 2003 to 30th
November, 2003. This is evidenced by the
challan bearing paper No. 38-Ga. Between
the deposits made on 2nd April, 2003 and
8th October, 2003 vide paper No. 37-Ga
and 38-Ga, there is no deposit of rent for
the months of June, July, August and
September. This is a clear period of default
of four months, even in the deposit of rent
in Court. In the following month i.e. the
month of December, deposit was made by
the tenant for whole of the next year and an
extra month, that is to say, from December,
2003 to 31st January, 2004.

33. The next deposit of rent was made
on 25th March, 2004 for the months of
February, 2004 to April, 2004. This was
followed by the deposit made on 1st June,
2004 for the period 1st May, 2004 to 31st
July. The next deposit of rent was made on
29th September, 2004 for the period 1st
August, 2004 to 30th August, 2004,
followed by a further deposit on 14th
December, 2004 for the period 1st
November, 2004 to 31st January, 2005. The
next deposit was made on 16th May, 2005
for the period 1st February to 31st May,
2005. On 27th September, 2005, the tenant
made deposit of rent again for the period
1st June, 2005 to 30th September, 2005.
The next deposit appears to have been
made, though the acknowledgment is a bit
too dim, on 22.02.2006 for the period 1st
October, 2005 to 31st March, 2006,
followed by the deposit made on 11th May,
2007 for the period 10th April, 2007 to 9th
April, 2008.

34. The finding of the Revisional
Court, therefore, that the tenant did not
deposit rent for the period 01.06.2003 to
30.09.2003 in proceedings under Section
30 of the Act is correct on facts. It is also
true that no rent has been deposited for the
period
01.04.2006
to
09.04.2007
in
proceedings under Section 30 of the Act, as
held by the Revisional Court. The finding
about the deposit made on 30th May, 2008
towards rent from 1st June, 2003 to 31st
July, 2003 is incorrect, because that appears
to be an aberration of stamping and the date
is 30th May, 2003, as entries on the relative
888 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
tender would elsewhere indicate. It is on
this basis that the Revisional Court has
concluded that the tenant has not deposited
rent regularly in Court under Section 30 or
paid it to the landlady, regularly.

35. It is but salutary that before
deposit of rent under Section 30 of the Act
may enure to the benefit of the tenant in a
suit for eviction based on actionable
default, deposit of rent should be validly
made under Section 30, covering the period
of default. Here, the records of the case
clearly indicate that rent deposited in
proceedings under Section 30, antedating
the institution of the suit and whereof the
tenant seeks to claim benefit in the matter
of actionable default, is neither regular
deposit nor the complete deposit of rent for
the entire period of time, commencing the
proceedings under Section 30 and until
institution of the suit. The order passed by
the Court under Section 30 of the Act on
06.04.2007 permits the tenant to deposit at
his own risk, after noticing the landlady's
stand that she never refused to accept the
entire rent due. Therefore, the order passed
under Section 30 would, by itself, not save
the tenant from the consequences of default
in payment of rent, if established on record
and actionable. In any case, the deposit
under Section 30 of the Act made by the
tenant is not valid, because it is not for the
relative period of time the deposit of due
rent, as the Revisional Court has found.
There are clear shortfalls for at least two
periods of time, one stretching about a year.
On this ground alone, this Court is of
opinion that the deposit made by the tenant
under Section 30 is not a valid deposit, of
which the tenant may be given benefit in
the suit brought on the ground of default.

36. The other matter, which derogates
from the validity of deposit made under
Section 30 of the Act, are the concurrent
findings of the two Courts below that the
tenant has not complied with the provisions
of Rule 21 of the U.P. U.B. Rules. Rule 21
reads:

"21. Deposit of rent.-(1) Any person
desirous of depositing rent under Section
30 shall apply in Form E. The application
shall be accompanied by as many copies
thereof as there are opposite-parties, and
also the process fee and notices in Form F.

(2) The deposit shall be made under
the Head "P-Deposits and Advances IIDeposits
not
bearing
interest-C-Other
Deposit Accounts-(b) Departmental and
Judicial
Deposits-Civil
Deposits-Civil
Court's Deposits"

(3) On such deposit being made, the
Court shall cause notice of the deposit to be
served on the opposite-party along with a
copy of the application.

4) Where a notice of the deposit is
returned unserved, the Court shall fix a date
on or before which the applicant shall
deposit fresh process fee and notice in
Form F. If within the time so allowed or
within such extended time, as the Court
may grant, the applicant fails to take steps
as above, the application shall be rejected
and the amount deposited shall be refunded
to the applicant.

(5) In the case of continuance of
deposit of rent for any subsequent period,
fresh application shall not be necessary. But
process fee and the notice in Form F shall
accompany every deposit."

37. The Trial Court as well as the
Revisional Court have recorded concurrent
findings of fact, the Trial Court relying on
the evidence of the tenant-DW-1 himself,
that along with the deposit of rent, process
fee and Form-F were not supplied, which
the tenant is obliged to supply under sub-
12 All. Raja Ram Vs. Saroj Bala
889
Rule (1) and sub-Rule (5) of Rule 21 of the
U.P. U.B. Rules. The aforesaid supply of
process fee and notice in Form-F has to
accompany each deposit made under
Section 30 of the Act and both the Courts
of fact below have found that none of the
deposits made by the tenant have complied
with the aforesaid requirement, which is
mandatory in order to make valid deposit of
rent under Section 30 of the Act. In fact,
sub-Section (4) of Section 30 of the Act
makes the requirement mandatory, to which
Rule 21 gives effect. The question of
validity of deposit under Section 30 of the
Act,
being
dependent
upon
strict
compliance with sub-Rules (3) and (5) of
Rule 21 of the U.P. U.B. Rules, fell for
consideration of this Court in Shekhar
Bahuguna v. Suresh Chandra Kapoor,
2010 SCC OnLine All 1891, where it was
held:

"42. The learned senior counsel for
the tenant submits that the above order is
indicative of the fact that necessary steps
were taken by the tenant for issuance of
notice which is being disputed by the
learned counsel for the landlord.