# Rajendra Kumar Jain v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2025) 8 ILRA 647
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-08-07
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 5314 of 2002
- **Bench:** Manish Mathur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/rajendra-kumar-jain-v-state-of-u-p-anr-53743
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Whether the punishment order removing the
petitioner from service is vitiated for nonissuance of show cause notice and denial of
opportunity of hearing as mandated under Rule
55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control
and Appeal) Rules, 1930 and Article 311 of the
Constitution of India.

HEADNOTE
Service Law - Disciplinary Proceedings -
Rule 55 of Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 - Article
311(2) of Constitution of India - Supply of
inquiry report and mandatory show cause
notice - Two-stage disciplinary process -
Non-issuance
vitiates
punishment
-
Removal order quashed.
648 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Held :
Petitioner
challenged
the
order
whereby
punishment of removal from service was
inflicted upon him on the ground that no fresh
show cause notice was ever served prior to
passing of the impugned order. Rule 55 of CCA
Rules clearly stipulates in a mandatory notion
that notice is required to be issued to the
delinquent employee prior to imposition of
punishment. After submission of the inquiry
report, at the first stage, it is the right of the
delinquent employee to raise objections with
regard to the manner of conduct of inquiry and
the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer.
Only after such grievance is considered by the
disciplinary authority can it record a finding
either agreeing or disagreeing with the inquiry
report. If agreeing, issuance of notice for
imposition of punishment must follow. Court
found that neither any show cause notice was
issued nor any opportunity of personal hearing
was provided prior to passing of the impugned
order. As the mandatory procedure was not
followed, the removal order was quashed.
Respondents directed to treat petitioner in
regular service throughout with consequential
service benefits on a notional basis. (Paras 18,
22, 24, 29) (E-5)

CASE LAW CITED
E.C.I.L. v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727

List of Acts

## Text

8 All. Rajendra Kumar Jain Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
647
after rendering service as work charged
for number of years in the Government
establishment/
department,
denying
them the pension on the ground that they
have not completed the qualifying
service for pension would be unjust,
arbitrary and illegal. Therefore, this
Court has observed and held that their
services rendered as work charged shall
be considered/ counted for qualifying
service. This Court has not observed and
held that the entire service rendered as
work charged shall be considered/
counted for the quantum of pension/
pension. The decision of this Court in the
case of Prem Singh (supra), therefore,
would be restricted to the counting of
service rendered as work charged for
qualifying service for pension".

(Emphasis added)

6. From the observations made qua the
directions issued by the Supreme Court in
Prem Singh's Judgment, it is clear that the
principles of law laid down in Prem
Singh's case would not be attracted in the
present case as petitioner has already
attained the qualifying period for pension
and is receiving pension. Petitioner since
claims to be regularized in substantive
capacity in the year 2004 under the rules of
regularization and if the previous period is
also counted for qualifying service then the
net result would be that petitioner's
regularization would take effect from back
date i.e. from the date he entered in the
work charge establishment in the year
1997. The legal position is very clear, a
person gets substantive appointment on the
date he is regularized in service and hence,
regularization cannot be given effect from
the back date unless and until the
regularization rules do provides for the
same or the regularization order provide for
the same. It is not the case of the petitioner
that he has been regularized w.e.f. the year
1997 and hence, I do not find any force in
the petition.

8. In view of the above, the petition
fails and is accordingly dismissed.
----------
(2025) 8 ILRA 647
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 07.08.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J.

Writ A No. 5314 of 2002
&
Writ A No. 2007437 of 1992

Rajendra Kumar Jain ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Alka Verma, Shivam Tiwari, Tanay Hazari,
Vijay Kumar Azad

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Prashant Singh Atal

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the punishment order removing the
petitioner from service is vitiated for nonissuance of show cause notice and denial of
opportunity of hearing as mandated under Rule
55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control
and Appeal) Rules, 1930 and Article 311 of the
Constitution of India.

HEADNOTE
Service Law - Disciplinary Proceedings -
Rule 55 of Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 - Article
311(2) of Constitution of India - Supply of
inquiry report and mandatory show cause
notice - Two-stage disciplinary process -
Non-issuance
vitiates
punishment
-
Removal order quashed.
648 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Held :
Petitioner
challenged
the
order
whereby
punishment of removal from service was
inflicted upon him on the ground that no fresh
show cause notice was ever served prior to
passing of the impugned order. Rule 55 of CCA
Rules clearly stipulates in a mandatory notion
that notice is required to be issued to the
delinquent employee prior to imposition of
punishment. After submission of the inquiry
report, at the first stage, it is the right of the
delinquent employee to raise objections with
regard to the manner of conduct of inquiry and
the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer.
Only after such grievance is considered by the
disciplinary authority can it record a finding
either agreeing or disagreeing with the inquiry
report. If agreeing, issuance of notice for
imposition of punishment must follow. Court
found that neither any show cause notice was
issued nor any opportunity of personal hearing
was provided prior to passing of the impugned
order. As the mandatory procedure was not
followed, the removal order was quashed.
Respondents directed to treat petitioner in
regular service throughout with consequential
service benefits on a notional basis. (Paras 18,
22, 24, 29) (E-5)

CASE LAW CITED
E.C.I.L. v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727

List of Acts
1. Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules, 1930, Rule 55
2. Constitution of India, Article 311

List of Keywords
Service Law; Disciplinary Proceedings; CCA
Rules; Show Cause Notice; Natural Justice;
Article 311; Inquiry Report; Removal from
Service;
Consequential
Benefits;
No
Back
Wages.

CASE ARISING FROM
Order dated 29.09.1992 removing the petitioner
from service

Appearances for Parties
Advs For Petitioner: Ms. Alka Verma assisted
by Mr. Tanay Hazari; Hemendra Pratap; Shivam
Tiwari; Vijay Kumar Azad
Advs For Respondents: C.S.C.; Prashant
Singh Atal; Sandeep Sharma (State Counsel)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manish Mathur, J.)

1. Heard Ms. Alka Verma, assisted by
Mr. Tanay Hazari, learned counsel for
petitioner and Mr. Sandeep Sharma,
learned State counsel for opposite parties.

2. Writ Petition No.7437 (S/S) of 1992
has been filed challenging the punishment
order
dated
29.09.1992
whereby
punishment of removal from service has
been inflicted upon petitioner.

3. Writ-A No. 5314 of 2002 has been
filed with regard to consequential benefits
sought in case the petition of 1992
succeeds.

4. It has been submitted that earlier
while in service, petitioner was issued a
charge sheet dated 27.01.1976 thereby
instituting the disciplinary proceedings
against him whereafter an inquiry report
was submitted holding petitioner guilty of
charges levelled against him. On the basis
of inquiry report, punishment order dated
02.12.1980 was passed against petitioner
dismissing him from service. The said
order
was
thereafter
challenged
by
petitioner before the State Public Services
Tribunal in Claim Petition No.173/F/iv of
1981. The said claim petition was allowed
by means of judgment and order dated
29.10.1983 primarily on the ground that
punishment order had been passed without
jurisdiction. Therefore, the matter was
remanded for passing of orders afresh on
the aspect of punishment while upholding
the inquiry proceedings. The said order
was thereafter challenged before this Court
by the State Government in Writ Petition
No.1524 of (S/S) 1984 in which although
8 All. Rajendra Kumar Jain Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
649
initially an interim order was passed but
was subsequently vacated and in pursuance
of which petitioner was allowed to join
duties w.e.f. 26.05.1990. The judgment and
order passed by Tribunal was also assailed
by petitioner in Writ Petition No.2581 of
(S/S)1994.

5. Supplementary affidavit filed today
on behalf of petitioner, which is taken on
record, brings on record the fact that both
the aforesaid petitions were thereafter
dismissed as infructuous in view of passing
of subsequent order which is impugned in
the present petition.

6. It has been submitted that the
impugned order has been passed without
complying with directions issued by the
Tribunal inasmuch as no fresh show cause
notice was ever served upon petitioner
prior to passing the impugned order of
removal, which was mandatory in terms of
Rule 55 of Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal), Rules 1930 ,which
were applicable at that time and which
specifically provided that no order of
punishment would be passed by the
disciplinary authority until and unless an
opportunity of hearing was provided to the
delinquent employee. It is submitted that
during pendency of petition, petitioner
passed away and has been substituted by
his legal heirs.

7. Learned counsel for petitioner submits
that since the said procedure has not been
followed, the impugned order therefore is
rendered vitiated. She has placed reliance on
judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of E.C.I.L. vs B Karunakar (1993)
4 SCC 727.

8. Learned State counsel has refuted
submissions advanced by learned counsel
for petitioner with the submission that once
the Tribunal has clearly upheld findings
recorded in the inquiry proceedings, the
only aspect required was to consider
inflicting punishment upon petitioner and
has adverted to paragraph 28 of counter
affidavit to submit that order of removal
has been passed on the basis of entire
material on record and inquiry report
submitted by the Inquiry Officer. It is
further submitted that there is no specific
ground taken by petitioner in pleadings that
he was not served with any show cause
notice or was not provided any opportunity
of hearing prior to passing of order of
removal. It is further submitted that
petitioner has also been unable to indicate
any prejudice caused to him even if it is
assumed, though not admitted, that he was
not afforded any opportunity of hearing
prior to passing of impugned order.

9. Upon consideration of submissions
advanced by learned counsel for parties and
perusal of material on record, it is evident
from a perusal of judgment and order
passed by the Tribunal, particularly in
paragraphs 6 and 7 thereof that the Tribunal
did not find any lacuna in the inquiry
proceedings and the punishment order
challenged therein was set-aside only on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction granting
liberty to the opposite parties to commence
from the stage after submission of inquiry
report. The Tribunal has also in paragraph
7 thereof clearly held that it is in
accordance with settled law that prior to
passing of final orders on the basis of
inquiry report, a show cause notice is
required to be issued to the delinquent
employee and for providing a personal
hearing prior to passing of such order.

10. It is also evident and admitted
between the parties that judgment and order
650 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
passed by Tribunal was thereafter assailed
by the petitioner as well as by the State in
writ petitions which were subsequently
dismissed
as
having
been
rendered
infructuous due to passing of present
impugned order. The said aspect clearly
indicates that findings recorded by the
Tribunal pertaining to inquiry proceedings
therefore attained finality since no lacuna
in the inquiry proceedings was found by the
Tribunal.

11. In such circumstances, the only
question surviving for examination is the
aspect whether petitioner was issued any
show cause notice or provided any
opportunity of personal hearing prior to
passing of impugned order of removal. The
aspect of prejudice being caused also
requires examination.

12. Although there is no specific ground
taken by petitioner in memorandum of
petition with regard to show cause notice or
opportunity of hearing not being provided to
him prior to passing of punishment order but
foundation for same has been made in ground
nos.1 and 9 thereof specifically indicating
therein that the impugned order is in violation
of Rule 55 of CCA Rules as well as Article
311 of Constitution of India.

13. In such circumstances, this Court
is of the considered opinion that since
foundation for such a ground has already
been raised in writ petition, the same can be
adjudicated upon.

14. With regard to the aspect of
issuance of a show cause notice prior to
passing any order inflicting punishment
upon the delinquent employee, the aspect
has clearly been delineated by Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of E.C.I.L
(supra) in following manner:-

"(1) Where the enquiry officer is
other than the disciplinary authority, the
disciplinary proceedings break into two
stages. The first stage ends when the
disciplinary
authority
arrives
at
its
conclusions on the basis of the evidence,
enquiry officer's report and the delinquent
employee's reply to it. The second stage
begins when the disciplinary authority
decides to impose penalty on the basis of its
conclusions. If the disciplinary authority
decides
to
drop
the
disciplinary
proceedings, the second stage is not even
reached.

While the right to represent
against the findings in the report is part of
the
reasonable
opportunity
available
during the first stage of the inquiry viz.,
before the disciplinary authority takes into
consideration the findings in the report, the
right to show cause against the penalty
proposed belongs to the second stage when
the disciplinary authority has considered
the findings in the report and has come to
the conclusion with regard to the guilt of
the employee and proposes to award
penalty on the basis of its conclusions. The
first right is the right to prove innocence.
The second right is to plead for either no
penalty or a lesser penalty although the
conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted.
It is the second right exercisable at the
second stage which was taken away by the
Forty- second Amendment. The second
stage consists of the issuance of the notice
to show cause against the proposed penalty
and of considering the reply to the notice
and deciding upon the penalty. What is
dispensed with is the opportunity of making
representation on the penalty proposed and
not of opportunity of making representation
on the report of the enquiry officer. The
latter right was always there. But before
the
Forty-second
Amendment
of
the
8 All. Rajendra Kumar Jain Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
651
Constitution, the point of time at which it
was to be exercised had stood deferred till
the second stage viz., the stage of
considering the penalty. Till that time, the
conclusions that the disciplinary authority
might have arrived at both with regard to
the guilt of the employee and the penalty to
be imposed were only tentative. All that has
happened
after
the
Forty-second
Amendment of the Constitution is to
advance the point of time at which the
representation of the employee against the
enquiry
officer's
report
would
be
considered. Now, the disciplinary authority
has to consider the representation of the
employee against the report before it
arrives at its conclusion with regard to his
guilt or innocence in respect of the
charges.

* * * Article 311(2) says that the
employee shall be given a "reasonable
opportunity of being heard in respect of the
charges against him". The findings on the
charges given by a third person like the
enquiry officer, particularly when they are
not borne out by the evidence or are
arrived at by overlooking the evidence or
misconstruing
it,
could
themselves
constitute new unwarranted imputations.
The proviso to Article 311(2) in effect
accepts two successive stages of differing
scope. Since the penalty is to be proposed
after the inquiry, which inquiry in effect is
to be carried out by the disciplinary
authority (the enquiry officer being only his
delegate appointed to hold the inquiry and
to assist him), the employee's reply to the
enquiry officer's report and consideration
of such reply by the disciplinary authority
also constitute an integral part of such
inquiry.

Hence, when the enquiry officer
is not the disciplinary authority, the
delinquent employee has a right to receive
a copy of the enquiry officer's report before
the disciplinary authority arrives at its
conclusions with regard to the guilt or
innocence of the employee with regard to
the charges levelled against him. That right
is a part of the employee's right to defend
himself against the charges levelled against
him. A denial of the enquiry officer's report
before the disciplinary authority takes its
decision on the charges, is a denial of
reasonable opportunity to the employee to
prove his innocence and is a breach of the
principles of natural justice."

15. For examination and applicability
of aforesaid judgment in the present facts
and circumstances of the case, particularly
paragraph 28 of the counter affidavit, it is
evident that neither any show cause notice
was issued nor any opportunity of personal
hearing was provided to petitioner prior to
passing of the impugned order.

16.
The
aspect
therefore
which
assumes importance is prejudice which is
caused to the petitioner.

17. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
E.C.I.L (supra) has clearly held that the
disciplinary proceedings are in two stages
with the first stage ending with submission
of inquiry report and second stage when the
disciplinary authority decides to impose
penalty on the basis of its conclusion. It has
also been held that the first right is the right
conferred upon the delinquent employee to
prove innocence and the second right is to
plead for either no penalty or lesser penalty
although conclusion regarding guilt is
accepted.

18. The aspect which can be therefore
culled out from the aforesaid judgment is
that even after submission of inquiry report,
652 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
at the first stage, it is the right of the
delinquent employee to raise objections
with regard to the manner of conduct of an
inquiry and the findings recorded by the
Inquiry Officer. It is only once such a
grievance is addressed by the disciplinary
authority that it can thereafter record a
finding either agreeing with the inquiry
report or disagreeing with the findings
recorded by the Inquiry Officer. It is in case
the disciplinary authority agrees with the
finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer, the
aspect of issuance of notice for purposes of
imposition of punishment is required to be
followed.

19. Thus, it is evident as held in
aforesaid case of E.C.I.L (supra) that
providing a copy of the inquiry report to
the delinquent employee is mandatory. It
can be seen that the aspect as to why supply
of the inquiry report to the delinquent
employee is mandatory is primarily for
such a delinquent employee to raise
objections either to conduct of inquiry
proceedings or to raise objections to
findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer.

20. This very purpose would stand
frustrated in case a copy of the inquiry report
is not supplied to delinquent employee.
Therefore, in the considered opinion of this
Court, after supplying of inquiry report, not
only as per Rule 55 of CCA Rules but also in
terms of Article 311 of Constitution of India,
an objection is mandatorily required to be
called for by the disciplinary authority from
the delinquent employee not only for the
purposes of imposition of punishment but
also for providing an opportunity of hearing
to the delinquent employee to prove his
innocence before the disciplinary authority.

21. From the purpose of issuance of
show
cause
notice
subsequent
to
submission of the inquiry report, it is
evident that the said procedure forms a
substantive part of the entire disciplinary
proceedings and is not merely a formality
and therefore is required to be strictly
adhered to.

22. In view of aforesaid discussions, it
is thus evident that reason for issuance of
notice prior to imposition of punishment
upon the delinquent employee is not only
for the purposes of punishment but also to
give an opportunity to the delinquent
employee to prove his innocence raising
grievance against the inquiry proceedings
as well as the findings recorded by the
Inquiry Officer. It is probably for this
reason that Rule 55 of CCA Rules clearly
stipulates in a mandatory notion that notice
is required to be issued to the delinquent
employee
prior
to
imposition
of
punishment.

23.
In
the
present
facts
and
circumstances of the case, not only upon
examination of impugned punishment order
but also as per paragraph 28 of counter
affidavit, it is evident that neither any
notice was served upon petitioner nor any
personal opportunity of hearing was
provided to him prior to passing of
impugned
order.
This
also
assumes
significance in view of judgment rendered
by the Tribunal specifically indicating that
prior to passing of punishment order, the
opposite parties were required to issue
show cause notice to the delinquent
employee.

24. In view of the fact that such
mandatory procedure has not been followed
by the opposite parties, renders the
impugned order dated 29.09.1992 vitiated
and is consequently quashed by issuing a
writ in the nature of certiorai.
8 All. Yogesh Kumar Sharma Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
653

25. Although learned counsel for
petitioner has submitted that once the
impugned punishment order has been
quashed,
he
would
be
entitled
for
backwages but this Court is disinclined to
grant such relief, particularly in view of the
fact that the inquiry report has specifically
been upheld against the petitioner by the
Tribunal with such findings having attained
finality and it is only on a technical aspect
that this petition is being allowed. Since the
findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer are
not being interfered with, this Court does
not find any occasion to grant backwages.

26. Ordinarily, in such circumstances,
the dispute is required to be remitted for
consideration afresh but considering the
fact that charge sheet pertains to the year
1976 and the petitioner in the meantime has
also passed away, this Court does not find
any occasion to remit the matter for
consideration afresh.

27. Writ-A No.5314 of 2002 has been
filed seeking a direction to opposite parties
to treat petitioner in continued service and
pay all the service benefits including
selection grade and other revised pay scales
as revised from time to time.

28. In view of the fact that impugned
order of removal of petitioner stands
quashed, the consequential benefits as
sought for in subsequent Writ-A No.5314
of 2002 are also allowed to the petitioner.

29. Resultantly, both the petitions
succeed and are allowed. Further writ in
the
nature
of
mandamus
is
issued
commanding the opposite parties to treat
petitioner in regular service throughout
with
consequential
service
benefits
financially being provided to him on a
notional basis.
----------
(2025) 8 ILRA 653
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 07.08.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAURABH SHYAM
SHAMSHERY, J.

Writ A No. 5735 of 2025

Yogesh Kumar Sharma ...Petitioner
Versus
State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Pradeep Kumar Upadhyay, Sharad Rastogi,
Sr. Advocate

Counsel for the Respondents:
Aditya Bhushan Singhal, C.S.C., Suresh
Singh

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether initiation of departmental proceedings
against a Superintending Engineer of U.P. Jal
Nigam (Urban), on the basis of approval granted
by the Board of Directors instead of the
Governor, is legally valid.

HEADNOTE
Service Law - Disciplinary Proceedings -
Post-Retirement Inquiry - Rule 351-A of
Civil Services Regulations - Competent
Authority
-
Board
of
Directors
-
Delegation of Power - Validity - U.P. Jal
Nigam (Urban) - Gratuity and Leave
Encashment.
Held :
Petitioner, a retired Superintending Engineer of
U.P.
Jal
Nigam
(Urban).
Prabandh
Nideshak/Nideshak
Mandal,
in
terms
of
amended Rules 3(1) and 3(2) of the U.P. Sarkari
Karmchari Acharan Niyamavali, 1956, with the
permission of the Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam
(Urban), Lucknow, took a decision to initiate
inquiry against the petitioner under Rule 351(A)
of the C.S.R. The petitioner argued that the
appropriate authority to grant such permission