# Rajeev Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 1 ILRA 651
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-01-21
- **Case number:** Misc. Bench No. 25382 of 2020
- **Bench:** Rajan Roy, Mrs. Saroj Yadav
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/rajeev-kumar-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-46707
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

(A) Civil Law - Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 - Section 19 - The petitioner has
assailed the grant of sanction to prosecute him
before institution of the prosecution in a
652 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
competent Court. The Court observed that
where it is not a case of absence of sanction,
but a case of validity of sanction, the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
would not take cognizance of the matter before
pre-cognizance stage. The appropriate remedy
would lie under Section 482 Cr.P.C. at the
appropriate stage. (Para 18)

Writ Petition Rejected. (E-8)

List of Cases cited :-

## Text

1 All. Rajeev Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
651
The Court can under Article 32 or Article
226 refuse to exercise its discretion of
striking down the order if such striking
down will result in restoration of another
order passed in favour of the petitioner and
against the opposite party in violation of
the principles of natural justice or is not in
accordance with law.

44. The Supreme Court in M.C.
Mehta (supra) also referred to another case
where there was a breach of principles of
natural justice. The Supreme Court found
that interference was not necessary if the
result of interference would be the
restoration of another order which was not
legal. In Mohd. Swalleh and others Vs
Third Additional District Judge; 1988 (1)
SCC
40,
the
Supreme
Court
was
considering an Appeal arising out of U.P.
Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting,
Rent
and
Eviction)
Act
1972.
The
Prescribed
Authority
dismissed
an
application filed by the landlord and this
was held clearly to be contrary to the very
purpose of Section 43(2) RR of the Act.
The District Court entertained the Appeal
filed by the landlord and allowed it without
noticing
that
such
appeal
was
not
maintainable. The High Court refused to
interfere. The Supreme Court on Appeal
filed by the tenant accepted that though no
Appeal lay to the District Court observed
nevertheless that the refusal of the High
Court to set aside the order of the District
Judge was correct, as that would have
restored the order of the Prescribed
Authority which was apparently illegal.

45. This Court having considered the
arguments of the counsel for the petitioner
is convinced that the petitioner is a stranger
to the cause pleaded in this petition. Even if
it be assumed that the order of the
Settlement Officer Consolidation and the
Deputy Director Consolidation would be
set aside by this Court in writ petition
proposed to be filed by the petitioner but
the order of the Commissioner would stand
in its way preventing it to enjoy the fruits
of the litigation, still the Court believes that
showing interference in the order of
Resumption would be against greater
public good as a Medical College and
Referral Hospital is proposed to be
established on the land in dispute under a
time bound centrally sponsored scheme.

46.

The
writ
Petition
stands
dismissed.

47.

The
interim
order
stands
discharged.
----------
(2021)01ILR A651
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 21.01.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJAN ROY, J.
THE HON'BLE MRS. SAROJ YADAV, J.

Misc. Bench No. 25382 of 2020
Connected with Misc. Bench Nos. 25759 of
2020, 25756 of 2020, 25639 of 2020, 25508 of
2020 & 25453 of 2020

Rajeev Kumar Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Purnendu Chakravarty, Annuj Taandon

Counsel for the Respondents:
Govt. Advocate, Shishir Jain

(A) Civil Law - Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 - Section 19 - The petitioner has
assailed the grant of sanction to prosecute him
before institution of the prosecution in a
652 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
competent Court. The Court observed that
where it is not a case of absence of sanction,
but a case of validity of sanction, the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
would not take cognizance of the matter before
pre-cognizance stage. The appropriate remedy
would lie under Section 482 Cr.P.C. at the
appropriate stage. (Para 18)

Writ Petition Rejected. (E-8)

List of Cases cited :-

1. Ajai Kumar & ors. Vs.St. of U.P. & ors. Writ
Petition No. 792 (MB) of 2020

2. Chhatra Pal Singh (C.P. Singh Vs St. of U.P. &
ors.16340 (MB) of 2020

3. Rajeev Garg Vs St. of U.P. & ors. 19087 (MB)
of 2020

4. St. of U.P. Vs Anil Kumar Sharma (2015) 6
SCC 716

5. Satya Pal Singh & ors. Vs St. of U.P. & ors.
Writ Petition No. 7806 (MB) of 2009

6. Dinesh Kumar Vs Airport Authority of India
(2012) 1 SCC 532

7. St. of M.P. Vs Dr. Krishna Chandra Saksena
(1996) 11 SCC 439

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajan Roy, J. &
Hon'ble Mrs. Saroj Yadav, J.)

1. This is a bunch of writ petitions
filed under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India challenging the sanction order
dated 16.12.2019 and consequential orders
of communication issued thereafter in
respect to F.I.R. registered at Crime No. 1
of 2014 dated 1.1.2014 under sections 409,
120-B I.P.C. and section 13(1)(d) read with
section
13(2)
of
the
Prevention
of
Corruption Act 1988. All these writ
petitions involve same issue, therefore, they
were heard together and are being decided
by a common judgment. For convenience
Writ Petition No. 25382 (MB) of 2020,
Rajeev Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. &
ors., has been treated as the leading writ
petition.

Petitioners of the aforesaid petitions
pray as under :

"this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to
issue -

(a) a writ, order or direction in the
nature of certiorari for quashing of the
Prosecution
Sanction
Order
dated
16.12.2019 signed on 14.12.2019 by the
Managing Director UPRNN and the
Communication Letter dated 16.12.2019
actually signed on 13.12.2019 against the
petitioner contained as Annexure No. 2 to
this Writ Petition arising out of FIR
registered at Crime No. 1/2014 dated
01.01.2014, under sections: 409, 120-B
IPC and section 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of
Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 after
summoning the records from the authority
competent.

(b) a writ order or direction so as to
decide this petition as per the order and
direction passed by Coordinate Bench of
this Hon'ble Court in Writ Petition No.
792/(MB) of 2020 (Ajay Kumar and
another v. State of UP and others) in the
facts and circumstances of this petition and
the same benefit may kindly be extended to
the petitioner also."

2. At the very outset learned counsel
for the petitioner submitted that Writ
Petition No. 792 (MB) of 2020, Ajai
Kumar & ors. V. State of U.P. & ors.,
involving similar issue and pertaining to
the same crime number, albeit, in respect to
other accused, has been decided by this
Court vide judgment dated 18.6.2020
wherein, without entering into validity of
the sanction order certain directions have
been issued to complete the investigation
1 All. Rajeev Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
653
with a further direction to the Court below
to consider objections to the validity of
sanction and till such decision is taken by
the Court below regarding validity of
sanction for prosecution against the said
petitioners, no coercive measures were to
be taken against them. He prays for similar
relief.

3. However, learned A.G.A. submits
that in the said petition the sanction order
dated 16.12.2019 was not under challenge,
instead an order communicating the same
had been challenged. Moreover, he says
that a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is not maintainable
against such a sanction order as its validity
can be seen during trial as has been held by
Hon'ble the Supreme Court in a catena of
decisions and by a Division Bench of this
Court in Satya Pal Singh & ors.

4. In response, learned counsel for
the petitioner invited attention of the
Court to interim orders passed in similar
cases pertaining to same crime number
relating to co-accused on 8.12.2020 in
Writ Petition Nos. 16340 (MB) of 2020,
Chhatra Pal Singh(C.P. Singh) v. State
of U.P. & ors., and 19087 (MB) of 2020,
Rajeev Garg v. State of U.P. & ors.,
wherein, referring to the decision in Ajay
Kumar's case, protection has been given
in terms thereof.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner
fairly admitted to the fact that in all those
cases which are referred hereinabove
investigation
had
already
been
completed, yet under some misconception
directions were issued for completion of
investigation. The sanction order in fact
had been issued after completion of
investigation.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner
was
further
confronted
as
to
the
maintainability of this writ petition in view
of various pronouncements of the Supreme
Court wherein a distinction has been made
between absence of sanction which can be
raised at a pre-cognizance stage before the
appropriate court and question of validity
of sanction for prosecution which can be
raised during trial, meaning thereby, a writ
petition in this regard would not be
maintainable. Learned counsel submitted
that in the facts of the present case
petitioner had not been arrested during
investigation since the lodging of the F.I.R.
in 2014 and even now merely because
sanction has been granted, even if the
investigating agency is proceeding to
submit a chargesheet, as is the case, there is
no mandatory necessity that the petitioner
is required to be arrested and produced
before the Court while submitting the
chargesheet, whereas in fact this is exactly
what they are proceeding to do. In this
regard he relied upon a decision of Hon'ble
the Supreme Court reported in 2015 (6)
SCC 716, State of U.P. v. Anil Kumar
Sharma, wherein a judgment of this very
court
making
it
mandatory
for
the
Police/Investigating Agency to produce the
accused while submitting chargesheet in
the court was set aside, inter alia, with the
observations that there is no requirement
under section 173 for the investigating
officer to produce the accused alongwith
the chargesheet. However, on being asked
as to whether section 173 or the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Anil
Kumar Sharma (supra) prohibits the Police
on its own from arresting the accused and
producing before the Trial Court so as to
expedite the proceedings, learned counsel
for the petitioner fairly submitted that it did
not.
654 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner
was asked as to whether there is a
difference in the High Court passing a
dictum mandatorily requiring the accused
to be arrested and produced before the
court at the time of submission of a
chargesheet and the Police on its own
considering the relevant facts arresting and
producing
him,
the
learned
counsel
admitted to the distinction in this regard,
however, he submitted that there is no
justification for the arrest of the petitioner
accused at this stage when he has not been
arrested in the past six years, especially as,
when the court below issues the summons
or warrants, as the case may be, he will
either appear on his own or be produced by
the Police. On being asked as to the remedy
under section 438 Cr.P.C. being available
in this regard, learned counsel referred to
practical difficulties in this regard and the
possibility of arrest before the remedy
could be availed.

8. He also submitted that the
challenge to the sanction order was on the
ground of non-application of mind to
relevant factors and materials.

9. As the petitioner is also being
prosecuted
under
the
Prevention
of
Corruption Act 1988, it is relevant to refer
to section 19 thereof which reads as under :

"19. Previous sanction necessary for
prosecution.--(1) No court shall take
cognizance of an offence punishable under
sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have
been committed by a public servant, except
with the previous sanction, save as
otherwise provided in the Lokpal and
Lokayuktas Act, 2013--

(a) in the case of a person who is
employed, or as the case may be, was at the
time of commission of the alleged offence
employed in connection with the affairs of
the Union and is not removable from his
office save by or with the sanction of the
Central Government, of that Government;

(b) in the case of a person who is
employed, or as the case may be, was at the
time of commission of the alleged offence
employed in connection with the affairs of a
State and is not removable from his office
save by or with the sanction of the State
Government, of that Government;

(c) in the case of any other person, of
the authority competent to remove him
from his office.

Provided that no request can be made,
by a person other than a police officer or
an officer of an investigation agency or
other law enforcement authority, to the
appropriate Government or competent
authority, as the case may be, for the
previous sanction of such Government or
authority for taking cognizance by the
court of any of the offences specified in this
sub-section, unless--

(i) such person has filed a complaint
in a competent court about the alleged
offences for which the public servant is
sought to be prosecuted; and

(ii) the court has not dismissed the
complaint under section 203 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and
directed the complainant to obtain the
sanction for prosecution against the public
servant for further proceeding:

Provided further that in the case of
request from the person other than a police
officer or an officer of an investigation
agency or other law enforcement authority,
the appropriate Government or competent
authority shall not accord sanction to
prosecute
a
public
servant
without
providing an opportunity of being heard to
the concerned public servant:

Provided also that the appropriate
Government or any competent authority
1 All. Rajeev Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
655
shall, after the receipt of the proposal
requiring sanction for prosecution of a
public servant under this sub-section,
endeavour to convey the decision on such
proposal within a period of three months
from the date of its receipt:

Provided also that in case where, for
the purpose of grant of sanction for
prosecution, legal consultation is required,
such period may, for the reasons to be
recorded in writing, be extended by a
further period of one month:

Provided
also
that
the
Central
Government may, for the purpose of
sanction for prosecution of a public
servant, prescribe such guidelines as it
considers necessary.

Explanation.--For the purposes of
sub-section (1), the expression "public
servant" includes such person--

(a) who has ceased to hold the office
during which the offence is alleged to have
been committed; or

(b) who has ceased to hold the office
during which the offence is alleged to have
been committed and is holding an office
other than the office during which the
offence is alleged to have been committed.]

(2) Where for any reason whatsoever
any doubt arises as to whether the previous
sanction as required under sub-section (1)
should be given by the Central Government
or the State Government or any other
authority, such sanction shall be given by
that Government or authority which would
have been competent to remove the public
servant from his office at the time when the
offence
was
alleged
to
have
been
committed.

(3)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),--

(a) no finding, sentence or order
passed by a special Judge shall be
reversed or altered by a Court in appeal,
confirmation or revision on the ground of
the absence of, or any error, omission or
irregularity in, the sanction required
under sub-section (1), unless in the
opinion of that court, a failure of justice
has in fact been occasioned thereby;

(b)
no
court
shall
stay
the
proceedings under this Act on the ground
of any error, omission or irregularity in
the sanction granted by the authority,
unless it is satisfied that such error,
omission or irregularity has resulted in a
failure of justice;

(c)
no
court
shall
stay
the
proceedings under this Act on any other
ground and no court shall exercise the
powers of revision in relation to any
interlocutory order passed in any inquiry,
trial, appeal or other proceedings.

(4) In determining under sub-section
(3) whether the absence of, or any error,
omission or irregularity in, such sanction
has occasioned or resulted in a failure of
justice the court shall have regard to the
fact whether the objection could and
should have been raised at any earlier
stage in the proceedings.

Explanation.--For the purposes of
this section,--

(a) error includes competency of the
authority to grant sanction;

(b)
a
sanction
required
for
prosecution includes reference to any
requirement that the prosecution shall be
at the instance of a specified authority or
with the sanction of a specified person or
any requirement of a similar nature."

10. We have gone through the
decision of a Coordinate Bench of this
Court in the case of co-accused in Writ
Petition No. 792 (MB) of 2020, Ajai
Kumar & Another v. State of U.P. &
ors., decided on 18.6.2020. In the said case
a consequential order dated 31.8.2019 was
656 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
under challenge, whereas the sanction had
been granted by the order dated 16.12.2019
which was not challenged. In the present
case order dated 16.12.2019 has been
challenged.

11. As stated by the learned A.G.A.
and as is also mentioned in the interim
orders passed in other writ petitions
referred hereinabove, the order dated
31.8.2019 which was challenged in the case
of Ajai Kumar (supra) was merely a
communication of the sanction granted on
16.12.2019/14.12.2019.

12. Be that as it may, the sanction
order dated 16.12.2019 is under challenge
in this writ petition. Furthermore, on a
perusal of the judgment dated 18.6.2020
referred hererinabove we find that though
the Coordinate Bench of this Court has
extensively dealt with the purpose and
object of sanction as also the stage at which
its validity can be challenged during trial,
no finding or opinion has been expressed as
to whether a writ petition under Article 226
of the Constitution of India would be
maintainable in view of various decisions
referred in the said judgment itself and
even otherwise rendered by Hon'ble the
Supreme Court and this Court wherein it
has been held that such a challenge to
validity of sanction can be raised before the
Trial Court, although, the Court was
obviously not inclined to entertain the writ
petition on the question of validity of
sanction as it directed the Trial Court to
consider it, however, while not entering
into the question of validity of sanction and
disposing off the writ petition gave
protection to the petitioner to the effect that
"till the decision is taken by the competent
court/Court of Magistrate in regard to the
sanction
of
prosecution
against
the
petitioner that whether the same is valid or
not, no coercive measures shall be taken
against him." Now the question before this
Court is that once the writ petition
challenging the validity of sanction is not
maintainable under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India in view of decisions
of Hon'ble the Supreme Court and this
Court wherein it has been held that such a
challenge can be raised and should be
raised before the Trial Court, is it within
the domain of this Court to grant some
relief while not entertaining the writ
petition ? It is the limited protection
granted as aforesaid which has created a
piquant situation before this Bench where,
on the one hand, we are bound to follow
the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court
and, on the other hand, petitioner claims
similar benefit on the ground of parity as
they are accused in the same crime number
as the petitioners in Ajay Kumar's case and
in the subsequent two writ petitions
referred hereinabove who have also been
granted such relief.

13. Before proceeding further we
would like to make a mention that the only
question which arises before us is validity
of sanction. Now, can it be seen by us at
this stage or it is to be seen by the Trial
Court at the appropriate stage, is the moot
point. A coordinate Bench of this Court in
the case of Satya Pal Singh & ors. v. State
of U.P. & ors. (Writ Petition No. 7806
(MB) of 2009) and connected matters had
the occasion to consider the question as to
whether a proposed accused under Article
226 of the Constitution of India can
challenge the grant of sanction to prosecute
him before institution of the prosecution in
a
competent
Court.
Considering
the
relevant provisions of law and various
provisions of this Court and the Supreme
Court of
India
the Division
Bench
concluded as under :
1 All. Rajeev Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
657

"38. In view of above discussion, this
Court is of the firm view that

(1) grant of sanction order to
prosecute the accused under the statute is
not an administrative action of the
competent authority. It would be a statutory
function of the competent authority and
subject to challenge in the proceedings
launched
against
the
accused
in
accordance with the procedure established
under law.

(2) An accused cannot be allowed to
challenge the order granting sanction to
prosecute at pre-cognizance stage. As the
same has no locus as held in Smt.
Nagawwa vs Veeranna Shivallngappa
Konjalgi
and
others;
MANU/SC/0173/1976; (1976) 3 SCC 736
and Raghu Raj Singh Rousha Vs. Shivam
Sundaram Promoters Private Limited and
another; MANU/SC/8476/2008 : (2009) 2
SCC 363.

39. In view of above, this bunch of writ
petition is not maintainable and the same
are liable to be dismissed. The interim
orders passed in the writ petitions are also
liable to be vacated, therefore, the interim
orders passed in the writ petitions stand
vacated.

40. Accordingly, all the writ petitions
are dismissed."

14. It categorically held that such
accused cannot be allowed to challenge the
order granting sanction to prosecute at precognizance stage.

15. When the above quoted decision
was rendered, there was no provision for
grant of anticipatory bail in the State of
U.P., however, now there is such a
provision.

16. We may also refer to a decision of
the Supreme Court of India reported in
(2012) 1 SCC 532, Dinesh Kumar v.
Airport Authority of India wherein it has
held as under :

"8. The provisions contained in
Sections 19(1), (2), (3) and (4) of the P.C.
Act came up for consideration before this
Court in Parkash Singh Badal (2007) 1
SCC 1. In paras 47 and 48 of the judgment,
the Court held as follows (SCC p. 37) :

"47: The sanctioning authority is not
required to separately specify each of the
offences
against
the
accused
public
servant. This is required to be done at the
stage of framing of charge. Law requires
that before the sanctioning authority
materials must be placed so that the
sanctioning authority can apply his mind
and take a decision. Whether there is an
application of mind or not would depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case
and there cannot be any generalised
guidelines in that regard.

48: The sanction in the instant case
related to the offences relatable to the Act.
There is a distinction between the absence
of sanction and the alleged invalidity on
account of non-application of mind. The
former question can be agitated at the
threshold but the latter is a question which
has to be raised during trial."

9.
While
drawing
a
distinction
between the absence of sanction and
invalidity of the sanction, this Court in
Parkash Singh Badal (supra) expressed in
no uncertain terms that the absence of
sanction could be raised at the inception
and threshold by an aggrieved person.
However, where sanction order exists, but
its legality and validity is put in question,
such issue has to be raised in the course of
trial. Of course, in Parkash Singh Badal
(supra), this Court referred to invalidity of
sanction on account of non- application of
mind.
658 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

10. In our view, invalidity of sanction
where sanction order exists, can be raised
on diverse grounds like non-availability of
material before the sanctioning authority
or bias of the sanctioning authority or the
order of sanction having been passed by an
authority not authorised or competent to
grant such sanction. The above grounds
are only illustrative and not exhaustive. All
such grounds of invalidity or illegality of
sanction would fall in the same category
like the ground of invalidity of sanction on
account of non-application of mind - a
category carved out by this Court in
Parkash Singh Badal (supra), the challenge
to which can always be raised in the course
of trial."

17. We may also refer to another
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
State of M.P. v. Dr. Krishna Chandra
Saksena, (1996) 11 SCC 439 :-

"8..................... sanctioning authority
was satisfied after complete and conscious
scrutiny of the records produced in respect of
the allegation against the accused. Now the
question whether all the relevant evidence
which would have tilted the balance in favour
of the accused if it was considered by the
sanctioning
authority
before
granting
sanction and which was actually left out of
consideration could be examined only at the
stage of trial when the sanctioning authority
comes forward as a prosecution witness to
support the sanction order if challenged
during the trial. As that stage was not
reached the prosecution could not have been
quashed at the very inception on the
supposition that all relevant documents were
not considered by the sanctioning authority
while granting the impugned sanction."

18. In view of the above decisions, we
have absolutely no doubt that this petition
challenging the order dated 16.12.2019
sanctioning
prosecution
against
the
petitioner is not maintainable and is not
liable to be entertained, however, as stated
earlier now the other aspect of the matter is
that in similar cases relating to same crime
number Coordinate Benches have granted
some
protection
as
already
referred
hereinabove to the co-accused till validity
of sanction is decided by the trial court. If
the petition itself is not liable to be
entertained then whether while dismissing
the same, irrespective of the fact that as to
whether we mention it as a disposal or
dismissal of the petition, any relief, if so, to
what extent, can be granted to the petitioner
herein, especially as, since June 2018 the
provision for grant of anticipatory bail
under section 438 Cr.P.C. has come into
force in the State of U.P. which can be
applied and considered at any stage,
certainly at a stage where no chargesheet
has been filed as yet as in this case and
appropriate relief can be sought. Question
is whether this Court should grant a
protection to the effect that no coercive
measures should be taken against the
petitioner till the trial court decides the
validity of sanction, at this stage ? Now the
fact is that the chargsheet has not been filed
as yet. We are at the pre-cognizance stage.
The law is very clear that where it is not a
case of absence of sanction, but a case of
validity of sanction, the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India
would not take cognizance of the matter
before the pre-cognizance stage. In fact,
even thereafter the remedy may not lie
under under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, but may be under section 482
Cr.P.C. at the appropriate stage, therefore,
ordinarily while dismissing the petitions we
would not grant such relief, nevertheless,
considering the piquant situation which has
already been noticed by us, as, in the same
1 All. Hindu Personal Law Board Vs. Union of Bharat
659
crime number this Court has granted
protection, as an exceptionally compelling
measure which is not to be treated as a
precedent, we provide that for 3 weeks
from the pronouncement of the judgment
petitioner(s) shall not be arrested in Case
Crime No. 1 of 2014 referred hereinabove,
during which, it shall be open for them to
apply for anticipatory bail under section
438 which may be considered by the Court
concerned as per law, but, this protection
shall cease immediately on expiry of 3
weeks as aforesaid. Thereafter, the law
shall take its own course. Subject to these
observations and leaving it open for the
petitioner to raise the question of validity of
sanction in the event a chargesheet is filed
before a Court of criminal jurisdiction, at
the appropriate stage, we dismiss these writ
petitions, but only for the aforesaid reason
without entering into the merits of the
sanction order impugned herein.
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(2021)01ILR A659
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 25.01.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RITU RAJ AWASTHI, J.
THE HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J.

P.I.L. Civil No. 2084 of 2021

Hindu Personal Law Board ...Petitioner
Versus
Union of Bharat ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Asok Pande

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.

(A) Civil Law - Public Interest Litigation
- doctrine of constitutional trust -
maxim - Salus populi suprema lex esto
- the good of the people shall be
supreme law - it cannot be believed
that
a
constitutional
authority
or
functionary
would
not
act
in
accordance with and within the scope
of its powers as indicated in the
Constitution of India - Courts have
very limited role with regard to judicial
legislation - neither the Courts can
legislate nor they have any competence
to issue directions to legislature to
enact a law in a particular manner -
legislature is supreme in its own sphere
under the Constitution - subject to the
limitations
provided
for
in
the
Constitution
itself
-
legislature
to
decide nature of operation of the
statutes - as to when and in what
respect and of what subject-matter the
laws are to be made.(Para - 5,6,)

Petitioner in person is only seeking a direction
for the concerned respondent to consider for
legislating a law regulating religious conversion
and no specific direction is being sought to
Parliament or any State Legislature to enact any
legislation.(Para -3)

HELD:- In view of aforesaid dictum, it is clear
that no direction can be issued for enacting any
legislation in any particular manner by High
Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.(Para - 8)

Writ Petition dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited :-

1. Manoj Narula Vs U.O.I. , (2014) 9 SCC 1
(Constitution Bench)

2. Municipal Committee, Patiala Vs Model Town
Residents Assn., (2007) 8 SCC 669

3. St. of H.P. Vs Parent of a student of Medical
College, (1985) 3 SCC 169
4. V.K. Naswa Vs U.O.I., (2012) 2 SCC 542 :
(2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 914