# Rajeev Singh v. U.O.I. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 7 ILRA 356
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-07-12
- **Case number:** First Appeal From Order No.2871 of 2016
- **Bench:** Ramesh Sinha, Narendra Kumar Johari
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/rajeev-singh-v-u-o-i-ors-47098
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

(a) Criminal Law - Bail - National
Security Act, 1980: Section 3(2) - Even
one solitary incident may give rise to the
disturbance of 'public order'.

In the instant case, the petitioner conspired
to get persons assassinated who being the
Mahant of the HulasiBagiya Ashram, his
disciple and his son and so creating a menace
in the society at large. To assassinate a
religious persons, while sleeping at night,
strikes at the root of the State's authority and
is directly connected to'public order' This act
of the petitioner was not directed against a
single individual, but against the public at
large having the effect of disturbing even
tempo of life of the community and thus,
breaching the 'public order' (Para 23).

The detaining authority has reason to believe
that there is imminent possibility of petitioner
being released on bail and on being so
released, he would in all probability would
indulge in prejudicial activities and to prevent
him from doing so, it is necessary to detain
him. (Para 24)

Writ Petition Rejected. (E-8)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

356 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Johal and Others, 2019 (2) T.A.C. 705
(S.C.) wherein the Apex Court has held as
under :

"13.
The
aforesaid
features
equally apply to the contentions urged on
behalf of the claimants as regards the rate
of interest. The Tribunal had awarded
interest at the rate of 12% p.a. but the same
had been too high a rate in comparison to
what is ordinarily envisaged in these
matters. The High Court, after making a
substantial enhancement in the award
amount, modified the interest component at
a reasonable rate of 7.5% p.a. and we find
no reason to allow the interest in this
matter at any rate higher than that allowed
by High Court."

18. No other grounds are urged orally
when the matter was heard.

18. 1 In view of the above, the
appeal is partly allowed. Judgment and
award passed by the Tribunal shall stand
modified to the aforesaid extent. The
respondent-Insurance
Company
shall
deposit the amount within a period of 12
weeks from today with interest at the rate
of 7.5% from the date of filing of the claim
petition till the amount is deposited. The
amount already deposited be deducted from
the amount to be deposited. The Insurance
Company who will deposit the entire
amount can have their right to recover the
amount from owner and the Insurance
Company of the other vehicle. As far as
deceased is concerned, it is a case of
composite negligence, hence, the amount
cannot be deducted from the compensation
awarded to the claimants who are the heirs
of a non tort-feasor.

19. In view of the ratio laid down by
Hon'ble Gujarat High Court, in the case of
Smt. Hansagori P. Ladhani v/s The
Oriental
Insurance
Company
Ltd.,
reported in 2007(2) GLH 291 and this
High Court in , total amount of interest,
accrued
on
the
principal
amount
of
compensation is to be apportioned on
financial year to financial year basis and if
the interest payable to claimant for any
financial year exceeds Rs.50,000/-, insurance
company/owner is/are entitled to deduct
appropriate amount under the head of 'Tax
Deducted at Source' as provided u/s 194A (3)
(ix) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and if the
amount of interest does not exceeds
Rs.50,000/- in any financial year, registry of
this Tribunal is directed to allow the claimant
to withdraw the amount without producing
the certificate from the concerned Income-
Tax Authority. The aforesaid view has been
reiterated by this High Court in Review
Application No.1 of 2020 in First Appeal
From Order No.23 of 2001 (Smt. Sudesna
and others Vs. Hari Singh and another) and in
First Appeal From Order No.2871 of 2016
(Tej Kumari Sharma v. Chola Mandlam
M.S. General Insurance Co. Ltd.) decided
on 19.3.2021 while disbursing the amount.

20. This Court is thankful to both the
learned Advocates for getting this matter
disposed of during this pandemic.
----------
(2021)07ILR A356
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 12.07.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAMESH SINHA, J.
THE HON'BLE NARENDRA KUMAR JOHARI, J.

Habeas Corpus No. 906 of 2021

Rajeev Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
U.O.I. & Ors. ...Respondents
7 All. Rajeev Singh Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
357
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Pawan Kumar Pandey, Mohd. Amir Khan,
Rajesh K. Agnihotri

Counsel for the Respondents:
Govt. Advocate, A.S.G.

(a) Criminal Law - Bail - National
Security Act, 1980: Section 3(2) - Even
one solitary incident may give rise to the
disturbance of 'public order'.

In the instant case, the petitioner conspired
to get persons assassinated who being the
Mahant of the HulasiBagiya Ashram, his
disciple and his son and so creating a menace
in the society at large. To assassinate a
religious persons, while sleeping at night,
strikes at the root of the State's authority and
is directly connected to'public order' This act
of the petitioner was not directed against a
single individual, but against the public at
large having the effect of disturbing even
tempo of life of the community and thus,
breaching the 'public order' (Para 23).

The detaining authority has reason to believe
that there is imminent possibility of petitioner
being released on bail and on being so
released, he would in all probability would
indulge in prejudicial activities and to prevent
him from doing so, it is necessary to detain
him. (Para 24)

Writ Petition Rejected. (E-8)

List of Cases cited:

1. Ashok Kumar Vs Delhi Administration AIR
1982 SC 1143 (followed)

2. Victoria Fernandes Vs Lalmal Sawma AIR
1992 SC 687 (followed)

3. State of U.P. & anr.Vs Sanjay Pratap Gupta @
Pappu & ors. 2004 (8) SCC 591 (followed)

4. Sant Singh Vs District Magistrate, Varansi
2000 Cri LJ 2230 (followed)

5. Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh Vs M.M.
Mehta (1995) 3 SCC 237 (followed)

6. Amanulla Khan Kudeatalla Khan Pathan Vs St.
of Guj. (1999) 5 SCC 613 (followed)

7. Hasan Khan Ibne Haider Khan Vs R.H.
Mendonea (2000) 3 SCC 511 (followed)

8. Smt. Bimla Rani Vs U.O.I. 1989 (26) ACC

9. Alijan Mian Vs District Magistrate Dhanbad
1983 (3) SCR 930: AIR 1983 SC 1130 (followed)

10. Attorney General of India Vs Amratlal
Prajivandas AIR 1994 SC 2179 (followed)

11. Kamarunnissa & ors. Vs U.O.I. (1991) 1 SCC
128 (followed)

12. Champion R. Sangma Vs St. of Meghalaya
(2015) 16 SCC 253 (followed)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ramesh Sinha, J.)

1. The instant Habeas Corpus Petition
under Article 226 of Constitution of India
has been filed by the petitioner, Rajeev
Singh, through his next friend/wife Smt.
Kiran Singh, challenging the validity and
correctness of the order of detention dated
25.10.2020
passed
by
the
District
Magistrate,
Hardoi
(respondent
no.2)
(hereinafter referred to as "Detaining
Authority") under Sub-section (2) of
Section 3 of the National Security Act,
1980 (hereinafter referred to as "Act,
1980") contained in Annexure No.2 to the
writ petition on being satisfied that the
detention of the petitioner was necessary
with a view to prevent him from acting in
any manner prejudicial to the maintenance
of public order as well as confirmation
order dated 08.12.2020 passed by the
Under Secretary, Home (Confidential)
Department,
Government
of
U.P.,
358 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Lucknow (respondent no.2) contained in
Annexure No.1 to the writ petition.

2. Heard Shri Pawan Kumar Pandey,
learned Counsel for the petitioner/detenue
and Shri S.P. Singh, learned Additional
Government Advocate for the State and
perused the material brought on record.

3. No one is present on behalf of the
Union of India to press this petition.

4. The order of detention along with
grounds of detention was served upon the
petitioner on 25.10.2020 in jail, while he was
in jail in a criminal case. Against the said
order of detention, the petitioner made a
representation dated 10.11.2020 to the
Detaining
Authority,
the
Secretary,
Department
of
Home
and
another
representation
to
the
Advisory
Board
constituted under Section 9 of the Act, 1981.
The State Government, in exercise of powers
conferred under Section 12 (1) of the Act,
1981, has confirmed the order of detention
and directed that the petitioner be detained for
a period of three months from the date of
detention vide order dated 29.10.2020, which
was communicated to the petitioner on
10.11.2020.

5. It transpires from the grounds of
detention
that
in
the
night
of
31.08.2020/01.09.2020, Baba Heeradas, his
disciple Meeradas and his son Netram were
brutally
murdered
by
suffocating
and
assaulting them with bricks, stones, rolling
board, knife and butt of country made pistol
in Hulasi Bagiya Aashram near Kumaon
Village. On account of the said incident, the
public order was completely breached and
attempts were made to spread religious
fanaticism by various social organizations
and political parties.

6. On the basis of written report of Om
Shankar in respect of the aforesaid incident,
an F.I.R. was lodged, which was registered as
Case Crime No. 353 of 2020, under Section
302 I.P.C. against unknown persons, at Police
Station
Tadiyawa,
District
Hardoi
on
01.09.2020. During investigation, it came
into light that the main accused for murdering
three deceased persons is Rakshpal, who used
to stay at Ashram. On the clue of the
informer, main accused Rakshpal was
arrested by the police on 02.09.2020 at about
04:30 P.M. near Badauli Petrol Pump and on
his interrogation, he admitted his guilt in
murdering three deceased persons and
narrated the story in detail to the police and
disclosed the names of Sanjay and Shafiq in
their connection of murder of the deceased
persons and also disclosed the name of Rajiv
Kumar Singh (petitioner herein) and his
brother Hariram in connection of preparing
forged ''Will deed'. Immediately thereafter, on
the pointing out of Rakshpal, the police had
recovered forged ''Will deed', blood stained
brick, blood stained knife and T-Shirt.
Thereafter,
the
associate
of
Rakshpal,
namely, Sanjay, was also arrested and on his
pointing out, blood stained brick was also
recovered. On 07.09.2020, the accused
Shafiq was arrested, whereas on 21.09.2020,
accused Hariram was arrested.

7. During investigation, the confessional
statements of accused persons including the
petitioner were recorded. All the accused in
their statements admitted the fact that it was
Rajiv Singh (petitioner herein), who made
conspiracy in making forged ''Will' in favour
of Rakshpal and on his advise, they killed the
deceased. The petitioner/detenue in his
confessional statement admitted the fact that
friendship with Rakshpal was made in jail
several years ago and since then Rakshpal is in
his contact and Rakshpal has treated him as
elder brother. The petitioner has stated that
7 All. Rajeev Singh Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
359
Rakshpal told him that if land of the Ashram is
given to him on any count, then, he would
give 1/3rd of the land to him and life will go
smoothly for both of them. On this, the
petitioner told Rakshpal that if he will give
him thumb impression of Heeradas on any
count in a blank stamp paper, he would make
forged ''Will deed' with the help of his
Advocate and on the basis of the said forged
Will, he become the owner of whole property
of the Ashram, whereupon Rakshpal had
given him a blank stamp paper affixing therein
thumb impression of Netram, who was the son
of Heeradas, to which he (the petitioner), after
making a forged ''Will deed' in favour of
Rakshpal, has given to Rakshpal. Later on,
Rakshpal told him that Heeradas has already
made a ''Will deed' in favour of his disciple
Meerdas and prepared for selling seven bigha
of land and also wanted to evict him from the
Ashram. On this, he (the petitioner) told
Rakshpal that if you get all the three out of the
way, then, no heirs would remain alive and
both of them will succeed in their design.

8. On the basis of the statements of the
accused persons and recovery of weapons of
assault on their pointing out and also other
available evidences, Investigating Officer
found the involvement of the petitioner in the
crime and has filed charge-sheet before the
competent Court. The petitioner is having a
criminal history of 21 criminal cases, which
are registered at various police stations of the
district. On account of the said triple murder,
thousands of villagers of village Kuamau and
nearby villages had gathered at the place of
occurrence and a panic situation has been
prevailed in the village. The children and
women have closed their door due to fear. On
account of death of Mahant, a malicious
attempt was made to spread religious frenzy.
The different political and social party have
tried to disturb the social harmony. The
atmosphere remained panic for about ten
days. Extra forces and P.A.C. were also
deployed to bring the situation under control.
On 05.10.2020, the petitioner applied for bail
before the Court which was fixed for
27.10.2020 and there was possibility of release
of the petitioner on bail and he would again
indulge in such activities which were likely to
affect adversely public order, therefore, his
detention became necessary under the Act of
1980.

9. In the aforesaid circumstances,
Station House Officer, P.S. Tadiyawan,
District Hardoi sent a report with relevant
papers to Superintendent of Police, Hardoi
for detaining the petitioner under Section 3
(2) of the Act, 1980. Thereupon, the
Superintendent of Police, Hardoi, after
considering the matter became satisfied with
the report sent by Station House Officer and
submitted
his
report
to
the
District
Magistrate,
Hardoi
for
detaining
the
petitioner under Section 3 (2) of the Act,
1980 to prevent him from indulging in such
activities causing disturbance of public order.

10. On the basis of material placed
before him, as briefly referred to above, the
Detaining Authority came to the conclusion
that the activity of the petitioner are
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order
and his activities has disturbed the public
tranquility, hence keeping in view his
criminal record and activities, the Detaining
Authority felt satisfied that there was every
likelihood that just after his release from jail,
he will again indulge in such type of activities
which will adversely affect the maintenance
of public order and peace and, therefore, to
prevent
him
from
committing
similar
activities prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order, it became necessary to detain
360 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
him with immediate effect under Section 3
(2) of the Act, 1980. Thus, the Detaining
Authority passed the impugned order dated
25.10.2020 for detaining the petitioner under
Section 3 (2) of the Act, 1980. The Detaining
Authority communicated the grounds of
detention to the petitioner on 25.10.2020. On
10.11.2020, the petitioner has sent his
representation through Superintendent of Jail,
District Hardoi to the Detaining Authority,
which was rejected by the Detaining
Authority
on
13.11.2020
and
other
representation, which was sent by the
petitioner, to the State Government was also
rejected on 25.11.2020 and the Central
Government has rejected the representation
of the detenue on 07.12.2020. The aforesaid
order
of
rejection
has
also
been
communicated to the petitioner.

11. The pleadings between the parties
have been exchanged.

12. While challenging the impugned
detention orders, learned Counsel for the
petitioner has argued that on account of
taking active part in public agitation against
the local police, the police personnel
became annoyed with the petitioner and
lodged 21 criminal cases against him. He
argued that on the basis of the said criminal
cases, the District Magistrate, vide order
dated 25.10.2020, invoked the provisions
of Section 3 (2) of Act, 1981 and detained
the petitioner/detenue in jail. He argued
that out of 21 criminal cases lodged against
the
petitioner/detenue,
the
petitioner
/detenue was acquitted in five cases and
enlarged on bail in eleven cases, whereas in
three cases, final report has been submitted.

13. Learned Counsel for the petitioner
further argued that in Crime No. 353 of
2020, under Section 419, 420, 467, 468,
302, 120-B I.P.C. and Section 3 (ii) (v) of
the Scheduled Caste and Schedule Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Police
Station Tadiyawan, District Hardoi, the
allegation against the petitioner is only to
the effect that forged ''Will deed' was
prepared by him in conspiracy with
Rakshpal with regard to the properties of
the Ashram of Heeradas in favour of
accused Rakshpal but there is no allegation
for killing the three deceased persons. He
further argued that the petitioner has no
connection with co-accused Rakshpal and
only on the basis of call details of coaccused Rakshpal and his confessional
statement, the petitioner has falsely been
implicated in the aforesaid criminal case.
Further, the petitioner has no connection
with the said incident or property of Baba
Heeradas. The aforesaid F.I.R. has been
lodged against the petitioner due to
political enmity with local M.L.A. In these
backdrops, the submission is that the
District Magistrate, while passing the
impugned order dated 25.10.2020 under the
Act of 1980, curtailed his personal liberty.

14. Per contra, learned Additional
Government Advocate appearing on behalf
of the State, while supporting the order of
detention, have submitted that the activities
of the petitioner were prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order; his activities
have disturbed the normalcy of the society;
there was every possibility that just after
his release from jail, he will again indulge
in such activities, which will adversely
affect the public order and peace, therefore,
to prevent him from further committing
similar criminal activities prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order, the detention
order was passed by the Detaining
Authority after its subjective satisfaction.

15. Learned Additional Government
Advocate has further argued that the
7 All. Rajeev Singh Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
361
activities of the petitioner were directed
against the public at large and were sufficient
to bring them within the ambit of public
order. The satisfaction of the Detaining
Authority is based on reliable and relevant
material and that there was no illegality in the
impugned orders. He further argued that if
the Detaining Authority arrives at the
subjective satisfaction that the activities of the
detenue are prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order and passes the detention order, it
cannot be interfered by this Court. The
grounds
of
detention
were
promptly
communicated to the petitioner. He further
argued that the petitioner is a man of criminal
antecedents and 21 criminal cases have been
registered against the petitioner at different
police stations of the district. He also pointed
out that the State Government, vide order
dated 08.12.2020, had extended detention
period tentatively for three months and the
same was also served upon the petitioner.
Thereafter, the State Government, vide order
dated 20.01.2021, had extended the detention
period for six months tentatively w.e.f. actual
date of detention i.e. on 25.10.2020 and the
same was also communicated to the
petitioner through radiogram on 20.01.2021.
He argued that till date no representation
against the extension of detention order has
been filed by the petitioner.

16. Having heard learned Counsel for
the petitioner/detenue and learned AGA on
behalf of the State, it transpires that the main
question for consideration before this Court is
whether the activities of the petitioner
mentioned in the grounds of detention fall
within realm of public order or law and order.

17. The distinction between the two
concepts of "public order" and "law and
order" has been lucidly explained by the
Apex Court in Ashok Kumar Vs. Delhi
Administration : AIR 1982 SC 1143,
wherein the Apex Court has observed that
the true distinction between the areas of
"public order" and "law and order", being
fine and sometimes overlapping, does not
lie in the nature or quality of the act but in
the degree and extent of its reach upon
society. The Apex Court has further
observed that the act by itself is not
determinant of its own gravity. It is the
potentiality of the act to disturb the even
tempo of the life of the community which
makes it "prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order". If the contravention in its
effect is confined only to a few individuals
directly involved, as distinct from a wide
spectrum of public, it would raise the
problem of "law and order" only. It is the
length, magnitude and intensity of the
terror wave unleashed by a particular act or
violence
creating
disorder
that
distinguishes it as an act affecting "public
order" from that concerning "law and
order". On the facts of that case the Apex
Court held that whenever there is an armed
hold up by gangsters in a residential area of
the city and persons are deprived of their
belongings at the point of knife or revolver
they become victims of organised crime
and such acts when enumerated in the
grounds of detention, clearly show that the
activities of a detenu cover a wide field
falling within the ambit of the concept of
"public order".

18. The Apex Court, to the aforesaid
effect, has made observations in Victoria
Fernandes Vs. Lalmal Sawma : AIR 1992
SC 687, wherein, relying on its earlier
decisions, including Ashok Kumar Vs.
Delhi Administration (supra), it was
reiterated that while the expression "law
and order" is wider in scope, in as much as
contravention of law always affects order,
362 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
"public order" has a narrower ambit and
public order would be affected by only
such contravention which affects the
community and public at large.

19. The distinction between violation
of 'law and order' and an act that would
constitute disturbing the maintenance of
'public
order'
had
also
fallen
for
consideration of the Apex Court in State of
U.P. & Anr. Vs. Sanjay Pratap Gupta @
Pappu and others : 2004 (8) SCC 591,
wherein the Apex Court, after an extensive
survey of authority on the issue brought out
the distinction in fine detail, which reads as
under :-

"12. The true distinction between
the areas of law and order and public
order lies not merely in the nature or
quality of the act, but in the degree and
extent of its reach upon society. Acts
similar in nature, but committed in different
contexts and circumstances, might cause
different reactions. In one case it might
affect
specific
individuals
only,
and
therefore touches the problem of law and
order only, while in another it might affect
public order. The act by itself, therefore, is
not determinant of its own gravity. In its
quality it may not differ from other similar
acts, but in its potentiality, that is, in its
impact on society, it may be very different.

13. The two concepts have welldefined contours, it being well established
that stray and unorganized crimes of theft
and assault are not matters of public order
since they do not tend to affect the even
flow of public life. Infractions of law are
bound in some measure to lead to disorder
but every infraction of law does not
necessarily result in public disorder. Law
and order represents the largest scale
within which is the next circle representing
public order and the smallest circle
represents the security of State. "Law and
order" comprehends disorders of less
gravity than those affecting "public order"
just
as
"public
order"
comprehends
disorders of less gravity than those
affecting "security of State". (See Kuso Sah
v. State of Bihar 1974 1 SCC 185, Harpreet
Kaur v. State of Maharashtra 1992 2 SCC
177, T.K Gopal Alias Gopi v. State Of
Karnataka 2000 6 SCC 168 and State of
Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub 1980 2 SC
1158).

14. The stand that a single act
cannot be considered sufficient for holding
that public order was affected is clearly
without substance. It is not the number of
acts that matters. What has to be seen is the
effect of the act on the even tempo of life,
the extent of its reach upon society and its
impact."

20. The issue has also been dealt with
in the case of Sant Singh vs. District
Magistrate, Varanasi : 2000 Cri LJ 2230,
wherein in paragraph 7 of the report, while
dealing with the point, the Apex Court has
held as under :-

"7. The two connotations 'law
and order' and 'public 'order' are not the
words of magic but of reality which
embrace
within
its
ambit
different
situations, motives and impact of the
particular criminal acts. As a matter of
fact, in a long series of cases, these two
expressions have come to be interpreted by
the apex Court. It is not necessary to refer
all those cases all over again in every
decision for one simple reason that they
have been quoted and discussed in earlier
decision of this Court dated 14-10-1999 in
Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 33888 of
1999- Udaiveer Singh v. State of U.P. and
the decision dated 1-12-1999 in Habeas
Corpus Writ Petition No. 38159 of 1999
7 All. Rajeev Singh Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
363
Rajiv Vashistha v. State of U.P. (Reported
in 1999 All Cri R 2777). The gamut of all
the above decisions in short is that the true
distinction between the areas of 'public
order' and 'law and order' lies not in nature
and quality of the act, but in the degree and
extent of its reach upon society. Sometimes
the distinction between the two concepts of
law and order' and 'public order' is so fine
that it overlaps. Acts similar in nature but
committed
in
different
contexts
and
circumstances
might
cause
different
reactions. In one case it might affect
specific individuals only and therefore,
touch the problem of 'law and order', while
in another it might affect 'public order'. The
act by itself, therefore, is not determination
of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of
the act to disturb the even tempo of the
community which makes it prejudicial to
the maintenance of 'public order''.

21. The scope of expression "acting
in
any
manner
prejudicial
to
the
maintenance of public order" as appearing
in Sub-Section 2 of Section 3 of the Act,
1980 also came up for consideration of the
Apex Court in Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya
Shaikh Vs. M.M. Mehta, (1995) 3 SCC
237; Amanulla Khan Kudeatalla Khan
Pathan Vs. State of Gujarat, (1999) 5
SCC 613 and Hasan Khan Ibne Haider
Khan Vs. R.H. Mendonca, (2000) 3 SCC
511. The Apex Court held that the fallout,
the extent and reach of the alleged activities
must be of such a nature that they travel
beyond the capacity of the ordinary law to
deal with the person concerned or to
prevent his subversive activities affecting
the community at large or a large section of
the society. It is the degree of disturbance
and its impact upon the even tempo of life
of the society or the people of a locality
which determines whether the disturbance
caused by such activities amounts only
to a breach of "law and order" or it amounts
to a breach of "public order". In Amanulla
Khan Kudeatalla Khan Pathan Vs. State
of Gujarat (supra), the Apex Court has
held that the activities involving extortion,
giving threat to public and assaulting
businessmen near their place of work were
sufficient to affect the even tempo of life of
the society and in turn amounting to the
disturbance of the "public order" and not
mere disturbance of "law and order".

22. While dealing with the question as
to whether one solitary instance can be the
basis of an order of detention, the Apex
Court in Smt. Bimla Rani Vs. Union of
India : 1989 (26) ACC 589 SC, observed
that the question is whether the incident
had prejudicially affected the 'public order'.
In other words, whether it affected the even
tempo of the life of the community. In
Alijan Mian v. District Magistrate
Dhanbad, 1983 (3) SCR 930 AIR 1983 SC
1130 it was held that even one incident
may be sufficient to satisfy the detaining
authority in this regard, depending upon the
nature of the incident. Similar view has
been expressed in the host of other
decisions. The question was answered more
appropriately and with all clarity in the case
of Attorney General of India v. Amratlal
Prajivandas : AIR 1994 SC 2179, wherein
the Apex Court ruled that it is beyond
dispute that the order of detention can be
passed on the basis of a single act. The test
is whether the act is such that it gives rise
to an inference that the person would
continue to indulge in similar prejudicial
activities. It cannot be said as a principle
that one single act cannot be constituted the
basis for detention. Thus, the argument of
learned counsel for the petitioner that since
it is solitary incident of the petitioner, he
364 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
deserves sympathy, is rejected. Now the
law, as it stands, is that even one solitary
incident may give rise to the disturbance of
'public order'. It is not the multiplicity but
the fall out of various criminal acts.
Though there is consistency in the various
decisions of the apex Court about the
interpretation of the expressions of 'law and
order' and 'public order' undue insistence on
the case law is not going to pay any
dividend as each case revolves round its
own peculiar facts and has to be viewed in
the light of the various attending factors. It
is difficult to find a case on all fours with
the case in hand.

23. In the instant case, after
examining the grounds of detention, briefly
referred to above, on the touchstone of the
legal position as emerging from the
aforementioned decisions, we are of the
view that the activities relied upon by the
Detaining Authority to come to the
aforementioned conclusion, cannot be said
to be mere disturbance of "law and order".
As noted in the grounds of detention, the
activities of the petitioner pertains to
engage into conspiracy to get a persons
assassinated who being the Mahant of the
Hulasi Bagiya Ashram, namely, Baba
Heeradas, his disciple Meeradas and his
son Netram and so creating a menace in the
society at large. There is material on record
to show that petitioner, being the friend of
main accused Rakshpal and Rakshpal has
treated him as elder brother, engaged into
conspiracy to get the forged ''Will deed' and
on the advise of the petitioner, the main
accused Rakshpal, Sanjay and Shafiq,
brutally murdered the deceased Baba
Heeradas, his disciple Meeradas and his
son Netram, which created panic in the
public affecting the normal tempo of life.
On getting information of triple brutal
murder, thousands of villagers of village
Kuamau
and
nearby
villagers
were
gathered there. In the village, fear and
panic atmosphere were prevailed. The
children and women closed their doors due
to said panic. On account of murder of
Mahant, the religious fanaticism had
erupted. The normal life in the village was
paralysed, which resulted in disturbance of
public order and public tranquility. To
assassinate a religious persons, while
sleeping in night, strikes at the root of the
State's authority and is directly connected
to 'public order'. This act of petitioner was
not directed against a single individual, but
against the public at large having the effect
of disturbing even tempo of life of the
community and thus, breaching the "public
order". Thus, we are unable to hold that
there was no material before the Detaining
Authority to come to the conclusion, it did,
to say that the activities of petitioner can be
construed as activities prejudicial to the
maintenance of "public order," within the
meaning of Sub-Section (2) of Section 3 of
the Act, 1981. We have, therefore, no
hesitation in holding that the instances of
petitioner's activities, enumerated in the
grounds of detention, clearly show that his
activities cover a wide field and fall within
the contours of the concept of "public
order"and the Detaining Authority was
justified in law in passing the impugned
order of detention as its confirmation order
against the petitioner.

24. So far as the plea of learned
counsel for the petitioner that the impugned
orders are vitiated because it has been
passed with a mala fide intention to
frustrate the bail likely to be allowed to the
petitioner, we are of the view that there is
no substance in the contention. The
Detaining Authority has reason to believe,
on the basis of material placed before him,
that there is imminent possibility of his
7 All. Raju Maurya @ Abhijeet Maurya Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
365
being released on bail and that on being so
released, he would in all probability
indulge in prejudicial activities and to
prevent him from doing so, it is necessary
to detain him. A detention order cannot be
struck down on the ground that the proper
course for the authority was to oppose the
bail application and if bail is granted
notwithstanding
such
opposition,
to
question it before a higher Court, as is
sought and pleaded by learned counsel for
the petitioner. In this regard, criteria was
laid down by the Apex Court in the case of
Kamarunnissa and others vs. Union of
India : (1991) 1 SCC 128 also fortified in
Champion R. Sangma vs. State of
Meghalaya : (2015) 16 SCC 253, wherein
the Apex Court was held :-

"13. In case of a person in
custody a detention order can validly be
passed (1) if the authority passing the order
is aware of the fact that he is actually in
custody; (2) if he has reason believe on the
basis of reliable material placed before him
(a) that there is a real possibility of his
being released on bail, and (b) that on being
so released he would in all probability
indulge in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is
felt essential to detain him to prevent him
from so doing."

25. It is not the case of the petitioner
that the grounds of detention while
extending the period of his detention has
not been supplied to the petitioner or any
particulars in regard to slapping detention
order upon him has not been supplied to
him.

26. However, needless to mention
here that the grounds of detention were
communicated to the petitioner along with
the detention order dated 25.10.2020. It
was further extended by the State which
was communicated to the petitioner in due
time.

27. For the reasons aforesaid, we are
of
the
considered
view
that
the
apprehension entertained by the Detaining
Authority, to the effect that petitioner's
activities are prejudicial to the maintenance
of public order, is genuine and well
founded. Thus, we do not find any illegality
in the impugned orders, warranting our
interference in extra ordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.

28. The instant Habeas Corpus Writ
Petition lacks merit and is, accordingly,
dismissed.

29. For the facts and circumstances of
the case, there will be no order as to costs.
----------
(2021)07ILR A365
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.07.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHAMIM AHMED, J.

Application U/S 482 Cr.P.C. No. 7972 of 2021

Raju Maurya @ Abhijeet Maurya
 ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sri Narsingh Pandey

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A.