# Rajeev Yadav @ Rinku v. State of U.P

- **Citation:** (2025) 4 ILRA 744
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-04-09
- **Case number:** Criminal Misc Bail Application No. 8027 of 2024
- **Bench:** Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/rajeev-yadav-rinku-v-state-of-u-p-53260
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Law
-
Criminal
Procedure
Code,1973-Section
439-
Indian
Penal
Code,1860-Section 302/34-The applicant
sought bail regarding the murder of the
deceased-The prosecution primarily relied
on the custodial confessional statement of
a
co-accused
and
a
disputed
dying
declaration
inferred
from
a
witness
statement under section 161 CrPC- The
only material directly linking the applicant
was the co-accused's confession, which is
not sufficient alone for conviction-Santosh
Yadav's statement, claimed to be a dying
declaration , lacked crucial details such as
timing
and
direct
threat
from
the
applicant-The
court
found
that
the
statement did not specifically implicate
the applicant, nor was it proximate in time
or content to the deceased's death, thus
affecting its evidentiary weight-The court
also held that subsequent FIR alleging
witness
threats
did
not
involve
the
applicant
directly-Questions
of
admissibility and evidentiary value should
be examined during the trial-Bail could be
granted subject to conditions.(Para 1 to
26)

The
application
is
allowed.
(E-6)
4 All. Rajeev Yadav @ Rinku Vs. State of U.P.
745
List of Cases cited:

## Text

744 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Court
had
initially
granted
interim
anticipatory bail to the applicants vide
order dated 3.3.2023 passed in Crl. Misc.
Anticipatory Bail Application No. 650 of
2023 and the said order was thereafter
made absolute vide order dated 19.7.2023
and the anticipatory bail application was
allowed. It is also relevant that earlier this
Court had granted protection to the
applicants vide order dated 19.6.2023 in
Crl. Misc. Writ Petition No. 4726 of 2023
which,
however,
was
dismissed
as
withdrawn vide order dated 5.12.2024 due
to filing of charge sheet.

23. In view of the above, it is
provided that in the event of arrest, the
applicants Tatheer Jafri(in FIR-Tatheer
Jafri @ Allika), Roshani Rizvi and
Sayyad Naseem shall be released on
anticipatory bail in aforesaid Case
Crime number on their furnishing a
personal bond with two sureties each in
the like amount to the satisfaction of
the
arresting
officer/investigating
officer/S.H.O.
concerned
with
the
following conditions:-

(1)
The
applicant(s)
shall
cooperate in the investigation and they
will not influence the witnesses.

(2) The accused-applicant(s)
will remain present as and when the
arresting officer/1.O./S.H.O. concerned
call(s) for investigation/interrogation.

(3) The applicant(s) shall not
leave India without previous permission
of the Court.

(4) In case of default, it would
be open for the investigating agency to
move application for vacation of this
interim protection.

24. The application stands disposed
of.
----------
(2025) 4 ILRA 744
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 09.04.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Criminal Misc Bail Application No. 8027 of 2024

Rajeev Yadav @ Rinku ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Applicant:
Karunesh Singh, Arun Sinha, Ram Chandra
Singh, Vijay Pratap Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
G.A., Rina Pandey, Sanjay Shankar Pandey

Criminal
Law
-
Criminal
Procedure
Code,1973-Section
439-
Indian
Penal
Code,1860-Section 302/34-The applicant
sought bail regarding the murder of the
deceased-The prosecution primarily relied
on the custodial confessional statement of
a
co-accused
and
a
disputed
dying
declaration
inferred
from
a
witness
statement under section 161 CrPC- The
only material directly linking the applicant
was the co-accused's confession, which is
not sufficient alone for conviction-Santosh
Yadav's statement, claimed to be a dying
declaration , lacked crucial details such as
timing
and
direct
threat
from
the
applicant-The
court
found
that
the
statement did not specifically implicate
the applicant, nor was it proximate in time
or content to the deceased's death, thus
affecting its evidentiary weight-The court
also held that subsequent FIR alleging
witness
threats
did
not
involve
the
applicant
directly-Questions
of
admissibility and evidentiary value should
be examined during the trial-Bail could be
granted subject to conditions.(Para 1 to
26)

The
application
is
allowed.
(E-6)
4 All. Rajeev Yadav @ Rinku Vs. State of U.P.
745
List of Cases cited:

1. Pakala Narayana Swami Vs Emperor (1939)
41 Bom LR 428

2. Irfan Vs St. of U.P.(2023) SCC OnLine SC
1060

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi,
J.)

1. Heard Sri Arun Sinha, the learned
counsel for the applicant, Sri Jayant Singh
Tomar, learned Additional Government
Advocate-I for the State, Shri Sanjay
Shankar Pandey, learned counsel for the
informant-complainant, and perused the
records.

2. The learned Counsel for the
applicant
has
filed
'Rejoinder
affidavit/reply
to
the
complainant's
supplementary affidavit' which is taken on
record.

3. The instant application has been
filed seeking release of the applicant on
bail in Case Crime No. 063 of 2024, under
Section 302/34 I.P.C. registered at Police
Station Cantt., District Ayodhya.

4. The aforesaid case has been
registered on the basis of an F.I.R. lodged
on 26.02.2024 at 04:58 hours, stating that
the informant was told by some unnamed
villagers in the night of 26.02.2024 at 12:30
hours that his 25 years' old son had met
with an accident near house of Ram
Karan Yadav. The injured was taken to a
hospital where the doctor told that he
had died due to gun-shot injury.

5. The post-mortem examination
report mentions lacerated entry wounds
on back of chest, waist, as well as left
arm and lacerated exit wound on left
arm. The cause of death has been
opined to be shock and hemorrhage as a
result of ante-mortem firearm injuries.

6. In the statement of the
informant recorded under Section 161
Cr.P.C., he reiterated the F.I.R. version.

7.

On
01.03.2024,
the
investigating officer recorded statement
of one Sunil Yadav, who stated that
Ritesh Yadav and the applicant Rajeev
Yadav had come to him and they had
told that they had killed Vishal Yadav.
They
stated
that
the
police
was
suspecting
their
involvement
in
commission of the offence and was
searching for them and they requested
the said witness to save them. The
police claimed that on the basis of
aforesaid information, when the police
party apprehended the applicant and coaccused Ritesh Yadav, the accused
persons fired gun-shots towards the
police personnel, but no police person
received any injury in the incident. The
co-accused Ritesh Yadav suffered a
gun-shot injury on his leg due to
retaliatory firing.

8. In his custodial confessional
statement recorded in that case, Ritesh
Yadav alleged involvement of the
applicant also in the present case.

9. In para-25 of the affidavit filed
in support of the bail application, the
applicant's involvement in ten other
criminal cases has been disclosed. In
four cases the applicant has been
granted bail. In four cases, he has been
implicated after his arrest in the present
case and two cases under the Gangsters Act
have been registered on the basis of the
applicant's involvement in the other cases.
746 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

10. The learned Counsel for the
applicant submitted that apart from the
custodial confessional statement of the coaccused Ritesh Yadav, there is no other
material to connect the applicant with
commission of the alleged offence.

11. Sri. Jayant Singh Tomar, the
learned
A.G.A.-I
opposed
the
bail
application and he has submitted that the
applicant's involvement in commission of
the offence has been established during
investigation and a charge-sheet has been
submitted against him. However, he could
not dispute the submission of the learned
Counsel for the applicant that the only
material against the applicant is the
custodial confessional statement of the coaccused Ritesh Yadav.

12. Sri Sanjay Shankar Pandey,
learned counsel for the informant, has
vehemently opposed the bail application
and he submitted that the deceased had
given a dying-declaration implicating the
applicant. As per him, the dying-declaration
can be inferred from statement of the
informant's son Santosh Yadav recorded by
the investigating officer, which has been
annexed along with the bail application as
well as along with the counter affidavit
filed by the State. He stated that Sandeep
Yadav, son of Chandradev Yadav had
telephonically informed Vinod Yadav that
Vishal Yadav had met with an accident.
This witness further stated that this
information had been given to Vinod Yadav
by Naveen Gaur by making a phone call. In
spite of a query made by the Court to the
learned counsel for the informant to explain
this discrepancy in the statement as to
whether the information of the incident was
given to Vinod Yadav by Sandeep Yadav or
Naveen Gaur, the learned counsel for the
informant could not give any reply. Santosh
Yadav further stated that upon receipt of
this information, he had gone to the spot
along with his brother Akash and father
Ram Bali Yadav (the informant) and found
his brother lying there. Santosh Yadav took
him to the district hospital where the doctor
told that the victim had died due to gunshot injury. Thereafter, the FIR was lodged.

13. Santosh Yadav further stated that
his father was involved in business of land
with Ritesh Yadav. His brother Vishal
Yadav also used to accompany his father
Rambali Yadav (the informant). Rambali
Yadav and Ritesh Yadav had entered into
an agreement regarding land of Smt.
Poonam Devi in the year 2021 which was
subject to a family litigation. The litigation
was decided in favour of Smt. Poonam
Devi in the month of January. Meanwhile,
price of the land had increased and Ritesh
Yadav wanted to get a sale-deed executed
in his own favour, which was opposed by
Vishal Yadav. Vishal Yadav had told his
brother Santosh Yadav that Ritesh Yadav
had threatened him but Santosh Yadav had
not
given
any
importance
to
this
information.

14. The learned counsel for the
informant has stated that the aforesaid
statement of Santosh Yadav wherein he
stated that the deceased had informed him
that Ritesh Yadav had threatened him,
amounts to his dying-declaration.

15. The statutory provision regarding
dying declarations is contained in Section
32(1) of the Evidence Act, which reads as
follows: -

"32. Cases in which statement of
relevant fact by person who is dead or
cannot be found, etc., is relevant.-
Statements, written or verbal, of relevant
4 All. Rajeev Yadav @ Rinku Vs. State of U.P.
747
facts made by a person who is dead, or who
cannot be found, or who has become
incapable of giving evidence, or whose
attendance cannot be procured without an
amount of delay or expense which under
the circumstances of the case appears to
the Court unreasonable, are themselves
relevant facts in the following cases:-

(1) When it relates to cause of
death.-When the statement is made by a
person as to the cause of his death, or as to
any of the circumstances of the transaction
which resulted in his death, in cases in
which the cause of that person's death
comes into question.

Such statements are relevant
whether the person who made them was or
was not, at the time when they were made,
under expectation of death, and whatever
may be the nature of the proceeding in
which the cause of his death comes into
question."

16. In reply to the Court's query that
the statement of Santosh Yadav does not
make a mention as to when such a
statement had been made by the deceased
and whether the statement which was not
made in close proximity of the death of the
victim or while he was apprehending his
death, can be treated to be his dying
declaration, the learned Counsel for the
informant submitted that the law in this
regard had been settled in the case of
Pakala Narain Swamy. However, he did not
provide a copy of the judgment relied upon
by him and he even could not give citation
of the judgment.

17. This is not the proper manner to
place reliance on a case-law before a Court.
PART III of the Allahabad High Court
Rules
contains
provisions
regarding
Criminal
Jurisdiction.
Chapter
XVIII
falling in Part III of the Rules deals with
Proceedings Other Than Original Trials.
Rule 3(2) falling in Chapter XVIII of the
Allahabad High Court Rules provides that:
-

"If the advocates are relying
upon any judgement, they must have three
photocopies thereof ready, two for the
Judges and one for the other side."

18. An Advocate appearing before the
High Court must be well versed with the
Rules of the High Court and must comply
with the same. Even otherwise, when the
Courts are over burdened with cases, it
should be the endeavor of the Advocates
appearing before the Courts - who are
officers of the Court, to render assistance
by advancing submissions in a precise and
concise manner so as to prevent wastage of
precious time of the Court. Relying upon a
case-law without providing a photocopy of
the same to the Court and without even
providing its citation, does not serve as a
proper assistance in delivery of justice.

19. Sri. Arun Sinha has provided
citation of the judgment relied upn by Sri.
Shanjay Shankar Pandey, which is "Pakala
Narayana Swami Vs. Emperor: (1939) 41
BomLR 428". The facts of Pakala
Narayana Swami were that on March 20,
1937, the deceased man had received an
unsigned letter inviting him to come that
day or next day to Berhampur. The widow
of the deceased said that on that day her
husband had showed her a letter and said
that he was going to Berhampur as the
appellant's wife had written to him and told
him to go and receive payment of his due.
The deceased left his house on Sunday,
March 21, in time to catch the train for
Berhampur. On Tuesday, March 23, his
body was found in the train at Puri. The
admission
of
this
statement
of
the
748 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
deceased's wife was challenged in appeal.
The first question framed by the Court was
whether the statement of the widow, that on
March 20 the deceased had told her that he
was going to Berhampur as the accused's
wife had written and told him to go and
receive
payment
of
his
dues,
was
admissible
under Section
32(1) of
the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Bombay
High Court held that: -

"The statement may be made
before the cause of death has arisen, or
before the deceased has any reason to
anticipate being killed. The circumstances
must be circumstances of the transaction:
general expressions indicating fear or
suspicion
whether
of
a
particular
individual or otherwise and not directly
related to the occasion of the death will
not be admissible. But statements made by
the deceased that he was proceeding to the
spot where he was in fact killed, or as to his
reasons for so proceeding, or that he was
going to meet a particular person, or that
he had been invited by such person to meet
him would each of them be circumstances
of the transaction, and would be so whether
the person was unknown, or was not the
person accused. Such a statement might
indeed be exculpatory of the person
accused.
"Circumstances
of
the
transaction" is a phrase, no doubt, that
conveys some limitations. It is not as broad
as the analogous use in "circumstantial
evidence" which includes evidence of all
relevant; facts. It is on the other hand
narrower than "res gest". Circumstances
must have some proximate relation to the
actual occurrence : though as for instance
in a case of prolonged poisoning they may
be related to dates at a considerable
distance from the date of the actual fatal
dose."
(Emphasis added)

20. In Irfan v. State of U.P., 2023
SCC OnLine SC 1060, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has considered the law
relating to dying declarations and has
referred to numerous precedents on the
point. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has
drawn the following conclusions:-

"62. There is no hard and fast
rule for determining when a dying
declaration should be accepted; the duty of
the Court is to decide this question in the
facts and surrounding circumstances of the
case and be fully convinced of the
truthfulness of the same. Certain factors
below reproduced can be considered to
determine the same, however, they will only
affect the weight of the dying declaration
and not its admissibility:-

(i) Whether the person making
the statement was in expectation of death?

(ii) Whether the dying declaration
was made at the earliest opportunity?
"Rule of First Opportunity"

(iii)
Whether
there
is
any
reasonable suspicion to believe the dying
declaration was put in the mouth of the
dying person?

(iv)
Whether
the
dying
declaration was a product of prompting,
tutoring or leading at the instance of police
or any interested party?

(v) Whether the statement was
not recorded properly?

(vi) Whether, the dying declarant
had opportunity to clearly observe the
incident?

(vii)
Whether,
the
dying
declaration
has
been
consistent
throughout?

(viii)
Whether,
the
dying
declaration
in
itself
is
a
manifestation/fiction of the dying person's
imagination of what he thinks transpired?
4 All. Rajeev Yadav @ Rinku Vs. State of U.P.
749

(ix)
Whether,
the
dying
declaration was itself voluntary?

(x) In case of multiple dying
declarations, whether, the first one inspires
truth and consistent with the other dying
declaration?

(xi) Whether, as per the injuries,
it would have been impossible for the
deceased to make a dying declaration?

63. It
is
the
duty
of
the
prosecution to establish the charge against
the accused beyond the reasonable doubt.
The benefit of doubt must always go in
favour of the accused. It is true that dying
declaration is a substantive piece of
evidence to be relied on provided it is
proved that the same was voluntary and
truthful and the victim was in a fit state of
mind. It is just not enough for the court to
say that the dying declaration is reliable as
the accused is named in the dying
declaration as the assailant.

64. It is unsafe to record the
conviction on the basis of a dying
declaration alone in the cases where
suspicion, like the case on hand is raised,
as regards the correctness of the dying
declaration. In such cases, the Court may
have to look for some corroborative
evidence by treating the dying declaration
only as a piece of evidence. The evidence
and material available on record must be
properly weighed in each case to arrive at
an appropriate conclusion..."

(Emphasis added)

21. When we examine the facts of the
present case in light of the law laid down
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in view of
the aforesaid law laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, what comes to light is that
the statement of Santosh Yadav that Vishal
Yadav had told him that Ritesh Yadav had
threatened him but Santosh Yadav had not
given any importance to this information,
does not disclose as to when was the threat
extended by co-accused Ritesh Yadav and
when had Vishal Yadav told it to Santosh
Yadav. The threat had not been extended by
the applicant. The threat was not to kill
Vishal Yadav. Even after coming to know
about the threat, Santosh Yadav himself had
not given any importance to it. These facts
adversely affect the weight of the so called
dying declaration.

22.

The
questions
regarding
admissibility, relevancy and weight of the
evidence would be better left to be dealt
with by the trial Court, but since
submissions have been advanced by the
learned Counsel for the informant on these
points, merely this much is being observed
that for the purpose of deciding the bail
application, it is relevant to be noted that
witness Santosh Yadav is the brother of the
deceased and informant's son. He has
stated in his statement recorded that he had
reached the spot of occurrence along with
his father. The FIR was lodged by his father
afterwards. This witness did not disclose
the fact that the deceased was threatened by
co-accused- Ritesh Yadav prior to lodging
of the FIR and this fact has been disclosed
for the first time while recording his
statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. This
statement does not make even a mention of
applicant's name.

23. Therefore, I am of the considered
view that the statement of Santosh Yadav
recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. does
not make out a case for rejection of the bail
application of the applicant.

24. The learned counsel for the
informant
further
submitted
that
the
accused
persons
are
threatening
the
witnesses of the present case and in this
regard FIR No.0070 of 2025 has been
750 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
lodged in Police Station Pura Kalander,
District Ayodhya under Sections 351(3)
B.N.S. alleging that a witness in the present
case, Suneel Yadav received a phone call
on 09.01.2025 from some unknown person
who introduced himself as Ritesh who
threatened the said person not to give
evidence in the matter. The Telephone call
is
said
to
have
been
received
on
09.01.2025, whereas the FIR has been
lodged on 09.02.2025. The FIR makes no
mention of the applicant s name and there
is no allegation that the phone call had been
made at the behest of the applicant. The
exact conversation that took place in that
phone call has not been reproduced in the
F.I.R. Therefore, I am of the considered
view that lodging of the aforesaid FIR a
month after receipt of the alleged phone
call, does not make any difference while
considering the bail application of the
applicant.

25. Having considered all the
aforesaid facts and circumstances of the
case, I am of the view that the aforesaid
facts are sufficient for making out a case
for enlargement of the applicant on bail in
the aforesaid crime. However, it is clarified
that the observations made in this order
would not affect the outcome of the trial.

26. Let the applicant- Rajeev Yadav
alias Rinku be released on bail in the
aforesaid case on furnishing a personal
bond and two sureties each in the like
amount
to
the
satisfaction
of
magistrate/court concerned, subject to
following conditions: -

(i) the applicant shall not tamper
with the prosecution evidence;

(ii)
the
applicant
shall
not
pressurize the prosecution witnesses;

(iii) the applicant shall appear on
each and every date fixed by the trial court,
unless his appearance is exempted by the
learned trial court.
----------
(2025) 4 ILRA 750
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 09.04.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE KRISHAN PAHAL, J.

Criminal Misc Bail Application No. 9861 of 2025

Arun Kumar Mishra ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sri Nitin Chandra Mishra, Sri R.B. Tripathi, Sri
Anoop Trivedi (Sr. Adv.)

Counsel for the Respondents:
G.A., Sri Devendra Singh

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code,1860 -
Sections 313 & 377 - Bail - Allegation of
rape on false promise of marriage -
Consent - Adult prosecutrix - Delay of five
months in FIR - Relationship admitted to
be consensual - Admitted deletion of
charges under Sections 313 & 377 I.P.C. -
Disputed marital status - Prima facie no
intention to deceive from inception -
Courts
not
to
criminalise
failed
relationships - Law does not enforce all
aspects of morality - Bail granted. (Paras
5, 30 to 42)

HELD:

This case is reflective of a broader societal shift,
where
the
sanctity
and
solemnity
once
associated with intimate relationships have seen
a marked decline. The prevalence of transient
and uncommitted relationships, often formed
and dissolved at will, raises critical questions
about individual responsibility and the misuse of
legal
provisions,
especially
when
such