# Rajendra Prasad Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 8 ILRA 24
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-08-01
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal U/S 372 CR.P.C. No. 46 of 2025
- **Bench:** Mrs. Sangeeta Chandra, Shree Prakash Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/rajendra-prasad-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-53658
- **Pages:** 22

## Headnote

Cr.P.C. (now S. 430 of the Bhartiya Nagrik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) filed by the informant /
relative
of
the
victim
(brother
of
the
deceased)-whether
he
falls
within
the
definition of "victim" under S 2(wa) Cr.P.C. (now
S. 2(1)(y) of the BNSS, 2023), and whether
such appeal requires leave to appeal.

Headnotes
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - S. 372
proviso - Victim's right of appeal -
Definition of 'victim'- scope - mental and
8 All. Rajendra Prasad Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
25
emotional injury - Appeal by victim - no
special leave required - Legal heir - Class
distinction under succession law not
applicable.
Held: The right to appeal under the proviso
to S. 372 Cr.P.C. is an absolute and
independent right of the victim, not
circumscribed by conditions or the requirement
of leave - The term 'victim' under S. 2(wa)
must receive a liberal, realistic, progressive
and
beneficial
interpretation,
including
persons
who
have
suffered
mental,
emotional, or economic injury due to the
offence - Appellant, being the brother of the
deceased, is a "legal heir" - Emotional harm
suffered by close relatives, even if not Class-I
heirs, is sufficient to confer victim status - A
complainant under the Negotiable Instruments
Act (S. 138) is a victim for the purposes of S.
2(wa) Cr.P.C. and entitled to appeal against
acquittal without seeking special leave - The
anxiety expressed by the learned counsel for the
State regarding award of compensation or its
apportionment after appeal can be addressed by
leaving it open for the Appellate Court to make
specific
order
regarding
awarding
of
compensation to the victims legal heirs in case
the challenge to the order of the Trial Court is
successfully made - Appeals admitted -
bailable warrants issued
against accusedrespondents - matter listed for further hearing.
(Paras 21,26,33,41,42,43) (E-7)

Case Law Cited
Manoj Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors.
[(2017) 2 UPLBEC 1245 (FB)]; Satpal Singh
v. State of M.P. & Ors. [2015 Cr.L.J. 4929
(SC)];
Mallikarjun
Kodagali
v.
State
of
Karnataka & Ors. [2019 (2) SCC 752]; Ram
Phal v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2015 SCC Online
Delhi 9802 (FB)]; Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v.
State of Maharashtra [2013 Cr.L.J. 3044
(SC)]; M/s Celestium Financial v. Gnanasekaran
[2025 LiveLaw (SC) 666]; Tata Steel Ltd. v.
Athma Tube Products Ltd. [2013 SCC OnLine
P&H 5834]; Parmeshwar Mandal v. State of
Bihar [2013 SCC OnLine Patna 602]

List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Bhartiya
Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Indian Penal
Code,
1860;
Fatal
Accidents
Act,
1855;
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Amendment
Act No. 5 of 2009; Hindu Succession Act; Indian
Succession Act, 1925; Muslim Shariyat laws.

List of Keywords
Victim - Legal heir - Appeal against acquittal -
Compensation - Emotional harm - Mental injury
- Right to appeal - Leave to appeal - Class I and
Class II heirs - Victim Compensation Scheme -
Definition of injury - Bailable warrants.

Case Arising From
Criminal Appeal filed by close relatives of the
deceased under S. 372 of the old Cr.P.C. (now
S. 430 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023), arising from orders of acquittal passed
by the respective Sessions Judges in favour of
the accused-respondents, objected to by the
learned
A.G.A.-I
on
the
ground
of
maintainability as the appeals had
been
preferred by the informant/relatives of the
victims.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
Mahendra Pratap Singh, Ranjit Singh
Advs. for the Respondents:
G.A. (U.C. Verma, A.G.A.-I)

## Text

_Characters 0–39,826 of 76,688. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39826 for what follows._

24 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
be seen that the present Accused Al and A3
are not alleged to have used any weapon.
The allegation of use of any weapon was
against
Benny
and
Prabhakaran.
Therefore, in absence of any allegations of
use of any deadly weapon by the Appellants
herein-Accused Nos. 1 and 3 Section 397
Indian Penal Code shall not be attracted
and to that extent the learned Counsel
appearing on behalf of the AppellantsAccused are right in submitting that they
ought not to have been convicted for the
offence punishable Under Section 397
Indian Penal Code."

32. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the
case of Ashfaq vs. State (Govt. of NCT of
Delhi) (Supra), has taken similar view in
regard to the Section 397 IPC.

33. The judgment of Full Bench of this
Court, in the case of Kuldeep Kumar
Tripathi vs. Rang Bahadur Pandey and
others (Supra), relied by learned AGA is not
applicable on the facts and circumstances of
the present case and it is in regard to the
jurisdiction of hearing of criminal appeal.

34. In view of above and considering the
overall facts and circumstances of the case,
this Court is of the view that the impugned
judgment and order has been passed
convicting and sentencing the appellants
without
considering
the
evidence
and
material
on
record
appropriately
and
recording the findings on the basis of
presumption, which could not have been
done and the prosecution has failed to prove
its case beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the
appellants could not have been convicted and
sentenced.
Therefore,
the
impugned
judgment and order is not sustainable and
liable to be set-aside and the appellants are
liable to be acquitted on the basis of benefit
of doubt.

35. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.

36. The impugned judgment and order
dated 7/11-1-1993 passed in S.T. No. 387
of 1991; State Versus Devendra Singh and
4 Others, arising out of Case Crime No.
66/1990 under Sections 395/397 IPC,
Police Station Behtagokul, District Hardoi
by IVth Additional Sessions Judge, Hardoi
is hereby set-aside. The appellants are
acquitted on the basis of benefit of doubt.
----------
(2025) 8 ILRA 24
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 01.08.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS. SANGEETA CHANDRA, J.
THE HON'BLE SHREE PRAKASH SINGH, J.

Criminal Appeal U/S 372 CR.P.C. No. 46 of 2025
Alongwith
Criminal Appeal U/S 372 CR.P.C. No. 52 of 2025

Rajendra Prasad Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Mahendra Pratap Singh, Ranjit Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
G.A.

Issue for Consideration
Maintainability of a criminal appeal under S. 372
Cr.P.C. (now S. 430 of the Bhartiya Nagrik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) filed by the informant /
relative
of
the
victim
(brother
of
the
deceased)-whether
he
falls
within
the
definition of "victim" under S 2(wa) Cr.P.C. (now
S. 2(1)(y) of the BNSS, 2023), and whether
such appeal requires leave to appeal.

Headnotes
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - S. 372
proviso - Victim's right of appeal -
Definition of 'victim'- scope - mental and
8 All. Rajendra Prasad Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
25
emotional injury - Appeal by victim - no
special leave required - Legal heir - Class
distinction under succession law not
applicable.
Held: The right to appeal under the proviso
to S. 372 Cr.P.C. is an absolute and
independent right of the victim, not
circumscribed by conditions or the requirement
of leave - The term 'victim' under S. 2(wa)
must receive a liberal, realistic, progressive
and
beneficial
interpretation,
including
persons
who
have
suffered
mental,
emotional, or economic injury due to the
offence - Appellant, being the brother of the
deceased, is a "legal heir" - Emotional harm
suffered by close relatives, even if not Class-I
heirs, is sufficient to confer victim status - A
complainant under the Negotiable Instruments
Act (S. 138) is a victim for the purposes of S.
2(wa) Cr.P.C. and entitled to appeal against
acquittal without seeking special leave - The
anxiety expressed by the learned counsel for the
State regarding award of compensation or its
apportionment after appeal can be addressed by
leaving it open for the Appellate Court to make
specific
order
regarding
awarding
of
compensation to the victims legal heirs in case
the challenge to the order of the Trial Court is
successfully made - Appeals admitted -
bailable warrants issued
against accusedrespondents - matter listed for further hearing.
(Paras 21,26,33,41,42,43) (E-7)

Case Law Cited
Manoj Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors.
[(2017) 2 UPLBEC 1245 (FB)]; Satpal Singh
v. State of M.P. & Ors. [2015 Cr.L.J. 4929
(SC)];
Mallikarjun
Kodagali
v.
State
of
Karnataka & Ors. [2019 (2) SCC 752]; Ram
Phal v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2015 SCC Online
Delhi 9802 (FB)]; Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v.
State of Maharashtra [2013 Cr.L.J. 3044
(SC)]; M/s Celestium Financial v. Gnanasekaran
[2025 LiveLaw (SC) 666]; Tata Steel Ltd. v.
Athma Tube Products Ltd. [2013 SCC OnLine
P&H 5834]; Parmeshwar Mandal v. State of
Bihar [2013 SCC OnLine Patna 602]

List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Bhartiya
Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Indian Penal
Code,
1860;
Fatal
Accidents
Act,
1855;
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Amendment
Act No. 5 of 2009; Hindu Succession Act; Indian
Succession Act, 1925; Muslim Shariyat laws.

List of Keywords
Victim - Legal heir - Appeal against acquittal -
Compensation - Emotional harm - Mental injury
- Right to appeal - Leave to appeal - Class I and
Class II heirs - Victim Compensation Scheme -
Definition of injury - Bailable warrants.

Case Arising From
Criminal Appeal filed by close relatives of the
deceased under S. 372 of the old Cr.P.C. (now
S. 430 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023), arising from orders of acquittal passed
by the respective Sessions Judges in favour of
the accused-respondents, objected to by the
learned
A.G.A.-I
on
the
ground
of
maintainability as the appeals had
been
preferred by the informant/relatives of the
victims.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
Mahendra Pratap Singh, Ranjit Singh
Advs. for the Respondents:
G.A. (U.C. Verma, A.G.A.-I)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs. Sangeeta
Chandra, J.)

1. These two Criminal Appeals have
been filed by close relatives of the victims,
under Section 372 of the old Cr.P.C. (Under
Section 430 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023), against orders of acquittal
passed by Sessions Judges in favour of the
accused respondents. When they were taken
up as fresh, the Learned A.G.A.-1 Shri U. C.
Verma,
raised
an
objection
regarding
maintainability of the appeals as they had
been filed by the informant/ relatives of the
victims. This Court in its order dated
19.03.2025, directed the Registry to list the
matters again as fresh to enable the counsel
for the appellants to file Supplementary
Affidavit indicating as to how the appellant
fall within the definition of Section 2 (1)(y)
of the BNSS (Section 2 (wa) of Cr.P.C.).
26 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
2. The appellant in Criminal
Appeal
No.C372/16/2025
(Rajendra
Prasad Singh Versus State of U.P. and
others), Rajendra Prasad Singh filed a
Supplementary Affidavit indicating that the
deceased is survived by his widow aged
about 45 years, his son aged about 22 years
and his two daughters aged about 19 years
and 17 years, respectively. It was also
informed to the Court that the mother of the
deceased is also alive. The appellant
reiterated his claim to prefer the appeal
being the brother of the deceased and thus
falling within the definition of "victim".
Oral arguments were advanced in detail
and have been mentioned in the order dated
26.03.2025, which is being quoted here in
below.:-

 "Supplementary affidavit filed
today is taken on record.

We have heard Sri Mahendra
Pratap Singh, who has placed reliance
upon the supplementary affidavit and also
on certain paragraphs of the full Bench
judgment of this Court rendered in Manoj
Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Others,
reported in [(2017) 2 UPLBEC 1245].

He says that the appellant is the
brother of the deceased and in his
supplementary affidavit, he has stated that
the deceased is survived by his widow,
aged about 45 years, his son, aged about
22 years and his two daughters aged about
19 years and 17 years. The counsel for the
appellant states that as per full Bench
decision of this Court, the definition of
'legal heir', as given in civil laws, shall not
be applicable for defining the legal heir, as
given in Code of Criminal Procedure.
There is no concept of Class-I and Class-II
legal heir and no preferential order
amongst them insofar as Code of Criminal
Procedure is concerned and, therefore, it
would be sufficient to show that he falls in
the category of legal heir and it is
irrelevant whether these Class-II legal
heirs are Class-I legal heirs.

The learned AGA-I, Sri Umesh
Verma has pointed out paragraph nos. 69
and 70 of the same judgment to argue that
the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. and is
an exception to the general law, it confers
on the victim to his/her right to appeal
against acquittal. In the first part, the
definition of the victim is given as 'a person
who has actually suffered any loss or
injury, caused by reason of any act of
omission for which the accused person has
been charged. Hence, only such person
would be treated as a victim who is subject
matter of the trial, being direct sufferer of
the crime. The appellant is a brother of the
deceased and he is not a direct sufferer. He
has not suffered any loss or injury either in
body, mind or reputation of the property.
The deceased's widow or his three children
can be said to have suffered loss or injury,
both in mind and in property due to death
of the deceased. The brother of the
deceased can only replace such family
member, if he is able to show that he
himself has suffered any loss or injury.
Since he cannot fall within the term of
'victim', he cannot be said also to be fallen
within the definition of 'legal heir' or
'guardian' more so when legal heirs like
widow and the children and also the
mother of the deceased are alive.

It has also been pointed out that a
right of appeal is given to the victim not
only against acquittal but also against
conviction for a lesser offence and even for
inadequate compensation. If this Court on
decision of an appeal under Section 372
Cr.P.C. finds inadequate compensation
being given by the trial court, then
compensation can also be increased. It is
not a case of the State-respondents that in
this
case,
the
matter
is
that
of
8 All. Rajendra Prasad Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
27
compensation. The State-respondents are
only concerned that if the definition of legal
heir is widened to include Class-II legal
heirs, despite survival of Class-I legal heirs
in some or the other case where the appeal
is filed for inadequate compensation, such
Class-I legal heirs will ultimately suffer, if
the Class-II legal heirs are permitted to file
appeal and get appropriate compensation.

Put up this matter on 02.04.2025,
as fresh. "

3. Shri Umesh Chand Verma, while
arguing against the maintainability of the
appeal has referred to Section 372 as
amended with effect from 31.12.2009,
which is being quoted here in below: -

"No
appeal
to
lie
unless
otherwise provided - no appeal shall lie
from any judgement and order of a
criminal court, except as provided for by
this code or by any other law for the time
being in force:

(Provided that the victim shall
have a right to prefer an appeal against
any order passed by the court, acquitting
the accused or convicting for a lesser
offence
or
imposing
inadequate
compensation, and such appeal shall lie to
the court to which an appeal ordinarily lies
against the order of conviction of such
court .)"

A "Victim" has been defined
Under Section 2 (wa) as "a person who has
suffered any loss or injury caused by the
reason of the act or omission for which the
accused person has been charged, and the
expression victim includes his or her
Guardian or legal heir."

4. It has been argued that by adding
a proviso to Section 372 as it then existed
by means of Amendment Act No.5 of 2009,
the victim was given certain valuable rights
against an order passed by the trial court -

 a) acquitting the accused or

b) convicting the accused for a
lesser offence or

c)
imposing
inadequate
compensation on the accused .

It has been argued that out of the
three categories as mentioned here in above
the category of acquitting the accused is
relatively simple to understand. In so far as,
conviction
for
a
lesser
offence
is
concerned, it may happen that an accused
may have been charged for commission of
an offence under Section 302 I.P.C, but
after appreciation of evidence in Trial, the
Trial Court finds that there is no sufficient
evidence and material to convict the
accused Under Section 302 I.P.C. It may
acquit the accused under Section 302 I.P.C
but may still find that there is sufficient
evidence and material to establish a
different charge for commission of offence
like that of Section 304 I.P.C. Part I or Part
II, or under Section 326, or Section 325,
Section 324 etc. for which, although the
accused has not been charged, the Court,
may still convict the accused under such
Sections. Such order/judgment is termed as
conviction for lesser offence and in such a
situation, the Court is obliged to record a
finding of acquittal Under Section 302 IPC,
which is a grave offence and at the same
time record a finding for conviction of the
accused for a lesser offence for which no
charge was framed initially. In such a
situation, the accused may challenge the
order of conviction for culpable homicide
not amounting to murder, in an appeal
Under Section 374 Cr.P.C. and the victim
may also challenge the acquittal of the
accused from the graver offence of murder
and such appeal will lie to the same court,
28 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
where the appeal of the accused against his
conviction shall be filed.

5. So far as the third category -
"imposing inadequate compensation" is
concerned, the word compensation is not
defined in the I.P.C. separately nor it is part
of the punishment as defined under Section
53 of the I.P.C.

Section 53 of the I.P.C. reads as
under -

 "53
Punishment
-
the
punishments to which offenders are liable
under the provisions of the Code are -

Firstly-death,

secondly - imprisonment for life.

Thirdly- repealed

Fourthly - imprisonment, which
is of two descriptions, namely:-

(1) Rigorous that is with hard
labour;

(2)- simple;

Fifthly - forfeiture of property;

Sixthly -fine

It
has
been
argued
that
compensation has no relevance in relation
to punishment, and as such, the question of
compensation does not arise even in a case
where the accused is convicted for an
offence and punished/sentenced as per the
First Schedule appended to the Cr.P.C.
1973.

6. In case of acquittal of an accused
for the offence charged There cannot be
any scope for compensation. The word
compensation and its importance can be
traced to the provision Under Section 357
of the Cr.P.C. and the introduction by the
Legislature
of
Section
357A,
which
provides for a "Victim Compensation
Scheme" introduced by way of the same
Amendment Act No.5 of 2009, with effect
from 31.12.2009.

Under Section 357(1), a court
while imposing a sentence of fine or a
sentence, including a sentence of death, of
which fine forms apart, order the whole or
any part of the fine recovered to be applied
-

a. In deferring the expenses
properly incurred in the prosecution;

b. In payment to any person of
compensation for any loss or injury caused
by the offence, when compensation is in the
opinion of the court, recoverable by such
person in a Civil Court;

c. When any person is convicted
of any offence for having caused the death
of another person or of having abetted the
commission of such an offence, paying
compensation to the persons who are,
under the Fatal Accidents Act 1855,
entitled to recover damages from the
person sentenced for the loss resulting to
them from such death.

d. When any person is convicted
of any offence, which includes theft,
criminal misappropriation, criminal breach
of trust, or cheating, or of having
dishonestly received or retained, or of
having voluntarily assisted in disposing of
stolen property, knowing or having reason
to believe the same to be stolen, in
compensating any bonafide purchaser of
such property for the loss of same, if such
property is restored to the possession of the
person entitled there to

357(2) If the fine is imposed in a
case, which is subject to appeal, no such
payment shall be made before the period
allowed for presenting the appeal has
elapsed, or if an appeal is presented, before
the decision of the appeal.

357(3) When a court imposes a
sentence of which fine does not form a part,
8 All. Rajendra Prasad Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
29
the court may, when passing judgment,
order the accused person to pay by way of
compensation, such amount as may be
specified in the order to the person who has
suffered any loss or injury by reason of the
act for which the accused person has been
so sentenced.

357(4) An order under this
Section may also be made by an Appellate
Court or by High Court or a Court of
Session when exercising its power of
revision.

357(5) At the time of awarding
compensation in any subsequent civil suit
relating to the same matter, the court shall
take into account any sum paid or
recovered as compensation under this
section.

7. In the State of U.P., certain
amendments have been made in Section
357 in relation to compensation to
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes
persons which need not be referred to in
this judgment as they are irrelevant to the
issues raised.

8. Shri U.C. Verma has argued that
as is evident from Sub Section (1) and Sub
Section (3) of Section 357 of the Cr.P.C.,
the Court while imposing sentence on the
accused may award compensation to a
victim in two ways. Firstly, when fine
forms part of the sentence, such fine may
be directed to be payable to the victim and
secondly, when the fine does not form the
part of the sentence, the Court may direct
the accused to pay compensation to a
victim of an amount specified in the
judgment and order.

In Clause (b) and (c) of Sub
Section (1) of Section 357, the Legislature
has provided that the Trial Court may order
for payment to any person of compensation
for any loss or injury caused by the offence,
when compensation is in the opinion of the
court recoverable by such person in a civil
court, where a suit for the same may be
filed.

9. Also, under Clause (c) when a
person is convicted of any offence for
having caused the death of another person
or having abetted the commission of such
an offence, the court may order paying
compensation to such persons who are
under the Fatal Accidents Act 1855,
entitled to recover damages from the
person sentenced for the loss resulting to
them from such death.

10. Under the Fatal Accidents
Act,1855 a provision has been made to
provide compensation to families for loss
occasioned by the death of a person caused
by actionable wrong. Section 1(a) of the
Fatal Accidents Act provides that the suit
for such compensation to the family of the
person for loss occasioned to it, by his
death shall be for the benefit of the wife,
husband, parent, and child, if any, of the
person whose death shall have been so
caused, and shall be brought by and in the
nature of the executor, administrator, or
representative of the person deceased.

 Again, Section 4 of the Fatal
Accident
Act
which
relates
to
the
interpretation clause has clarified "- - the
word 'person' shall include Father and
Mother,
and
Grandfather
and
Grandmother; and the word 'child' shall
include Son and Daughter, Grandson, and
Granddaughter,
and
Stepson
and
Stepdaughter.

11. It has been argued on the basis
of the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act
that
the
compensation
as
has
been
30 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
envisaged under Sub Section (3) of Section
357 of the Cr.P.C. has to be given to the
person who has suffered any loss or injury
by reason of action of the accused person
who has been so sentenced. Referring to
the judgment rendered by the Supreme
Court in Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad Versus
State of Maharashtra reported in 2013
Criminal Law Journal 3044 (SC), it has
been argued that Section 357 confers a
power coupled with the duty on the Court
to apply its mind to the question of
awarding compensation in every criminal
case. It was observed by Hon'ble Supreme
Court
that
the
power
to
award
compensation was intended to reassure the
victim that he or she is not forgotten in the
criminal justice system. "The courts should
not ignore the provision of grant of
compensation altogether, and they should
apply their mind to the question of
compensation, every time they pass a
sentence on conviction. If they do not
award compensation, it would defeat the
very object behind the introduction of the
provision."

12.
Referring
to
the
victim
compensation scheme under Section 357A,
it has been argued that in every case where
there is a conviction there may or may not
be any compensation awarded to the person
who has suffered the loss or injury. Even
where there is acquittal from a graver
charge and conviction for a lesser offence,
the Trial Court should consider the
question of grant of compensation. Also in
case of death, the only and direct sufferers
of the offence is the immediate family of
the deceased. that is the wife and son and
daughter, and may be also the parents of
the deceased. The brother of the deceased
may be the informant and also a family
member, but on his filing of the appeal and
getting a favourable final order by the
Appellate
Court
the
question
of
compensation to the immediate family
would still have to be considered. If this
Court allowed any and every family
member however distant, to be considered
as victim or his/ her legal heir, and the
immediate family of the deceased did not
choose to file an appeal, which eventually
raised a successful challenge to the order of
the Trial Court then their right to due
compensation will be ignored.

13.
Learned
counsel
for
the
appellant on the other hand have relied
upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in
Manoj Kumar Singh Versus State of U.P.
and Others 2017, 2 U.P. LBEC1245. The
Full Bench of this Court was considering
the question as to "who will fall within the
definition of victim as contemplated by
Section 2(wa) of the Code inserted by Act
Number 5 of 2009". The Supreme Court's
decision in Satpal Singh Versus State of
M.P. was considered as well as judgments
of two Division Benches of this Court and
of the Patna High Court respectively,
namely, Edal Singh Versus State of U.P.
and Others in Criminal Miscellaneous
Application under Section 372 Cr.P.C.
No.172 of 2014 decided by this Court on
10.04.2014; and in Parmeshwar Mandal
Versus State of Bihar and Others in
Criminal Appeal No.1078 of 2012, reported
in 2013, SCC Online Patna 602; and
judgment rendered by two Full Benches,
one of Punjab and Haryana High Court in
Tata Steel Limited Versus Mrs. Athma
Tube
Products
Limited
and
Others
reported in 2014 (1) PLR1; and the other
by the Delhi High Court in Ram Phal
Versus State of U.P. and Others reported
in 2015 SCC Online Delhi 9802. After
considering such judgments which dealt
with the evolution of the right to appeal
given to a victim culminating in the
8 All. Rajendra Prasad Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
31
Amendment Act No.5 of 2009, and also
issues framed by the two Division Benches,
as aforesaid, of this High Court and Patna
High Court, and the issues framed by the
two Full Benches as aforesaid of Punjab
and Haryana High Court and Delhi High
Court, the Full Bench of this Court
observed in paragraph 25 as follows: -

"25. The judgments quoted above
would go to show that while analysing the
definition of victim, various High Courts
have taken note of various sources to find
out as to what is the true meaning of victim.
...,"

14.
In
respect
of
different
approaches which could be adopted for
interpreting the term 'victim', the Full
Bench of the Delhi High Court in
Paragraph 13 had observed as follows: -

 "Para 13. A survey of these High
Court decisions reveals four possible
approaches to the question of victim's
locus standi to maintain an appeal under
the proviso to Section 372:

(a), a narrow reading of the word
'victim' (limiting it to direct and proximate
physical harm); and a narrow reading of
the term 'legal heir' (limiting it to lines of
succession and personal law). This is the
approach of the Division Bench of this
Court in Chhatar Singh Versus Subhash
176 (2011 ) DLT356 and of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in D. Sudhakar
Versus Panapu Sreenivasulu reported in
2013, Criminal Law Journal 2764.

(b) A broad reading of the word
'victim' (expanding it to emotional harm
caused by the direct harm to someone that
one is close to), and a narrow reading of
the term, 'legal heir' (limiting it to lines of
succession under personal law). This is the
approach of the Patna High Court. The
Guwahati High Court has also favoured a
broad reading of the word 'victim', while
returning no finding on the meaning of
'legal heir'.

(c), a narrow reading of the word
'victim' and a broad reading of the term
'legal heir'.

(d) a broad reading of the term
'victim' and also of the term 'legal heir'.
This appears to be the view of Punjab and
Haryana High Court, which favours
abroad reading of 'legal heir' although it
does not appear to have returned a
conclusive finding on reading of the word
'victim'."

15. The Full Bench of this Court in
Manoj Kumar Singh (Supra) went on to
observe .. "What we find from a reading of
the judgments of the various High Courts is
that while interpreting the word 'victim',
the High Court have given elaborate
meaning to the word 'victim'. In this
background, as to whether the term victim
has rightly been understood, is an issue to
be answered by us".

16. The Full Bench of this Court,
thereafter observed that a perusal of the
judgments
of
various
High
Courts
"....show that they dealt with the definition
of victim in respect of an offence of murder
without considering the impact of the
nature of an offence of which one is a
victim. There are various forms of offences
provided under Indian Penal Code as well
as other special laws. An offence may be
against body, mind, property, etc. In that
context injury caused by the offence would
vary. Further, there may be a crime against
society, which can be termed as a
victimless crime because there is no victim
in particular. None of these judgments
consider
the
above
aspect.
In
this
32 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
background, we proceed to consider the
case in hand..."

17. It was observed by the Full
Bench in Manoj Kumar Singh (Supra) that
Chapter 29 of the Code provides for appeal
against conviction as an unrestricted right
given to the accused (Section 374), whereas
the appeal against acquittal is a restricted
right given initially to the Government and
the complainant of a case (Section 378) and
now to the victim also under the proviso of
Section 372.

18. The Full Bench of this Court in
Manoj Kumar Singh initially dealt with the
nature and scope of the remedy of appeal as
is provided Under Section 372 proviso
Cr.P.C., and thereafter from Paragraph 43
onwards proceeded to deal with the word
'victim' as used in Section 2(wa) for the
purpose of maintenance of appeal Under
Section 372 of the Code. It examined the
context in which the word 'victim' has
been used in the Code and observed that
the victim has been given the right to
engage
an
Advocate
to
assist
the
prosecution with permission of the Court,
(Section 24); the right to prefer appeal
against acquittal (proviso to Section 372);
the statutory arrangement to compensate
victim or his dependent through victims
compensation scheme (Section 35, 7A, 35
7B, 35 7C); The manner in which the
statement of a victim in relation to an
offence of rape is to be recorded during
investigation that is by giving facility of
recording of statement at residence or at a
place of her choice by a woman police
officer in presence of parents or guardians
etc. (Section 157).

19. The Full Bench in Manoj
Kumar Singh thereafter considered the
principles of interpretation used in various
judgments of the Supreme Court and of
Coordinate Benches of the Delhi High
Court and Punjab and Haryana High Court
and noticed that the definition of 'victim'
as 'means X and includes 'Y' has been
discussed and relying upon observations
made by the Supreme Court in Black
Diamond Beverages Versus Commercial
Tax Officer reported in 1998 (1) SCC 458,
in the context of use of words "means and
includes" and has held that the first part of
the phrase" means X "usually refers to the
ordinary and natural meaning, but with an
extension of the second part that is includes
Y, the first part of the definition should be
given its ordinary, popular or natural
meaning, and the second part which
includes certain others will not prevent the
main provision from receiving its natural
meaning.

20. Referring to "loss" or injury as
mentioned in the definition of 'victim'
under Section 2(wa), it was observed that
loss or injury have been used as synonyms
to each other and Section 44 of the IPC
postulates the word injury to denote any
harm whatsoever illegally caused to any
person, in body, in mind, reputation or
property. There can be four types of harm
which may be illegally caused to any
person as per this definition in respect of
body, mind, reputation, and property and an
offence may inflict upon a person, a
combination of one or more types of harm
as mentioned under Section 44 of the IPC.
Any emotional harm or injury, however
grave it may be, caused to any person, not
being the direct sufferer, especially when
emotional harm or injury is neither
ingredient of the offence nor is the fact in
issue in the trial of the accused, cannot
grant status of 'victim' to such other
person, not being the direct sufferer of
offence, or receiver of harm caused by the
8 All. Rajendra Prasad Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
33
offence, and no person, other than actual
receiver can be treated as 'victim' of
offence so as to provide him/her right to
prefer appeal under the proviso of Section
372. In absence of the direct sufferer or in a
case where the direct victim suffers a
disability, his or her legal heir or Guardian
would qualify as a victim.

21. In so far as the expression legal
heir is concerned, the Full Bench of this
Court in Manoj Kumar Singh considered
the conclusion drawn by the Full Benches
of Delhi High Court and Punjab and High
Court observed that the expression 'legal
heir' is required to be read in a sense
different from what it is for the purpose of
civil rights, wherein the degree of legal
heirs have been categorized as Class I,
Class II and so on. Both the Full Bench
decisions give a liberal interpretation to the
term 'victim'. The Court considered the
dictionary meaning of the word 'legal heir'
and in all such definitions and found that
the common thread is that the person who
is entitled to receive property of any person
when such person dies, is termed as heir.
The use of the word "legal" as a prefix to
the word "heir" denotes that the status of
such person as heir must be recognized by
law. It is only then he can be termed as
legal. Succession and inheritance can be of
two kinds - testamentary or intestate. The
law on intestate succession for different
communities in India is governed by
different rules applicable for that particular
community. Broadly speaking, succession
is either under the Hindu Succession Act or
the Indian Succession Act or the Muslim
Shariyat laws. With the exception of
Muslims, the Indian Succession Act 1925
has a common set of rules for persons of all
religions. In civil law, pertaining to Hindu
community, the legal heirs of Class I
category in order of preference would oust
the legal heirs of Class II category, but
Class II legal heirs are nevertheless legal
heirs. This preferential right has been
recognized under Civil laws by way of
statutory arrangements. But in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, no such statutory
arrangement is available to provide for
classes of legal heirs or a preferential order
amongst them. Hence, in the context of
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure,
the
expression,
"legal
heir"
cannot
be
construed to create categories of legal heirs
unless it requires determination of civil
rights of the person claiming to be legal
heir of the deceased.

22. The Full Bench of this Court
thereafter observed in paragraph 69 and 70
as follows: -

 "69. From the discussions that
have been made above, it is clear that the
proviso of Section 372 is an exception to
the general law and the same confer on a
victim, the right to appeal against the
acquittal , which is subject to the grant of
leave by the court. The first part of the
definition 'victim' as given under Section
2(wa) (that is, victim means a person who
has suffered any loss or injury caused by
reason of the act or omission for which the
accused person has been charged), is
required to be construed in its literal sense
and no liberal interpretation is required.
Accordingly, only such person would be
treated as victim who is the subject matter
of trial being the direct sufferer of the
crime in terms of loss or injury caused to
his own body, mind, reputation, and
property, and such loss or injury is one of
the ingredients of the offence for which the
accused person has been charged, and
therefore any other person cannot be
accepted as victim within the first part of
Section 2 for the purpose of maintaining
34 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
appeal. The second part that is "includes
his or her guardians or legal heir " , would
come into play when the actual Sufferer is
absent or suffers disability.

"70. In other words, 'victim'
means the actual sufferer of offence
(receiver of harm caused by the accused ),
no person, other than actual receiver of
harm can be treated as victim of offence, so
as to provide him/her right to prefer appeal
under proviso of Section 372, though, in his
or her absence or disability, his legal heir,
or guardian would qualify as victim and
have a right to appeal. A person who
claims himself to be a legal heir of actual
victim (Direct sufferer), would be able to
maintain appeal provided he establishes his
claim as such before the court in his
application by disclosing his particulars;
relationship with the victim; and the
ground on which such claim of being legal
heir or guardian is based...."

23. The Full Bench of this Court
Manoj Kumar Singh (Supra) however had
observed in Paragraph 26 as follows: -

 "26. The Full Bench of Delhi
High Court and the Division Bench of
Patna High Court and the Full Bench of
Punjab and Haryana High Court arrived at
a unanimous conclusion that the proviso of
Section 372 is not an exception but confers
an independent statutory right of appeal to
a victim, hence, no leave to appeal is
required as provided under section 378 of
the Code. This particular conclusion, that
has been arrived at has been specifically
overruled by the Apex Court in the case of
Satyapal Singh Versus State of Madhya
Pradesh and Others reported in 2015
Cr.L.J. 4929 (Supreme Court) by holding
that the proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C.
must be read along with its main
enactment, that is, Section 372 should be
read together with sub Section (3) of
Section 378 of the Code otherwise the
substantive provision of Section 372 of the
Code would be rendered nugatory, as it
clearly provides that no appeal shall lie
from any judgment or order of a criminal
court, except as provided by the Court.
Consequently, in view of the dictum of the
Apex Court and Satpal Singh (Supra) the
legal position stands clarified that the
proviso of Section 372 is an exception to its
main provision and cannot be construed as
an independent statutory right in complete
detachment
with
the
main
statutory
arrangement.
In
the
said
case,
the
deceased's father had preferred appeal.
The Apex Court in that context observed as
follows: -

"9. We have carefully examined
the above mentioned provisions of Cr.P.C.
and the Full Bench decision of the Delhi
High Court referred to supra upon which
strong reliance is placed by the learned
counsel for the appellant. There is no doubt
that the appellant, being the father of the
deceased has locus standi to prefer an
appeal before the High Court under
proviso to Section 372 of the Cr.P.C., as he
falls within the definition of 'victim' as
defined Under Section 2wa of Cr.P.C., to
question the correctness of the judgement
and order of acquittal passed by the High
Court in favour of respondent 2 to 6 in
Sessions Case Number 293/2010 ."...

The Supreme Court in Satyapal
Singh(Supra) after considering several
case laws relating to the rules of
interpretation observed that the proviso
added to the main provision in Section 372
must be read along with its main enactment
that is, Section 372 itself and together with
Sub Section (3) to Section 378 of Cr.P.C.,
otherwise the substantive provision of
Section 372 of Cr.P.C. will be rendered
nugatory as it clearly states that no appeal
8 All. Rajendra Prasad Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
35
shall lie from any judgment or order of a
criminal court, except as provided by the
Cr.P.C.. The judgment of the Apex Court
has settled so far as one particular aspect
of the matter is concerned that is, the
proviso of Section 372 is an exception to its
main provision and cannot be construed as
an independent statutory right in complete
detachment
with
main
statutory
arrangement.

24. The Full Bench taking into
account the law as settled by the Supreme
Court in Satpal Singh Versus State of
Madhya
Pradesh
and
Others
2015,
Criminal Journal 4929 (Supreme Court);
observed that as per statutory arrangement
under the Code, the victim has been
conferred right to prefer appeal against
acquittal with the leave of the Court.

25. This observation made by the
Full Bench in Manoj Kumar Singh (Supra)
no longer can be said to be a binding
precedent in view of law settled by a larger
bench of the Supreme Court in Mallikarjun
Kodagali
(dead)
through
Legal
Representatives V. State of Karnataka and
Others reported in 2019 (2) SCC 752;
where the Supreme Court by a majority
judgment delivered by Hon'ble Justice
Lokur, approved the observation of the Full
Bench of the Delhi High Court in Ram
Phal Versus State reported in 2015 SCC
Online Delhi 9802; and of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Tata Steel Limited
Versus M/s Aatma Tube Products Limited
reported in 2013 SCC Online, Punjab and
Haryana 5834, and the observation made
by Division Bench of the Patna High Court
in Parmeshwar Mandal Versus State of
Bihar reported in 2013 SCC Online Patna
602, and overruled the observations made
by the Division Bench in Satpal Singh
Versus State of M.P. reported in 2015 (15)
SCC 613 on the point; and observed that
several High Courts have taken a consistent
view to the effect that the victim of an
offence has a right of appeal Under Section
372 proviso Cr.P.C. and have also taken the
view that the date of the alleged offence
has no relevance to the right of the appeal.
The significant date is the date of the order
of acquittal passed by the trial court.