# Rajendra Singh &Anr v. District Magistrate Raebareli &Ors

- **Citation:** (2019) 1 ILRA 1015
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-09-05
- **Case number:** Land Acquisition No. 174 of 2015
- **Bench:** Pankaj Kumar Jaiswal, Jaspreet Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/rajendra-singh-anr-v-district-magistrate-raebareli-ors-44393
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

1016 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
C.S.C.,
Anupam
Mehrotra,
Gopesh
Tripathi

A. Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Sections 3
(b), 4, 6, 12(2), 18. Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition,
Rehabilitation
and
Resettlement
Act,
2013:
Sections
24(1)(a), 64. Held:- Collector does not
have power to withhold the referencedelving into the merits is outside his
jurisdiction.

Petitioners' application against the mutation
Order was under challenge. Notification u/s 4
and declaration u/s 6 of the old Act was
issued.
During
the
pendency
of
the
proceedings, the old Act was repealed and
replaced
by
Act
of

## Text

_Characters 0–39,655 of 54,261. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39655 for what follows._

1 All. Rajendra Singh & Anr. Vs. District Magistrate Raebareli & Ors.
1015
the material on record and found that the
provisions contained under Section 12
and Section 16 are not attracted to the
present facts and circumstances of the
case and the pleadings placed before the
Prescribed Authority as well as before the
Appellate Court. I am of the considered
opinion that the judgments relied upon by
learned counsel for the petitioners are
distinguishable
and
do
not
have
applicability to the present case.

29. The Prescribed Authority, while
dealing with the issues framed and material
placed on record, recorded cogent reason
and after considering the bona fide
requirement and comparative hardship as
well as other ingredients required for
consideration of claim for release of the
shop, proceeded to pass the order dated
24/12/2005.
He
also
considered
the
statements of facts made in paragraphs 1
and 2 of the release application filed under
Section 21 (1)(a) and written statement filed
by the opposite parties.

30. On perusal of the statements of
facts made in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
application moved under Section 21(1)(a)
by the landlord, the Prescribed Authority,
considering the statement of fact made in
written statement, has return finding of
fact that there is relationship of landlord
and tenant between the parties and on the
basis of bona fide requirement and
comparative hardship has decided the
issue in favour of the landlord which was
affirmed
by
the
Appellate
Court
dismissing the appeal filed by the
petitioners.

31. This Court, upon consideration,
came to the conclusion that there are
concurrent findings and cogent reasons
recorded in passing the orders and there is
no ground made out by the petitioners for
interference in the orders impugned. Both the
courts below have duly considered the
judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the
parties and thereafter, allowed the application
filed under Section 21 (1)(a) and dismissed the
appeal vide the orders impugned.

32. In the opinion of this Court, both
the courts below have committed no
illegality nor the impugned orders suffer
from any infirmity. Therefore, this Court
declines to interfere in the impugned
orders.

33. Accordingly, this writ petition
lacks merits and is hereby dismissed.

34. It is, however, directed that the
petitioner shall evict the shop in dispute
within a period of four months from the
date of production of a certified copy of
this order ensuring payment as directed by
the Appellate Court.

35. No order as to costs.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 05.09.2019
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE PANKAJ KUMAR JAISWAL, J.
THE HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J.

Land Acquisition No. 174 of 2015
alongwith
Land Acquisition No. 175 of 2015

Rajendra Singh &Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
District Magistrate Raebareli &Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Apporva Tewari

Counsel for the Respondents:
1016 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
C.S.C.,
Anupam
Mehrotra,
Gopesh
Tripathi

A. Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Sections 3
(b), 4, 6, 12(2), 18. Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition,
Rehabilitation
and
Resettlement
Act,
2013:
Sections
24(1)(a), 64. Held:- Collector does not
have power to withhold the referencedelving into the merits is outside his
jurisdiction.

Petitioners' application against the mutation
Order was under challenge. Notification u/s 4
and declaration u/s 6 of the old Act was
issued.
During
the
pendency
of
the
proceedings, the old Act was repealed and
replaced
by
Act
of
2013.
Petitioner's
application u/s 18 of the old Act was rejected
by respondent No.2. Allowing the present
petition, the High Court. The Collector does
not have power to withhold the reference
nor does he have any discretion in the
matter whether the dispute raised has any
merit or not and the same has to be left
for the determination of the Court. Delving
into the merits of the dispute is exceeding
jurisdiction.
(Para 33, 39)

B. Before passing award, conflicting
claims
were
available
before
Collector.
Therefore,
Petitioners'
application cannot be said to be time
barred. (Para 40, 41, 43, 44)

C.
Once
it
is
established
that
petitioners were "person interested"
u/s 18, non-disclosure of the entire set
of litigation would not affect the right
of the petitioners. (Para 50, 51, 52)

Precedent followed: -

1.Sharda Devi Vs. State of Bihar and Another,
2003 (3) SCC 128 (Para 21, 30, 33, 38)

2. Ramesh B. Desai Vs. Bipin Vadilal Mehta and
Others, 2006 (5) SCC 638 (Para 21)

3. Himalayan Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. Vs. Francis
Victor Coutinho, AIR 1980 SC 1118 (Para 51)

Precedent distinguished: -

1.Ramesh Chandra and Others Vs. Tanmay
Developers Pvt. Ltd., 2017 (13) SCC 715
(Para 27, 53)

2.Union of India and Others Vs. Major General
Shri Kant Sharma and Another, 2015 (6) SCC
773
(Para 27, 54)

3.Mohammad
Hasnuddin
Vs.
State
of
Maharashtra, 1979 (2) SCC 572 (Para 27, 55)

4.Shahid Zamal and Another Vs. State of U.P.
and Others, 2018 (3) SCC 52 (Para 27, 56)

5. M/s Prestige Lights Ltd. Vs. State Bank of
India and Others, 2007 (8) SCC 449 (Para 27,
49) (E-4)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Kumar Jaiswal, J.
& Hon'ble Jaspreet Singh, J.)

1. Both these writ petitions assail the
order dated 28.09.2015 passed by the
opposite party no. 2 and since common
questions of facts and law are involved.
Hence both the petitions have been heard
together and are being decided by this
common judgment.

2. W.P. No. 174 (LA) of 2015 has
been filed by Sri Rajendra Singh and
Anand Singh whereas W.P. No. 175 (LA)
of 2015 has been filed by Smt. Pushpa
Devi @ Pappo Devi who is the mother of
Rajendra
Singh
and
Anand
Singh.
Primarily, the grounds raised in both the
petitions are similar, however, in so far as
the claim is concerned, there is a
divergence in the stand of the petitioners
of W.P. No. 174 (LA) of 2015 and
petitioners of W.P. No. 175 (LA) of 2015.
1 All. Rajendra Singh & Anr. Vs. District Magistrate Raebareli & Ors.
1017

3. To put the controversy before this
Court in a proper perspective, certain
facts giving rise to the above petitions are
being noticed hereinafter:-

4. That both the present writ
petitions assail the order passed by the
Special Land Acquisition Officer whereby
he has rejected the claim of the petitioners
in both the writ petitions for referring the
matter for adjudication in terms of Section
18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
hereinafter referred to as "Old Act of
1894" which is equivalent to Section 64
of The Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency
in
Land
Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013, hereinafter referred to as "New Act
of 2013. For the sake of convenience the
facts, dates and events have been noticed
from the W.P. No. 174 (LA) of 2015.

5. The land in question bearing
Khata No. 69 and 70 situate in Village
Dalmau, District Raebareily which is the
subject matter of acquisition for setting up
the Battalion for Indo Tibetan Border
Police, for which a notification under
Section 4 of the Old Act of 1894 was
issued on 12.06.2013. Subsequently, the
declaration under Section 6 of the Old Act
of 1894 was issued on 30.12.2013.

6. The aforesaid land admittedly
belonged to Late Raja Uday Raj Singh
and his name was duly recorded in the
revenue records as bhumidhar with
transferable rights.

7. It is the case of the petitioners that
Raja Uday Raj Singh had two wives
namely Smt. Laxmi Kunwar and Smt.
Pushpa Devi @ Pappo Devi (petitioner of
W.P. No. 175 (LA) of 2015). Sri Uday
Raj Singh had one son from his first wife
Smt. Laxmi Kunwar namely Rakesh
Pratap Singh who is the respondent no. 3
in the above writ petitions and he had two
sons from the second wife Smt. Pushpa
Devi @ Pappo Devi namely Rajendra
Singh and Anand Singh (who are the
petitioners in W.P. No. 174 (LA) of
2015).

8. Sri Uday Raj Singh expired on
13.05.1976. It is the case of the petitioners
that at that point of time the petitioners of
W.P. No. 174 (LA) of 2015 were only 14
and 12 years of age respectively and
though they along with Smt. Pushpa Devi
@ Pappo Devi were the successor,
however, the respondent no. 3 by
misleading the revenue authorities only
got his name mutated as the sole
bhumidhar with transferrable rights in
respect of Khata No. 69 and 70 which
admeasures 317 Bighas 18 Biswas and 3
Biswansi. This mutation order dated
27.07.1978 was not known to the
petitioners and it is only on 27.04.2010,
from a newspaper report published in
Dainik Jagran, Raebarely which indicated
that some land of Shivgarh estate situate
in Village, Pargana and Tehsil Dalmau,
District Raebarely was made the subject
matter
of
some
dispute
then
the
petitioners inspected the revenue records
and upon obtaining the certified copies of
the Khatauni as well as the Khewat, for
the first time they became aware that by
means of the ex-parte order dated
27.07.1978, respondent no. 3 had got his
name mutated in place of late Raja Uday
Raj Singh.

9. The petitioners thereafter assailed
the order dated 27.07.1978 by moving an
application for recall specifically stating
therein that they were the co-tenure
holders along with the respondent no. 3
and had equal rights over the aforesaid
1018 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
property and that the name of the
petitioners be also mutated in the revenue
records. The aforesaid application was
moved on 12.07.2010. At this juncture, it
would be pertinent to notice that as far as
Smt. Pushpa @ Pappo Devi is concerned
while she also assailed the mutation order
dated 27.07.1978, however, her ground of
challenge was that Late Raja Uday Raj
Singh had executed his last registered
Will dated 15.04.1969 and in furtherance
of the aforesaid Will, upon the death of
Late Raja Uday Raj Singh on 13.05.1976,
the petitioner of W.P. No. 175 (LA) of
2015 became the exclusive owner of the
said estate left behind by Late Raja Uday
Raj Singh.

10. It has also been pleaded on
record that late Raja Uday Raj Singh had
instituted a suit against his first wife
namely Smt. Laxmi Kunwar and his son
Rakesh Pratap Singh (respondent no. 3)
which was registered as R.S. No. 15 of
1968. The said suit was filed in the Court
of Civil Judge, Raebareily. During the
pendency of the aforesaid suit, since the
Late Raja Uday Raj Singh had expired,
hence, in the aforesaid suit Smt. Pushpa
Devi @ Pappo Devi was permitted to be
substituted
in
his
place
after
due
consideration of his last Will dated
15.04.1969. It has been stated that since
upon substitution in the Civil Suit, the
respondent no. 3 herein was aware of the
fact that Late Raja Uday Raj Singh had
executed a registered Will in favour of
Smt. Pushpa Devi, however, the same was
concealed by the respondent no. 3 and had
got his name mutated in the revenue
records. Thus, it would be seen that as far
as the two petitions are concerned, the
writ petitioners of W.P. No. 174 (LA) of
2015 are claiming co-tenure ownership
along with the respondent no. 3 and Smt.
Pushpa Devi, whereas the writ petitioner
of W.P. No. 175 (LA) of 2015 is
maintaining her case as being the sole and
absolute owner of the estate left behind by
Late Raja Uday Raj Singh on the basis of
his last registered Will dated 15.04.1969.

11. It will also be relevant to point
out that a number of civil disputes and
cases are pending between the petitioners
and the respondent no. 3 in various
Courts. It is in this backdrop of disputes
and time that the notification under
Section 4 and declaration under Section 6
of the old Act of 1894 was issued. The
writ petitioners of both the writ petitions
before the Special Land Acquisition
Officer submitted their objections stating
that they also had a stake in the
compensation
amount
and
it
was
specifically stated that in view of ongoing
litigations, the respondent no. 3 alone was
not the sole tenure holder whereas the
writ petitioners of both the writ petition
also had a right in the property and now
since the said property had been acquired,
accordingly they had a right in the
compensation and it was further prayed
that the said compensation amount may
not be released in favour of the
respondent no. 3.

12. During the pendency of the
proceedings
before
the
Special
Land
Acquisition Officer, the Old Act of 1894 was
repealed and was replaced by the Act of 2013.
Taking the benefit of Section 24 (1) (a) of the
Act of 2013 it was prayed that since no award
had been made under the Act of 2013,
accordingly, the compensation is to be
adjudged in accordance with the provision of
the Act of 2013. The writ petitioners of both
the writ petitions again made applications
before the respondent no. 2 on 13.06.2014
stating that in view of the disputes between
1 All. Rajendra Singh & Anr. Vs. District Magistrate Raebareli & Ors.
1019
the parties the amount may not be released in
favour of respondent no. 3 alone and that the
petitioners also had a right and the matter be
referred to the competent Court in terms of
reference under Section 18 of the Old Act of
1894 (which is equivalent to Section 64 of the
new Act of 2013). Similar application was
made by the petitioners on 21.07.2014 and
thereafter the respondent no. 2 issued notices
dated 05.08.2014 requiring the petitioners to
furnish evidence/documents in support of their
claims. The petitioners filed their affidavits
bringing on record all the facts along with
their documents in support of their claim
which was submitted with the respondent no.
2 along with their covering application dated
19.08.2014.

13. Since this matter was already
seized with the respondent no. 2,
however, before adjudicating upon the
same,
it
passed
its
award
dated
25.07.2015 wherein it did not indicate as
to who was entitled to the compensation
and to what extent.

14. That even after passing of the
award, the respondent no. 2 yet again
issued notice dated 17.08.2015 calling
upon the petitioners to produce their
evidence in support of their claim. The
petitioners once again by means of their
letter/application
dated
26.08.2015
submitted evidence/documents in respect
of
their
claim
and
sought
the
apportionment of the compensation and
the disputed questions referred to to the
Court. The respondent no. 3 also
submitted his objections and disputed the
claim of the writ petitioners of both the
writ petitions and sought the release of
compensation in his favour alone.

15. The petitioners had thereafter
filed another application dated 21.09.2015
reiterating the request to refer the disputes
to the Court, however, the respondent no.
2 by means of order dated 28.09.2015
rejected the application of the petitioners
and adjudicating the matter itself found
that there was no merit in the objections
raised by the writ petitioners and held the
respondent no. 3 to be entitled to the
compensation and further provided that
the order passed shall be subject to any
order passed in any title suit by a
competent Court against the respondent
no. 3.

16. It is this order dated 28.09.2015
which is the subject matter of challenge in
the
above
two
writ
petitions.
Significantly, the writ petitioners of both
the writ petitions had initially preferred
one composite writ petition No. 146 (LA)
of
2015,
however,
the
same
was
withdrawn, with liberty granted by a coordinate Bench of this Court by means of
order dated 16.10.2015 to file a fresh writ
petition and subsequently these two
separate writ petitions came to be filed.

17. The Court has heard at length Sri
Anil Tiwari, learned Senior Advocate assisted
by Sri Apoorva Tiwari for the petitioners of
W.P. No. 174 (LA) of 2015 and Sri Arvind
Jauhari, learned counsel for the writ petitioner
of W.P. No. 175 (LA) of 2015 and Sri
Anupam Mehrotra learned counsel who has
appeared on behalf of respondent no. 3 in both
the writ petitions.

18. The contention of learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioners Sri Anil Tiwari is
that the respondent no. 2 has committed a
grave illegality, inasmuch as, once the matter
was pending before the respondent no. 2
wherein application had been moved bringing
on record the dispute in between the parties
regarding the compensation and these
applications were in the knowledge of the
1020 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
respondent no. 2 even prior to the date of
passing of the award and so thereafter,
however, in terms of Section 18 of the Old
Act of 1894 which is equivalent to Section 64
of the New Act of 2013 it was incumbent
upon the respondent no. 2 to have referred the
matter to the appropriate Court / Authority for
adjudication. It has been submitted that it was
not at all within the domain of the respondent
no. 2 to have adjudicated the rights of the
parties and the respondent no. 2 has exceeded
its jurisdiction vested in it in law by holding
that the objections raised by the writ
petitioners did not have any merit and it
upheld the right of the respondent no. 3 to
receive the compensation.

19. It has been elaborated by Sri
Tiwari that in the proceedings under the
Land Acquisition Act, the legislature has
used to word ''interested person' and any
person who has a right over the
compensation is an interested person and
has a right to approach the Special Land
Acquisition Officer. Once the issue had
been raised by such interested person in
terms of Section 18 of the Old Act of
1894 (equivalent to Section 64 of the new
Act of 2013) then it was incumbent upon
the Special Land Acquisition Officer to
refer the dispute for reference and it is not
within his jurisdiction to adjudicate the
conflicting claims of the respective
parties.

20. It has been further submitted that
since the respondent no. 2 has taken upon
himself to adjudicate the rights which is
in gross violation of the powers conferred
upon the Special Land Acquisition
Officer, consequently, the order being
wholly without jurisdiction and nonest
deserves to be set aside and a direction be
issued that the Special Land Acquisition
Officer may refer the matter before the
appropriate authority for apportionment of
the compensation in terms of the new Act
of 2013.

21. The Learned Senior Counsel for
the petitioners has relied upon the
decisions of the Apex Court in the Case of
Sharda Devi Vs. State of Bihar and
Another reported in 2003 (3) SCC 128
and Ramesh B. Desai Vs. Bipin Vadilal
Mehta and Others reported in 2006 (5)
SCC 638 in support of his submissions.

22. The aforesaid submissions have
also been adopted by Sri A.K. Jauhari,
learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.
No. 175 (LA) of 2015.

23. Per contra, the learned counsel
for the respondent no. 3 Sri Anupam
Mehrotra has vehemently opposed the
submissions of the learned counsel for the
petitioner.
The
primary
ground
of
challenge raised by Sri Mehrotra is that
the petitioners are not entitled to maintain
the above writ petitions as they have not
approached the Court with clean hands
and have resorted to suppression and
concealment of facts. It has been
submitted
that
large
number
of
proceedings were pending between the
parties which have been concealed by the
petitioners. It has also been vehemently
urged that the sole ground raised by the
petitioners in their application before the
Special Land Acquisition Officer was that
the mutation order of 1978 was under
challenge, inasmuch as, the writ petitioner
had made an application for recall of
order 21.07.1978 vide application dated
12.07.2010. However, it is submitted that
the said application was dismissed in
default by means of the order dated
25.10.2012. Subsequently, an application
for recall of the said order dated
1 All. Rajendra Singh & Anr. Vs. District Magistrate Raebareli & Ors.
1021
25.10.2012 was moved which was also
rejected by means of the order dated
30.03.2015 and yet again the application
for restoration/recall was moved. It is
only by means of the order dated
21.07.2016 that the application for
restoration/recall was allowed and order
was set aside but it was only the
subsequent order by which the restoration
application was rejected was set aside and
it did not restore the original applications
for recall which were moved in the year
2010.

24. Thus, the submissions of Sri
Mehrotra is that an incorrect impression
was given by the writ petitioners and even
similar facts were brought on record in
the above writ petition to indicate that
their application challenging the mutation
was pending whereas the same already
stood dismissed in default on 25.10.2012
and the said order had yet not been
recalled. What was recalled was the order
of dismissal of the restoration application
and thus on the date when the Special
Land Acquisition Officer has passed the
impugned order admittedly the recall
applications against the mutation order
was not in existence and thus no benefit
could be granted to the writ petitioners on
the assumption of the pendency of the
recall application dated 12.07.2010.

25. It has also been submitted by Sri
Mehrotra that since the application for
reference did not adhere to the ingredients
as set out in Section 64 of the Act of
2013, hence it was not incumbent upon
the respondent no. 2 to have made the
reference. It has also been submitted that
the respondent no. 2 is not a mere
authority who just receives the application
and without application of its mind, is
required to make the reference, rather it
has to apply its mind and only when it
finds that the application is in accordance
with the parameters set out in Section 64
and Section 65 of the new Act of 2013
only then a reference can be made. Since
the applications moved by the writ
petitioners did not comply with the
requisite conditions, accordingly it was
absolutely appropriate for the respondent
no. 2 to have refused to make the
reference.

26. It has also been pointed out that
the writ petitioners of W.P. No. 174 (LA)
of 2015 had already instituted a Regular
Suit bearing No. 566 of 1999 wherein
they were claiming declaration to the
effect that the respondent no. 3 be
declared as not being the son of Late Raja
Uday Raj Singh wherein an injunction has
also been prayed that the respondent no. 3
is not entitled to the property inherited by
the respondent no. 3, thus, the aforesaid
suit also encompasses within its fold, the
land in question which is the subject
matter of acquisition and hence once the
issue was already seized by the Civil
Court in Regular Suit No. 566 of 2019,
thus the same could not be made the
subject matter of reference.

27. Sri Mehrotra has also vehemently
urged that the application filed by the writ
petitioners seeking reference under Section 18
of the old Act was barred by the limitation as
provided in sub Section (2) of Section 18 of
the Act of 1894. Sri Mehrotra has relied upon
the decision of the Apex Court in the case of
Ramesh Chandra and Others Vs. Tanmay
Developers Pvt. Ltd. reported in 2017 (13)
SCC 715, Union of India and Others Vs.
Major General Shri Kant Sharma and
Another reported in 2015 (6) SCC 773,
Mohammad Hasnuddin Vs. State of
Maharashtra reported in 1979 (2) SCC 572,
1022 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Shahid Zamal and Another Vs. State of
U.P. and Others reported in 2018 (3) SCC
52 and M/s Prestige Lights Ltd. Vs. State
Bank of India and Others reported in 2007
(8) SCC 449 in support of his submissions.

28. The Court upon hearing the learned
counsel for the respective parties and on
perusal of the record and their respective case
laws, discerns the following questions for
consideration.

(i) Whether the respondent no. 2 was
obliged to refer the matter under Section
18 of the old Act or the respondent no. 2
could have decided the applications
seeking reference and adjudicate the
dispute by himself ?.

(ii) Whether the application seeking
reference made by the writ petitioners was
barred by limitation as provided in
Section 18 of the old Act equivalent to
Section 64 of the new Act ?.

(iii) Whether the writ petitions filed
by
the
writ
petitioners
should
be
dismissed on the ground of non-disclosure
of full and complete details regarding the
pending litigations between the parties ?.

29. In order to answer the aforesaid
questions which have been set out for
determination, it would be relevant to
notice the scheme of the land acquisition
especially in light of the provisions
contained under Section 18 and Section
30 of the old Act equivalent to Section 64
and Section 76 of the new Act.

30. This aspect of the matter has
been extensively dealt with by the Apex
Court in the Case of Sharda Devi Vs.
State of Bihar and Another (Supra).
The Apex Court while summarizing the
difference in the reference made under
Section 18 and under Section 30 of the
old Act in context with locus, types of
disputes which are referrable, nature of
power exercised by the authority and the
ground of limitation and has held as under
:-

"By reference to locus

Under Section 18(1) a reference can
be made by the Collector only upon an
application in writing having been made
by (i) any person interested, (ii) who has
not accepted the award, (iii) making
application in writing, to the Collector,
requiring a reference by the Collector to
the court, (iv) for determination of any
one of the four disputes (specified in the
provision), and (v) stating the grounds on
which objection to the award is taken. For
reference under Section 30 no application
in writing is required. The prayer may be
made orally or in writing or the reference
may be made suo motu by the Collector
without
anyone
having
invited
the
attention of the Collector for making the
reference.

By reference to the disputes referable

Under Section 18(1) there are four
types of disputes which can be referred to
the civil court for determination. They are
disputes: (i) as to the measurement of the
land, (ii) as to the amount of the
compensation, (iii) as to the persons to
whom the compensation is payable, or
(iv) as to the apportionment of the
compensation
among
the
persons
interested. Under Section 30 the only
disputes which are referable are: (i) any
dispute as to the apportionment of the
amount of compensation or any part
thereof, or (ii) a dispute as to the persons
to whom the amount of compensation or
any part thereof is payable. A dispute as
to the measurement of the land or as to
the quantum of compensation or a dispute
of a nature not falling within Section 30,
1 All. Rajendra Singh & Anr. Vs. District Magistrate Raebareli & Ors.
1023
can neither be referred by the Collector
under Section 30 of the Act nor would the
civil court acquire jurisdiction to enter
into and determine the same.

By reference to the nature of power

Under Section 18 of the Act the
Collector does not have power to
withhold the reference. Once a written
application has been made satisfying the
requirements of Section 18, the Collector
shall make a reference. The Collector has
no discretion in the matter, whether the
dispute has any merit or not is to be left
for the determination of the court. Under
Section 30 the Collector may refer such
dispute to the decision of the court. The
Collector has discretion in the matter.
Looking to the nature of the dispute
raised, the person who is raising the
dispute, the delay in inviting the attention
of the court, and so on - are such
illustrative factors which may enter into
the consideration of the Collector while
exercising the discretion. If the Collector
makes the reference it may be decided by
the court subject to its forming an opinion
that the dispute was capable of reference
and determination under Section 30 of the
Act. In case the Collector refuses to make
a reference under Section 30 of the Act,
the
person
adversely
affected
by
withholding of the reference or refusal to
make the reference shall be at liberty to
pursue such other remedy as may be
available to him under the law such as
filing a writ petition or a civil suit.

By reference to limitation

Under Section 18 the written application
requiring the matter to be referred by the
Collector for the determination of the court
shall be filed within six weeks from the date of
the Collector's award if the person making it
was present or represented before the
Collector at the time when he made his award
or within six weeks of the notice from the
Collector under Section 12(2) or within six
months from the date of the Collector's award,
whichever period shall first expire. There is
no such limitation prescribed under Section
30 of the Act. The Collector may at any time,
not bound by the period of limitation, exercise
his power to make the reference. The
expression
"the
person
present
or
represented" before the Collector at the time
when he made his award would include
within its meaning a person who shall be
deemed to be present or represented before
the Collector at the time when the award is
made. No one can extend the period of
limitation by taking advantage of his own
wrong. Though no limitation is provided for
making a reference under Section 30 of the
Act, needless to say, where no period of
limitation for exercise of any statutory power
is prescribed, the power can nevertheless be
exercised only within a reasonable period;
what is a reasonable period in a given case
shall depend on the facts and circumstances
of each case.

26. The scheme of the Act reveals
that the remedy of reference under
Section 18 is intended to be available only
to a "person interested". A person present
either
personally
or
through
a
representative or on whom a notice is
served under Section 12(2) is obliged,
subject to his specifying the test as to
locus, to apply to the Collector within the
time prescribed under Section 18(2) to
make a reference to the court. The basis
of title on which the reference would be
sought for under Section 18 would
obviously be a pre-existing title by
reference to the date of the award. So is
Section 29, which speaks of "persons
interested". Finality to the award spoken
of by Section 12(1) of the Act is between
the Collector on one hand and the
"persons interested" on the other hand
and attaches to the issues relating to (i)
1024 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the true area i.e. measurement of the land,
(ii) the value of the land i.e. the quantum
of compensation, and (iii) apportionment
of the compensation among the "persons
interested". The "persons interested"
would be bound by the award without
regard to the fact whether they have
respectively
appeared
before
the
Collector or not. The finality to the award
spoken of by Section 29 is as between the
"persons interested" inter se and is
confined to the issue as to the correctness
of the apportionment. Section 30 is not
confined in its operation only to "persons
interested".
It
would,
therefore,
be
available for being invoked by the
"persons interested" if they were neither
present
nor
represented
in
the
proceedings before the Collector, nor
were served with notice under Section
12(2) of the Act or when they claim on the
basis of a title coming into existence postaward.
The
definition
of
"persons
interested" speaks of "an interest in
compensation to be made". An interest
coming into existence post-award gives
rise to a claim in compensation which has
already been determined. Such a person
can also have recourse to Section 30. In
any case, the dispute for which Section 30
can be invoked shall remain confined only
(i) as to the apportionment of the amount
of compensation or any part thereof, or
(ii) as to the persons to whom the amount
of compensation (already determined) or
any part thereof is payable. The State
claiming on the basis of a pre-existing
right would not be a "person interested",
as already pointed out hereinabove and
on account of its right being pre-existing,
the State, in such a case, would not be
entitled to invoke either Section 18 or
Section 30 seeking determination of its
alleged pre-existing right. A right accrued
or
devolved
post-award
may
be
determined in a reference under Section
30 depending on the Collector's discretion
to show indulgence, without any bar as to
limitation. Alternatively, such a right may
be left open by the Collector to be
adjudicated upon in any independent
legal proceedings. This view is just, sound
and logical as a title post-award could
not have been canvassed up to the date of
the award and should also not be left
without remedy by denying access to
Section 30. Viewed from this angle,
Sections 18 and 30 would not overlap and
would have fields to operate independent
of each other."

31. From the perusal of the
principles extracted above, it is clearly
brought out that a reference under Section
18 of the old Act is only available to a
person interested. A person who is either
personally present before the Special
Land Acquisition Officer or through a
representative or to whom a notice is
served subject to meeting the test of
locus-standi, such a person can apply to
the
Collector
within
the
time
so
prescribed in the aforesaid sections to
make a reference.

32. Obviously the basis of title on
which a reference can be sought under
Section 18 , as explained by the Apex
Court, would apparently be on the basis of
a pre-existing title. It has also been clearly
stated that the disputes which can be
referred for reference under Section 18
are
such
disputes
relating
to
(i)
measurement of the land (ii) as to the
amount of compensation (iii) as to the
persons to whom the compensation is
payable (iv) as to the apportionment of
the compensation amongst the persons
interested.
Once
an
application
is
submitted to the Collector which complies
1 All. Rajendra Singh & Anr. Vs. District Magistrate Raebareli & Ors.
1025
with the requirements as set out in Section
18 then it is imperative for the Collector
to make such a reference.

33. The Apex Court in the Case of
Sharda Devi (Supra) has clearly held that
the Collector does not have the power to
withhold the reference nor does he has
any discretion in the matter whether the
dispute raised has any merit or not and the
same has to be left for the determination
of the Court.

34. Applying the principles as laid down
by the Apex Court and considering the fact
that as far as the present writ petitioners are
concerned, they have been claiming title in
respect of the property in question on the basis
of inheritance, having succeeded to the estate
of Late Raja Uday Raj Singh. Though, the
acquisition notice under Section 4 was dated
12.06.2013 whereas the rights claimed by the
writ petitioners accrued to them upon the
death of Late Raja Uday Raj Singh who
expired on 13.05.1976. Thus, in so far as the
dispute of succession and inheritance is
concerned, the same accrued to the parties in
the year 1976 i.e. prior to the date of
notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act and thus it can safely be said
that as far as the rights agitated by the writ
petitioners is concerned the same was a preexisting right and is not a right which has
accrued to them post the notification or
making of the award.

35. From the perusal of the record, it
is also clearly reflected that the dispute is
in respect of who is entitled to the
compensation since the respondent no. 3
claims that he is the only successor of
Late Raja Uday Raj Singh, therefore, the
compensation should be paid to him,
alone. Whereas the writ petitioners of
W.P. No. 174 (LA) of 2015 submit that
they along with their mother Smt. Pushpa
Devi have a right. On the other hand, Smt.
Pushpa Devi who is the writ petitioner of
W.P. No. 175 (LA) of 2015 claims to be
the exclusive owner, having succeeded to
the entire estate of Late Raja Uday Raj
Singh on the basis of a registered Will
dated 15.04.1969. It is also not disputed
that there is a bitter litigation between the
parties, inasmuch as, the respondent no. 3
has also challenged the paternity of the
petitioners of W.P. No. 174 (LA) of 2015.

36. From the record it reveals that
prior to the date of the passing of the
award, the petitioners had already made
an application before the Special Land
Acquisition
Officer
registering
their
objections including the fact that they had
staked their claims by means of their
objections dated 13.06.2014. The record
also indicates that the Special Land
Acquisition Officer had even called for
the documents from the writ petitioners to
substantiate their case and in furtherance
thereof the writ petitioners had submitted
their affidavits bringing on record the
documents in support of their claims.
Once these claims were before the Special
Land Acquisition Officer who himself
had issued notices dated 05.08.2014 to the
parties concerned, a copy of which has
been annexed as Annexure No. 10 to the
writ petition, then in the aforesaid
circumstance,
the
Special
Land
Acquisition
Officer
ought
to
have
considered the same while passing the
award dated 25.07.2015, however, the
record would indicate that while passing
the award there was no discussion or even
reference to the respective and conflicting
claims of the parties.

37. Significantly, the respondent no.
2 again by means of his notice dated
1026 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
17.08.2015 (post passing of the award)
again issued notices and required the writ
petitioners and the parties to submit their
documents/evidence. The writ petitioners
once again submitted their applications
which have been brought on record, a
copy of which is Annexure no. 14 and
Annexure No. 15 of the writ petition.
Thus, from the above, the fact which
cannot be disputed is that the matter in
dispute
regarding
the
payment
of
compensation was
alive before the
respondent no. 2. It was a dispute which
had been raised by the parties clearly
referrable under Section 18 of the old Act
equivalent to Section 64 of the new Act.

38. It is also not in dispute that the writ
petitioners and the respondent no. 3, all were
present before the Special Land Acquisition
Officer even prior to the making of the award
and had been agitating their claims. Once
their claims were present with the Special
Land Acquisition Officer who did not
consider the same at the time of making an
award and himself required the parties to
appear before him in the month of August,
2015 and required the petitioners to submit
their documents in respect of the respective
claims which was done by the writ
petitioners. Thus, under these circumstances,
it was not open for the Collector to have
entered into the merits of the disputes and as
per the dictum of the Apex Court in the case
of Sharda Devi, the Collector was obliged to
refer the disputes for adjudication to the
Court. It was not open for the Collector to
withhold the reference nor was it open for
him to entertain the same on its merit and
find out whether the dispute so raised by any
party had any merit or not.

39. Under these circumstances, the
only inescapable conclusion that can be
drawn is that the respondent no. 2 exceeded
his jurisdiction by delving into the merit of
the disputes while passing the impugned
order dated 28.09.2015. Thus, this Court has
no hesitation to hold that the respondent no.
2 did not have the jurisdiction to delve into
the merits of the disputes raised by the
parties and consequently the only option left
with the respondent no. 2 was to have
referred the dispute for adjudication to the
competent Court. The first question is
answered accordingly.

40.